

**Selected
Annual Proceedings
of the**

**Florida
Conference
of
Historians**



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Daytona Beach, FL**

**April 15-17, 1999
Fort Meyers, FL**

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**Selected
Annual Proceedings
of the**

***Florida
Conference
of
Historians***

Editors of:

*Selected Annual Proceedings
of the
Florida Conference of Historians*

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Tallahassee Community College**

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Letter From the Editors

Accomplishment and Astonishment. It is with a combination of these emotions that we present the Florida Conference of Historians Selected Annual Proceedings for 1998-1999. A sense of accomplishment for helping to continue the excellent tradition of the Florida Conference of Historians. A feeling of astonishment for how quickly time passes. This is our fifth and final year as the editors of the Annual Proceedings. We have edited three volumes, two of them combined: Volumes 3/4, 1995-1996; Volume 5, 1997 and Volumes 6/7, 1998-1999. The fine tradition of quality for which the FCH is known allowed us to fill the Annual Proceedings with well-written papers. This made our job the more easier and enjoyable and to you all we extend a well-deserved thank you.

We have enjoyed our time as editors and sincerely believe that we have developed a closer relationship with the FCH membership. Again, for that we thank you. We hope the membership continues to support the Annual Proceedings by submitting their papers for publication and following the submission guidelines of the new editor, Irvin Solomon of Florida Gulf Coast University. We wish Irvin well. May he enjoy himself and your support as much as we did.

As is usual we are responsible for all editing errors contained within and will gladly blame each other for any you may encounter

Will Benedicks
Kyle Eidahl

Tallahassee, Florida
December, 1999

Thomas M. Campbell Award

The Florida Conference of Historians announces the inauguration of the Thomas M. Campbell Award for the best paper presented in the Annual Proceedings.

Thomas Campbell, (Tom) was the driving force behind the creation of the Florida Conference of Historians, at that time called The Florida College Teachers of History, over 30 years ago. It was his personality and hard work that kept the conference moving forward. Simply put, in the early years he *was* the conference.

Tom was a professor of U.S. Diplomatic History and a fellow student and close friend of George C. Herring. It is with the monetary support of George C. Herring that this award is possible. And so, the Thomas M. Campbell Award is in his name so that we may recognize and remember his efforts on behalf of the Florida Conference of Historians.

Florida Conference of Historians

1998 Annual Program

Hosted by
Paul Edson

Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University
Daytona Beach Florida

Thursday, March 12

7:00-10:00 P.M.

Registration & Reception: River Room

Friday, March 13

7:00-8:00

Breakfast Coastal Room

8:45-10:00

Registration Main Lobby

8:45-9:45

1A. Asia and the West in the 20th Century

Chair: Blaine Browne, Broward Community College

"Baptism of Fire: The Yangjiang Incident of November 1927: The Maryknoll Mission Enterprise and the Chinese Nationalist Revolution of 1925-1927"

Paul Rivera, Florida Gulf Coast University

"Japan and Italy Squabble Over Ethiopia: The Sugimura Affair of July 1935"

J. Clarke, Jacksonville University

Discussant: Blaine Browne, Broward Community College

1B. History of Utopias

Chair: Frank Baglione, Tallahassee Community College

“Precis Harmony Society and Jacksonian America”

Lemuel Molovinsky, Broward Community College

“An Untapped Historical Legacy: The Koreshan Unity’s Guide Star Publishing House”

Irvin D. Solomon, Florida Gulf Coast University

Discussant: Frank Baglione, Tallahassee Community College

10:00–11:30

2A. American Foreign Policy

Chair: Will Benedicks, Tallahassee Community College

“John Foster Dulles and the Japanese Peace Treaty”

Philip Cantrell, West Virginia University

“Historical Analogies and American Foreign Policy Waltraud”

Quiser Morales, University of Central Florida

“The U.S. Origins of the South Asian ‘Green Revolution’”

Eric Strahorn, Florida Gulf Coast University

Discussant: Will Benedicks, Tallahassee Community College

2B. Religion and the Military in the Ancient and Early Modern Era

Chair: David B. Mock, Tallahassee Community College

“Atum’s Progeny: The Development and Influence of Ancient Egyptian Theologies”

Frank Baglione, Tallahassee Community College

“Elizabethan Maranos Exposed”

Charlie Meyers, Independent Scholar

“Army Unity and the March on London, March to August, 1647”

Stan Carpenter, Florida State University

Discussant: David B. Mock, Tallahassee Community College

1:30-3:15

**3A. Planting the seeds of interest:
Teaching the Introductory History Survey Course**

Chair: Robinson Herrera, Florida State University

“Using the American History Survey Course to Teach Students to “Think Historically”

Larry Youngs, Georgia State University

“Losing Tarzan Forever: Rethinking the Presentation of African History”

David R. Campbell, Michigan State University

“Beyond Generals and Presidents: Natives, Africans, Women and People of Mixed Descent in the Latin American Survey Course”

Robinson Herrera, Florida State University

“Surveying Student Interest: A Project Undertaken by the Florida State University History Department”

Robert Cassanello, Florida State University Daniel S. Murphree, Florida State University

Discussant: Robinson Herrera, Florida State University

**3B. The Smart Classroom: Students and the Integration of Technology
into Florida Gulf Coast University**

Chair: Irvin D. Solomon, Florida Gulf Coast University

“Meeting the Challenge: Fulfilling Florida Gulf Coast University’s Mandate for Technology and History”

Irvin D. Solomon, Florida Gulf Coast University

“The Promises and Challenges of Technology and History”

Eric Strahorn, Florida Gulf Coast University

“The Florida Gulf Coast University Experience: New Trends in History and Pedagogy”

Jackie Kent, Florida Gulf Coast University

Discussant: David B. Mock, Tallahassee Community College

3:30-4:45

4A. 20th Century Florida

Chair: **Jackie Kent**, Florida Gulf Coast University

“Like a Comet’: Claude Pepper in the 1929 Florida State Legislature”

Joe Guttman, University of Virginia

“Fighting Fascists in the Sunshine State: Bishop Joseph P. Hurley”

Charles Gallagher, Diocese of St. Augustine

“Breaking the Bank: Darkness at the Sunshine State Bank”

Melissa Soldani, Florida State University

Discussant: **Jackie Kent**, Florida Gulf Coast University

4B. U.S. Civil War

Chair: **Irvin D. Solomon**, Florida Gulf Coast University

“Bitterly Against Us’: Slave and Free Black Women in Florida”

Tracy J. Revels, Wofford College

“Captain J. J. Dickinson and Partisan Operations in Florida, 1864-1865”

David Coles, Florida State Archives and Tallahassee Community College

Discussant: **Irvin D. Solomon**, Florida Gulf Coast University

6:30-7:30

Banquet

Speaker, **George C. Herring**, Department of History University of Kentucky

“Missed Opportunities? A Participant’s Reflections on the June, 1997, Hanoi Conference on the Vietnamese-American War”

Saturday March 14

8:45-10:30

5A. Historical Research Teaching and the Internet

Chair: **J. Clarke**, Jacksonville University

"An Interpretive Framework for Understanding Florida History"

William Marina, Florida Atlantic University

"New Historicism: A Useful Multi-disciplinary Method"

Donna Barbie, Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University

"Problems in Researching and Instructing Irish History"

Dennis Rubini, Temple University

Discussant: **J. Clarke**, Jacksonville University

5B. Modern History

Chair: **David Richards**, Lake City Community College

"How Aviation Shrank the World Around 1960"

J. Roger Osterholm, Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University

"Moldava's Prospects for Continued Independence in Light of Her History and Current Situation"

Thomas Hegarty, University of Tampa

Discussant: **David Richards**, Lake City Community College

10:45-12:00

6A. Military History

Chair: **David Proctor**, North Florida Community College

"Controlling the Grand Armée: Napoleonic Regimental Administration, 1806-1812"

Everett Dague, Florida State University

"Fighting to Win: The Life and Service of General James Van Fleet"

Paul F Braim, Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University

Discussant: **David Proctor**, North Florida Community College

6B. The Japanese-American Connection

Chair: H. Donald Kirkland, Lake City Community College

“Yellow and Black: Japanese Influence on American Blacks Before World War II”

Josh Lewin, Jacksonville University

“The Assimilation of Japanese Americans Since World War II”

Kazuo Yagami, Florida State University

Discussant: H. Donald Kirkland, Lake City Community College

Florida Conference of Historians

1999 Annual Program

Hosted by
Irvin D. Solomon

Florida Gulf Coast University
Fort Meyers, Florida

Thursday, April 15

4:30 - 7:30 P.M.
Registration

7:30 - 9:30 P.M.
Mixer

Friday, April 16

8:30 - 10:00 A.M.

Royal Meeting Room: American History Through a Different Lens

Chair: Roy I. Mumme, Florida Gulf Coast University

"Confederate Ersatz, Villainous Salt-Petre, Ladies of Selma: Rejuvenating Civil War History Through the Black, Gray, and Blue Humor of Johnny Reb and Billy Yank"
Roy I. Mumme, Florida Gulf Coast University

"The Uses of History: Four Narratives of the Pequot War of 1637"
Blaine T. Browne, Broward Community College

"The Forgotten Migration: U.S. African-American Emigration in the Americas"
E. Valerie Smith, Florida Gulf Coast University

Discussant: Gordon Patterson, Florida Institute of Technology

Sabal Meeting Room: The Internationalization of History and Memory

Chair: Anna M. Dempsey, James Madison University

“The New York Times and Yasir Arafat, 1988-1996”

John J. McTague, Saint Leo College

“Filming German History and Memory: Three Movies by Michael Verhoeven”

Katrin Paehler, The American University

“Historic Memory and German Cultural Identity: Anselm Kiefer and Rejuvenated Explorations of German History”

Anna M. Dempsey, James Madison University

“Democratic Italy and the Allies: From the ‘Ashes of Disgrace’ to Equality in NATO, 1943-50s”

Marco Rimanelli, Saint Leo College

Discussant: Susan A. Eacker, Morehead State University

**Queen Meeting Room: Ancient Greece and Rome:
Theoretical Articulation of Character, Daring, and Images**

Chair: Jeffrey L. Miller, Florida Institute of Technology

“Democratic Characteristics of Democracy: Liberty’s Relationship to Equality and Freedom of Speech in Ancient Athens”

Jeffrey L. Miller, Florida Institute of Technology

“Constraints on Command: An Analysis of the Restrictions and Limitations of Logistics, Military Intelligence and Battlefield Selection Imposed on Roman Military Commanders during the Second Punic War”

Rodney Earl Walton, Florida International University

“Ship Frescoes in the Temple of Isis in Pompeii”

Wilma Lovejoy, Edison Community College

Discussant: Alana Cain Scott, Morehead State University

10:30 - Noon

Royal Meeting Room: New Interpretations of Florida's Past

Chair: Susan A. Eacker, Morehead State University

"Harriet Beecher Stowe's Private Life and Public Letters in Postbellum Florida"

Susan A. Eacker, Morehead State University

"Victory from Defeat: Claude Pepper and the Florida Senatorial Election of 1934"

Joseph Allen Guttman, University of Virginia

"The Origins of Mosquito Control in Florida: The Creation of the Florida Anti-Mosquito Association"

Gordon Patterson, Florida Institute of Technology

"History Used, Confused, or Abused: Recollections of Thomas A. Edison's Affiliation With the Town of Fort Myers, Florida"

Irvin D. Solomon, Florida Gulf Coast University

Discussant: Roy I. Mumme, Florida Gulf Coast University

Sabal Meeting Room: The Koreshan State Historic Site and its Significance to Southwest Florida and the Nation

Chair: Jane Munson Hogg, Bonita Springs Historical Society

"Women in the Koreshan Unity"

Jane Munson Hogg, Bonita Springs Historical Society

"Cyrus Teed"

Peter van Russel Hicks, Koreshan State Historic Site

"Koreshan State Historic Site Archives"

Michael Widner, Collier County Public Library

Discussant: Michael P. Musick, National Archives

Queen Meeting Room: Impacting Lives: Florida Voices from the Past

Chair: Anna Mary Dempsey, James Madison University

“Building for the Future--the CCC In Florida”

Julian Pleasants, University of Florida

“An Opportunity to Rectify Possible Omissions’: African-Americans, the University of Miami, and the UBS Protest of 1968”

Aldo Regalado, University of Miami

“The Primary Role of Seminole Slaves in the First Seminole War”

James E. Lake, University of Miami

Discussant: Anna Mary Dempsey, James Madison University

1:30 - 3:00

**Royal Meeting Room: Rejuvenating the Teaching of History:
Trends, Themes, and the Internet**

Chair: Irvin D. Solomon, Florida Gulf Coast University

“Trends in Teaching History at the College Level”

Irvin D. Solomon, Florida Gulf Coast University

“Oldies But Goodies: Rejuvenating the Ancient World History Curriculum”

Alana Cain Scott, Morehead State University

“Is Anybody Teaching History in High School?”

Jean McNary, Zephyrhills High School

“‘One to Speak, Another to Hear’: The Internet and the Preservation of Oral History”

Terry Dugas, Florida Gulf Coast University

Discussant: David B. Mock, Tallahassee Community College

**Sabal Meeting Room: Pre- and Post-Imperial Case Studies:
Expanding Influence and its Residual**

Chair: Edmund Abaka, University of Miami

"Economic Imperialism and British Colonial Policies in the Gold Coast, 1824-1900"

Edmund Abaka, University of Miami

"History of Wildlife Conservation in Post-Colonial India"

Eric Strahorn, Florida Gulf Coast University

"Marriage Alliance: The Union of Two Imperiums, Japan and Ethiopia"

Jay Clark, Jacksonville University

"The United States and Central America: Past, Present, and Future"

Anthony J. Beninati, Valencia Community College

Discussant: Jeff Miller, Florida Institute of Technology

3:30 - 5:00

Sabal Meeting Room: Florida's Unusual Military Heritage

Chair: Robin F. A. Fabel, Auburn University

"Settling Scores on the Fringe: Duels and Dustups in British West Florida"

Robin F. A. Fabel, Auburn University

"Skulkers and Deserters in Florida During the Civil War"

David Stanford Gregory, Florida State University

"The Civilized and the Savage: The Ethical Conduct of the U.S. Army During the Second Seminole War"

David W. Rolfs, Florida State University

Discussant: Blain T. Browne, Broward Community College

**Royal Meeting Room: Special Session:
Workshop on Researching at the National Archives**

Chair: Irvin D. Solomon, Florida Gulf Coast University

Facilitator: Michael P. Musick, The National Archives, Washington, D.C.

“Researching at the National Archives: An Overview and an Examination of Records Relating to Florida History in the Civil War and Reconstruction Period”

Michael P. Musick, Civil War Specialist, National Archives, Washington, D. C.

Judith Z. Thorne, User Services, National Archives, Washington, D. C.

Budge Weidman, Project Manager/Civil War Conservation Corps, National Archives, Washington, D.C.

Discussants: Jane Munson Hogg, Bonita Springs Historical Society

Peter van Russel Hicks, Koreshan State Historic Site

Michael Widner, Collier County Public Library Audience

7:00 - 8:30

Banquet

Mr. Herman O. Bly, J.D., Distinguished Special Agent for the FBI under J. Edgar Hoover, CIA Officer, and author of, *Communism, The Cold War and the FBI Connection*.

“Communism, the Cold War, and the FBI Connection: Time to Set the Record Straight.”

Saturday, April 17

8:30 - 10:00

Royal Meeting Room: Intimate History and the Theme of Connections

Chair: Eric Strahorn, Florida Gulf Coast University

“The Caloosahatchee: One Hundred years of History”

Carolyn Kimes, Florida Gulf Coast University

“Jewish History in the South from Charleston, South Carolina to Savannah, Georgia, to Ft. Myers, Florida”

Timothy L. Chestnut, Barron Collier High School, Naples, Florida

Discussant: Wilma Lovejoy, Edison Community College

**Sabal Meeting Room: The Italo-Ethiopian War of 1935-1936:
Young Historians Explore the Nature and Meaning of Conflict**

Chair: Jay Clark, Jacksonville University

"Ethnic Conflict in America During the Italo-Ethiopian War of 1935-36"

Amber Dearborn, Jacksonville University

"The Italo-Ethiopian War of 1935-36: Chemical Warfare"

Frank Salling, Jacksonville University

"Italy's Use of Aircraft in Ethiopia, 1935-36"

Michael J. Foley, Jacksonville University

"Prelude to Liberation: The Ethiopian Patriot's Struggle Against Italian Imperialism"

Stephen R. DesRosiers, Jacksonville University

Discussant: Jay Clark, Jacksonville University

10:30 - Noon

**Royal Meeting Room: New Interpretations of European History:
Strategies, Results, and Analysis**

Chair: Pascal R. Venier, University of Salford, Manchester, England

"Theophile Delcasse and French Foreign Policy, 1898-1901: Towards a Reinterpretation"

Pascal R. Venier, University of Salford, Manchester, England

"Historical Monuments: A Categorization and Some European Examples"

Paul Edson, Embry-Riddle University

"Wasted Opportunity: The Flanders Harbors and German Naval Strategy, 1914-1916"

Mark Karau, Florida State University

"Kleinkrieg or Sitzkrieg: The Marine Korps Flandern and German Naval Policy, 1914-15"

Jerrett Phipps, Tallahassee Community College

Comment: David B. Mock, Tallahassee Community College

11:30 - Noon

**Sabal Meeting Room: Special Session. Creating Historical Monuments:
The Completion of the Southernmost Monument to the Federal Service of Black
Soldiers (the USCT) in Fort Myers, Florida**

**D. J. Wilkins Distinguished Sculptor and Creator of Numerous Nationally Acclaimed
Works North Fort Myers**

John Foster Dulles and the Japanese Peace Treaty

Phillip A. Cantrell, II
West Virginia University

John Foster Dulles, born on February 25, 1888 in Watertown, New York, is best known for his service as President Eisenhower's Secretary of State from 1952 until his death by cancer in 1959. During his term as Secretary of State and after his death, Dulles was known for his stern anti-Communism, and his frequently bellicose speeches often generated considerable alarm, especially in light of Eisenhower's doctrine of massive retaliation. Dulles was, in Richard Challener's words, "...a stern Presbyterian who thundered endlessly about the evils of atheistic communism."¹

John Foster, as Secretary of State, fully accepted the containment doctrine and saw the world as two armed camps. The United States was the embodiment of good and the Soviets were evil incarnate. In 1958, Reinhold Niebuhr observed of Dulles' character, "Mr. Dulles' moral universe makes everything quite clear, too clear... For self-righteousness is the inevitable fruit of simple moral judgments, placed in the service of moral complacency."² Dulles' impassioned speeches about the evils of world communism seemed to be the righteous diatribes of a political evangelist who was fusing a dangerous new nationalism with an old-time religion.

My purpose here, however, is to bring to light a different John Foster Dulles, by examining the origins of his arguably progressive approach to the Japanese Peace Settlement of 1951. I will call to attention several of the early influences on John Foster Dulles, including his upbringing and his experience at the Versailles Peace Conference following the First World War. I particularly wish to look at the influence of the Nobel Prize-winning French philosopher Henri Bergson, who, I argue, heavily influenced many of Dulles' early ideas on diplomacy and world affairs. Dulles' pre-Cold

¹Richard D. Challener, "The Moralist as Pragmatist: John Foster Dulles as Cold War Pragmatist", *The Diplomats, 1939-1979*, Gordon A. Craig and Francis L. Loewenheim, eds. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 135.

²Reinhold Niebuhr, "The Moral World of John Foster Dulles" *New Republic* (December 1, 1958), 8.

War progressivism has received insufficient attention thus far and the picture that emerges of John Foster is one of a man considerably more complex and open-minded than his later reputation suggests.

Regardless of his public image in the 1950s, Dulles was not a religious fundamentalist early in life, nor was he throughout most of it. Dulles' father was a Presbyterian of a more moderate persuasion, even to the point of being considered a liberal in his day. Michael Guhin writes, "...several passages in Reverend Dulles' major theological work, *The True Church*, suggest that he was basically a church moderate with at least three important inclinations toward a liberal theological viewpoint."³ Certainly young John Foster was raised in a rigorous and conservative Presbyterian home. Yet, he was raised to be a theological moderate with an internationalist, worldly out-look. The moderate teachings of his father and the influences of his elder statesman grandfather, John Watson Foster, made deep and long-lasting impressions on the young man.

When John Foster was an accomplished lawyer at the age of thirty-six, his moderate theological leanings were made evident at the 1924 Presbyterian General Assembly. The fundamentalist Presbyterian core, led by no lesser a figure than William Jennings Bryan, was attempting to excommunicate Dr. Harry Fosdick. Fosdick had disputed the validity of the Virgin birth, and Reverend Dulles sent his son to defend Dr. Fosdick and the modernist position. John Foster engaged in a series of shrewd parliamentary maneuvers and the modernists won the day.

Dulles' road to becoming an accomplished lawyer began at Princeton, where his early college career had progressed uneventfully. Dulles struggled with grammar and language arts at first, attesting to the somewhat average education he received at his Watertown schools. Towards the end, however, he began to excel, first earning the Chancellor Green Mental Science Fellowship, giving him a year of study in Europe at the Sorbonne under Henri Bergson. In the end, Dulles decided on a degree in philosophy and was elected to Phi Beta Kappa. Upon graduation, he delivered the valedictory speech, having finished second in his class.

Although he gave consideration to his parent's wishes for him to enter the ministry, he chose the path of his grandfather. As he grew older, Dulles became increasingly impressed by the examples set by John Watson Foster and his uncle, Robert Lansing. At Princeton he had also discovered his own sympathies for many of the views espoused by then university president, Woodrow Wilson. An early stepping stone in his career was in 1907, when he was granted leave from Princeton to participate in the Second Hague Conference.

His grandfather was a delegate for the Imperial Government of China and used his position to secure a secretaryship for John Foster. At the young age of nineteen, he

³Michael Guhin, *John Foster Dulles: A Statesman and His Times* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972), 13.

proved himself useful with his ability to translate French. His year of study at the Sorbonne came after the conference, during which he immersed himself in French culture and philosophy, taking further courses in international law during his free time.

Upon returning home, Dulles entered the George Washington Law School. Dulles' life in school was far from the normal life led by law students. Living with his influential grandfather in a large patrician house in downtown Washington, Dulles was a frequent guest at White House parties where he quickly became friends with President William Howard Taft's two sons, Robert and Charles. Completing the three year curriculum in two while engaging in an active Washington social life, Dulles exhibited the energy that later characterized his diplomatic and political life. Though he never actually received a degree on technical grounds, he passed the New York State Bar in 1911.

The coming of World War I, in 1914, brought another chance for Dulles to work in a diplomatic capacity. Dulles' uncle, Robert Lansing, who was now the Secretary of State under President Wilson, chose him for a confidential mission to Central America. The crux of the mission was to insure that the Central American governments would side with the United States when the inevitable entry into World War I came.

Upon the completion of his mission, Dulles served for the duration of the war as a military lawyer on the War Industries Board, his eyesight barring him from combat. He rose to the rank of major and, at the war's end, received tributes for his service from both Vance McCormick and Bernard Baruch. Dulles' exemplary service, experience, and family connections, particularly that of Robert Lansing, earned him an invitation to accompany the American delegation to the Paris Peace Conference as an economic and legal expert. Dulles served in many capacities at the Conference, but was noted most highly for being a representative on the Reparations Committee under Bernard Baruch and Vance McCormick.

His influence at the Conference continued to grow, as Michael Guhin points out, for although he officially served only as counsel to the American Reparations group, he quickly became its principal spokesman and writer.⁴ Moreover, Dulles agreed with the other American delegates that French and British demands on Germany were preposterous and would serve only to create a dangerous European dilemma in the future. Though he labored with distinction to forge compromises and statement revisions, Dulles' efforts were in vain. Despite John Maynard Keynes' declaration that the British and French arguments for reparations inclusive of war costs were "...overwhelmed by the speeches made on behalf of the American delegates by Mr. John Foster Dulles"⁵, the victors gathered the spoils at Versailles while Wilson returned home to fight his own political battles. Dulles remained in Paris for a short time at Wilson's behest before returning in 1920 to his law practice, where he continued to take an

⁴Ibid, 27.

⁵Quoted in Guhin, 29.

active interest in issues related to the reparations settlement.

Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, John Foster continued in a legal career at the Wall Street firm, Sullivan and Cromwell, rising to senior partner and building a comfortable lifestyle for his family. He maintained an active interest in diplomacy and world politics as well, taking part where occasion saw fit. During this period Dulles more fully developed his thoughts on international relations and solidified the ideas that preoccupied him in the years leading up to World War II. Again, the picture that emerges is strikingly different from the one that later generations developed.

In terms of global politics, Dulles preoccupied himself mainly with the pursuit of peaceful change and the avoidance of war. After Versailles, and generated in large part by the spirit he found at Versailles, Dulles rejected ideological nationalism. In his major writing from the period, *War, Peace and Change*, Dulles called for an abandonment of the tendency to "identify one's personified state with deity and the other national personality with evil."⁶ In Dulles' world view, nationalism must give way to internationalism, driven by *enlightened* national self-interest. Conflict and, ultimately war, is brought on by uncompromising nationalism to the exclusion of international realities, a situation he no doubt observed both prior to and present at the frustrating Versailles conference.

Moreover, to Dulles, greed was not necessarily the engine that drove destructive nationalism. The original sin was the desire to preserve the national status quo, no matter what the cost. Dulles was compelled to write in 1935:

The true explanation of the imminence of war lies in the inevitability of change and the fact that peace efforts have been misdirected toward the prevention of change. Thereby forces which are in the long run irresistible are temporarily dammed up. When they finally break through, they do so with violence.⁷

Thus, change, on a global scale, was and is inevitable. For Dulles, change had to be accepted because of what he called the on-going struggle between the forces of the static and dynamic. Dulles defined the static forces as people and nations who were, because of power or wealth, content with their national or world situation. The dynamic was summed up as the forces of change that sought to improve an existing situation or to correct some perceived injustice in their past.

Disagreement and conflict arose when the static forces perceived change as threatening to their largely satisfied state of being. The dynamic forces fueled the threat by placing blame on the static nations of the world for the inequalities that existed. Numerous historians have argued that John Foster Dulles left no creative legacy on foreign policy matters. However, the record speaks otherwise. In 1943, in the midst of World War II, Dulles was warning that "cooperation between a dynamic and a static

⁶Quoted in Guhin, 40.

⁷John Foster Dulles, "The Road to Peace" *Atlantic Monthly* (October 1935), 492.

power is impossible, and that peace demands constant readjustment."⁸ Many scholars have argued that Dulles' ideas originated in the 1920s or '30 or possibly at the Versailles Conference. Rather, to locate the genesis of Dulles' ideas one must look to his experience in Paris after the Second Hague Conference, where he encountered Henri Bergson and was "impressed with his theories of flux, of the irresistible force of change in human affairs."⁹ Bergson's theories revolved primarily around the concept of perception versus reality in terms of movement and change. For Bergson, and consequently for his students, change and movement are constant and unstoppable.

In *Matter and Memory*, Bergson wrote, "Movement is...an indisputable reality...that there is real motion no one can seriously deny."¹⁰ Dulles later applied Bergson's thinking on human nature to the realm of politics. Bergson asked the question, "Whence comes then the irresistible tendency to set up a material universe that is discontinuous, composed of bodies which have clearly defined outlines..."¹¹ Dulles seized upon Bergson's ideas of change and, from there, fashioned his own theory of the static and the dynamic. John Foster preoccupied himself with how to reconcile these two forces in such a way as to avoid international conflict and war.

Moreover, because the forces in question were always in motion with new demands encountering the same rigidities, any solution had to be viewed, of necessity, as temporary. Any treaty that sought to preserve a given situation indefinitely was worthless in the long term. Notably, only seven years after the implementation of the Japanese Peace Treaty, Dulles himself was recommending that it be changed to account for an altered situation in the Far East. Dulles believed the best prospect for world peace was an international body that would exclude no nation based on its political system or ideology and would seek to recognize the legitimate and enlightened aspirations of change for its member nations.

Looking back to Versailles as an example, Dulles recognized that an industrious and historically dynamic nation like Germany could not be restrained indefinitely by a series of clauses, myopically written by the present victors at Paris. In 1935, Dulles wrote, "It was recognized, even at Versailles, that a nation such as Germany could not be placed in perpetuity in a position of inequality and inferiority."¹² Such an observation leads one to believe that the victors at Versailles, having recognized it themselves, may have sought even harder to keep Germany restrained.

In the world view that John Foster had developed, Bergson's theory of flux in human affairs had to be allowed for in the final settlement. At Versailles, it was not.

⁸"Dulles Points Out Russian Dynamism", *New York Times*, October 15, 1943.

⁹Ronald W. Pruessen, "John Foster Dulles and the Predicaments of Power", *John Foster Dulles and the Diplomacy of the Cold War*, Richard Immerman, ed. (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1990), 23.

¹⁰Henri Bergson, *Matter and Memory* (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1912), 254-255.

¹¹*Ibid.*, 260.

¹²Dulles, "The Road to Peace", 495.

Rather, at Versailles, Dulles recognized that the victors were trying to deny the inevitable changes demanded by the European situation; in effect, pushing Europe backwards to the same divisions that had led to war in the first place. In Clemenceau and Lloyd George, Bergson's lament was fulfilled. Bergson noted, "...are we likely to gain a nearer knowledge of things by pushing the divisions yet further? In this way we do indeed prolong the vital movement; but we turn our back upon true knowledge."¹³ As Europe began to stumble into war in 1936, Dulles viewed the events and divisions of the day as a "struggle between the dynamic and the static—the urge to acquire and the desire to retain."¹⁴ The resulting tension historically led to war. Being that change is unavoidable, it was more in the national interest to accommodate such change, rather than go to war.

Throughout the period and during the Second World War, Dulles remained conciliatory and moderate in his stance. He embraced neither political party at this time and worked for bipartisan solutions and peace settlements in the form of a body such as would become the United Nations. Though he did not absolve the leadership of Germany and Japan from responsibility for their actions, he also placed some measure of blame for the Second World War on the mindset of the Allies.

The system of rigid national sovereignty, as evidenced at Versailles, accounted for the war. The desire to maintain the status quo was the original sin. Rather than punish the defeated and return the world to its pre-World War I state, had the victors at Versailles sought to reconcile the forces of the static and forces of dynamism that were becoming apparent in the twentieth century, the crisis of 1939 may have been avoided.

Moreover, while no supporter of isolationism, Dulles originally opposed American intervention on the grounds that it would identify America with the "senseless repetition of the cyclical struggle between the dynamic and static forces of the world."¹⁵ Needless to say, Dulles received no small measure of criticism for his perceived complacency toward the Nazi abuses that Europe was becoming painfully familiar with. Michael Guhin observed, "...because of his detached viewpoint, [Dulles] seriously misjudged the real dangers of Hitler's Germany and manifested less sensitivity than many of his contemporaries."¹⁶

In the years after the war, as in the years before the war, Dulles operated in and out of both Republican and Democrat circles. Because of his foreign policy his views, Dulles was more closely identified with the moderate, internationally inclined wing of the Republican party. Yet, even as late as 1949, "Dulles was not really considered a 'party man' and, in some Republican circles, was viewed as a crypto-Democrat", especially when President Truman asked Dulles to be a delegate to the United Nations

¹³Bergson, 262.

¹⁴Townsend Hoopes, *The Devil and John Foster Dulles* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1973), 46.

¹⁵Quoted in Hoopes, 52.

¹⁶Guhin, 47.

from 1946 until 1948.¹⁷ His relative popularity with Truman's administration was made evident again in 1951 when President Truman asked him to takeover the long dormant negotiations for a peace treaty with Japan.¹⁸

Japan had been under U.S. Occupation since the end of the war, dutifully administered by Douglas MacArthur and SCAP. When the decision was made by the Truman administration to negotiate a formal peace settlement, the Occupation had been dragging on for five years, with the U.S. seemingly in no hurry vacate Japan. In his memoirs, Yoshida Shigeru, prime minister and foreign minister in 1950, noted that the delay in negotiating a settlement only benefited Japan and his reference point was Versailles. Yoshida writes, "The basic factor that guided our approach to peace was that unlike the Versailles Peace Conference, the conference that would be held this time would not be one in which victor and vanquished came together to discuss the terms of peace."¹⁹ His rationale was that by delaying the settlement, Japan would get much more favorable terms.

Several considerations were driving the U.S. to finalize a settlement. The "Long Peace", as John Lewis Gaddis describes it, had become considerably *less* peaceful since 1945. Tensions with the Soviet Union had escalated dramatically, especially as America's nuclear monopoly ended in 1949. Mao's forces had driven the Nationalists from China in the same year. The Iron Curtain had fallen on Europe and Korea itself was divided in 1950, with war soon to follow. Regional alliances and economies needed to be shored-up.

Moreover, Japan itself needed internal stability and a better relationship with the U.S. Truman's administration was receiving reports from men like Alex Pendleton. Pendleton was a retired naval officer who, in 1950, was still living in Japan and running a law practice. In August, 1950, Pendleton submitted a confidential report to the White House condemning SCAP policies and arguing that, contrary to news reports, "...Japan would overwhelmingly go communist rather than submit to a continuation of the present American policies."²⁰ If reports such as Pendleton's were taken seriously, Truman's administration was forced to act. The White House and the Democrats could not afford another loss to communism. Japan needed to be strengthened, liberated, and welcomed into the Western family of nations as an equal, not a defeated foe.

John Foster Dulles was chosen to be the White House's special representative in the negotiations for numerous reasons but, as the final settlement with Japan revealed, Dulles was the ideal candidate. His beliefs about diplomacy and relations among nations were enlightened and progressive, dating back to his days as a student

¹⁷Ibid, 52.

¹⁸Challener, 139.

¹⁹Yoshida Shigeru, *The Yoshida Memoirs* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1962), 246.

²⁰The Papers of Harry S Truman, The President's Secretary's Files, Foreign Affairs Series, Box 182, File "Japan". Harry S Truman Presidential Library, Independence, Missouri.

of Bergson. His experiences at Versailles reinforced what he was already beginning to believe, and those lessons were applied in Tokyo in 1950–51. Dulles stated in a preliminary meeting with the Soviet representative in October, 1950 that "...the U.S. attitude toward a treaty with Japan was based on the theory that the best way to assure Japan's adherence to peaceful ways was to conclude with her a non-restrictive and liberal peace treaty."²¹ The agreement reached in 1951 does indeed reflect U.S. aims, carried out and bore to fruition by John Foster Dulles.

²¹Truman Papers, The President's Secretary's Files, Box 117, File "D". HST Library.

Japan and Italy Squabble over Ethiopia: the Sugimura Affair of July 1935

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Few today appreciate the crucial role that the Italo-Ethiopian War of 1935 and 1936 played in interwar diplomacy—followed as it was by the climactic events in China, Spain, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and the Second World War itself.

In truth, the Italo-Ethiopian War presaged the coming conflagration in significant ways, and Ethiopians, for their part, consider their lost war as the opening salvo of World War II. For the Soviets, in many ways the most perspicacious observers of the international scene in the mid-1930s, the war destroyed all hope for their original conception of Collective Security. They had sought to stitch together Britain, France, and Italy, with Rome's allies (Hungary and Austria) and Paris' allies (Romania, Czechoslovak, and Yugoslavia). This net would ensnare Germany so tightly as to prevent Hitler from taking even the first step toward aggression. Moscow's Collective Security also sought to unite Britain, France, Italy, China, and the United States against Japan's encroachments on the Asian continent.¹ For Germany, the war offered the first opportunity to wedge Italy apart from the other powers sufficiently to allow room for maneuver. For millions of black Africans and their diaspora throughout the New World, the war became a central rallying cry for their assertions of national independence and personal freedom.² For Italian Fascists, the war seemed to presage the recreation of Rome—although a mere five years later it meant only that this outpost of an overextended imperial regime became the first loss of Axis conquests. At the same time, Italy's anti-Fascists saw Ethiopia's guerrilla war against occupation as

¹J. Calvitt Clarke III, *Russia and Italy Against Hitler: The Bolshevick-Fascist Rapprochement of the 1930s* (New Haven, CT, 1991), esp. 163–84.

²See, e.g., William R. Scott, *The Sons of Sheba's Race: African-Americans and the Italo-Ethiopian War, 1935–1941* (Bloomington, 1993); Joseph E. Harris, *African-American Reactions to War in Ethiopia, 1936–1940* (Baton Rouge, 1994); and S. K. B. Asante, *Pan-African Protest: West Africa and the Italo-Ethiopian Crisis, 1934–1941* (London, 1977).

the first blow in Italy's Resistance Movement after 1943.³

Ethiopians do not use family names and commonly go only by their first names; when necessary, they will also use their father's first name. This paper will cite Ethiopian names according to Ethiopian practice, i.e, first name, then father's first name. Japanese, on the other hand, use their family first. Again, this paper will conform to Japanese practice, i.e., family name, then first name.

For Japan, the war marked a diplomatic *volte face* and the first step toward an alliance with Germany and Italy. The Sugimura Affair was the yeast in that diplomatic brew.

As Italy's dispute with Ethiopia grew during 1934 and 1935, Japan's leading nationalists, particularly "Pan-Asianists," promoted a "solidarity movement" with Ethiopia. Between 1927 and 1937, some 634 right-wing groups with 122,000 members were organized in Japan. These nationalists exalted the emperor above the constitution, and seeking "Renovation" they wanted to create a "National Defense State."⁴

For more on Japanese attitudes toward Ethiopia, see Okakura Takashi and Kitagawa Katsuhiko, *Nihon-Afurika Koryu-shi: Meiji-ki kara Dainiji Sekaitaisen-ki made* [Japanese-African Relations: From the Meiji Period to the Second World War] (Tokyo, 1993), 18-23 and Aoki Sumio and Kurimoto Eisei, "Japanese Interest in Ethiopia (1868-1940): Chronology and Bibliography," *Ethiopia in Broader Perspectives*, 1: 713-28. Listing assassination among their weapons to coerce government policy, they

³There is a growing literature on Ethiopian resistance to Italian occupation. See, e.g., the several articles in *Ethiopia in Broader Perspectives: Papers of the XIIIth International Conference of Ethiopian Studies*, 3 vols., Fukui Katsuyoshi and Shigeta Masayoshi (Kyoto, 1997): Alberto Sbacchi, "The Recognition of the Italian Empire 1936-1938," 1: 247-62; Tesema Ta'a, "The Bonayyaa Incident and the Italian Occupation of Naqemtee (1936-1941)," 1: 263-285; and Wudu Tafete Kassu, "Dajjazmac Haylu Kabbada and the Patriotic Resistance Movement in Wag, 1935-41," 1: 97-110. See as well Uoidelul Chelati Dirar, "Italian Colonialism in Walqayt: The Case of Masfen Aeddu," unpublished paper presented to the XIIIth International Conference of Ethiopian Studies, Kyoto, Japan, Dec. 1997; Richard Pankhurst, "Emperor Haile Selassie's Litigation in England to Reassert the Independence of Ethiopia during the Italian Occupation in 1937 and 1938," *Ethiopia Observer* 14 (1971): 3-9; Richard Pankhurst, "The Ethiopian Patriots and the Collapse of Italian Rule in East Africa, 1940-41," *Ethiopia Observer* 12 (1969): 92-127; Richard Pankhurst, "The Ethiopian Patriots: The Lone Struggle, 1936-1940," *Ethiopia Observer* 13 (1970): 40-56; and Egziabher Salome Gabre, "The Ethiopian Patriots, 1936-1941," *Ethiopia Observer* 12 (1969): 63-91.

⁴Furukawa Tetsushi, "Japan's Political Relations with Ethiopia, 1920s-1960s: A Historical Overview," unpublished paper presented to the 35th Annual Meeting of the African Studies Association, Seattle, WA, Nov. 20-23, 1992, 10; Furukawa Tetsushi, "Japanese-Ethiopian Relations in the 1920-30s: The Rise and Fall of 'Sentimental' Relations," paper presented at the 34th Annual Meeting of the African Studies Association, St. Louis, MO, Nov. 1991, 10.

One Renovationist in the Research Division, Nimiya Takeo, wrote a 152-page pamphlet, "The Unique Principles Guiding Japanese Diplomacy." Although influential, it was not officially published until December 1936. Part II of the pamphlet, "The Asian Racial Movement and the Principle of Asia for the Asians," emphasized that an expansionist policy was defensible only if built on racial nationalism. Part III, "The Japanese Racial Spirit as the Guiding Principle of Diplomacy" asserted that traditional Japanese morality, not western imperialism, had to guide expansion. An aggressive diplomacy possibly leading to war was tenable only if based on idealism. The pamphlet demanded the building of a new order in which Japan would assume leadership. Ohata Tokushiro, "The Anti-Comintern Pact, 1935-1939," in James William Morely, *Deterrent Diplomacy: Japan, Germany, and the USSR, 1935-1940*, Selected translations from: *Taiheiyō senso no michi: kaisen gaiko shi* (New York, 1976), 10-15.

became influential within the military and bureaucracy.

A most urgent supporter of Ethiopia was one of the ultranationalist groups, the Amur River Society [*Kokuryu Kai*, often misnamed the "Black Dragon Society" in English]. In June, the *Kokuryu Kai* organized Ethiopian Crisis Committee [*Echiopia Mondai Iinkai*]. Its membership saw the conflict between Italy and Ethiopia as pitting white and colored peoples against one another. Further, Japan was obligated to support Ethiopia which admired, praised, and respected Japan.⁵ Similarly, members of the Japanese-Ethiopian Society [*Nihon Echiopia Kyokai*] and the Great Japanese Turan Youth League [*Dai Nihon Turan Seinen Renmei*] prayed: "We wish the wrongdoings of the whites to be punished, and our friend Ethiopia achieve victory."⁶

Several other nationalist associations supporting Ethiopia were established by October 1935. The Ethiopian Defense Society [*Echiopia Boei Domeikai*] was formed in July and Ethiopian Comrades' Rescue Society [*Echiopia Kyuen Doushikai*] in August. Other nationalist groups such as the Pan-Asianism Society [*Dai Ajia Shugi Kyokai*], the Japan-Turan Association [*Dainihon Tsuran Renmei*], and the Patriotic Youth Association [*Aikoku Seinen Renmei*], strongly supported Ethiopia. The Patriotic Women's Association [*Aikoku Fujin Kai*] offered medical equipment to Ethiopia. Students organized pro-Ethiopian groups in campuses. Furukawa, "Japan's Political Relations," 10-11; Furukawa, Japanese-Ethiopian Relations," 11; *New York Times*, Sept. 22, 1935.

Throughout the world many quickened at the excitement of the coming racial struggle. As just one example, one of America's premier black newspapers, the *Chicago Defender*, breathlessly expected that once war broke out, thousands of highly trained Japanese with modern equipment would "go tramping through African hinterlands to the aid of their darker brothers on the lofty plateaus of Ethiopia." The paper also claimed that the Japanese navy had been conducting deep-sea maneuvers in the Red Sea within easy reach of Mas'uwa and predicted that within a week's notice scores of these "swift relentless cruisers from the third largest navy in the world" would "dump tons of explosives under Mussolini's very nose in Africa."⁷

⁵See Okakura and Kitagawa, *Nihon-Afurika Koryu-shi*, 17-61; Richard Albert Bradshaw, "Japan and European Colonialism in Africa, 1800-1937" (PhD dissertation, Ohio University, 1992), 291-311; and Herui Wolde Selassie, *Dai Nipon* [Great Japan], Forward by Baron Shidehara Kijuro, trans. Oreste Vaccari and Enko Vaccari (Tokyo, 1934). Originally published in Amharic, *Mahidere Birhan: Hagra Japan* [The Document of Japan] (Addis Ababa, 1934). Shidehara was foreign minister between 1924-27 and 1929-31; he served as prime minister from 1945-46. For the perceived similarities between Japan and Ethiopia, see Messay Kebede, "Japan and Ethiopia: An Appraisal of Similarities and Divergent Courses," in *Ethiopia in Broader Perspectives*, 639-51 and Donald N. Levine, "Ethiopia and Japan in Comparative Civilization Perspective," in *Ethiopia in Broader Perspectives*, 1: 652-75. Also see Ishihara Hideko, "First Contacts Between Ethiopia and Japan," unpublished paper presented to the XIIIth International Conference of Ethiopian Studies, Kyoto, Japan, Dec. 1997.

⁶*Turan*, Mar. 1, 1935, no. 4, published by Daido sha, Nihon Echiopia Kyokai and Dai Nihon Turan Seinen Renmei: Record Office (Tokyo) A461 ET/11-2 vol. 1.

⁷*Chicago Defender*, July 13, 1935.

Feeding off such sentiments, the Soviet press reported in February 1935 that the Japanese ambassador in Rome had protested the mobilization of Italian troops and had sharply stated that Japan would "categorically oppose any occupation of Abyssinia." Italy's military action against Ethiopia was, the press said, a demonstration aimed at Japan more than at Ethiopia.⁸ The Soviets, well into 1935, continued with these themes, which unctuously justified Italian belligerence by claiming that Japanese trade inroads into Ethiopia naturally offended Italy.⁹

At odds with its own nationalists, the Japanese *Gaimusho* [foreign ministry] criticized Japan's press and nationalists for their provocative commentary and thereby emphasized the government's moderate position toward Italy. Japan's police kept close track of the pro-Ethiopian activities of the *Kokuryu Kai* and other nationalist groups.¹⁰

Putting an exclamation point to this moderate stance—if that is the right metaphor for denying rumors of interest in a matter—on July 10, 1935, Amau Eiji, a *Gaimusho* spokesman, denied that Emperor Hirohito was contemplating any move to help his brother emperor, Haile Sellassie, and even that Japan had diplomatic representation in Ethiopia. He rejected rumors that Japan was shipping munitions to Ethiopia or that Japan had persuaded Ethiopia to buy Japanese products in preference to Italian. Amau blamed exaggerated notions of Japanese interests in Ethiopia on Soviet sources. He emphasized Japan's determination, however, to protect its commercial interests and added: "We are naturally greatly concerned with any danger of war. War in any part of the world is bound to affect all other parts."¹¹

Following the *Gaimusho's* line, Japan's ambassador to Rome, Dr. Sugimura Yotaro visited Mussolini on Tuesday, July 16, 1935. Not for the first time he assured the Duce that Japan, despite its commercial interests, held no political interests in Ethiopia and would maintain neutrality in Italy's coming war. The Italians publicized this statement as a communique, and Italy's press put the matter plainly: "This solemn statement is the more important as it puts an end to all rumors which have circulated

⁸*Izvestia*, Feb. 14, 1935; *Moscow Daily News*, Feb. 14, 1935.

⁹The Soviets had long tried to stir up Italo-Japanese antagonisms. Long articles in the Russian press at the turn of the year, e.g., had declared that the African state had thus far maintained its independence thanks only to the tripartite Italo-French-British rivalry. But now, the advance of Japanese capital and dumping in Ethiopia threatened all three, and Italy had received tacit support from London and Paris to establish with force the economic privileges which the negus had not voluntarily conceded. *Pravda*, Dec. 16, 1934; *Za industrializatsiu*, Dec. 15, 1934; Attolico to Rome, 12/20/34, 2/16/35; Ministero degli Affari Esteri, Direzione Generale degli Affari Politici, URSS (Rome) [hereafter cited as MAE (Rome) AP URSS] b(usta) 15 f(oglio) 2.

¹⁰*Asahi Shinbun* (Tokyo), July 11, 1935; Oguri to Goto, 6/5/35; Oguri to Goto and Hirota, 7/20/35; Record Office (Tokyo) A461 ET/11-2 vol. 1; *New York Times*, July 11, 1935.

¹¹*Osaka Mainichi & Tokyo Nichi Nichi*, July 11, 1935; *Chicago Daily News*, July 10, 1935; Record Office (Tokyo) A461 ET/11-2 vol. 1; Iranian papers printed these denials. Okamoto to Hirota, 8/26/35; Record Office (Tokyo) A461 ET/11, vol. 2. See also *Cape Times*, Jan. 4, 1935; Record Office (Tokyo), E424 1-3-1; *New York Times*, July 11, 1935; and *Japan Times*, July 11, 1935.

lately.¹²

On July 12 while visiting Montreal, Viscount Mushanokoji, Japan's ambassador to Germany, had repeated that his country had only a commercial interest in Ethiopia. Mushanokoji, who had built up Japan's trade with Haile Selassie's empire, suggested that the Japanese felt about the situation exactly as they expected the rest of the world felt about Japan's operations in Manchuria, "a domestic matter of vital importance only to the two nations concerned." *New York Times*, July 13, 1935.

Although what Sugimura had said was not much different from what *Gaimusho* spokesmen had long been saying, a popular storm soon engulfed Japan. Inspired newspaper articles accused Sugimura of having exceeded his instructions. And Sugimura's "slip of the tongue" in giving "a kind of verbal pledge" to the Duce caused furor in the *Gaimusho*, where some of its younger officials demanded his immediate recall.¹³

An upset Hirota Koki, Japan's foreign minister, grilled his ambassador about why he had spoken so clearly. On July 18, Sugimura responded that he had agreed to Italy's communique because, despite Japan's natural sympathy for Ethiopia, Mussolini was using the "Yellow Peril" bogey to threaten whites in Europe and the United States.¹⁴ Over the next several days Sugimura spoke with the Japanese and Italian presses trying to mollify opinion in both governments and publics.¹⁵

Italy's ambassador to Tokyo, Giacinto Auriti, called on Hirota at the *Gaimusho* on Friday afternoon, July 19, to ask about Tokyo's "real" intentions in view of the anti-Sugimura reaction in Japan. Hirota confirmed that Japan's interest in Ethiopia was mainly commercial. The previous October, he pointed out, when Sugimura had left for Rome, he had been instructed to dispel rumors that Japan was politically active in Ethiopia and wanted to sell arms and ammunition there. On the other hand, while Hirota himself had told the Italian ambassador that Japan intended to establish a legation in Addis Ababa to strengthen commercial ties, he had not instructed Sugimura "to make the statement ascribed to him." Japan, as a friend of both Ethiopia and Italy,

¹²*Moscow Daily News*, July 21, 1935; *Osaka Mainichi & Tokyo Nichi Nichi*, Nov. 13, 1934, July 18, 1935; *Japan Times*, July 18, 21 1935; *New York Times*, July 17, 1935; Taura Masanori, "I. E. Funso to Nihon gawa Taio: Showa 10 nen Sugimura Seimei Jiken wo Chushin ni," [Italo-Ethiopian Conflict and the Japanese Response] *Nihon Rekishi* [Japanese History] 526 (Mar. 1992): 79-80; Taura Masanori, "Nichii Kankei to sono Yotai (1935-36): Echiopia Senso wo meguru Nihon gawa Taio kara" [Italo-Japanese Relations and Their Conditions (1935-36): From the Japanese Response to the Ethiopian War] in Takashi Ito, ed., *Nihon Kindai-shi no Sai Kochiku* (Tokyo, 1993), 305.

¹³*Osaka Mainichi & Tokyo Nichi Nichi*, July 20, 1935; *New York Times*, July 19, 1935; *The Times* (London), July 20, 1935; *Japan Times*, July 20, 21, 1935; *Moscow Daily News*, July 21, 1935; Taura, "I. E. Funso to Nihon gawa Taio," 80.

¹⁴Taura, "I. E. Funso to Nihon gawa Taio," 81-82.

¹⁵Italy, Ministero degli Affari Esteri, *I documenti diplomatici italiani* [hereafter cited as *DDI*], (Rome, 1953-), 8th (series), (vol. 1): no. 555; *Osaka Mainichi & Tokyo Nichi Nichi*, July 18, 20, 1935; *Japan Times*, July 21, 1935; *New York Times*, July 20, 1935; *Moscow Daily News*, July 21, 1935.

wished that their problems would be resolved peacefully and quickly.¹⁶

Not much distinguished Hirota's statement from Sugimura's except their tone. Hirota had added that, not yet knowing whether there would be peace or war, Japan was going to watch developments and would reserve the right to comment. Unfortunately, in trying to clarify Sugimura's statement, Hirota invited Italy's further upset.¹⁷

Luigi Mariani, counselor of the Italian Embassy, on Friday evening and again the next morning complained to Amau about the attitude of Japan's press. He also insisted that the Italo-Ethiopian treaty of 1928 had stipulated that Ethiopia would welcome Italian merchandise, and he argued that it breached that treaty when Ethiopia welcomed Japanese goods over Italian. Amau answered, as often before, that the influx of Japanese merchandise was due to their quality and price.¹⁸

Concerned at the uproar back home, on July 20 Sugimura sped telegrams to the *Gaimusho* explaining that he had told Mussolini that Japan did not intend to interfere in the Italo-Ethiopian conflict and did not have any political interests in Ethiopia. He asked if his statements conformed, in fact, to Japanese policy. Hoping to end rumors rife in foreign newspapers that Japan would intervene, the ambassador explained that he had tried to make Japan's attitude clear to rid the Duce of his suspicion that Japan was sending military supplies to Ethiopia. Mussolini, he said, had suggested publicizing these statements as a communique, and he had agreed.¹⁹

Officials and citizens in both countries were confused about exactly what Sugimura had said, and, more important, the meaning of Hirota's efforts to modify Sugimura's assurances. Pugnacious presses muddied the waters. This paper is too short to unravel the virulently racial charges and countercharges leveled over the next several days.²⁰ Hirota's attitude, however, clearly shocked Rome, where it seemed little short of an open declaration of hostility. The *Giornale d'Italia* got to the nub of the matter—and the *Moscow Daily News* happily and provocatively passed the opinion on:

¹⁶Taura, "I. E. Funso to Nihon gawa Taio," 82-83; Taura Masanori, "Nihon-Echiopia Kankei ni miru 1930s nen Tsusho Gaiko no Iso" [A Phase of the 1930s Commercial Diplomacy in the Japanese-Ethiopian Relations], *Seifu to Minkan* [Government and Civilians], *Nenpo Kindai Nihon Kenkyu* [Annual Report, Study of Modern Japan], 17 (1995): 158-59; *New York Times*, July 20, 1935; *The Times* (London), July 20, 1935; *Moscow Daily News*, July 8, 21, 1935; *Japan Times*, July 21, 1935.

¹⁷Taura, "I. E. Funso to Nihon gawa Taio," 82-83; *Japan Times*, July 22, 1935; *Osaka Mainichi & Tokyo Nichi Nichi*, July 21, 1935.

¹⁸*New York Times*, July 21, 1935; *Japan Times*, July 21, 22, 1935; *Osaka Mainichi & Tokyo Nichi Nichi*, July 20, 21, 1935.

¹⁹Sugimura to Hirota, 7/20/35; 7/20/5; Record Office (Tokyo) A461 ET/11-7 vol. 1; Taura, "I. E. Funso to Nihon gawa Taio," 80-81.

²⁰William H. Fort, "Italy Aghast at Japan's Unexpected Hostility to Plans," *Chicago Daily News*, July 22, 1935; Record Office (Tokyo) A461 ET/11-2 vol. 1; *Osaka Mainichi & Tokyo Nichi Nichi*, July 21, 1935; *Japan Times*, July 24, 1935.

Notwithstanding the clear statement of the Japanese ambassador in Rome, Japan is now trying to deny this statement and to demonstrate a complete and hostile solidarity with Abyssinia against Italy.²¹

Even though Italy fulsomely attacked Japanese brazenness, duplicity, and hypocrisy, in truth, Japan's position represented an un hoped-for bonanza for Italy's propaganda in Europe in favor of its East African venture.²² Meanwhile, Japan's press and nationalist groups continued to attack Sugimura and Italy and to praise Ethiopia.²³

Guards protected the Japanese embassy in Rome and an Italian legation in Japan.²⁴ Sugimura, personally popular in Italy especially in sporting circles, was one of the few to stay calm as he rationally tried to mollify Italian opinion and to make Tokyo aware of obvious truths—not the least was that Japan was too far away to affect materially the outcome of any war between Ethiopia and Italy. To try to do so would needlessly and foolishly make an enemy of Rome. He especially warned that publicizing Japan's political ambition toward Ethiopia as a general conflict between the colored and white races would backfire because Rome was clearly trying to draw London and Paris into aiding Italy.²⁵

Taking his own advice to act cautiously, Sugimura spent July 22 at an aristocratic seaside resort, Castelo Fusano, near Rome enjoying his favorite sport, swimming.²⁶

On the evening of July 26, 100,000 demonstrated in Rome. The well-organized crowd gathered at 1:00 p.m. near the Ministero delle Esteri [foreign ministry] where General Achilles Starace, secretary of the Fascist Party, harangued them. Afterward they marched through the streets singing Fascist revolutionary songs and shouting, "Down with England, Ethiopia, and Japan." Carrying huge posters and banners, including "Rome will save Europe," they marched to the Palazzo Venezia and cheered for Mussolini, but he did not appear. The government stationed two hundred carbonari at each of the British and Japanese embassies and guarded the Ethiopian consulate.²⁷

Mussolini in an unsigned article in *Popolo d'Italia* of July 31 laid bare the *realpolitik*

²¹*Moscow Daily News*, July 24, 1935.

²²Sugimura to Hirota, 7/23/35: Record Office (Tokyo) A461 ET/1-7 vol. 1; *New York Times*, July 23, 1935; *Japan Times*, July 23, 24, 25, 1935; *The Times* (London), July 23, 1935.

²³Fujita to Hirota, 7/30/35: Record Office (Tokyo) A461 ET/1-2 vol. 1; *Japan Times*, July 21, 26, 1935; Taura, "I. E. Funso to Nihon gawa Taio," 82; *The Times* (London), July 25, 1935; *New York Times*, July 25, 1935.

²⁴*New York Times*, July 21, 23, 1935; *Japan Times*, July 24, 25, 1935.

²⁵Sugimura to Hirota, 7/27/35: Record Office (Tokyo) A461 ET/1 I, vol. 1; Sugimura to Hirota, 7/31/35; Sato to Hirota, 7/27/35: Record Office (Tokyo) A461 ET/1-7, vol. 1; Sato to Hirota, 8/31/35: Record Office (Tokyo) A461 ET/1 vol. 2. See *The Times* (London), July 23, 1935; *Moscow Daily News*, July 24, 1935; *New York Times*, July 23, 1935; *Japan Times*, July 24, Aug. 8, 1935; Taura, "Nichii Kankei to sono Yotai (1935-36)," 305-06.

²⁶*Japan Times*, July 24, 1935.

²⁷Sugimura to Hirota, 7/31/35: Record Office (Tokyo) A461 ET/1-7, vol. 1; *Japan Times*, July 27, 28, 1935.

lurking behind the mask of racial politics:

[T]he Abyssinians are not negroes; they consider themselves Semites. Besides, Fascism would never raise the race question. Not even civilization is the object that Italy has in view. Civilization, too, will be only a consequence of the Italian policy.

The essential arguments, absolutely unanswerable, are two: the vital needs of the Italian people and their security in East Africa.²⁸

By virtue of the treaty signed in 1930 among Great Britain, France, Italy, and Ethiopia to regulate the importation of arms and munitions into the East Africa, Mussolini believed that Italy had the right to act as Ethiopia's military patron.²⁹ Japan's perceived penetration of Ethiopia, done in the midst of Haile Selassie's effort to modernize his army particularly hyperventilated Italy—fires which Moscow eagerly stoked.³⁰ Italian newspapers claimed that Japanese officers had been retained to instruct and reorganize Ethiopia's troops—charges consistently denied in both Addis Ababa and Tokyo.³¹

In fact, on August 2, Ethiopia's minister asked Sugimura for Japanese aid. Beyond Italian intransigence and the hard truth of Sugimura's understanding of the situation, Haile Selassie's hopes for Japanese arms were doomed. Importing weapons from Japan was difficult. The Djibouti-Addis Ababa Railroad refused to transport weapons, leaving only the camel route from Kenya and Sudan. Revealing his desperation, the Ethiopian minister wondered if Japan could send submarines to sink Italian transport ships! A more modest alternative, he allowed, would be for Japan to state

²⁸*The Times* (London), Aug. 1, 1935. In a long article, the *Japan Times* on February 13, 1935 analyzed the Ethiopian situation. Underlying Mussolini's ambitions were two points, wrote the paper. The first was to show Italy's ability to acquire more territory and to expand its colonial empire; the second was Italy's desire to beat France, Germany, and especially Japan to the control of the vast potential sales to Ethiopia's millions. On the other hand, the paper continued, the Ethiopian considered himself to be vastly superior to the white man. After a short, sympathetic history of Ethiopia, the paper added that recently Japan and Germany had appeared on the economic horizon, sending their salesmen to unload quantities of "cheap gimcracks which so fascinate semi-civilized populations."

For a discussion of Italy's racial policies, see Pankhurst, "The Lone Struggle," 40-56.

²⁹*The Times* (London), Aug. 22, 1930.

³⁰The bulletin of the Central Executive Committee of the Uzbek Republic, charged that it was difficult to buy Sugimura's statement that Japan did not have any interests in Ethiopia because Japanese imperialism had started to take a special interest in Ethiopia in 1931 and 1932 and because Japanese goods had flowed in. Japan had acquired a 1,000,000-acre concession in Ethiopia for cotton growing. Japan's advance had stirred alarm among the Great Powers, especially Italy and Britain, and the imperial countries cooperated with each other to restrain Japan in Ethiopia. Japan intended to use the Ethiopian issue to get a compromise from the great powers in China over the Far Eastern issue. Kitada to Hirota, 8/21/35: Record Office (Tokyo) A461 ET/11 vol. 2.

³¹See, e.g., *DDI*, 8th, 1: nos. 61, 82, 170, 174, 177, 195, 205, 217, 220, 247, 304, 436, 528, 552, 560, 601, 607, 628, 641, and 701; Izumi Tetsu, "Italy's Aim Approved Though Policy to Ethiopia Condemned," *Contemporary Opinions on Contemporary Topics* (Jan. 9, 1936): 10-12; *Moscow Daily News*, July 28, 1935; *Japan Times*, Aug. 8, 10, 11, 30, 1935; *The Times* (London), Feb. 28, Aug. 7, 9, 10, 1935; *New York Times*, Dec. 27, 1934, Aug. 5, 7, 9, 13, 29, 30, Oct. 6, 1935; Furukawa, "Japan's Political Relations," 12.

officially its support for Ethiopia. Sugimura refused to do either.³²

By August 7, the *Japan Times* had reported that July's misunderstanding between Rome and Tokyo over the Ethiopian issue was generally regarded in Italy as having ended. The press had published and was satisfied with the *Gaimusho's* denial of reports that Japan was sending arms and a commercial mission to Addis Ababa.³³ Italo-Japanese reconciliation had begun—and along the realistic lines Japan's ambassador had sought.³⁴

Trying to provoke Rome against Tokyo, for a while the soviet press continued to fan rumors of Japanese military support for Ethiopia.³⁵ By late August, however, the Kremlin had reappraised the situation. On August 27, the Soviet press examined the rapprochement between Italy and Japan and repeated the comments of the *Giornale d'Italia*:

The position which the Japanese press is now taking on the Italo-Abyssinian dispute shows that a clash between Italy and Japan is not possible in the historical events now developing, and that both nations can be only in one camp....More than ever before Italy and Japan should recognize that their fates are identical, just as the means they consider necessary for realizing their aims are the same.

Both Italy and Japan needed expansion, and both had encountered League resistance, added the paper. This identity "of interests of Italy and Japan can only lead to unity in viewpoint and position and to political solidarity against all hostile forces." The paper concluded with an assurance that Italy's claims on Ethiopia in no way encroached on Japanese interests; Italy was not striving for a monopoly or a "closed door" in Ethiopia.³⁶

By September 13, Amau was agreeing that Japan's attitude was "that of a spectator watching a fight from a high window." Tokyo's attitude remained one of watchful

³²Sugimura to Hirota, 8/3-4/35: Record Office (Tokyo) A461 ET/11-7 vol. 1. This was not Japan's first rebuff of Ethiopia. The acting minister of Ethiopia to Italy, Yesus Ghebre had asked Sugimura for Japanese support in December 1934; Sugimura then also had avoided a concrete response. *Gaimusho* and military officials rejected the idea of giving aid. Furukawa, "Japan's Political Relations," 11; Furukawa, Japanese-Ethiopian Relations," 12. On Aug. 8, the Ethiopian minister in London tried to encourage Japan to supply weapons to Ethiopia—with no success. Fujii to Hirota, 8/8-9/35: Record Office (Tokyo) A461 ET/11-7 vol. 1.

³³*Japan Times*, Aug. 9, 1935; *New York Times*, Aug. 10, 1935.

³⁴Sugimura to Hirota, Aug. 16, 1935; Aug. 19, 1935; Aug. 31, 1935; see also Okamoto to Hirota, 8/26/35: Record Office (Tokyo) A461 ET/11, vol. 2.

³⁵*Moscow Daily News*, Aug. 26, 1935. Japan's representatives commented on the continuing interest of the Soviet press in the Sugimura Affair and Italy's antagonism toward Japan over Ethiopia as well as the Japanese threat to the Soviet Union through Korea and China. Kitada to Hirota, Aug. 21, 1935: Record Office (Tokyo) A461 ET/11 vol. 2.

³⁶*Moscow Daily News*, Aug. 27, 1935. Showing how much the Soviet position had changed, *Izvestia* charged that Japan, in not opposing Italian aggression in Northeast Africa, was ignoring the 1932 Abyssinian-Japanese Trade Agreement. The paper's fears were transparent. In approving of Italy's designs, it charged, Japan expected a similar understanding of its own ambitions in China. *Izvestia*, Oct. 28, 1935.

waiting and protection of Japan's commercial interests.³⁷ By September 21, the *Nichi Nichi* dared analyze the advantages Japan might expect to reap if Italy and Ethiopia went to war.³⁸

Hopeful at encouraging Japan's support, Ethiopia's foreign minister, Daba Birrou, toured Japan to grand fanfare in September and October 1935.³⁹

For a while, private, nationalist opinion in Japan continued to favor Ethiopia. Aoki and Kurimoto, "Japanese Interest in Ethiopia," 1: 720; Furukawa, "Japan's Political Relations," 11; Furukawa, "Japanese-Ethiopian Relations," 11-12. Of one reception Western newspapers pointed out that Daba Birrou, "young," "coal-black," and English-speaking, appeared dazed by the amount of hand shaking by elderly patriots. He did not realize, however, that no Japanese of importance was present.⁴⁰ A snide, but accurate, appraisal by western sources. Impressed by Britain's firmness, Japan briefly—but only briefly—considered joining League of Nations sanctions. Sugimura's policy had always been official Japan's.⁴¹

Popular sympathy in Japan, though not greatly excited, remained with Ethiopia. There were public lectures, and documentary films about Ethiopia appeared at movie theaters. Cultural exhibitions of Ethiopia at department stores attracted many visitors. An "Ethiopian Cafe" was opened in Tokyo and refused Italian customers.⁴² The crisis also provided topics for popular dramas, short stories, and magazine cartoons. Japan's nationalist groups remained vocal if impotent. Inspired by Daba Birrou's visit, the Ethiopian Problems Society telegraphed the foreign minister at Addis Ababa:

The Japanese nation indignantly condemns Italian aggression. God bless righteous Ethiopia. In a war air raids are not the deciding factor. Never lose courage. Transmit this message to your commanders.

In Kochi Prefecture around Tei village stores to this day sell "Ethiopia Manjuu"—a shiny, brown, sweet, steamed dumpling stuffed with azuki bean paste—and named in the 1930s to show solidarity with the Ethiopian people.⁴³

³⁷*New York Times*, Sept. 14, 1935.

³⁸*Ibid.*, Sept. 22, 1935.

³⁹*Osaka Maimichi & Tokyo Nichi Nichi*, Aug. 13, 1935; *New York Times*, Aug. 9, 13, 1935, Sept. 14, 19, 20, Oct. 6, 1935; *The Times* (London), Aug. 9, 10, Sept. 20, 1935; *Japan Times*, Aug. 10, 11, 13, Sept. 12, 14, 1935; *Moscow Daily News*, Aug. 11, Sept. 20, 1935; Furukawa, "Japan's Political Relations," 10; Okakura Takashi, "1930 Nendai no Nihon-Ethiopia Kankei," [Japanese-Ethiopian Relations in the 1930s], *Afurika Kenkyu*, 37 (Dec. 1990): 61-62; Angelo Del Boca, *La guerra d'Abissinia* (Milan, 1965), 28; Oguri to Goto and Hirota, 9/23/35; Record Office (Tokyo) A461 ET/I1-2 vol. 1.

⁴⁰*New York Times*, Sept. 22, 1935; *The Times* (London), Sept. 23, 1935.

⁴¹*New York Times*, Oct. 5, 1935.

⁴²Furukawa, "Japanese Political Relations," 11; Yusuke Tsurumi and Shigetsugu Komai, *Fuun no Rutsubo Ethiopia* [A Misfortunate Ethiopia] (Tokyo, 1935), 310-15; Bradshaw, "Japan and European Colonialism," 347.

⁴³E-mail: From Luke Shepherd Roberts, Mar 20, 96, 02:17:27 pm.

At the last stages of the war, criticism in Japanese newspapers tended to focus on the League's unreliability and Britain's weak diplomacy rather than on Italy's aggression. The "solidarity" movement among Japanese nationalists died out rapidly as attentions turned toward China and militaristic domestic reforms.⁴⁴

After the war's end, Germany recognized Italy's annexation to encourage Italy's approval of Nazi aggression in the Rhineland. Japan also began to negotiate with Italy about approval of its activities in both Ethiopia and China. Japan abolished its legation established on January 1, 1936, and reorganized its representation as a consulate in Addis Ababa in November—in effect recognizing Italy's annexation officially. Italy guaranteed Japanese trade profits in Ethiopia and granted Tokyo its official approval of its puppet state in Manchuria.⁴⁵ Jordan to Arita, 11/18/36: Record Office (Tokyo) A461 ET/I1 Vol. 8. This followed an earlier letter in which he decried Italy's abuse of Ethiopia: "[O]nly unity between AFRICA and ASIA will overcome this great trouble." Jordan letter, 5/12/36: Record Office (Tokyo) A461 ET/I1-2 vol. 2.

However, Italy betrayed its promises on trade concessions. Business for foreign merchants became more difficult, and the Addis Ababa branch of the firm of Mishima Shoten, the only Japanese business there, was forced to close down, a "complete violation of our commercial rights, complained the Japanese."⁴⁶

Nonetheless, the Italo-Japanese rapprochement, begun after the Sugimura Affair, quickly culminated in the Anti-Comintern Pact which by November 1937 had united Italy and Japan with Germany and helped pave the way to World War II.⁴⁷

* * *

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⁴⁴Furukawa, "Japan's Political Relations," 12; Furukawa, Japanese-Ethiopian Relations," 13.

⁴⁵Furukawa, "Japan's Political Relations," 12-13; Furukawa, Japanese-Ethiopian Relations," 13; Taura, "Nihon-Ethiopia Kankei ni miru 1930s," 159; *Giornale d'Italia*, Dec. 3, 1936: Record Office (Tokyo) M130 1-1-2.

For a detailed account of the history of establishing commercial representation in Ethiopia, see Taura, "Nihon-Ethiopia Kankei ni miru 1930s," 141-170.

Some illusions died hard. Robert O. Jordan, President General of the Ethiopian Pacific Movement, wrote to foreign minister Arita Hachiro, at the end of 1936. Claiming that the Ethiopian Pacific Movement spoke "for the darker peoples of the world," he tried to discourage Japan's recognition of Italy's conquest which would "lessen the faith that the sons and daughters of Africa had placed in the good Government of Japan." He continued: "According to history, we are sure that the Japanese people always show a good feeling towards their colored brothers of the world. We have great faith in what the future holds for the dark races under the excellent leadership of Japan."

⁴⁶Taura, "Nihon-Ethiopia Kankei ni miru 1930s," 160.

⁴⁷For more on this connection, see Taura, "Nichii Kankei to sono Yotai (1935-36)," 304-05.



“Yellow” and “Black” Japanese-Inspired Sedition Among African Americans Before and During World War II

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It was January 25, 1942, less than fifty days after Japan's "day of infamy," the attack on Pearl Harbor. That cold Sunday morning a furious group of whites forced Cleo Wright, a black, twenty-six-year-old cotton-mill hand, from his jail cell in Sikeston, Missouri. Wright had been jailed for the attempted rape of a white woman, Mrs. Dillard Sturgeon.¹ The enraged mob dragged Wright behind a car through the city's streets, stopping briefly at each of the black churches in town. The driver finally stopped the car near the railroad where the mob burned Wright's dead, torn body. A month later, on February 22, the President of the United Negro Improvement Association (UNIA) and editor of the monthly, *The New Negro World*, James R. Stewart exhorted, a crowd, "We will remember Missouri and then Pearl Harbor... To hell with Pearl Harbor."²

Such seditious talk frightened patriotic Americans. It certainly frightened the founding director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), J. Edgar Hoover. Eager to find out what lay behind this audacious call to subvert America in her hour of need, on June 22 Hoover commissioned the Survey of Racial Conditions in the United States. For this report he asked federal agents to look for "racial disturbances or potential racial outbreaks which may have an effect upon the national security" and for "racial disturbances which may receive national notoriety."³

The FBI particularly feared that a Japanese fifth column had infiltrated the United

¹ Ernest Allen, Jr., "Waiting for Tojo, The Pro-Japan Vigil of Black Missourians, 1932-1943." *Gateway Heritage* (Fall 1995): 39.

² Robert A. Hill, ed., *The FBI's RACON: Racial Conditions In The United States During World War II* (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1980), 101.

³ *Ibid.*, 16.

States. The August 23, 1941 issue of the Hour, a "confidential bulletin" edited by Albert E. Kahn, shows that the fear had merit,

"The purpose of such fifth column activity, which seeks unscrupulously to capitalize upon legitimate grievances of the Negroes,...[is] to split Americans into opposing camps, white against black, and thus to weaken the country as a whole and hamper the defense effort."⁴

In fact, the Bureau had long set its sights on black organizations that were involved in pro-Japanese propaganda. In 1940 the United States Military Intelligence Division had reported that the Chicago *Defender*, an important black newspaper, contained "propaganda which might hinder the Government in securing registrations from Negroes who come within the draft age."⁵ While the FBI feared the influence of such newspapers, the truth was that the black press was only reporting on their communities where pro-Japanese propaganda had flourished for at least forty years.

After the Russo-Japanese War of 1904 and 1905, many of the world's "colored" peoples recognized Japan's victory over "white" Russia as their own. For the first time in modern history, a non-western nation had humbled a first-rank European power. Oppressed peoples throughout the world began to see Japan as their future liberator. Black Americans joined the adulation.

Marcus Garvey of the UNIA greatly admired Japan, and Garvey's ideas helped mold the thoughts of many others. As early as 1918, he had warned that, "The next war will be between the [N]egroes and the whites unless our demands for justice are recognized...With Japan to fight with us, we can win such a war."⁶ Observing their growing power in the Pacific, Garvey believed that the Japanese were as tired of western domination as were African Americans.

Openly angry at the repression of black culture, many African Americans began to speak forcefully not only for their Civil Rights during the 1930's, but also with a growing sense of African nationalism. Some black Americans even sought racial independence, African redemption and colonization of their African homeland, and Afro-Asiatic racial solidarity. Horance Cayton, who succeeded Garvey as head of the UNIA, boldly stated that, "Black America is ready for a nationalistic movement such as Garvey's when the right demagogic leadership presents itself."⁷

Garvey's ideas became the foundation for many of the pro-Japanese groups that

⁴ Ibid., 6. The FBI also feared that the Communist Party could exploit civil rights issues. An editorial in the communist *Daily Worker*, for example, had described the government's handling of the grand jury's investigation of Cleo Wright, and concluded that the government had to uphold the constitutional rights of all Americans, including those of African decent. Failure to do so would only play "into the hands of the defeatists and fifth Columnists."

⁵ Ibid., 22.

⁶ Ernest Allen, Jr., "When Japan was "Champion of the Darker Races": Satakata Takahashi and the flowering of Black Messianic Nationalism," *The Black Scholar* (vol. 24, no. 1) : 29.

⁷ RACON, 33.

fell under the FBI's gaze during the 1930s and 1940s. From the national headquarters of the UNIA, located in Cleveland, Ohio, the organization sought to return African Americans to Africa. After Japan's attack, Stewart's "To Hell with Pearl Harbor" admonition resonated through UNIA meeting halls across the country.⁸ At 300-person meetings of the Detroit UNIA, a Reverend Wheat urged African Americans to reject the white man's ideas and to think independently. Blacks, he said, could take advantage of the war to secure their rights.⁹

After a 1943 indictment of two leaders of the Pacific Movement of the Eastern World, (PMEW), one Naka Nakane, who was "an apparent Japanese government operative,"¹⁰ claimed that during 1933 and 1934 there were Japanese agents working for the UNIA throughout the United States. Nakane himself started many of these organizations, including Development of Our Own. While leading this organization, Nakane had assumed the alias, Satakata Takahashi, a major in the Japanese Army. He also claimed to represent the Black Dragon Society in the United States.¹¹ A Tokyo native born, Nakane had emigrated to Victoria, British Columbia, about 1903. There he married a Englishwoman, Annie Craddock. In 1922, Nakane moved with his family to Tacoma, Washington. After hard times he abandoned his family and dropped out of sight to re-emerge in 1932 at a UNIA meeting in Chicago.¹² On April 20, 1934, the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service deported him to Japan. Five years later, on January 11, 1939 he re-entered the United States through Buffalo, New York, and became active in a new organization, the Onward Movement of America, with the same old agenda. After attempting to bribe an immigration inspector, he was arrested on June 22. Six days later he was sentenced to three years and fined \$4,500.¹³

One friend and ideological compatriot of Nakane's, Policarpio Manansal, who used many aliases, including Ashimo Takis and Mimo De Guzman. Apparently of Japanese ethnicity, he had been born in the Philippines in 1900. He began speaking for the UNIA in the early 1930's.¹⁴ Ultimately, he was sentenced to three years by a federal judge for forging a postal money order. During questioning, De Guzman admitted to having received funds from Nakane, whom he presumed to have been backed up by Japan. De Guzman had distributed these funds to organizations influential among African Americans.¹⁵

⁸ Ibid., 108.

⁹ Ibid., 113.

¹⁰ Allen, "Waiting for Tojo," 40.

¹¹ The most notorious of Japan's superpatriot groups, the Kokuryu Kai is more properly called the "Amur River Society," but generally was known in English by the more sinister-sounding "Black Dragon Society."

¹² RACON, 515.

¹³ Ibid., 516.

¹⁴ Allen, "Waiting for Tojo," 40.

¹⁵ RACON, 531.

During the 1930's in the New York area, many successors to the deteriorating UNIA sprang up under different names. The FBI considered these new factions of Garverism as anti-white, with many individual members reported to have made seditious, pro-Japanese statements. One was Robert O. Jordan. Jordan had met De Guzman in 1935 and within six months the two had established the Ethiopian Pacific Movement, (EPM). During the war, Jordan stated that he had been commissioned by De Guzman to organize Negroes in the Eastern United States. He wanted to "line up the colored people for the Japanese, so that when they take over the country the colored people will be all one."¹⁶

The EPM sought to resettle African Americans in Africa. Between 1935 and 1937, the organization was heavily engaged in the Harlem area, only to fade out for two years. Jordan revived the organization in 1939, when he began to harangue street meetings, generally on Sunday evenings at 113 Lenox Avenue, New York. Usually 50 to 125 "uneducated" blacks attended, with the majority from the British West Indies.¹⁷ Some in the FBI doubted the true commitment of the EPM's leadership to their stated goals.¹⁸

In a January 25, 1942 address, Jordan claimed that his Japanese contacts stretched back to his Japanese training in 1922. Since then he had been their agent and had even served three years as a second officer in the Japanese navy.¹⁹ These claims are doubtful. It is true however, that Jordan had written Japan's foreign minister on May 12, 1936, seeking "unity between AFRICA and ASIA,"²⁰ and that six months later he again had written, this time requesting that Japan lead the "Dark Races" to freedom.²¹ In June 1941, Jordan visited the Japan Institute, located in New York. He bore a letter of introduction from Kyuya Abiko, the Executive Secretary of the Japanese Association. After the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor, the EMP met behind closed doors at its Lenox Avenue office. There Jordan turned his organization more radically toward the Japanese. He proclaimed that he would be ashamed to wear a United States Military uniform and that he would fight for Japan with every drop of his blood.²²

¹⁶ *The New York Times*, Dec. 17, 1942.

¹⁷ RACON, 532.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 531.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 532. Upon his arrest in 1941, Jordan claimed that he had been employed on a Japanese merchant ship, the S.S. Maru. This is suspicious as "Maru" merely means "ship."

²⁰ European Pacific Movement, Inc., New York, Ro. O. Jordan, President, to Japanese Foreign Secretary, Tokyo, May 12, 1936: Record Office (Tokyo) ETH-2 vol. 2.

²¹ Robert O. Jordan, President General of Ethiopian Pacific Movement, Inc. of New York to Hachiro Arita, Foreign Minister, Tokyo, Nov. 18, 1936: Record Office (Tokyo) A461 ET/11 vol. 8.

²² RACON, 186. De Guzman later told the FBI, "that Jordan may have been contacted by the Japanese and was in their employ." De Guzman added that Nakane used Jordan and that the Japanese were trying to develop people who could rally American Negroes. De Guzman disclosed that Jordan had claimed in the fall of 1941 that he was about to get financial aid from Japan. This money would enable Jordan to pay De Guzman to join the EPM thereby validate the organization. *Ibid.*, 532.

Jordan claimed that Japan was only waiting for the opportunity to establish 20,000,000 African Americans as masters of Africa. On January 18, 1942, he declared that the Japanese were trying to establish nations around the world for the "Dark Races" of the world, "and have the black man rule the black man." He added, "This is going to be a race war and you must be ready. When you are drafted start a whispering campaign among your comrades."²³ Jordan believed that Japan would defeat the United States: "The thing to do now if the Negroes have any sense at all, instead of fooling around with the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People and the Randolph movement and all that sort of thing, is to join up with the Japanese."²⁴

Jordan was arrested and charged with the conspiracy to violate the Alien Registration Act. He was found guilty on three counts, and on March 11, the court sentenced him to three consecutive sentences of ten days each.

Later, the United States government charged members of the EPM with sedition under Title 50, Section 33 of the United States Code:

In that on or about the fifth of July, 1942...these defendants, when the United States was at war, did unlawfully, willfully and knowingly cause and attempt to cause insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny and refusal of duty in the military and naval forces of the United States; that the said defendants stated to a person wearing the uniform and distinctive insignia of a member of the United States Army and to others, in substance, that Negro soldiers should not fight for the United States against Japan and the other Axis Powers with which the United States was at war.²⁵

Jordan was arrested with four other members of the EPM. On September 15, 1942.²⁶ Jordan pugnaciously asserted, "I expect to be put in a concentration camp soon. The people who put me there, I shall order their heads to be chopped off when the new order is in control."²⁷ The only white man arrested with Jordan was Joseph Hartley, a enlisted army man. From November, 1941 to June 7, 1942, Hartley had spoken often at the EPM's Sunday meetings. In one speech he had asserted that there was a "pro-Japanese conspiracy to destroy the morale and unity of the armed forces."²⁸ Another of the arrested, James Henry Thornhill, had stated that if the United States Government was, "foolish enough to give him a gun" he would shoot his own commanding officer.²⁹

²³ *Ibid.*, 7. Jordan added in Garveyesque tones: "Japan is going to liberate the dark races, and all intelligent people should realize now that the battle Japan is fighting against the Western Powers is the battle of Africa, the battle of Asia, the battle of the dark man here in Central America and West Indies."

²⁴ *The New York Times*, Dec. 17, 1942.

²⁵ RACON, 535.

²⁶ *The New York Times*, Sept. 15, 1942.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, Sept. 16, 1942.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, Sept. 26, 1942.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, Dec. 17, 1942.

When Jordan was sentenced to ten years in prison, many in Harlem were relieved to see this West Indies black man off their streets. Even though African Americans had good reasons to follow Jordan, most in the community were repulsed by the idea of becoming a traitor. A local New York judge observed, "Fortunately, that loyal community, of which many of us are so very proud, remained disaffected. However, the people must be protected from the acts of men such as these."³⁰

Many others had contact with Jordan and met similar fates. For example, Mittie Maud Lena Gordon, founder of the Peace Movement of Ethiopia, was arrested and charged on September 20, 1942, with eight counts of violating the Sedition Code. With her, the government arrested her husband, William Green Gordon, David J. Logan, and Seon Emanuel Jones. When taken into custody, Mr. Gordon held a membership card signed by "Sato Kata Takahaski, President General, Kito, Japan", and Logan possessed the specifications of the Curtiss, Packard and Whirlwind airplane motors.³¹ Brought to trial on a cold January 25, 1943, the defendants were found guilty on February 15. The Supreme Court upheld their conviction on the charges of "conspiracy to cause disloyalty and refusal of duty in the United States military and naval forces."³²

The Federal investigators who investigated America's racial situation often showed great insight. The FBI compiled their reports at that time when America was fighting a war for freedom and self determination throughout the world. At home America was fighting a parallel battle; African Americans were fighting for their own freedom at home, as well. Often the FBI investigators acknowledged the legitimacy of African American grievances. Agents genuinely feared the pro-Japanese sedition they had discovered, whether perpetrated by grifters and frauds, or by genuine believers. What ought to amaze us is how many black Americans rejected Japanese leadership, and chose, instead, to fight for their place in the American dream.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, Jan. 15, 1943.

³¹ *Ibid.*, Feb. 5, 1943.

³² *Ibid.*, Dec. 14, 1943.

The Useable Past: Historical Analogy in International Affairs

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*We have to take from the past what is good....To cut our losses and build something new.*¹

Introduction

Whether in war-ravaged Bosnia, post-apartheid South Africa, or post-Dirty War Argentina—to name but a few graphic examples—historians as well as the man and woman on the street are confronted with pasts that must become known, understood, and ultimately reconciled. In part the struggle is a human and psychological one; and, in part, it represents an intellectual need to learn from history in order to avoid the mistakes of the past in the future. Within this context, historical analogy continues to hold a commanding position. In all three country cases war crimes commissions and truth commissions continue to scour the record of the past in order to reunify and normalize traumatized peoples and countries. Operating within ambivalent maxims that the truth shall set you free or that the truth leads to reconciliation, and influenced by persistent and powerful analogies with the Jewish Holocaust and the Nuremberg War Crimes Tribunals of World War II, the challenge of how to assimilate the past and construct logical reasoning and formulate conclusions about the past remains formidable. It seems that in no single disciplinary field (other than history itself) and in no single substantive area has the process of analyzing events to distill historical analogies been more prevalent than in international affairs and diplomatic history and in dealing with the chronic threats of disastrous global wars and regional conflicts.

Classic examples of remarkable historical analogies are discovered in the great

¹ Suzanne Daley, "Dark Past, Black Future for Africa's 'White Tribe,'" *The New York Times*, 22 February 1998, p. 1. Words of an 11th-generation Afrikaner, Christoff Heyns, on post-apartheid life in South Africa.

history of *The Peloponnesian War* by the ancient Greek historian Thucydides, who was also one of the early proponents of realism as a theory of international relations. Clearly, one may argue that then and now, historical analogy has served as an indispensable mode of reasoning, theorizing and theory-building in many fields, but especially history and international politics. The historian, David Hackett Fischer, correctly argued that "without analogies, creative thought and communication" would be inconceivable.² As one contemporary historian succinctly observed, "visions of any future have to proceed from the awareness of some kind of past; otherwise...there can be no language for expressing them."³ In large part, analogy and metaphor (an abridged form of analogy) are the more prevalent language structures employed to express this logically deduced relationship between the past, present and future. In this sense, analogous thinking and metaphorical images may be seen to represent the more diffuse and less precise type of theory generally found in the social sciences, wherein concepts and hypotheses are interrelated and supported by historical description and comparison as evidence; and ultimately even evaluated against normative standards.⁴ In his discussion of false analogy, David Hacker Fischer reminds us that "analogical inference plays an important, and even an indispensable, part in the mysterious process of intellectual creativity," and that "many great innovative minds," including famous men of science like Galileo, Sir Isaac Newton, Benjamin Franklin, and Huygens, relied on analogy for theoretical breakthroughs and

² David Hackett Fischer, *Historians' Fallacies: Toward a Logic of Historical Thought* (New York: Harper & Row, 1970), p. 244.

³ James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., *Contending Theories of International Relations: A Comprehensive Survey*, 4th ed. (New York: Longman, 1997), p. 6, quoting Gaddis from "International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War," *International Security*, 17 (Winter 1992/1993): 6.

⁴ See Elliot Zashin, and Phillip C. Chapman, "The Uses of Metaphor and Analogy: Toward a Renewal of Political Language," *The Journal of Politics*, Vol. 36 (1974): 290-326. Although unnecessary in this essay, these authors draw generally useful distinctions between the devices of metaphor, simile, and analogy. A metaphor is variously defined as "a figure of speech in which one thing is likened to another, different thing by being spoken of as if it were that other"; an "anomalous assertion of identity, or also an elliptical simile with the term 'like' understood, where the comparison of similarities and differences is tacit, or an unconscious, involuntary association of ideas. A simile is a direct comparison using the term 'like.' And an analogy "is a technique of explanation relying upon direct comparison," whereby comparison is explicit and conscious, and "is typically used in the more abstract and deliberate phases of thought." The comparisons invoked in analogy are too complex to be spontaneous and demand the "conscious cooperation" of an audience to work out the expressed parallelism. However, the authors stress that "metaphor and analogy are not mutually exclusive." Indeed, the use of analogies in international affairs, politics and perhaps history, may meld the two. Thus powerful analogies, I would argue, may take on the function often attributed to metaphors of doing more than simply substituting for formal comparison, and of actually adding meaning and broader context to a statement, experience or event, pp. 295-296, 300, 302, and 310-11.

discovery.⁵

This is not to conclude that analogies only serve the scientist, historian, or abstract theorist, because analogous thinking also serves to make the past usable for the policymaker who seeks to derive knowledge from direct personal and decision-making experience, and understandable and explainable to the general public. Analogies bridge the concerns of social theorists with generalization, or the identification of the "elements common to many situations," with the demands of policymakers who must come to terms with unique situations, but in reference to similar past experiences.⁶ Traditional international relations scholars have long held that history is the very blood and sinew of international relations theory. Over forty years ago, Kenneth Thompson argued: "The substance of theory is history, composed of unique events and occurrences. An episode in history and politics is in one sense never repeated. It happens as it does only once. In this sense, history is beyond the reach of theory. Underlying all theory, however, is the assumption that these same unique events are also more concrete instances of more general propositions."⁷ If history is integral to theory, so is analogy. Clearly, "traditionalist" international relations theorists have consciously employed metaphor and analogy to conceptualize and explain both the "reality" and alternate visions of political and international life. Even the "behavioralist" theories have relied on concepts in their "scientific" models which are derived

⁵ Fischer, *Historians' Fallacies*, pp. 243-44; and Thomas S. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1962). Kuhn describes the role of paradigms (or models, frameworks, structures) and paradigm shift in the process of insight and discovery. The process that precedes paradigm shifts he compares to a flash of insight. Interestingly, Max Black, philosopher and linguist, describes the cognitive function of metaphor "as an instrument for drawing implications grounded in perceived analogies of structure between two subjects belonging to different domains"; and notes that "a good metaphor sometimes impresses, strikes, or seizes its producer: We want to say we had a 'flash of insight,' not merely that we were comparing A with B, or even that we were thinking of A as if it were B." Max Black, *Perplexities: Rational Choice, the Prisoner's Dilemma, Metaphor, Poetic Ambiguity, and Other Puzzles* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990), p. 64. In this work and his earlier *Models and Metaphors* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1962), Black does not differentiate between the function of metaphors and analogies.

⁶ Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, Jr., *Contending Theories*, p. 22; David Hackett Fischer states that multi-functional analogies "suggest and persuade, inform and illustrate, communicate and clarify," and serve as vehicles "for the transference of thought from one mind to another." *Historical Fallacies*, p. 244. Max Black's study of metaphors discusses frames and images in language, which can, of course, be related to the concepts of image and "definition of the situation," central to political psychology and decision-making; Black, *Perplexities*, pp. 47-65. For example see: Irving L. Janis, and Leon Mann, *Decision Making: A Psychological Analysis of Conflict Choice, and Commitment* (New York: Free Press, 1977); Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1976).

⁷ Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, Jr., *Contending Theories*, p. 53, quoting Thompson, "Toward a Theory of International Politics," *American Political Science Review*, 49 (September 1955): 734. And in assessing the role of metaphor in language Max Black argues that "every implication-complex supported by a metaphor's secondary subject, I now think, is a model of the ascriptions imputed to the primary subject: Every metaphor is the tip of a submerged model." In this sense metaphors and analogues create relational and interactive models used to understand and explain international events. Black, *Perplexities*, p. 62.

from analogies or metaphors.⁸

With this introduction in mind, the initial purpose of this brief essay is to further consider and assess the role and function of several selected popular historical analogies. It seems that often the conscious awareness of the widespread use and of the full implications of analogous reasoning elude us.⁹ Some of the most popular and persistent historical analogies are those that have formed and continue to form around the central problem of international and human affairs: war and conflict. As a beginning, this investigation will focus on old and new analogies influential in diplomatic history and international relations, in order to determine the benefits and detriments associated with this natural form of historical reasoning and theorizing.

Appropriate Analogies

The success of physical science depends on the selection of the crucial experiment; that of political science in the field of international affairs, on the selection of the crucial period. I have chosen for my topic the period between 1812 and 1822, partly, I am frank to say, because its problems seem to me analogous to those of our day. But I do not insist on this analogy.¹⁰

The search for the appropriate analogy presupposes that historical analogies do indeed influence the process of both theorizing and decision-making in a meaningful way, and that the public analogies often employed by statesmen are directly or indirectly correlated to their rational choices and policy actions. Certainly the analogies employed by elites have been used to fashion and influence public opinion. Moreover, scholars have assessed the role of analogies and of the lessons that may be learned from history. Historians such as Ernest May and Arthur Schlesinger have debated whether statesmen are drawn to analogies in order to solve foreign policy dilemmas or in order to publicly justify predetermined decisions.¹¹ In one work professor May concludes that the answer is both; analogies serve analytical as well as advocacy func-

⁸ Zashin and Chapman, "Uses of Metaphor and Analogy," p. 293. These authors offer the concepts of "equilibrium, feedback, input, transactional, game, and structural-functional models," and critically charge that "these are at best analogies or metaphors" with tenuous empirical and experiential referents.

⁹ Fischer notes that "the fallacy of the insidious analogy is an unintended analogical inference which is embedded in an author's language, and implanted in a reader's mind, by a subliminal process which is more powerfully experienced than perceived," p. 244.

¹⁰ Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, Jr., *Contending Theories*, p. 78, quoting from Henry A. Kissinger, *A World Restored—Europe After Napoleon: The Politics of Conservatism in a Revolutionary Age* (New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1964), p. 55.

¹¹ Ernest May, "Lessons" of the Past: *The Use and Misuse of History in American Foreign Policy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973); Arthur Schlesinger's review of "Lessons" of the Past" by Ernest May in *The Journal of American History* 61 (September 1974): 443-444.

tions.¹² In the analytical function analogies may assist in the process of disassembling any given situation by "separating the *Known* from the *Unclear* and both from the *Presumed* (presumed, that is, by those who think they have a problem)."¹³

International relations theorists have also engaged in this debate, emphasizing the role of cognitive processes, psychology, and perception, on the one hand, and the environmental and systemic constraints of inter-state politics on the other.¹⁴ A brief review of the pros and cons of this debate has been discussed in Yuen Foong Khong's persuasive investigation of the uses of analogies in the Vietnam War.¹⁵ Characterizing the two seemingly conflicting perspectives on the role of historical analogies in policymaking as the analytical view and the skeptical view, the former understands analogies as cognitive devices used by decision makers to determine policy, while the skeptical view perceives analogies as primarily *ex post facto* public justifications. Khong rejects the view of this last group which she terms "skeptics," and insists on the integral role of the "AE (Analogical Explanation) framework" which serves to "perform six diagnostic tasks central to political decision-making." These tasks include defining the situation, assessing the stakes, prescribing solutions, evaluating alternatives, predicting success; evaluating moral correctness; and warning of potential dangers.¹⁶ In a sense these operations are similar to the tasks expected of a theory, paradigm, or research design; and, therefore, to my mind, reasoning by analogy and precedent can also be conceived as pre-theoretical activities. In addition these are analytical tasks that have also been identified as integral to the policymaking and decision-making processes. She ultimately argues that the application and testing of historical analogies in the Vietnam case can be perceived as useful for theory building and as ideal for theory-confirming and invalidation.¹⁷ Specifically, her historical research reveals that the Munich analogy and especially the Korean analogy influ-

¹² Richard E. Neustadt, and Ernest R. May, *Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision-Makers* (New York: Free Press, 1986), p. 32. Here, in referring to the Cuban Missile crisis of October 1962, Neustadt and May conclude: "As we have already noted, advocacy stands with or ahead of sheer analysis as an objective for the uses we have studied. When summarized by JFK for public consumption, the history of the issue of 'offensive' Soviet weapons overseas was meant to move his auditors and rally their support—to smother questions, not to raise them. It was slanted accordingly."

¹³ Neustadt and May, *Thinking in Time*, p. 37. They note that analysis literally means to "dissolve things," from the Greek words, *anas*, or things, and *lysein*, meaning to dissolve.

¹⁴ Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), and Glenn Snyder and Paul Diesing, *Conflict Among Nations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977).

¹⁵ Yuen Foong Khong, *Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), pp. 7-9.

¹⁶ Khong, *Analogies at War*, p. 10.

¹⁷ Khong, *Analogies at War*, p. 11; citing here Harry Eckstein's work on crucial case studies, as those that are the "most likely" for invalidation, and the "least likely" for validation. Thus her selection of the Vietnam case, which was the most likely case for analogies to be used as public justification, but the least likely case to support the analytical view if indeed analogies "played a major diagnostic role in policy-making."

enced the decision to intervene in Vietnam in 1965 and determined the form of how that military intervention would occur. Further, she concludes that none of the other rival explanations—the dominant ones being containment, hawks versus doves, bureaucratic politics, and domestic imperatives—as effectively served as persuasive alternatives.¹⁸

However, having demonstrated the important role of key historical analogies, her work also confirms that analogies were generally misused and the wrong lessons drawn from history. Instead of asserting, as many have done, that policymakers have been hampered by their imperfect historical knowledge, she convincingly suggests that the flaw lies in the analogical reasoning process itself. Her argument is supported by the fact that in the Vietnam decision of 1965 the major policymakers had been either former professors of history or “certainly more historically conscious than the average career official.”¹⁹

Relying on the classic analysis of historical methodology by David Hackett Fischer and studies of logical reasoning and cognitive psychology, she defines *historical analogy* as “an inference that if two or more events separated in time agree in one respect, then they may also agree in another.”²⁰ One can interpret from this logical parallelism that analogies not only help to order and interpret voluminous flows of information, but that they also assist in the coping process, and do so inherently by simplification. Therefore, this rational and logical process is potentially structurally limited; it can err not only in terms of the very selection of the relevant analogy, but also in the selection and rejection of confirming information from reality. She explains these problems as “systematic biases” associated with the “top-down” processing of incoming information, and the holder’s blind persistence to maintain the analogy.²¹ Thus, analogies may function in ways similar to cognitive belief-systems which reinterpret and filter incoming stimuli in order to maintain congruence with initial premises and values and preclude cognitive dissonance. Given these conclusions, how does one find the appropriate analogy, and are any analogies ever appropriate?

Analogies for War, Revolution and Intervention

He did not accept the “shameful” peace as final. He, too, held that revolutionary war was

¹⁸ Khong, *Analogies at War*, pp. 11 and 17.

¹⁹ Khong, *Analogies at War*, p. 13; here she notes that some of these officials in the first group included Dean Rusk, McGeorge Bundy, Walt Rostow, Arthur Schlesinger, and James Thomson, as well as George Ball and William Bundy, in the second category.

²⁰ Khong, *Analogies at War*, pp. 6–7; from Davis Hackett Fischer, *Historians’ Fallacies* (New York: Harper and Row, 1970), pp. 243–59; and in symbolic terms as in Fischer, AX:BX::AY:BY, or “event A resembles event B in having characteristic X; A also has characteristic Y; therefore it is inferred that B also has characteristic Y.”

²¹ Khong, *Analogies at War*, p. 14.

*inescapable; and more than once he recalled the peace of Tilsit which Napoleon had dictated to Prussia in 1807 and which the progressive Prussian statesmen, von Stein and Gneisenau, had used to modernize their country and army and to prepare revenge. He was following their example; and he also hoped that during the respite revolution might mature in Germany and renounce and annul the Kaiser's conquests.*²²

Great men and great minds (as well as small ones) have been captivated by historical analogies in times of war and revolution. Trotsky, the brilliant Russian Bolshevik revolutionary, not only compared the brutal German-Russian separate peace at Brest Litovsk to the Prussian defeat by Napoleon at Tilsit, but he, as well as Lenin, often drew analogies between the Russian Revolution and the Great French Revolution. In the words of Isaac Deutscher, Trotsky's biographer, "the Bolsheviks had been accustomed to look back to the great French precedent and to think in historical analogies."²³ Thus, to paraphrase a current graduate student, the French Revolution served as a model, both positive and negative for the Bolsheviks. President Harry Truman in the 1950 Korean War decision invoked the events of the 1930s and a pre-Munich analogy of appeasement, explaining to Congress that he committed American troops because he remembered the "fateful events of the nineteen-thirties, when aggression unopposed bred more aggression and eventually war."²⁴

The extant and declassified historical record reveals that John F. Kennedy and his advisers resorted to critical historical analogies as a way to assimilate and assess the potential ramifications of the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis.²⁵ For example, Secretary of State Dean Rusk compared the crisis to the 1956 "Suez-Hungary combination" wherein the Soviet tanks crushed the Hungarian uprising while the West was preoc-

²² Isaac Deutscher, *Trotsky, The Prophet Unarmed*, Vol II., p. 94, describing Trotsky's view of the Treaty of Brest Litovsk.

²³ Deutscher, p. 94.

²⁴ Neustadt and May, *Thinking in Time*, p. 36 and 41. On the 1930s analogies, these authors quote at length from Truman's memoirs: "I recalled some earlier instances: Manchuria, Ethiopia, Austria. I remembered how each time that the democracies failed to act it had encouraged the aggressors to keep going ahead. Communism was acting in Korea just as Hitler, Mussolini, and the Japanese had acted ten, fifteen, and twenty years earlier. I felt certain that if South Korea was allowed to fall, Communist leaders would be emboldened to override nations closer to our own shores. If the Communists were permitted to force their way into the Republic of Korea without opposition from the free world, no small nation would have the courage to resist threats and aggression by stronger Communist neighbors. If this was allowed to go unchallenged, it would mean a third world war, just as similar incidents had brought on the second world war." Harry S. Truman, *Memoirs*, Vol. 2, *Years of Trial and Hope* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1955-56), pp. 332-33. Also refer to Ernest R. May, "Lessons" of the Past: *The Use and Misuse of History in American Foreign Policy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973), pp. 52-86. Neustadt and May indicate that Truman did not, but could have equally recalled Hitler's militarization of the Rhineland in 1936, or the Czech crisis of 1938 and Munich. Truman, instead refers to Japan's seizure of Manchuria in 1931-32; Italy's 1938 aggression in Ethiopia; and Hitler's Anschluss with Austria in 1938.

²⁵ Neustadt and May, *Thinking in Time*, p. 31, argues that in the Cuban Missile Crisis we have an instance of the "better" use of history than the "usual practice," and that "analogies were little used." Rather "the history of the issue was understood; presumptions were questioned; the histories of persons most concerned as well as organizations most affected were brought into play."

cupied with the British and French bombing of the Suez Canal.²⁶ This analogous thinking, therefore, explains both the perception of the missile crisis as a Soviet ruse, and the fears that American responses might cause Khrushchev to retaliate in Berlin. A more pervasive and persuasive analogy that surfaced during the crisis was Pearl Harbor. Thus the note that Robert Kennedy passed his brother with the message, "I know now how Tojo felt when he was planning Pearl Harbor," has become legendary. Through this analogy Robert Kennedy and the various references to Pearl Harbor by Theodore Sorensen and George Ball, probably dissuaded President Kennedy from the surprise bombing option. The analogy had a powerful effect on other members of the ExCom decision-making group as well, despite the fact that Eisenhower's former Secretary of State Dean Acheson, who had been invited to the meeting, argued forcefully against the applicability of the analogy, calling it "silly."²⁷ Neustadt and May argue that although Kennedy referred to the lessons of the 1930s in his public address that this was only rhetoric; and that his reference to World War I was not really analogous. Nevertheless, both seemed to be analogues that taught powerful negative lessons of the dangers to avoid. May's recent scholarship on the Kennedy tapes affirms the importance of both the Pearl Harbor (no secret surprise attacks) and Munich-type (no appeasement of dictators) analogies in the crisis outcome.²⁸

In a similar vein, the Bosnian crisis which erupted in the early 1990s, and has at times dominated and continued in the news for nearly a decade, evoked the fearful analogy of Sarajevo in 1914, as well as that of Munich and Vietnam. And now that violence has recently escalated in Kosovo, Bosnia itself is being seen as a model and analogue for the what is ahead. Bitterly one Albanian official in the self-styled Kosovo government referred to the Dayton Accord of 1995 that brought an uneasy peace to Bosnia: "It was a terrible, terrible lesson'.... We learned that violence works. It is the only way in this part of the world to achieve what you want and get the attention of the international community."²⁹ And news commentators and policy experts feared that Kosovo would be even worse than Bosnia, not only an extension of more ethnic cleansing, but a crisis case, much closer to the 1914 Sarajevo assassination of the Aus-

²⁶ Neustadt and May, *Thinking in Time*, p. 5; and Ernest R. May and Philip D. Zelikow, eds., *The Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House During the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997), p. 17.

²⁷ Neustadt and May, *Thinking in Time*, pp. 6-7.

²⁸ Ernest R. May, and Philip D. Zelikow, *The Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House During the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997), pp. 1-7. The editors commented that "in the debates recorded on Kennedy's tapes, Pearl Harbor has a presence as pervasive as Munich. Recollections of Pearl Harbor had helped to make worst-case worry about surprise attack a guiding theme for postwar U.S. military planning and procurement. Absent Pearl Harbor, the whole debate about the Soviet missiles in Cuba might have been different, for supposed lessons from the Pearl Harbor attack shaped the intelligence collection apparatus that informed Kennedy of the missiles and kept him and his advisers abreast of day-to-day developments." p. 4

²⁹ Chris Hedges, "Another Victory for Death in Serbia," *The New York Times*, March 8, 1998, Section 4, p. 5.

trian Archduke, that may not be contained. Or, in the view of the journalist, "Kosovo isn't another Bosnia. It came first, and could be worse."³⁰ Perhaps for this reason, in the current Kosovo crisis the "falling dominoes" analogy—used during the 1947 Greek Civil War and in the 1950s and 1960s with American involvement in Vietnam—has directly been invoked. The Kosovo ethnic conflict has the potential to engulf Macedonia, and therefore Greece, and Albania, as well as the United States and other NATO members.

Why are such analogies so popular in times of war and revolution? In part, because analogies draw, as Yuen Foong Khong suggests, unforgettable lessons of history which are very useful to define, and to assess stakes, alternatives, success, possible dangers, and moral rightness. Analogy is also a way that both theorists and decision makers can effectively, and persuasively, "communicate their vision to audiences who lacked theoretical sophistication."³¹ And as Neustadt and May emphasize, analogues serve to highlight similarities and differences, that are central to the critical process of comparison. How is "now" like "then."³² In the cases of Bosnia and Kosovo aggression analogies are important in the search for a rationale for intervention, as they were in the 1950 Korea crisis or 1963 escalation in Vietnam. And are such analogies dangerous? Despite the potential persuasiveness of analogies of war, Michael Clough criticizes this misuse of analogy in his recent review of David Callahan's *Unwinnable Wars*. Callahan indirectly employs a domino or spillover metaphor to rationalize American involvement and intervention in ethnic conflicts in far away countries. To espouse a form of aggressive internationalism in the world's periphery, the reviewer asserts, Callahan inappropriately reworks a "version of the cumulative-threat argument of the cold war. If zones of instability expand or multiply, the well-being of the international system as a whole suffers."³³ Moreover, the reviewer is critical of a central metaphor that the book draws between America's urban ghettos and the "global ghettos" of the Third World periphery. The reviewer essentially concludes with the warning that a revival of an ethnic violence-based domino theory which might provoke and justify interventions would be counterproductive to the American national interest. Challenging the logic of the implied analogy, he argues for careful case by case evaluation of each crisis.³⁴

Analogies for Enemies

That was the approach George Bush and Jim Baker tried on Hussein before they started

³⁰ Hedges, "Another Victory for Death in Serbia," *The New York Times*.

³¹ Zashin and Chapman, "Uses of Metaphor and Analogy," p. 292.

³² Neustadt and May, *Thinking in Time*, pp. 41–42.

³³ Michael Clough, "Uncle Sam, Policeman," a review of David Callahan, *Unwinnable Wars: American Power and Ethnic Conflict*, in *The New York Times Book Review*, March 8, 1998, p. 22.

³⁴ Clough, "Uncle Same, Policeman," p. 22.

calling him *Hitler Jr.*³⁵

Analogies have also been useful to stereotype and demonize enemies and enemy leaders and to contain them. For example Muammar el-Khaddafi has been compared to Hitler, and Panama's ex-dictator, Antonio Noriega, before and after the December 1989 intervention was likened to both. Similarly, to characterize Saddam Hussein's perceived behavior, both in the 1991 Gulf War and in the recent U.S.-Iraq crisis over continued United Nations weapons inspections, a popular metaphor has been that of Adolf Hitler and the analogy of his appeasement at Munich and subsequent aggression.³⁶ The Munich and Hitler comparisons have not only seemed to coincide with reality for most Americans and Westerners, but they have served to explain, popularize and propagandize war and coercive diplomacy. And although no direct, public references to Kofi Annan as Neville Chamberlain, Britain's Foreign Secretary who negotiated the Munich agreement, have apparently emerged, if the newly brokered agreement with Saddam Hussein and the U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan is violated (as many predict it will be), the World War II analogy will be further reinforced and the world's populations potentially more receptive to the direct use of force to contain or rollback another dictatorship. Indeed if one compares and probes the lessons behind the 1930s analogies the message is "that something had not been done which, if done, might have staved off World War II."³⁷ On the other hand, the consequences of the very decision to use force in the U.N.-sponsored 1950's police action in Korea, a crisis decision which had also heavily relied on the analogues of the 1930s to contain aggressors and dictators, may currently present a powerful counter-analogue, with the warning message not to pursue forceful military action too far. Thus the failed attempt to reunify Korea provides a historical lesson in the limited use of force and limited war objectives. Neustadt and May debate the probable consequences in 1950 if Truman had announced at the outset limited U.S.-U.N. war aims to restore existing borders rather than Korean unification, and conclude that this action would have been political difficult.

Then, not unlike now, broader military aims were initially very popular. Compare current editorials and the criticism by Republicans and Democrats alike of the self-imposed limitation of planned bombing in Iraq. In Republican circles, for example, President Clinton has been characterized as "soft on Iraq," and Pennsylvania's Republican Senator Arlen Specter confirmed: "There's more than a consensus,

³⁵ Jim Hoagland, "Smoke-and-Mirrors Diplomacy," *The Washington Post National Weekly Edition*, March 2, 1998, p. 5.

³⁶ For example, Steven Erlanger, "America, the Lone Wolf With a Following," *The New York Times*, March 1, 1998, Sec. 4, p. 4. Erlanger states: "The United States sees Mr. Hussein as uniquely evil, a 'Hitler' who threatens world peace and oil routes through his pursuit of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons."

³⁷ Neustadt and May, *Thinking in Time*, p. 43, referring to the 1950 Korea decision.

there's virtual unanimity that Saddam Hussein has to be deposed."³⁸ On the democratic side, Massachusetts Senator John Kerry proposed an "endgame strategy with respect to Saddam," and the insertion of ground troops and special operations commando units.³⁹ And as one commentator wrote of the operation: "On what might be the eve of the largest U.S. military campaign since the Persian Gulf War, U.S. military planners are struggling to reconcile an overwhelming military advantage with a set of imposed limits."⁴⁰ Those limits include propaganda defeats as a result of civilian casualties and destruction of "dual-use" locations, the risks to U.S. pilots and civilians from an inadvertent release of toxins into the atmosphere, as well as the broader issues of future credibility of U.S. force, continued leverage over Saddam Hussein, and anti-Americanism in the Arab World.⁴¹

The focus on limited force in the current U.N.-Iraqi crisis suggests that perhaps Korea, rather than Munich, may be the more persuasive and appropriate analogy influencing decision makers privately. If the fundamental goal of U.S. policy is to prevent World War III, which many have generally assumed would be most likely in the volatile Middle East, the negative lesson of Korea suggests that the maintenance of the status quo or "restoring conditions as before," is the best formula for peace.⁴² Further reinforcing the limited force lesson, is another unforgettable foreign policy analogy: the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion, wherein a "covert" CIA plan to overthrow Cuba's Fidel Castro failed, in part because of overestimation of the internal opposition to the dictator on the island. Recently, international relations analyst, Richard Haass, cited the Bay of Pigs analogue, which historians have described as "the classic case of presumptions unexamined."⁴³ Haass specifically warned against "strategies designed to capitalize" on a weak and divided Iraqi opposition.⁴⁴ As Castro did to a lesser degree in Cuba after his 1959 Revolution, Iraq's Saddam Hussein has systematically executed, imprisoned, or exterminated internal opposition elements. However, upon closer inspection, Haass really seemed to be recalling the powerful and persistent Vietnam analogy and its central historical lesson implied in a recent press statement: "We would be investing U.S. prestige and risking U.S. lives in situations in which it could be impossible to distinguish between friend and foe."⁴⁵ Not surprisingly, perhaps more than Munich and the 1930s aggression analogies, the American war in Vietnam continues to represent the most pervasive historical analogy for foreign policymakers

³⁸ "Nothing too covert about the U.S. desire to remove Hussein," *Orlando Sentinel*, February 27, 1996, p. A-14.

³⁹ "Nothing too Covert," p. A-14.

⁴⁰ John Mintz, "Winning the Battle Without Losing the War," *The Washington Post National Weekly Edition*, February 23, 1998, p. 14.

⁴¹ Mintz, "Winning the Battle," p. 14.

⁴² Neustadt and May, *Thinking in Time*, pp. 47-48.

⁴³ Neustadt and May, *Thinking in Time*, p. 140, and for discussion of this analogy, pp. 140-56.

⁴⁴ "Nothing too covert," p. A-14.

⁴⁵ "Nothing too covert," p. A-14.

in the second half of the twentieth century.

Vietnam's Never Again⁴⁶

*American wars have to be politically understandable by the American public. There has to be a cogent, convincing case if we are to enjoy sustained public support.*⁴⁷

North Vietnam's revolutionary leader, Ho Chi Minh, once warned the colonialist French that in the struggle for Vietnamese independence for every one Frenchman killed, ten Vietnamese would die, but that in the end they would tire first. Arguably, the French experience in the First Indochinese War of 1945–1954, would have been an appropriate analogy for the Americans in Vietnam from 1965 to 1975. Neustadt and May refer to a memorandum attributed to McGeorge Bundy, a national security adviser, and written to President Lyndon Johnson in 1965 that was entitled, "France in Vietnam, 1954, and the U.S. in Vietnam, 1965—A Useful Analogy?" The memo forcefully concluded that the differences in the two cases were great and the similarities virtually nonexistent.⁴⁸ Nevertheless, the most important similarity appears to have been overlooked or underestimated—the domestic political and overall international consequences of an unpopular, unwinnable, protracted war. Like the French, the U.S. could not bear the costs or outlast the Vietcong in this lengthy anticolonial struggle, termed "peoples' war" and a "war of national liberation" by the North Vietnamese opponents. As a result, the very stakes and national interests that most decision-makers had agreed necessitated engagement—international credibility and firm alliance commitments—and that Vietnam had been intended to affirm, were cast into doubt. Moreover, the domestic political and electoral consequences of appearing "soft on communism," were realized in the presidential defeats as a result of growing popular opinion against the war.⁴⁹

Ironically, if learning important lessons from historical analogies is at the heart their analytical, theoretical and operational contribution to policymaking, it is also at

⁴⁶ This is of course a popular refrain and the title of Earl C. Ravenal's study, *Never Again: Learning from America's Foreign Policy Failures* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1978).

⁴⁷ Vice President Hubert Humphrey in a letter to LBJ in 1965, quoted in Neustadt and May, *Thinking in Time*, p. 87.

⁴⁸ Neustadt and May, *Thinking in Time*, pp. 75–76 and 82–83.

⁴⁹ Neustadt and May, *Thinking in Time*, p. 86. The authors quote Lyndon Johnson's remarks to a friend: "I know that Harry Truman and Dean Acheson had lost their effectiveness from the day that the Communists took over China. I believed that the loss of China had played a large role in the rise of Jose McCarthy. And I knew that all these problems, taken together, were chickenshit compared with what might have happened if we lost Vietnam." Taken from Doris Kearns, *Lyndon Johnson and the American Dream* (New York: Harper & Row, 1976), pp. 252–53. Ostensibly, one lesson that LBJ did not seem to learn from the Korean analogy was to avoid protracted limited wars. In a footnote Neustadt and May draw from an NSC meeting on July 21, 1965 the statement that Johnson wanted the mission in Vietnam to be limited as much as possible, p. 305.

the heart of the difficult decision-making process: rarely does every participant or observer learn similar lessons from the same historical events. Perhaps the Vietnam War analogy has been so pervasive and persuasive is because a degree of consensus has emerged as to its lessons. However, Earl Ravenal specifically decried the contemporary situation wherein the overwhelming central Vietnam lesson of noninterventionism was never learned and never accepted. Two potentially conflicting policy lessons that were drawn have implications for the current U.S.-U.N.-Iraqi confrontation. First of these he views as tactical, that future intervention should not be gradual, but overwhelming and rapid; and the second, which he characterizes as "the most important strategic lesson", is that "there are constraints that limit the production and projection of American military power."⁵⁰

How can one resolve this apparent conundrum that often inappropriate analogies are drawn by policymakers to deal with international crises? As Yuen Foong Khong suggests, perhaps the answer lies more in the structure of analogy, and in the expressed or implied psychological and perceptual relationships. Therefore, can the persistence of the Vietnam War analogy be the consequence of its perceived and desired overall congruence with the many other critical historical analogies of this century? Theoretically and analytically dissonance and contradictions among competing historical analogies are potentially resolvable by a careful study of history and delineation of known, unclear, and presumed facts, and a thorough evaluation of similarities and differences.⁵¹ On the other hand, behavioral research on cognitive dynamics and images in international affairs has indicated that the contradictory or discrepant information "does not create an equal pressure to reduce dissonance," because "attitudes about central values will be more resistant to change," than attitudes at the periphery of the belief system.⁵² Further, this work argues that attitudes and perceptions that support central values, such as aggressors must be punished or they will aggress further, will remain unchanged if challenged by contradictory information.

More precisely, what is being asserted here is not only that discrepant or dissonant historical information will be suppressed or discarded, but that the analogies of the 1930s, the 1938 Munich analogy, the 1951 Korean War analogy, and most especially the 1965 Vietnam War analogy, are readily interpreted so that they reinforce elements of a central and fundamental lesson enshrined in twentieth century international affairs: "that success only feeds the appetite of aggression," and if not stopped that "the battle would be renewed in one country after another."⁵³ This domino metaphor, implying that security is indivisible, and "that weakness in one place would only invite aggress-

⁵⁰ Ravenal, *Never Again*, pp. 70-71; quote, p. 104.

⁵¹ Neustadt and May, *Thinking in Time*, p. 53; and see May's, "Lessons" of the Past, for this model.

⁵² Ole R. Holsti, "Cognitive Dynamics and Images of the Enemy," in John C. Farrell and Asa P. Smith, *Image and Reality in World Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), p. 21.

⁵³ Ravenal, *Never Again*, p. 34.

sion in others," was not only widely shared by the majority of key decision makers in all of the post-World War II crises and their derived analogies above.⁵⁴ In short, despite the arguments of the Vietnam War scholars, or the fascinating research of Yuen Foong Khong, historical analogies have not been at war, because an overall analogical consensus, just like a dominant theoretical paradigm, continues to hold court. The major analogues since World War II have all been fundamentally subservient to that lesson of oppose aggression and the domino metaphor of Hitler and Munich. If the above thesis can be supported, then the current references to Hitler, Munich, and appeasement in relation to the dispute with Saddam Hussein reflect more than historical analogy at the service of public propaganda, but also reveal a persistently persuasive model structuring the choices of decision makers. In this sense the 1991 Gulf War may be said to have done more than erase the legacy of the "Vietnam syndrome," it has defeated a revolutionary challenge to the dominant analogical paradigm of post-World War II American foreign policy, and its continued goals to militarily exercise power, selectively intervene where national interests are perceived to be threatened, and actively pursue international leadership.

If one remembers how the lessons of the 1930s and Munich were described and perceived by Truman and later presidents, the sense was that resolute timely action would prevent a worse situation in the future. For example, in the Korean decision Truman explained, "Firmness now would be the only way to deter new actions in other portions of the world...confidence of peoples in countries adjacent to the Soviet Union would be very adversely affected" if the U.S. failed to take action.⁵⁵ And successful action would further serve to deter other aggressive moves elsewhere. "I remembered how each time that the democracies failed to act it had encouraged the aggressors to keep going ahead. Communism was acting in Korea just as Hitler, Mussolini, and the Japanese had acted...."⁵⁶ For Truman the events of the 1930s were seminal, landmark experiences which May asserts had a "conversion effect" on him and evoked his "shame and guilt" because he had supported neutrality legislation. He became convinced that the United States should have led to forcibly oppose aggression.⁵⁷ It is from Truman that we see the admitted conscious awareness that history was to be used to discover foreign policy precedents which would serve as lessons and guides to "right principles" of action.⁵⁸ However other presidents, both Johnson and Kennedy, for their own personal reasons, ascribed to similar perceptions of the "domino theory" or indivisibility of aggression, of "punish the aggressor," and of the need to demonstrate American resolve and protect credibility. The words of Henry Kissinger in the 1975 Mayaguez incident, as reported by President Gerald Ford, are

⁵⁴ Ravenal, *Never Again*, quote, p. 43.

⁵⁵ May, *Lessons of the Past*, pp. 76-77.

⁵⁶ May, *Lessons of the Past*, pp. 81-82.

⁵⁷ May, *Lessons of History*, p. 81.

⁵⁸ May, *Lessons of History*, p. 82.

exemplary: "It is not our choice. But we must act upon it now, and act firmly," otherwise American resolve and prestige could be at stake.⁵⁹ All of these examples and many more underline a central, almost universal, lesson to be found in the Munich analogy: Inaction breeds war. A recent analysis of American motivations in the Gulf War basically updated this lesson:

The breakdown in the post-war global balance of power between the 'east' and 'west' entails the relaxation of the superpower restraints on Third World client states and a potential for more violence and coercive behaviour by a number of regimes in this category. American inaction in response to Iraq's invasion would have risked the message being received...by many of these regimes that similar action by them in the future would not bring forth an American reaction.⁶⁰

Perhaps historians like David Hackett Fischer would respond to the problem of the conundrum over competing analogies with his explanation of the "fallacy of the insidious analogy," whereby unintended and dysfunctional conclusions are drawn, or some other error in analogous reasoning. Others have argued that landmark historical events and experiences (such as the last war) influence the selection and persistence of certain analogies, and that the personal experiences of decision makers (what happened to them than why it happened) are often critical in this selection process.⁶¹ Thus Kennedy when asked about the domino theory responded: "I believe it. I believe it."⁶²

To conclude this preliminary exploration, I think that the answers to the conundrum and the most fertile field for further investigation lie in uncovering the repeated application of certain landmark analogies. Yuen Foong Khong in her provocative work, *Analogies at War*, has done precisely that for the 1965 Vietnam decision. She discovered that the most frequently used Vietnam analogies in public between 1950 and 1966 were Korea and the 1930s; and those most frequently used in private for this time were Korea and the French experience.⁶³ Not only need this type of careful analysis be undertaken for decision making after 1965, but more deconstruction of the main lesson of the most frequently used analogies is needed. For example, other research has also indicated that states cared less about specific issues intrinsically than about the expectations other states might derive from how the issues were dealt with. In short, over time consistency in behavior and adherence to precedent were

⁵⁹ Neustadt and May, *Thinking in Time*, p. 60.

⁶⁰ Ken Matthews, *The Gulf Conflict and International Relations* (New York: Routledge, 1993).

⁶¹ Robert Jervis, "How Decision-Makers Learn from History," in John A. Vasquez, *Classics of International Relations*, 3rd ed. (Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1996), pp. 166-171.

⁶² May, "Lessons" of the Past, p. 93.

⁶³ Khong, *Analogies at War*, pp. 60-61.

extremely important.⁶⁴ The consistent context and import of all historical analogies since World War II have underlined strong and consistent action to repel a threat.

Perhaps such a project might lend support to my earlier argument that the congruence of one central lesson within historical analogies and the salience of this central lesson for deeply held values and landmark experiences and perceptions of decision-makers is significant. Historians call it, "finding the history that fits."⁶⁵ But the critical question remains: History that fits what? Postmodern International relations theorist refer to "intertextual relations," and remind the reader that we have "beliefs because there exist institutionalized interests with respect to how we process information about remote experiences."⁶⁶ This poststructuralist perspective argues that "the orthodoxies of our social and political worlds are recreated" in our writing and our texts "through which our dominant understandings of the world have been constructed."⁶⁷ What impact might this approach have on further understanding of the roles of metaphor and analogy in history and diplomacy?

⁶⁴ Paul A. Anderson, "Justifications and Precedents as Constraints in Foreign Policy Decision-Making," *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 25, No. 4 (November 1981): 741, and 742-43. Anderson quotes Henry Kissinger who explained that in the world, "stability depends upon confidence in American promises." And concludes that "governments have a stake in maintaining certain expectations and in preventing others from being established." Therefore, actions incompatible with "desired precedents and expectations" are generally unacceptable. Notice the adjective "desired."

⁶⁵ Neustadt and May, *Thinking in Time*.

⁶⁶ Michael J. Shapiro, "Textualizing Global Politics," in James Der Derian, and Michael J. Shapiro, eds., *International/Intertextual Relations* (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath, 1989), p. 19.

⁶⁷ Shapiro, "Textualizing," in *International/Intertextual*, p. 18.

How Jetliners Shrank the World About 1960

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Transcontinental air travel had taken two days when the 1930s began, combined with rail links, but by 1936 the venerable Douglas DC-3 could do it in 16 hours without help from the railroads. The world began to shrink about 1860 with long-range rail traffic and the later steamships, but that increasing shrinkage virtually ceased with 1960. A transcontinental flight in 1936 of 16 hours was itself a tremendous improvement over the two-month journey in covered wagons and the three- to five-day trip by railroad. The Boeing Model 317 Stratoliner was developed by 1938 with the B-17 wing, but it came too close to World War II to amount to much. The ten-hour transcontinental flights from 1946 to 1958 were another milestone in shrinking the world, but the five-hour flight that has been common since 1959 has served as the standard now for forty years. The jet age also has the recommendation of providing comparatively cheaper fares, making flights today very common. If we consider shrinking the world as not only a matter of speed but also the availability of economically priced flights, then the blue ribbon goes to 1958.

After the war, the Constellation (a sleek airliner with three vertical tails), the pressurized Douglas DC-6 of 1946, and the Boeing Stratocruiser, the latter a two-decker version of the B-29, all flying at about 300 miles per hour, were the primary aircarriers until jet airliners appeared. Thus, by 1946 the world had already shrunk for the general public, but not as much as it would by 1960. The Consolidated-Vultee B-36 and the swept wing Boeing B-47 jet bomber of 1951 were succeeded in 1954 by the eight-engine B-52s, which carry 20,000 pounds of bombs or missiles and another 40,000 pounds under its wings farther and faster, and about 100 still serve the Air Force, although the last built (the 744th) was in 1962.

Improved airline connections even before jet travel enhanced statehood for Alaska and Hawaii and the expansion of Major League Baseball since 1953 beyond Eastern railroads, and then emerged the international "jet set." Congress created an independent Federal Aviation Administration in 1958 to improve safety. Martin and Convair produced twin-engine airliners to replace the DC-3, now using 100-octane

fuel, and flying became more attractive and safer than taking trains and ocean liners.¹ Soon transatlantic jet flights revealed "jet lag," all-cargo jetliners developed right after passenger jets went into service, and Delta Airlines joined American, Pan American, TWA, United and others as a major carrier. Unfortunately, the immense popularity of jet travel and attractive airports contributed to the decline of city centers.

The jumbo jets, like the Lockheed L-1011 TriStar and the Douglas DC-10, followed the trailblazing by the Boeing 747. Since 1980 the European Airbus Industrie has offered airliners that compete well with Boeing and others, except for the paramount 747. Boeing also produces smaller airliners like the best-selling 737 and the 150-seat 727, and McDonnell Douglas provide the competitive DC-9 and MD-80.

But the story of how civilian jet air transportation developed and shrank the world is itself fascinating.

The de Havilland D.H. 106 Comet was the world's first jet transport to enter service as a passenger airliner, doing so with the British Overseas Airways Corporation. It was an orthodox, low-wing design with leading-edge sweep of 20 degrees, powered by four de Havilland Ghost centrifugal-flow turbojet engines producing 4,450 pounds of thrust and housed within the wing roots. Initially it seated 36 passengers in two pressurized cabins. Its cruising speed was 490 miles per hour, with a range of 1750 miles. The prototype flew in July 1949, and BOAC received a fleet of ten in 1952. The first jet route was from London to Johannesburg, covering 6,700 miles in just under a full day [23 hours, 34 minutes]. The Comet cut twelve hours off the flight to Ceylon and a day and a half off the route to Singapore. The Comets were introduced on many other air routes, drastically reducing flight times. The flight from London to Tokyo became 33 hours and 15 minutes instead of 86 hours, nearly reducing the flight time to one-third. Then Air France and UAT, another French airline, began to fly Comets, while many other airlines had orders for the jetliner.

But then one broke up in the air near Calcutta in 1953, exactly one year after the inaugural Comet passenger flight (*Janes*). In January and April of the next year, two more Comets suffered in-flight structural failures after more than 3000 flights on each airframe (Whitehouse 281, Caidin 109-10), resulting in the withdrawal of the aircraft from passenger routes. The Comet 2s, powered by Rolls Royce Avon engines, were strengthened but diverted from BOAC to the RAF. A "stretch" long-range Comet 3 first flew on July 19, 1954, but it served only as a test vehicle, making a round-the-world flight, and did not go into production. The Comet had failed in the early 1950s to shrink the world.

The world was stunned at the loss of three Comets in a little more than a year, and the grounding of the airliner seriously damaged public opinion about jet flight. The studies of the Comet revealed metal fatigue, previously a little regarded phenomenon,

¹ Some analysts charge that flying on scheduled airliners is less safe than automobiles and trains if one calculates the time spent in the respective vehicles rather than just the overall accident rates, especially rates per passenger mile (Whitehouse 333-37; and on air safety, see 184-87, 280-82, 288-91).

which had begun at the sharp corner of a window in the cabin and allowed explosive decompression at a high altitude (Whitehouse 280). Although designers learned how to overcome metal fatigue, in the race to produce a jet airliner, the baton of jet flying was handed off to Boeing and America.

The phenomenon of metal fatigue had been emphasized in the feature film *No Highway in the Sky*, directed by Henry Koster and starring James Stewart as Theodore Honey. Honey is an awkward British genius who is an aircraft metallurgist and predicts that the tail of a new airliner called the Reindeer would break off after 1440 hours of flight. (Remember, one famous reindeer was named Comet.) In the film, however, the Reindeer is a turboprop aircraft, like the Vickers Viscount and the later Lockheed Electra. After a flight to Labrador and warning airline officials and a movie star named Monica Teasdale played by Marlene Dietrich, Honey pulls the lever of the landing gear to disable the airplane on the ramp. Later, of course, he is vindicated when his tests show that at about 1450 hours of simulated flight, the tail of a test Reindeer does indeed break off. One curiosity is that this British film, which also features Glynis Johns, Jack Hawkins, Elizabeth Allen as Honey's daughter, and Kenneth More as the copilot, appeared in 1951, a full year before the first Comet suffered catastrophic metal fatigue. Robert Robbins, a test pilot through the '40s, has informed me that there were instances of metal fatigue back to 1940, but it was of little consequence, and also that wings of two B-47s actually broke off in flight in 1958 (interview March 9 and 11, 1998).²

In 1957 the Comet was reinstated as BOAC ordered 19 Comet 4s, powered by improved Rolls Royce Avon 524 engines, and could carry from 60 to 81 passengers each. The first Comet 4 flew on April 27, 1958, and on October 4 BOAC inaugurated Comet service from London to New York, but the range of the Comet 4 was inadequate for this demanding route. Airlines in Argentina and East Africa and the RAF flew Comet 4s, and in 1959 improved versions were introduced. The Model C went into service in 1960, and a total of 112 Comets of all models were produced. The type was far outclassed, however, by the Boeing 707 and the Douglas DC-8, so that future Comets, instead of capitalizing on having innovated public jet air transportation, merely became the Nimrod reconnaissance aircraft for the RAF.

In 1952 Boeing managers foresaw the end of the production of the Model 367 Stratocruisers and the Air Force tanker KC-97. Having provided the United States Air Force with six-jet B-47 bombers and already the eight-jet B-52 bombers, Boeing gambled that the Air Force would need a high-speed jet tanker to refuel these jet bombers

² Robert Robbins told me that about 1955 Boeing became aware that the newer and lighter aluminum alloy they used since about 1948 was too brittle and very susceptible to metal fatigue. Boeing began to produce the B-52Bs with an older and less critical alloy, and the "skin" on the wings of B-47s, KC-135s, and B-52Gs were retrofitted, so that many of these aircraft aside from B-47s, are still in use. Of the two B-47s that broke apart in 1958, one was near Homestead Air Force Base, Florida, and the other was near Tulsa, Oklahoma. The 707 had the advantage from the beginning of the superior aluminum alloy (Interview, March 11, 1998).

in the air. Their gamble was dicey for a few years, but in August 1954 the Air Force announced that it would buy a few of these new jets, which Boeing obscurely called the Model 367-80, or the "Dash Eighty," and the Air Force called the KC-135 (Caidin 135, 145-46). That decision was the beginning of another great aviation story, for the model became not only the 717 (for C-135s and KC-135s) but also was enlarged as the 707 and the 720, the first great success as an international passenger jet airliner. One of the main test pilots for Boeing from 1944 to 1948, Robert Robbins, who introduced the B-47 bomber to the world in 1947, is proud to observe that virtually all the succeeding jet airliners, save the little used supersonic Concorde, follow the general configuration that Boeing developed for that early bomber (Caidin 135, 141, 144-46).

While the British Comet was sinking under the weight of the tragedies of structural failures in 1954, Boeing had the benefit of de Havilland's failures and of its own expertise to produce an airliner that, more than any other, continues to stand for jet travel. Juan Trippe, the legendary president of Pan American World Airways, risked \$296 million dollars in April 1955 by ordering 20 Boeing 707s and 25 DC-8s. United Airlines ordered thirty DC-8s, and then American Airlines ordered thirty more 707s, which enabled Boeing to begin production the most famous jetliner until the emergence of the 747. TWA resisted jet aircraft for a while until it had to buy jets to be competitive. In 1956 the 707 outsold the DC-8 three to one (Heppenheimer 169). A 707 cost about \$5.5 million.

The first production 707 was delivered to Pan American in the middle of August 1958, nearly four months after the Comet 4 entered service. The 707, however, appeared three months ahead of schedule, and reporters gloated that the jetliner was like "a penthouse in the sky" and "like flying ten miles a minute in my easy chair." Another advantage was that established pilots adapted easily to jet flying. The world began to shrink for good in October 1958 when Pan Am assigned the only two 707s available at the time to fly transatlantic, replacing six piston-engine airliners. The passenger load on each 707 was 109 seats, including 65 in economy class. Two months later Pan Am leased 707s to National Airlines to fly happy passengers from New York to Miami, and profits rose. In January 1959 American Airlines placed 707s in transcontinental service (Caidin 63, 116), and other airlines followed. In December 1959 one 707, assisted by the jet stream, clocked a speed of 626 miles per hour and crossed the Atlantic in 5 hours and 41 minutes. More people bought airline tickets, and by October 12, 1959, in barely fourteen months, a million passengers had flown on the 707, thanks especially to the affordable prices and the attractiveness of speedy travel. Airline profits soared even higher through cargo revenue.

There were a few incidents with 707s in 1959, but only one fatal accident (Whitehouse 288-90). The autopilot on a 707 caused a tense moment in a transatlantic flight in February 1959, and a defective electronic device caused a fatal crash at Idlewild Airport (now JFK) on March 1, 1962, but there was no structural failure and the aircraft proved to be a reliable and safe giant. In August 1959 the 707 Intercontinental versions

arrived, able to carry 189 passengers for up to 5000 miles. In barely 18 days in July 1960, Sabena Belgian World Airlines flew its five 707 Intercontinentals nonstop day and night to ferry 15,000 people to safety from a bloody rebellion from Leopoldville in the Congo to Brussels. On one flight 303 passengers flew the 4000 miles, and altogether there were 62 round trips that carried an average of more than 250 people per flight.

In 1960, moreover, Pan Am's North Atlantic route had 91.5 percent of all seats filled, and American had 95.3 percent of seats filled on transcontinental flights, and other lines had exceptional records (Whitehouse 291). Passengers doubled from 1950 to 1960, and they doubled and doubled again by 1970 even before the advent of the jumbo jets (Whitehouse 311-12, Morrison and Winston 7, "Aviation," *Grolier*). In 1959, 51 million passengers flew on domestic air routes, and in 1969 the number had risen to 120 million (Whitehouse 318). Total air passengers on all the American airlines rose from 418,000 in 1930, to 20 million in 1950, to 58 million in 1960, to 170 million in 1970, to nearly 300 million in 1980, to 465.6 million in 1990, and nearly 500 million in 1993 (Morrison and Winston 7).

In 1946, while New York's Grand Central Station served 65 million riders of the rails, La Guardia airport served 2.1 million passengers, Washington National served 757,000, Chicago's Midway airport served 1.3 million, and Los Angeles served 760,000 people (Heppenheimer 131), but these numbers became dwarfed after 1960 and jet travel. Twenty-one years later, in 1967, Chicago's O'Hare airport had 27 million passengers, which rose to 40 million in 1975 and 60 million by 1990 (Whitehouse 319, *World Book Almanac*, 1993). Without the jet airliners, the increase in air passengers might have doubled every twenty years after 1957. At that rate the number of passengers would have been about 100 million in 1977 and 200 million in 1997, but the total passengers by 1997 was about 600 million. The increase of threefold more than an expected basic increase can be attributed especially to the convenience of jetliners, which shrank the world about 1960.

The second-generation DC-8 broke the sound barrier in 1961 and regularly flew at 634 m.p.h. over 8800 miles. Moreover, air safety of the airlines increased, and the public took further note of the estimable Boeing Airplane Company. Thus, as even many timid passengers agreed to fly, it was by 1960 that the world shrank and ocean-going liners were doomed. The Douglas DC-8 deserves much of the credit, behind the outstanding leader of the Boeing Airplane Company. It took the safe and reliable Boeing 707 to overcome the public's hesitation to fly jets, especially after the debacle of the British Comets in 1953 and 1954. By 1960 the public had largely forgotten the terrible history of the Comet. With the safety of jet engines, the fatality rates per million airline departures (in a three-year moving average) dropped significantly, until it went from 1.2 in 1977 to 0.7 in 1985 and down to 0.2 in 1993 (Morrison and Winston 32).

Passengers flocked to the jetliners (Whitehouse 294). The future of the airlines in the 1970s may have been as bleak as some analysts forecast, for then as now smaller

cities had scant air service, but not so with the larger cities, which thrived beyond anyone's wildest dreams. Eastern, Braniff, and Pan Am did ultimately fail,³ while the surviving airlines profit through less generous service, but the number of passengers did rise dramatically and the ability to span the world increased amazingly. The public now has little choice but to accept being squeezed into jumbo airliners for long flights, except for the few who can afford lavish first-class service. The chief advantage has become the relative brevity of uncomfortable flying.

In 1967 Pan American, which also operated hotels and provided aerospace services, was the world's largest air-cargo carrier and was rich. It earned about \$1.1 billion from operating revenues, for a profit of about \$65 million, and in that year Pan Am had 14.9 billion passenger miles, and increase of 12.7 percent over 1966, with about 8.5 million passengers, an increase of 15.2 percent, and about a 62 percent seat capacity (Whitehouse 304, 306). The world did indeed shrink for good in 1958-59.

About 1956 General Curtis LeMay⁴ could foresee the future of aviation. Considering the leap from the first Wright Flyer of 1903 to the B-52 bomber of 1953, the general prophesied, "There will be more progress in the air in the next fifty years than in the last fifty" (Mansfield 374). The quantum leaps became possible, but economies and social issues generally restricted increases of jetliner speeds and, instead, jetliners offered increased total weights and improved jet engines. But General LeMay presciently expected the industry to fly men to the moon when most Americans dismissed that as a comic-book fantasy and envisioned the Space Shuttle and the Soviet Mir space station.

Boeing 707s are not seen much today at city airports, for their original engines are too loud for modern regulations (Caidin 69-72), but the Air Force still flies many KC-135s and E-3s, which were given improved engines. The Air Force had nearly 900 overall, counting 50 E-3 AWACS reconnaissance aircraft, which are based on the Model 707, and a few that served as Air Force One, until it was replaced in 1990 by a B-747.

One test of the popularity of an airplane is that it misleads many people. For example, the Douglas DC-8 looks very similar to the 707. Its wings are swept back 30 degrees rather than 35 degrees, but who can tell? Most people would call a DC-8 a 707 just because the Boeing airliner is so much more famous and highly regarded. The DC-8 was a worthy competitor to the 707 except initially for its shorter range, a range

³Pan American World Airways made a tentative comeback in 1997 and continued to struggle along into 1998, but it was hardly a mere shadow of its former glory.

⁴General Curtis E. LeMay (born in 1906) was the most extraordinary tactician and strategist of the United States Air Force, who virtually saved the Eighth Air Force of the Army Air Corps in England during World War Two, perfected the bombing of Japan in 1945, initiated the famed Berlin Airlift in 1948, improved the later Strategic Air Command and its B-36s, B-47s, B-52s, and jet tankers, and became the Air Force Chief of Staff from 1961 to 1965. Although George Wallace's racist views disturbed him, he campaigned for Vice President as Governor Wallace's running mate in 1968 to undermine the campaign of Hubert Humphrey, although the decision cost him his national reputation (Walter J. Boyne, "LeMay," *Air Force Magazine*, March 1998, 60-67).

far extended in a later version. Fully 556 DC-8s were built, but about 1700 Boeing models were built as 707s, C-135s, KC-135s, and B-3s.

The Boeing 707 four-jet airliner became popular in 1958, the similar DC-8 the next year, and "jumbo jets" and "wide-body jets" began service in 1969 with the 400- and 500-passenger Boeing 747s, a design the Air Force rejected in 1962 in favor of the Lockheed C-5 Galaxy. The C-5A itself replaced a long line of huge military cargo planes, like the Douglas C-124 Globemaster, and overshadowed the Lockheed C-141 Starlifter. Unfortunately the jumbo jets of Lockheed and Douglas, the L-1011 and the DC-10, respectively, seriously impaired the financial health of both companies and forced their mergers with other manufacturers. But now that the world is as small as it has been for forty years, the future holds something like the X-30 of NASA and the Air Force or the X-33 National Space Plane being proposed by various manufacturers ("X-series Aircraft," *Grolier*). The X-33 is currently a contest between three versions, one offered by McDonnell Douglas and Boeing, for a trans-atmospheric vehicle that could fly from New York to Beijing in two hours at Mach 20. Perhaps General LeMay foresaw this possibility as well.

The present thesis, however, is especially that about 1960 the world shrank dramatically, and that primarily occurred through the speeds and attractiveness of jet air travel. Notable shrinkage of the world occurred in 1936 and by 1950, but that was cut in half in 1958-59, along with lower fares. Airline speeds leaped from 300 miles per hour in 1950 to 600 miles per hour in 1960, which proves this point all by itself. A transcontinental flight that took two days in 1930 was reduced to ten hours by 1950 and was reduced to a flight of less than five hours by 1960.⁵ A nonstop transatlantic airline flight was not even possible in 1930 and improbable in 1940, and it took a demanding twelve hours by 1950, but only six hours in 1958, a time that remains in effect today, forty years later. The attractiveness of flying in a 707 or a DC-8 by 1960 further contributed to making the world smaller not just theoretically but in actual and common practice.

Whether the Space Plane will become popular depends on its cost. I can see that the public will be flying the latest models of the 747, the new Boeing 777, and other airliners for the next thirty years. Despite the congestion in seating preferred by the major airlines, tremendous improvements in the power and quietness of recent jet engines, fortunately, make jet flying as attractive as it remains (Heppenheimer 348-50).

⁵ For views on aviation about 1940, which was severely curtailed by the developing World War, see Whitehouse 266 and 269.

Table 1: Selected Airlines

Year ^a	Manufacturer	Model	Type ^b	Power ^c	Passengers	Speed ^d	Range
1930	Boeing	247	2 recip	550 hp	10	160	750 mi.
1936	Douglas	DC-3	2 recip	1000 hp	28-36	180	1025 mi.
1938	Boeing ^e	317	4 recip	1100 hp	35	220	2390 mi.
1943	Lockheed	Constellation	4 recip	2200 hp	40	290	3500 mi.
1945	Boeing ^f	377	4 recip	3500 hp	100	300	4000 mi.
1946	Douglas	DC-6	4 recip	2100 hp	52	310	3000 mi.
1951	Vickers	Vicount	4 tprop	2000 hp	65	357	1587 mi.
1952	de Havilland	Comet 1	4 jets-c	4450 lb	36	490	1750 mi.
1958	Boeing	707	4 jets-a	19,999 lb	170	605	3000 mi.
1958	de Havilland	Comet 4	4 jets-a	10,500 lb	81	500	2000 mi.
1959	Lockheed ^g	L-188	4 tprop	4000 hp	80	405	3000 mi.
1959	Douglas	DC-8	4 jets-a	15,000 lb	176	600	2600 mi.
1970	Boeing	747	4 jets-a	47,000 lb	400	590	6500 mi.
1971	Douglas	DC-10	3 jets-a	40,000 lb	270	564	4600 mi.
1972	Lockheed	L-1011 Tristar	3 jets-a	50,000 lb	300	558	6000 mi.
1974	Airbus	A300	2 jets-a	52,500 lb	269	567	3700 mi.
1976	B&E/Aerospa- tiale	Concorde	4 jets-a	38,000 lb	130	1200	4100 mi.
1982	Boeing	767	2 jets-a	44,300 lb	250	600	2500 mi.
1995	Boeing	777 ^h	2 jets-a	95,000 lb	305	600	4630 mi.
c. 2010	Consortium	X-33 Space Plane	6 scramjets		200?	Mach 20	25,000 mi.

^a The year in which the airliner first went into passenger service.

^b Number of engines, and whether reciprocating (radial or inline), jet (centrifugal or axial), or turboprop (jet prop).

^c Horsepower for reciprocating engines and turboprops or pounds of thrust for jets, rating cited for each engine.

^d Cruising speed in miles per hour.

^e Boeing Stratoliner, designed in conjunction with the famed B-17

^f Boeing Stratocruiser, designed in conjunction with the famed B-29

^g Lockheed Electra, one of a long line of distinguished airliners of the same name

^h Basic data on the original 777 was furnished by Mr. Michael Lombardi of Boeing Airplane Company (March 11, 1998).

NOTE: Some of the above airliners, most notably the Lockheed Constellation, the Douglas DC-6 and DC-8, and the Boeing 707, 747, and 777 went through many improvements in design over the years. The DC-8, of course, is credited to McDonnell Douglas Aircraft Company through a merger in 1967. The Lockheed L-188 Electra was withdrawn about 1962 because of structural failure near the tail, but a newer and slightly smaller model continues to fly as the Navy's P-3 Orion reconnaissance aircraft. The Boeing 737 is now the best-selling airliner, save only for the venerable DC-3 that hails back to 1936 and which still flies. The newest Pratt & Whitney engine for the Boeing 777 is rated at 105,000 pounds of thrust (Lombardi), merely 15 years since the most powerful airline engines were rated at about 45,000 pounds.

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Bitterly Against Us: Slave and Free Black Women in Florida During the Civil War

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*"A LIKELY NEGRO GIRL—a good washer and ironer and seamstress."
Florida Sentinel, advertisement, December 9, 1862*

When Elizabeth Coffee Sheldon's father left his Madison County plantation, he made a farewell speech to his family and the assembled slaves. Years later, his daughter fondly remembered the address. "My father bids farewell to his slaves, and to their care and protection he leaves his home, his wife, his two little girls, his all." After illness shortened his military career, Sheldon's father returned to his estate. On learning of Lee's surrender, he decided to inform his bondsmen of their freedom, telling them they had the option of leaving or staying. "The Negroes received the intelligence without the slightest demonstration," Sheldon recalled, proudly noting that all of her father's former chattel elected to remain on the plantation.¹

Southerners comforted themselves with this image after the cause was lost, arguing that their imprisonment of a people had somehow been beneficial, and that most blacks had lovingly worn their chains. On the surface, with no major slave uprisings or massacres, Florida had been a land of relative contentment, where slaves were either too loyal or too terrified to oppose their masters. However, when individual accounts are collected, a very different picture—one of quiet but dogged determination to be free—begins to emerge. Though usually ignored in the story, slave women contributed to this quest for freedom and dignity, and their experiences are worth seeking.

The 1860 census enumerated 30,397 female slaves in Florida, compared to 31,348

¹Elizabeth Coffee Sheldon, "My Old Black Mammy," in *United Daughters of the Confederacy, Florida Division Scrapbooks, Vol. 3, Florida State Archives, Tallahassee*. Afterwards cited as *UDC Scrapbooks*.

male slaves.² Most female slaves lived on plantations or farms, and were concentrated in the cotton region known as 'Middle Florida.' Others worked in towns, serving as cooks, nurses, and laundresses. In agricultural areas, the labor women performed depended greatly on the size of the estate and the nature of the owner or overseer. The larger the plantation, the greater the chance that an individual slave would perform sex-typed work such as cooking or sewing; on most estates the women worked in the fields. Even on prosperous plantations, women's seasonal fieldwork was essential. The fertility of female slaves was a calculation planters did not ignore, and some children of slaves recalled that their mothers were purchased as 'breeders'. A female valued for her childbearing might receive better treatment and praise from her owner, but few women escaped the grueling work in Florida's fields. Records from Chemoninee Plantation in Jefferson County note the number of female slaves who fainted from the heat while working in cotton.³

Unlike their mistresses who publicly demonstrated their loyalty to the Confederacy or confided their thoughts to letters and diaries, slave women are historically mute. Few could read or write, and to assert any sentiment in opposition to their owners was to court punishment. Much work remains to be done on the first hand remembrances of slaves, in Florida and elsewhere, but outside observers did record comments and actions of Florida's slaves. While the sources must be viewed critically, many of the actions speak volumes for how slaves, especially women, felt about and reacted to their condition.

Labor management was one of the key problems faced by women of the slaveholding South as their men departed for the battlefield. Plantation mistresses were certainly experienced in dealing with domestics, and in tackling duties such as providing clothing or medical care, but many were not comfortable with supervising field work outside of the 'big house'.⁴ Letters from soldier husbands and fathers contained advice on how to deal with slaves. While most seem to focus on the male labor force, some of the instructions were directed towards the management of female slaves. George Washington Parkhill, master of the Tuscawilla plantation in Leon County and a Captain in the 2nd Florida Infantry, wrote to his wife Lizzie that she "must take a girl out of the field and learn her what you wish her to do"—perhaps a daunting task to a woman insecure in her new role as plantation manager. New strategies for work, punishment, and rewards were constantly being negotiated between mistresses and maids.⁵

²*Eighth Census*, 1860, Vol. 1, Population, 54.

³Female slavery in Florida seems to follow the outlines discussed by Kenneth Stampp in *The Peculiar Institution*. For more specific discussions of the nature of slavery in Florida, see Julia Floyd Smith, *Slavery and Plantation Growth in Antebellum Florida, 1821-1860* and Edwin L. Williams, Jr., "Negro Slavery in Florida" in the *Florida Historical Quarterly*, Vol. 28.

⁴See "Slave of Slaves" in Catherine Clinton, *The Plantation Mistress: Woman's World in the Old South* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1982), 16-35.

⁵George Washington Parkhill to Lizzie Parkhill, 13 October 1861, George Washington Parkhill Letters, 1861-1862, Special Collections, Florida State University, Tallahassee.

Florida's slaves contributed to the Confederacy by continuing to labor in the fields, producing the staples to finance and feed the troops, as well as the local population. Domestic workers of the Watkins family of Bartow were sent out to labor for Confederate ladies, a task that drew a pointed comment from one slave, when she told her young mistress "Missis L. Say you father he sending us to wash to help her husband fight to keep us slaves."⁶ On the Pine Hill plantation near Tallahassee, domestics also served as tutors to Susan Bradford Eppes and her mother, who had forgotten the arts of spinning and weaving. Other slave women contributed their knowledge of herbs and roots, demonstrating how to produce natural dyes for clothing and home remedies.⁷

If slave management became too difficult, or the family coffers depleted, then slave women might find themselves serving as financial assets for Florida families. The price of slaves rose during the war due to labor shortages, and a 'likely female' could raise ready cash. Wartime newspapers continued to carry advertisements for slaves of women and children, often to cover debts. A woman might be more prone to find herself on the auction block than a male who would be still be needed in the fields. In towns, despite strict laws designed to curb the practice, female slaves were still rented out to neighbors for kitchen or washing duty.⁸

While women like Susan Bradford Eppes or Elizabeth Coffee Sheldon later remembered their domestics as cheerful and willing allies in the war effort, other women reported that female slaves were surly and disrespectful during the conflict. Sarah L. Jones, the English governess employed by Governor Milton's family at Slyvania, Milton's Jackson Country plantation, found her black charges particularly exasperating. Jane, a slave girl given to her as a personal servant was, in the governess' view, "a hideous picture of sullen, dogged stupidity" whose constant expression was a spiteful glare. Mrs. Milton frequently ordered Jane to the overseer for punishment, but cuts with a whip, which the girl refused to even acknowledge, did not improve her nature.⁹ If anything, the beatings made Jane more incorrigible. When Jane purposely blotched such simple assignments as lighting fires, Jones worked up the nerve to do as Mrs. Milton had suggested and "cuff" Jane for disobedience, landing two weak blows on Jane's back. Jane turned, and in an "underground" voice that terrified the teacher, told her how her former mistress had *never* struck her, indicating her contempt for the cowering Jones. The teacher later concluded that "in spite of her temper, (Jane)

⁶Margaret Watkins Gibbs, *Memory Diary of Mrs. George Gibbs*, St. Augustine Historical Society Collection, St. Augustine.

⁷Susan Bradford Eppes, *Through Some Eventful Years* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida [facsimile edition], 1968), 147, 162, and Eppes, *The Negro of the Old South: A Bit of Period History* (Chicago: Joseph G. Branch Publishing Company, 1925), 109-111.

⁸ Julia Floyd Smith, *Slavery and Plantation Growth in Antebellum Florida 1821-1860* (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1973), 50.

⁹Catherine Cooper Hopley, *Life in the South* (New York: Augustus M. Kelley [reprint edition], 1971), vol. 2, 258-259.

respected herself, and was really very unhappy, from loneliness and want of sympathy." Aware that her parents in South Carolina were already free and working for the Yankees, Jane probably did not expect to be burdened with Jones' petty tyranny for much longer.¹⁰

Flora, assigned as a nurse to the youngest Milton child, also seemed to be waging a private psychological war against the teacher. She would bring the baby to the classroom, allow him to scatter his toys, then abruptly announce "Missus calls!" Seizing the child, she dashed from the room, leaving the toys for the governess to retrieve. On other occasions, she would move at a snail's pace, pretending not to understand commands to close doors and windows. Pushed beyond patience, the governess slapped her. Flora continued to meander through her chores, acting as if she had not felt the blow. Only the teacher's hand was hurt.¹¹

Octavia Stephens found that war and matriarchs made for surly domestics. When her mother moved into Rose Cottage, the Stephens' plantation near Welaka for the duration, the house slaves, Jane and Jesse, made it clear that "two bosses" were too much for one household. They became disrespectful, complaining constantly about the extra work. When Stephens threatened to beat Jane, Jane replied tartly that "she would rather be whipped to death than worked to death." Such small rebellions indicated the will of black women to resist their enslavement in ways that would not threaten their lives or families, but would still punish their owners.¹²

Some slave women indicated their discontent with their situation during the war by refusing to feel sympathy for whites, or even by teasing former owners about their misfortunes. Brought to Tampa as a child in 1854, Sarah Brown endured a painful separation from her mother. When she cried, her mistress beat her. As a young woman in this frontier region, Brown held a variety of jobs. She was a chambermaid at the Florida House hotel, a field hand, a nursemaid, and finally a laborer in a salt works. She witnessed the brutal treatment of a deranged female slave, who was hitched to a plough and forced to pull it around a field. This "cure" killed the woman. During the war, Brown and other women at the salt works watched Union gunboats shelling Tampa; their thoughts were not recorded, but can easily be imagined. Brown returned to her mistress' home and found the woman sobbing. When asked why, her mistress explained that her husband was in service and might be killed. Brown took the opportunity to remind her white owner of the many beatings she had received for crying when separated from her mother. With caustic bluntness, Brown told her owner that weeping "would not do her any good."¹³ In Key West, where freedom came early for many slaves, a former bondwoman watched in amusement as her refined mistress struggled to plant a garden. Leaning on the fence, confidence in her

¹⁰Ibid, 279-283.

¹¹Ibid, 283-285.

¹²Ellen Hodges Patterson, "The Stephens Family in Florida." (M.A. Thesis, Gainesville, 1979), 51.

¹³"One Time Slave Sheds Light on Life in Tampa," *Tampa Tribune*, 5 June 1988.

new status, she asked her one-time owner about the work and "how she liked it."¹⁴

As a slave state, Florida was not friendly to its "free colored" population before the war. Their numbers were very small; only 932 were listed in the 1860 census and all but 326 of these persons lived in cities and towns, with the heaviest concentrations in Pensacola, Jacksonville, Key West, and St. Augustine. A majority, 643, were mulattoes. Women accounted for slightly more than half of the free black population.¹⁵ Numerous state and local laws made common actions difficult for this class. Any free black person judged by whites to be "idle" or "dissolute" could be seized and sold into slavery. In Pensacola, home to the largest population of free blacks, they were often assessed special tax, including a \$2 fee to put on any form of entertainment.¹⁶ A legislative act of 1848 required free Negroes in Florida to establish a white person as a legal guardian. Another act in 1856 added provisions for enforcement, following complaints that the law was lax in St. Augustine and Pensacola. Free blacks who failed to obey could be arrested and fined. Despite these hardships, some free blacks fared well, including Martha Dexter of Duval County, who in 1860 had \$5,000 in real estate and a personal estate estimated at \$52,000. Most free black women lived as best they could, working as servants, seamstresses, laundresses, and midwives.¹⁷

The free population of Florida increased during the war whether whites approved or not. Despite the legends of loyal servants who hid the silver and protected mistresses from Yankee insults, many slaves expressed their true desires by abandoning their owners at the first opportunity. Master and mistresses tried to secure their investments by spreading stories of Yankee atrocities, warning that the Union men would throw children in the rivers or sell them in Cuba. Some even portrayed the Yankees as subhumans or demons, complete with hooves and pointed tails. These stories may have terrified children or a few superstitious elders, but slaves generally equated Yankees with freedom.¹⁸ Sensible masters and mistresses tried to keep their slaves ignorant of troop movements, realizing, as Ellen Call Long of Tallahassee did, they should be "far from thinking that they [slaves] will not succumb to Yankee authority if it should approach them."¹⁹ Some owners, secure in the interior, did

¹⁴"At the Dry Tortugas During the War: A Lady's Journal," *The Californian Illustrated* (1892), 103.

¹⁵Smith, *Slavery and Plantation Growth*, 111-112; *Eighth Census*, 1860, Vol. 1, Population, p. 54. There were 478 female free blacks to 454 males. Of these 325 females were considered mulattoes, as were 318 males.

¹⁶Kenneth Stampp, *The Peculiar Institution*, p. 216; John Hope Franklin and Alfred A. Moss, Jr, *From Slavery to Freedom*, 6th edition (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1988), 141.

¹⁷Ruth B. Barr and Modeste Hargis, "The Voluntary Exile of Free Negroes Of Pensacola," *Florida Historical Quarterly* 17 (July 1938): 8-10; Smith, *Slavery and Plantation Growth In Florida*, 119-120; Russell Garvin, "The Free Negro in Florida Before the Civil War," *Florida Historical Quarterly* 46 (July 1967): 12.

¹⁸*Philadelphia Inquirer*, 22 February 1864; Bell Irvin Wiley, *Southern Negroes* (New York: Rinehart & Company, Inc., 1938), 12-18. Ironically, slave parents sometimes used the threat of Yankees to keep naughty children in line!

¹⁹Ellen Call Long, *Southern Breezes; or, Florida, New and Old* (Gainesville: University of Florida Press [facsimile edition], 1962), 331.

manage to prevent their slaves from learning how close they were to freedom. A former slave from Suwanne County recalled that the residents of his plantation had "hardly been aware that there had been a war going on," while Thomas Lenton of Jefferson County managed to keep his field hands unaware of the war's end until the spring crops could be planted in 1865. However, for most whites the slave grapevine was a far better intelligence service that either the Union or the Confederacy could ever devise. Amanda McCray, a seamstress and domestic on a plantation in Madison County, recalled that she first learned of the war from another slave who then led them in secret prayers for the Union soldiers. "Contrabands," as escapees were called, were soon a common sight.²⁰

As Union forces moved into Florida and Confederate families fled into the interior or to other states, slaves found prime opportunities to escape. Refugeeing caused confusion and hardship on families, black and white. Slaves were separated from spouses and children, the old, disabled, or very young were sometimes simply abandoned to the Yankees. Slaves on the march could flee, their absence not noted in the general mayhem until too late. Sometimes entire families ran away, hurrying to the Union lines where food, clothing, and medical attention waited.²¹ In May 1864, a small craft filled with 30 slaves raised a white flag and was taken aboard the steamer *Magnolia* on the St. Johns River. Esther Hill Hawks, a woman doctor with the troops, issued rations to the women as the men were quickly drafted for labor in the camps. She interviewed only the female contrabands, and came to the conclusion that they "are intelligent and active—and many of them have picked up a little book learning. It is not uncommon to find a *fair* reader among those who have always been slaves." An educated member of any escape party was certainly an asset.²²

Though many slaves remained on plantations, sometimes within the sound of gunfire, it is doubtful that they did so out of an exaggerated sense of loyalty. Some many have been treated decently, and others might have thought their chances better remaining on the plantation than slipping away to an uncertain fate.²³ Certainly those beyond the gates harbored few illusions about whites. Susie King, a laundress for the 1st South Carolina Volunteers, a black unit, spoke with rebel families in Jacksonville during the 1863 Union occupation. She noted that the white women complained about having only hardtack to eat and refused to offer hospitality to their black visitors. "They were bitterly against our people," King wrote in her memoirs, "and had

²⁰*Slave Narratives: A Folk History of Slavery in the United States, From Interviews With Former Slaves, Florida Narratives* (St. Clair Shores, Minnesota: Scholarly Press, 1976), Vol. 17, 98, 165-166, 214-215.

²¹Mrs. L. Thompson, "Reminiscences of the War," UDC Scrapbooks, Vol. 1; Brian E. Michaels, *The River Flows North: A History of Putnam County, Florida* (Palatka: Putnam County Archives and History Commission, 1976), 99.

²²Gerald Schwartz, ed., *A Woman Doctor's Civil War: Esther Hill Hawks' Diary* (Columbia: University of South Carolina press, 1984), 77.

²³Thelma Bates, "The Legal Status of the Negro in Florida," *Florida Historical Quarterly* 6 (January 1828): 172.

no mercy or sympathy for us."²⁴

Free blacks and slaves who found their way to freedom quickly took advantage of its opportunities to find work for themselves. Women turned to traditional tasks of cooking and cleaning, finding jobs where ever Union soldiers were stationed. Aunt Eliza, a former slave hired by Emily Holder, wife of a Union surgeon at Ft. Jefferson, was already a famous cook in Key West when she found employment. She quickly became a familiar sight to the troops, stooped from working long hours in fields, her front teeth gone, and smelling strongly of tobacco from her odorous pipe. She had abandoned her slave husband for a younger man, Jack, who was thirty to her fifty. Jack was somewhat shiftless, causing his bride to occasionally threaten him with an ax. Eliza retained habits from her slave days, including devouring all the food her employers failed to eat, but obviously enjoyed her new life as a free person.²⁵ Amanda McCray eventually left the plantation in Madison County to become a cook for Union troops. Other black women, especially in Key West and Union occupied coastal cities, sold fried cakes to the servicemen, who noted their friendliness and their willingness to talk about their experiences in slavery.²⁶ In seeking opportunities, not all former slave women were successful or noble. In St. Augustine, a young mulatto woman was forcibly ejected from Fort Marion for annoying a Union regiment, and in Fernandina white teachers complained of an elderly black women "enslaving" a black orphan.²⁷

Education for their children was another essential concern of black women. Chloe Merrick and Cornelia Smith, teachers supported by the Freedmen's Relief Association of Syracuse, established a school in Fernandina in December 1862, enrolling some 70-80 pupils who had already begun informal instruction under the tutorage of soldiers, ministers, and freedwomen. The teachers held mothers' meetings weekly and observed that whites could learn much from the spirit of co-operation in the black community. In Jacksonville, Esther Hill Hawks noted how one scholar, a former slave girl, expressed bitterness towards her former owner. "She never give me 'nuff to eat," the youngster charged, and begged Hawks to teach her how to write so she could pen a letter to her mistress, telling her about all the good food she now savored and how she hoped her mistress was starving.²⁸

Black women celebrated their freedom vibrantly. In St. Augustine, they marched

²⁴Patricia W. Romero, ed., *A Black Woman's Civil War Memoirs* (New York: Markus Wiener Publishing, 1988), 56.

²⁵"At the Dry Tortugas," 87-89.

²⁶*Slaves Narratives*, Vol. 17, 212-213; *A Few of the Reminiscences in the Life of a Soldier of the 110th N. Y. Vols.* By Wm. S. Stebbins, Oswego County Historical Society, n.p. in Lewis G. Schmidt Papers, Florida State Archives.

²⁷*Diary of Elias A. Bryant* (4th New Hampshire Regiment) in Lewis G. Schmidt Papers, Florida State Archives; Sarah Whitmer Foster and John T. Foster, Jr., "Chloe Merrick Reed: Freedom's First Lady," *Florida Historical Quarterly* 71 (January 1993): 286.

²⁸Foster and Foster, "Chloe Merrick Reed," 284-285; Schwartz, ed., *A Woman Doctor's Civil War*, 69-70.

in Emancipation Day parades with their spouses and children, then listened to speeches on patriotism. Their children gave public performances of popular tunes, including *Thrice Happy Days*. In a mirror image of white society, black women took the initiative in planning fundraisers and parties. *The Peninsula* of Fernandina noted that two committee of colored ladies had been established to plan the refreshments for the 1863 celebration of Independence day. All were proper matrons, and were known to be experienced cooks and caterers. "The affair promises to be a complete success," the paper predicted. The same could be said for freedom.²⁹

²⁹William Watson Davis, *The Civil War and Reconstruction in Florida* (Gainesville: University of Florida press [facsimile edition], 1964), 237; Fernandina *The Peninsula*, 2 July 1863.

Review Essay: Meeting the Challenge: Fulfilling Florida Gulf Coast University's Mandate for Technology and History

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On August 25, 1997, Florida Gulf Coast University opened for students. The nation's newest university, located in Southwest Florida, has as its primary mission undergraduate education, with a broad range of programs in the arts and sciences. The programs are planned for community college transfer students and beginning freshmen. Selected graduate programs will be introduced as needs and as resources allow. Important elements of the university center on quality undergraduate education, alternative learning and teaching systems, convenience of class scheduling, distance learning, and the critical use of technology in instruction.

While at the University of South Florida's Fort Myers' Campus, I created FGCU's History Program during the school's formative process; I now serve as FGCU's History Program Director. My mission has been to establish a new and dynamic program, emphasizing an interdisciplinary approach, hands-on community service and historical agency experience, and the quality use of technology for instruction and distance learning. I have also stressed flexibility of student matriculation as opposed to the typically rigid history program requirements at many established universities. Currently, the FGCU History Program includes two other full-time faculty—Dr. Jacquelyn Kent and Dr. Eric Strayhorn—and a number of adjuncts working with me. In the near future, I hope to gain new hires in women's history, early American history, public history, and museum management.

The new History Program grew directly from FGCU's Mission Statement and Guiding Principles as promulgated early in the evolution of the school. The most relevant sections of the Mission Statement included:

✦The new university, located in Southwest Florida has, as its primary mission, undergraduate education, with a broad range of programs in arts and sciences, business, environmental science, computer science, education, nursing/allied health, and social services.

✦The region in which the university will be located combines rapid population growth in a geographically constrained area, the Gulf of Mexico to the west and Lake Okeechobee to the east, with a unique and sensitive environment. The university, therefore, will be ideally suited to emphasize study of the environment. Specialized degree programs will draw students from throughout Florida and beyond, especially as alternative teaching systems and technology are employed.

✦Graduate education and continuing education will primarily serve the needs of part-time working individuals whose professional growth will demand programs arranged at convenient times, places, and in modules to accommodate their employment. In addition to the traditional campus program schedule, a "weekend college" program will be offered in selected subject areas to enable students to earn complete degrees solely through evening and weekend study.

✦An important element of the university will be the variety of alternative learning and teaching systems. Parts of many degree programs will be available via television courses, computer-assisted instruction, and competency-based exams, which will permit those who have special achievements or experience in a variety of settings to satisfy some of their degree requirements.

The most significant points of the "Eight Guiding Principles" for the evolution of the History Program have proved to be:

✦Student success is at the center of all university endeavors.

✦Technology is a fundamental tool in achieving educational quality, efficiency and distribution.

✦Connected knowing and collaborative learning are basic to being well-educated.

✦Assessment of all functions is necessary for improvement and continual renewal.

History Curriculum

Building a history curriculum for the new university of the twenty-first century proved to be a challenging task. It involved not only assessing past and present programs and student needs, but also anticipating the program and student needs of a new era, especially regarding distance learning and the use of technology. Creating the history program for FGCU became an even greater challenge when the University elected to offer a Bachelor of Arts in Liberal Studies, which included a 24-hour integrated core of interdisciplinary courses. All traditional majors, for example history,

were then relegated to a "concentration" status of 36 maximum credits.

Given these premises, I envisioned a history concentration of a minimum of 36 hours. In keeping with University of South Florida's requirements and other State University System (SUS) programs, I argued forcefully for three credit lower-level courses and four credit upper-level courses. I also surveyed the Internet and existing SUS general education curricula requirements for ideas on how to argue for inclusion of history courses into the embryonic FGCU General Education program. All of the courses would stress critical thinking, effective communication, diversity, and the mastery of developing technologies (e.g., electronic data bases and Internet fluency), among other cognitive skills. It was my position, as well, that our history curriculum should, and would, provide students with an intellectual/professional framework that spoke directly in almost unmatched ways to FGCU's Mission Statement, Guiding Principles, and the College of Arts and Science's unfolding mission and goals.

It must be understood that the discipline of history is inextricably linked to all disciplines that comprise the traditional college of Arts and Sciences. This rang more true than ever as I explored ways to utilize history in the creation and operation of our regional emphasis and in our cutting-edge environmental studies program. I developed my early vision for the program from the premise that rigorous lessons in historical methodology and the communicating and justifying of conclusions would stimulate and complement the other Arts and Sciences disciplines (including all Integrated Core and interdisciplinary courses); also an emphasis on local/regional history and public/applied history would provide significant bridges to other disciplines and programmatic missions throughout the University.

Thus, curriculum development for our history program has stressed an intellectual/ professional orientation. It also provided new and innovative ways to cross-fertilize subject matter throughout the Arts and Sciences disciplines, emphasize the value of cultural/social and intellectual diversity, and stress how to promote the art of inquiry and the use of technology. Moreover, the history program has sought to:

- ◊prove consistent with extant SUS programs
- ◊prepare in a proper way students who may want to transfer into other SUS, private, or out-of-state schools
- ◊equip students for entry into and success with graduate and professional schools (e.g., M.A. in history program and admission into law school)
- ◊prepare students for successful matriculation in other concentrations (or major and minors for those who may transfer into other schools).
- ◊guide students into new levels of awareness regarding the complexity of the present and past world—the ways in which world forces operate are incredibly complex and most

students are either unaware of them or have difficulty focusing on the critical nature of them.

It has been said that throughout the millennia history has been the greatest teacher. I proposed that our curriculum graphically demonstrate this to our students and to the surrounding community in new and innovative ways.

As the University took shape, so did new challenges to my program development. The most immediate challenge was to delineate a positive and visible role for history courses in the evolving General Education Program. As I addressed this challenge, the new concern of offering appropriate history courses for state certification of History/Social Studies teachers also demanded my attention. Thus, as I created the new history program, I became increasingly aware of university and wider concerns and priorities that would both shape and limit the new history track. Briefly, those concerns centered around the FGCU's Mission and Stated Principles, the abbreviated credit parameters set by our College of Arts and Sciences (which chose to emphasize an integrated core of interdisciplinary courses rather than traditional majors) credit-assigned for history courses, a proper place for history in the General Education Program, teacher certification concerns, and always an overarching emphasis on distance learning and technology.

Based on these collective concerns, I created the following specific and universal goals for the embryonic History Program.

Specific Goals

◆ *Student Centeredness*

The history program would further the professional, personal, and intellectual needs of students. It would demonstrate to students in meaningful ways that the study of history is an exciting and useful way for human beings to acquire self knowledge.

◆ *Pedagogical Interrelatedness*

The history program would relate learning in demonstrable ways to the general education program, the College of Arts and Sciences' integrated core, the other discipline concentrations, the student's professional goals, and to the broad and specific goals of the University.

◆ *Pedagogical Integration*

The history program would offer courses that integrate other curricular material and goals (but not replicate them). Students would readily perceive the logical connections between and among various disciplines, concentrations, and programs.

◆ *Pedagogical Flexibility*

Students would have a range of course-delivery options that incorporated both traditional and non-traditional formats. Whenever possible, these options would change over time to fit students' individual needs and to incorporate developing technologies.

✧ *Pedagogical Relevance*

History courses would reflect the latest scholarship, technological, and historiographical trends and would make those features relevant to students.

✧ *Competency Centeredness*

History courses would stress the development of student competencies in such areas as research, writing, communicating, critical analysis of information, and observation and reflection. Course activities and assignments would continually be reevaluated in order to ensure student mastery of these competencies.

✧ *Diversity Sensitivity*

History courses would logically develop sensitivity to historical and contemporary issues of diversity, such as race, sex, age, ethnicity, and ideological and religious beliefs. History courses would be continuously reevaluated to ensure their effective incorporation of these issues, as well as their developing current issues such as environmental concerns.

✧ *Qualitative Oversight*

Whenever possible, the history program and history courses would be reviewed by relevant faculty and outside agencies to ensure the incorporation and execution of these goals in new and innovative ways. This would be an ongoing assessment process.

Universal Goals

The student will:

- ✧ learn the importance of developing a historical perspective as essential to the processes of human inquiry
- ✧ gain appreciation for the development of American civilization and how it relates to the development of a historical perspective
- ✧ learn the importance of understanding contemporary cultures and events within the enhanced reasoning developed by a historical perspective
- ✧ comprehend the literary, philosophical, and ideological historical roots of contemporary American and world cultures
- ✧ recognize controversies which arise from historical misperceptions and conflicts
- ✧ derive informed opinion based on the critical evaluation of arguments and viewpoints
- ✧ recognize historical development and diversity as they relate to the modern world
- ✧ master library and bibliographic skills
- ✧ provide opportunities for internship experiences

◆master the skills of critical thinking, effective communication, developing technologies, cyberspace networks, and electronic data bases, especially as they relate to problem solving

Once I had in place the skeletal structure of the program, I then moved forward with addressing the new distance learning and technology demands for it. I began by drawing on my own experiences with telecourses at USF, reviewing all SUS programs and catalogs for ideas, searching the Internet for new and innovative courses, contacting colleagues and other professionals around the nation, speaking with publishing representatives at conferences and over the telephone, and generally searching all potentially relevant literature and organizational resources. Eventually, I created a strong core of distance-learning telecourses, which I quickly incorporated into the course offerings. My hope was to use these courses as a starting point for eventual Interactive Television (ITV) courses and Internet-based courses, all of which I have now implemented and incorporated into the History Program.

As the opening day for the University approached, the History Program had scheduled the largest number of distance-learning courses in the College of Arts and Sciences. Today, I and the other history faculty have instituted new ITV and Internet-based courses at a rate that defines us as the discipline leader in distance-learning. The path, however, has been fraught with certain dangers.

The use of new technology and instructional support have proved to be ongoing concerns for the History Program. Although the faculty are experienced in, and eager risk takers with, new technology and distance-learning courses, the implementation of such at a new university have proved daunting. Most discouraging has been the lack of sustained and innovative technological support, communication problems with support staff, and inoperable or faulty equipment and electronic delivery services. These problems have proved to be frequent and frustrating.

A final concern has been the thorny issue of whether or not technology and distance learning are quality instructional vehicles. In this concern, technology has been less of an issue than distance learning courses. The uses of technology today are near mind boggling, but the instructor need only review and select those forms of technology—especially for research in history classes—most appropriate to his or her courses. Some of the most common technology questions involve implementation of computer learning, Power Point lectures, slide, map, and speeches delivery off CD ROM, email, chartgroup, listserver demands, Internet-based research and courses, student submission of an electronic portfolio of cumulative work as a senior project, electronic syllabi, individual and program home pages, and bona fide computer research papers and tests. Since it is difficult to determine authorship of papers and ownership of tests over an electronic bridge, the latter two issues involve questions of ethics as well as instruction.

The argument that distance learning courses do, indeed, deliver quality instruction is problematic. Frequently, technology glitches impede the learning process, but

just as frequently students and professors lament the lack of spontaneous and group interaction. Moreover, what type of learning actually takes place over Internet-based courses? Is it inductive? Interactive? Delayed interactive? Intuitive? Or simply rote learning? An even thornier issue is whether or not the discipline of history actually lends itself to distance learning. Obviously, learning can, and does, take place over time and space, but is that learning truly qualitative? Ultimately, then, the question becomes whether or not the Internet itself is appropriate for classroom delivery and assessment! Our experiences at FGCU would suggest that professional historians, including their representative state and national organizations, should closely discuss this concern.

In sum, my experience in building the new history program for the 21st century involved merging the influences of the computer age with the evolving demands of a new student-centered university. History professors today must speak and teach to not only new technical skills and demands but also to new intellectual, professional, and personal demands as enunciated by legislatures, administrators, and student "consumers." The skills and approaches of the past will not, therefore, meet present demands. New history programs must, indeed, be innovative and eclectic in myriad ways.

Florida Conference of Historians



The U.S. Origins of the South Asian “Green Revolution”

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Introduction

This paper will examine the role of various U.S. institutions in the creation of the “Green Revolution” in India. These institutions, such as the Rockefeller and Ford Foundations, American land-grant universities, and the United States Agency for International Development, played an integral part in the development of the agricultural research infrastructure of India after 1947.

These American institutions, however, did not seek to simply impose the American model of agriculture upon India. As India turned to the U.S. for assistance in its program of agricultural development, there was a complex process of negotiation as both sides sought to implement their interpretation of the needs of Indian farmers. While much of the technology of the “Green Revolution” originated in the U.S., Indian institutions and farmers adopted only that technology they wanted and adapted it to Indian conditions. As such, there was an “Indianization” of “Green Revolution” technology.

The purpose and nature of U.S. aid changed dramatically over time, so that in the late 1940s no U.S. institution envisioned playing a role in the creation of the “Green Revolution.” At first such institutions as the Rockefeller Foundation sought to provide aid on a relatively modest scale. But the leadership of the Foundation soon reinterpreted India’s situation in light of both fears of global overpopulation and the Cold War. By the 1950s, the Foundation massively increased the size and scope of its aid to India to the extent that it played a small but significant role in the development of Indian agricultural policy.

Definition of the “Green Revolution”

The “green revolution” in India is conventionally defined as the significant

increase in agricultural productivity due to the use of wheat and rice hybrid seeds, chemical pesticides and fertilizers, and advanced agricultural techniques and machinery brought about by the Government of India's High Yielding Varieties Programme [HYVP].¹ However, the "green revolution" has proven to be a more complicated process. The very term "green revolution" implies that technological innovations such as hybrid seeds and chemical fertilizers were suddenly adopted in the mid-1960s and led to a swift and unprecedented increase in agricultural production. Prem S. Mann aptly represents this interpretation of the "green revolution" in India:

Until the early 1960s the farmers in India were using obsolete and traditional modes of cultivation. There was very little use of modern techniques with inputs like tractors, threshers, combine harvesters, tubewells, pumpsets, fertilizers, pesticides, and insecticides....By the mid-1960s, however, a spectacular change was being witnessed in the use of technology and inputs in Indian agriculture.²

In this rhetoric of the "green revolution," a rhetoric that was common among the government officials, scientists, and academics involved in the early stages of the "green revolution," India had been mired in "traditional" agriculture until the adoption of High Yielding Varieties [HYV] seeds and other "green revolution" technologies.

Furthermore, scientists at the Rockefeller Foundation, who played an important role in the introduction of "green revolution" technology into India, had argued in the 1950s that India had lost all facility for innovation and change. They further claimed that "[m]ore millions are enslaved by centuries of tradition and are not truly free to try new methods or to exploit their own ingenuity."³ In addition, the U.S. government under Lyndon Johnson used foreign aid programs to force India out from what it considered to be economic and agricultural stagnation.⁴ Such calumnies failed to recognize that technological innovation in Indian agriculture had occurred long before the 1960s.

In fact, there is little that was revolutionary in the "green revolution" technology adopted throughout South Asia. B.H. Farmer has warned that it is wrong to overemphasize the revolutionary aspects of "the new technology" on South Asian agricul-

¹ Norman Borlaug 1983 "Contributions of Conventional Plant Breeding to Food Production" *Science*. 219:692 and Peter B.R. Hazell 1994 "Rice in India" *National Geographic Research & Exploration*. 19(2):173.

² Prem S. Mann 1989 "Green Revolution Revisited: The Adaption of High Yielding Variety Wheat Seeds in India" *Journal of Development Studies*. 26:131.

³ Quoted in John H. Perkins 1990 "The Rockefeller Foundation and the Green Revolution, 1941-1956" *Agriculture and Human Values*. 7(2):12. See also J.G. Harrar, Paul C. Mangesdorf and Warren Weaver "Notes on Indian Agriculture," April 11, 1952. Rockefeller Archive Center, Rockefeller Foundation Archives, Record Group 6.7, Series II, Box 26, Folder 147.

⁴ Arthur A. Goldsmith 1988 "Policy Dialogue, Conditionality, and Agricultural Development: Implications of India's Green Revolution" *The Journal of Developing Areas*. 22:390.

tural production as though agriculture in the sub-continent were sunk in a static stupor before the arrival of that technology.⁵

Throughout much of South Asia, agricultural research, experimentation, and technological innovation have a long history. Furthermore, the adaptation and adoption of new technologies must be seen in the context of the simultaneous commercialization of agriculture. As new technologies were introduced into South Asia, agriculture ceased to be primarily subsistence-based. New crops, including cash crops, were introduced into the state, and these often required the importation of new inputs, like fertilizers and hybrid seeds. Significantly, the new technology was expensive to acquire and use. A subsistence farmer who had a two acre holding could not afford to purchase or use tractors, petrochemical fertilizers, or tube wells. Only farmers with access to relatively large amounts of capital could participate in the new commercialized agricultural economy. The effect of this split was a substantial change in the social relations of agricultural production in those areas where commercial agriculture developed even before the 1960s.⁶

While the "green revolution" was the adoption of specific technologies by farmers in the 1960s, it was only one more step in a long process of agricultural innovation in the area which began long before independence in 1947.⁷ The Government of India [GOI] increased its support agricultural of research after independence, especially through the facilities of the Indian Council on Agricultural Research and the Indian Agricultural Research Institute. The GOI's involvement with agriculture changed with the adoption of the first Five-Year Plan in 1951 and a gradual de-emphasis on the Grow More Food program in the 1950s. The first Five-Year Plan was concerned mostly with repairing the damage caused to Indian agriculture by World War II and partition.⁸ Furthermore, several of the state governments became active in agricultural research after independence. In 1949, the state of Uttar Pradesh [UP] created the Bureau of Agricultural Information as a way to educate farmers.⁹ As part of the state's first five-year plan, UP in 1951 created an extension service as part of the Department of Agriculture, with the stated purpose of educating farmers.¹⁰ Uttar Pradesh was the first state to create an agricultural university, passing the necessary legislation in 1958.

⁵ B.H. Farmer 1986 "Perspectives on the 'Green Revolution' in South Asia" *Modern Asian Studies*. 20:180.

⁶ Miriam Sharma 1985 "Caste, Class, and Gender: Production and Reproduction in North India" *Journal of Peasant Studies*. 12(4):58.

⁷ S.K. Mukherjee 1992 "Progress of Indian Agriculture: 1900-1980" *Indian Journal of History of Science*. 27(4):445, Elizabeth Whitcombe 1972 *Agrarian Conditions in Northern India, Volume 1: The United Provinces Under British Rule, 1860-1900*. Berkeley: University of California Press, pp.64-109, and Carl E. Pray 1984 "The Impact of Agricultural Research in British India" *The Journal of Economic History*. 44(2):430.

⁸ D.G. Karve 1961 "Plans of Agricultural Development in India" *Journal of Farm Economics*. 43:1081.

⁹ Government of Uttar Pradesh State Archive (Lucknow), Agriculture Department (B) file number 145/1951, volume 4, p. 272.

¹⁰ Government of Uttar Pradesh State Archive (Lucknow), Agriculture Department (B) file number 145/1951, volume 4, p. 262.

The UP Agricultural University, the first land-grant university in India, supported agricultural research and provided extension services to farmers throughout much of the state of UP.

Historian S.K. Mukherjee argues that there was an increase in the production of food crops in India even before the beginning of the "green revolution." Mukherjee suggests that this increase was due to improved seeds and agricultural techniques plus the increased use of irrigation and fertilizer.¹¹ According to the Indian Council on Agricultural Research, some 28,932 field experiments were conducted in India from 1948 to 1959¹² with roughly one-third of them being conducted in the state of Uttar Pradesh.¹³ Clearly, Indian agriculture was not static prior the "revolutionary" 1960s, even though the level of technology available to and utilized by farmers varied greatly by class and location in the country.

The "green revolution" in India is best defined as the adoption of certain, specific mid-1960s technologies, not as some unprecedented break with "traditional" agriculture. The most important facets of "green revolution" technology are HYV hybrid seeds and the farm machinery, irrigation facilities, fertilizer, herbicides, and pesticides necessary to utilize them.¹⁴ Hybrid seeds were first developed in the United States in the 1910s and 1920s, and HYV seeds are particularly productive strains of hybrids. HYV seeds were first developed in the 1950s and 1960s through research sponsored, in part, by the Rockefeller Foundation and the Ford Foundation in Mexico, India, and the Philippines.¹⁵ In 1956, the Rockefeller Foundation and the GOI signed an agreement that created the India Agricultural Program which funded research programs throughout the country; and the Rockefeller Foundation played a leading role in the transfer of information about agricultural research methodology to India in the 1950s and 1960s.¹⁶

The Rockefeller Foundation

The Rockefeller Foundation first became involved in agricultural research in India in the early 1950s with the request for financial assistance from the Allahabad Agricultural Institute in the state of Uttar Pradesh.¹⁷ At about the same time, the GOI

¹¹ Mukherjee 1992:447.

¹² Quoted in D. Singh, B.N. Tyagi, O.P. Kathuria and M.L. Sahni 1971 "A Survey of Agricultural Experimentation in India" *Indian Journal of Agricultural Sciences*. 41(11):901.

¹³ Singh, Tyagi, Kathuria and Sahni 1971:902.

¹⁴ Vandana Shiva 1993 *Monocultures of the Mind: Perspectives on Biodiversity and Biotechnology*. Dehra Dun: Natraj Publishers. p.39.

¹⁵ Perkins 1990:10 and Uma Lele and Arthur A. Goldsmith 1989 "The Development of National Agricultural Research Capacity: India's Experience With the Rockefeller Foundation and Its Significance for Africa" *Economic Development and Cultural Change*. 37:306.

¹⁶ Lele and Goldsmith 1989:308.

¹⁷ Warren Weaver, "Notes on Indian Agriculture," November 15, 1951. Rockefeller Archive Center, Rockefeller Foundation Archives, Record Group 1.2, Series 464, Box 28, Folder 218.

determined that the country's maize research program was inadequate and approached the Rockefeller Foundation for technical assistance.¹⁸ The Rockefeller Foundation and the GOI later agreed to expand their joint efforts to additional crops like rice and wheat.¹⁹ This "mutuality of interest" made it possible for the GOI and the Foundation to work successfully, so that, in short, the Foundation's efforts in India lacked the know-it-all neo-imperialist approach found in foreign assistance projects funded by other organizations.²⁰

The Ford Foundation, the U.S.-based Agricultural Development Council, and the U.S. Technical Cooperation Administration, predecessor to the U.S. Agency for International Development, also funded agricultural research in India during the 1950s and 1960s.²¹ Various U.S. universities were also involved in Indian agricultural research by serving as contractors for the U.S. government.

The Indian Agricultural Research Institute, relocated to New Delhi after 1947, was the leading Indian institution for agricultural research at this time and was the site for much of the agricultural research conducted in India until the development of the country's land-grant agricultural universities in the 1960s. Researchers in the late 1950s and early 1960s focused on developing new hybrids of rice, wheat, and maize, and these HYV seeds became available to farmers beginning in the early 1960s.²² In 1963 the GOI created the National Seeds Corporation which had the responsibility of producing and distributing improved hybrid seeds.²³

In response to a Ford Foundation report entitled "India's Food Crisis and Steps to Meet It," the GOI created a program to further the development and distribution of the new hybrid seeds. In 1959, the Intensive Agricultural Districts Program [IADP] was established jointly with the Ford Foundation.²⁴ The IADP selected areas which had an adequate supply of rainfall or irrigation and which promoted the increased use of inputs like fertilizers. The IADP proved to be less than entirely successful and

¹⁸ U.J. Grant and E.J. Wellhausen, "A Study of Corn Breeding and Production in India—General Comments," March, 1955. Rockefeller Archive Center, Rockefeller Foundation Archives, Record Group 1.2, Series 464, Box 17, Folder 142 and F.W. Parker "The Hybrid Maize Program in India," April 17, 1957. Rockefeller Archive Center, Rockefeller Foundation Archives, Record Group 1.2, Series 464, Box 1, Folder 5.

¹⁹ Guy B. Baird, "Cooperative Indo-American Projects," Rockefeller Archive Center, Rockefeller Foundation Archives, Record Group 1.2, Series 464, Box 3, Folder 15 and A.S. Carter, Walter Scott and Clare Porter, "Seed Improvement in India; Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow," 1969. Rockefeller Archive Center, Rockefeller Foundation Archives, Record Group 6.7, Series IV, Sub-series 4, Box 69, Folder 453.

²⁰ Lele and Goldsmith 1989:310.

²¹ Ashok Rudra 1978 "Organisation of Agriculture for Rural Development: The Indian Case" *Cambridge Journal of Economics*. 2:390, Eugene S. Staples 1992 *Forty Years: A Learning Curve; The Ford Foundation Programs in India, 1952-1992*. New Delhi: The Ford Foundation. p.15-16 and Douglas Ensminger 1962 "Overcoming the Obstacles to Farm Economic Development in the Less-Developed Countries" *Journal of Farm Economics*. 44:1374-1377.

²² Perkins 1990:13.

²³ M.S. Randhawa 1986 *A History of Agriculture in India*, Volume 4, p.246.

²⁴ Rudra 1978:390, Sharma 1985:58 and Staples 1992:16-18.

was canceled in the mid 1950s.²⁵ The GOI and the Rockefeller Foundation determined that the local improved seed varieties were not sufficiently responsive to the higher use of fertilizer to justify the expense.²⁶

The New Strategy

In 1965 the GOI announced a "New Strategy" to increase agricultural production, and it included the High Yielding Varieties Program which was a joint effort between the GOI and the Rockefeller Foundation and included the development and testing of new hybrid varieties of wheat and rice.²⁷ The New Strategy was a larger version of the IADP. Like the IADP, it sought to promote the increased use of fertilizers, but it also offered farmers with new hybrid varieties which were more responsive to the higher amount of fertilizer used. In addition to promoting new hybrid varieties and greater use of fertilizer, the New Strategy also included the investment in fertilizer factories in India, the extension of adequate credit to enable farmers to use the new varieties, the control of grain purchase prices to give farmers the financial incentive to try the new varieties, and the reorganization of agricultural research in India.²⁸ The National Seeds Corporation was given the primary responsibility of distributing the new hybrid HYV seeds to farmers, but state departments of agriculture also were responsible for the multiplication and distribution of the new hybrids.²⁹

Analysis of the New Strategy by policy makers, scholars, and journalists began immediately. In 1968, agronomist V.S. Vyas concluded the New Strategy had proven to be more productive than "traditional agriculture." Vyas, however, noted that the program faced several difficulties, such as a lack of coordination between the various government agencies involved and the failure of state extension programs and agricultural cooperatives to adequately support the program. Vyas concluded that the program could become a complete success if these bureaucratic questions were addressed.³⁰ In 1969, The Rockefeller Foundation's Ralph W. Cummings and S.K. Ray argued that the New Strategy had had a profound effect on grain production. They acknowledged that the New Strategy had problems, such as they unreliable availability of inputs and the instability of grain prices, but they suggested that these problems could be resolved.³¹ In 1969, Francine R. Frankel argued that the New Strategy was

²⁵ Brian Lockwood, P.K. Mukherjee and R.T. Shand 1971 *The High Yielding Varieties Programme in India, Part 1*. New Delhi: Government of India, Planning Commission, Programme Evaluation Organization/Australian National University, Research School of Pacific Studies, p.1-2.

²⁶ Lockwood, Mukherjee and Shand 1971:1-4.

²⁷ Lockwood, Mukherjee and Shand 1971:2.

²⁸ Lockwood, Mukherjee and Shand 1971:4-5 and Rudra 1978:382.

²⁹ Lockwood, Mukherjee and Shand 1971:7.

³⁰ V.S. Vyas 1968 "The New Strategy: Lessons of First Three Years" *Economic and Political Weekly*. 3(43):A13-A14.

³¹ Ralph W. Cummings, Jr. and S.K. Ray 1969 "The New Agricultural Strategy: Its Contribution to 1967-68 Production" *Economic and Political Weekly*. 4(13):A7-A9.

based on false assumptions. Most importantly, Frankel argued that the new HYV seeds were not any better than the older hybrids already in use and thus the New Strategy would produce, at best, mixed results.³² In a 1976 study by the GOI's Programme Evaluation Organization and the Australian National University researchers concluded that, despite problems, the New Strategy and HYVP had "substantially increased production of foodgrains in India."³³ Other commentators argued that the New Strategy was not as successful as its proponents claimed. They suggested that it was hampered by administrative problems, shortage of agricultural inputs, especially fertilizer, lack of adequate irrigation facilities, social and economic instability, and environmental problems, such as the chemical exhaustion of the soil and the salinization of the soil.³⁴

Agricultural universities throughout India were central to the development, distribution, and promotion of new hybrids, fertilizers, pesticides, and agricultural techniques in the 1960s and 1970s. For example, the UP Agricultural University at Pantnagar in Nainital district was the first land-grant or agricultural university in India. The idea of creating agricultural land-grant universities in India originated with the GOI's University Education Commission as well as the GOI's Damle Committee on Agricultural Research and Education, which was staffed by Indian and American agricultural experts.³⁵ Harpal Singh Sandhu, UP Assistant Director of Colonization, invited the Damle Committee to visit the Tarai State Farm, near the Nepal border, and consider it as the site for an agricultural university. The Committee liked the site and recommended that an agricultural university be built there.³⁶ Sandhu and A.N. Jha, UP Food Production Commissioner, were sent by the Committee to the U.S. to visit several land-grant universities in 1950, and they recommended to UP Chief Minister G.B. Pant that an American-style agricultural university should indeed be built on the grounds of the Tarai State Farm. Pant approved, and the state of UP, in consultation with H.W. Hannah of the University of Illinois, made a proposal to the GOI in 1956 to create an agricultural university.³⁷ The GOI approved the proposal, and the UP legislature then passed the Uttar Pradesh Agricultural University Act in 1958. With GOI approval, the UP government received funding to begin construction from the Indo-U.S. Technical Cooperation Programme [TCP] through the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, which served as an TCP contrac-

³² Francine R. Frankel 1969 "India's New Strategy of Agricultural Development: Political Costs of Agrarian Modernization" *Journal of Asian Studies*. 28(4):693-696.

³³ Lockwood, Mukherjee and Shand 1976:vii.

³⁴ See Shiva 1993 and Farmer 1986.

³⁵ Uttar Pradesh Agricultural University 1963 *A New System of Education in India*. Pantnagar: UPAU, p. 5.

³⁶ Rudra 1978:390.

³⁷ UP Agricultural University 1963:6.

tor.³⁸ In addition, university personnel were actively involved in providing technical assistance to the UP Agricultural University, which included the training of UPAU faculty and assistance in the original construction of the Pantnagar campus, as well as later additions.³⁹ The UP Agricultural University at Pantnagar was renamed the Govind Ballabh Pant University of Agriculture and Technology in 1970.

Pantnagar University soon became a significant force in the development and transfer of HYV seeds and related technology throughout the state. The University promoted the adoption of HYV technology by farmers in two ways. First, the University sought to educate farmers about HYV technology through degree courses on campus and through an extension system that sent extension agents to visit farmers and demonstrate the new technology.⁴⁰ As part of the educational effort, the University created four regular publications: the annual report for the University's experiment station, the *Indian Farmer's Digest*, the *Indian Agricultural Index*, and the *Pantnagar Journal of Research*. It is not clear how much influence these publications had on UP farmers, however, because only the *Indian Farmer's Digest* had a Hindi language edition. Second, University scientists conducted research in all aspects of agriculture, including agronomy, entomology, horticulture, veterinary medicine, irrigation technology and methodology, and grain storage technology. More specifically, the University developed and tested new seed hybrids, fertilizers, and pesticides specifically for use in the state, and this new technology has also been adopted in other parts of India. The University has produced new maize, wheat, and rice varieties, but, while maize, wheat, and rice have been the core of the "green revolution," Pantnagar scientists have also experimented with barley, soybean, sugarcane, sugar beet, jute, millet, sorghum, pulses, lentils, oilseeds, and other crops. Furthermore, experimentation with all of these crops involved not only the development of new varieties and hybrids, but their field testing to determine the proper use of irrigation, fertilizers, and pesticides for each.⁴¹

The U.S. greatly influenced the development of the University through its funding of several University programs. Many of the University's research activities were funded by the Rockefeller Foundation, the Ford Foundation, the Indo-U.S. Technical Cooperation Programme, and the U.S. Agency of International Development (pro-

³⁸ GOI Ministry of Finance, Department of Economic Affairs 1959 *Report on the Indo-U.S. Technical Co-operation Programme*. New Delhi: GOI, p.157.

³⁹ University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Department of Architecture 1975 *Campus Development Planning Study; G.B. Pant University of Agriculture and Technology*. Urbana: University of Illinois, p.4 and Uttar Pradesh Agricultural University 1963:27.

⁴⁰ Uttar Pradesh Agricultural University 1963:14-19 and Charanjit Ahuja "One University That Actually Works" *Indian Express*, March 9, 1994, p.3.

⁴¹ UP Agricultural University, Experiment Station, *Annual Report for 1971-72*, p. 1, B.K. Tyagi and N.K. Das 1970 "Reactions of Added Phosphorus to Submontaneous Soils of Uttar Pradesh" *Indian Journal of Agricultural Sciences*. 40(3):235, and Ambika Singh, I.J. Singh and V.K. Berry 1971 "Economic Studies on Productivity of Irrigated Crops and Sources of Irrigation in Uttar Pradesh" *Indian Journal of Agricultural Sciences*. 41(5):427.

gram Public Law 480). The University also received funding from student tuition, income from the operations of university farm, and various external agencies, including the Indian Council of Agricultural Research, the GOI Planning Commission, the GOI University Grants Commission, the UP State Council of Scientific and Industrial Research, the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (Bombay), and the World Bank.⁴² The bulk of the university's operating budget, however, has come from the profits of the University farm.⁴³

In addition, Pantnagar University served as a valuable resource for those farmers who wished to adopt HYV technology, but the availability of the necessary information and inputs was only one of several factors that affected the spread of the new methods in UP. There were several other important factors, including the availability of irrigation facilities and electricity, the availability and price of inputs such as seed, fertilizer, and pesticides, the availability of credit, and grain purchase prices. In short, farmers had to be convinced that the new technologies would be profitable before they would use it. Uncertainty about the profitability of HYV technology led many farmers, especially those with small holdings, to cautiously experiment with it. They would often devote part of their land to the new seeds while planting the remaining land with native or *deshi* varieties. Furthermore, many farmers continued to cultivate *deshi* varieties because of periodic shortages of inputs like HYV seeds and fertilizer.⁴⁴

The "green revolution" in South Asia was the adoption of certain technologies by farmers beginning in the late 1950s. Most of these technologies originated in the U.S. with private companies and land-grant universities. The participation of U.S. government agencies and private organizations in the transfer of "green revolution" technology to India began at the behest of the GOI so that important decisions governing this transfer were made by Indian politicians, bureaucrats, and scientists in cooperation with their American counterparts. The land-grant universities of India have played an important role in this process through research and education, and by developing, producing and distributing HYV seeds and related technology.

⁴² Staples 1992:18.

⁴³ University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Department of Architecture 1975:11.

⁴⁴ K. Chandra Mouli 1980 *Agricultural Development and Disparities; A Study of Eighteen Western Districts of Uttar Pradesh*. Delhi: University of Delhi, p.36-48, K. Subbarao 1980 "Institutional Credit, Uncertainty and Adoption of HYV Technology: A Comparison of East U.P. With West U.P." *Indian Journal of Agricultural Economics*. 35(1):69, and Vyas 1968:A13-A14.



Postwar Assimilation of Japanese Americans And Japanese Ethnicity

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Just like many other ethnic groups, Japanese Americans faced the harsh and discriminative social conditions in the prewar era. Yet, when the war ended, while most of the other ethnic groups either remained unassimilated or had to struggle in their assimilation efforts, Japanese Americans began their smooth and rather rapid assimilation into the mainstream of U.S. society.

What made the difference? An answer to this question seems to be found in the ethnic backgrounds of Japanese Americans. Although Japanese Americans and the other ethnic groups shared the similarity in economic and social conditions they faced, Japanese Americans uniquely and fundamentally differed from the others in the ethnic background. Therefore, one premise that could be made here is that Japanese Americans may have had certain ethnic traits that helped them in their assimilation effort, while the others did not have.

This study attempts to see what those ethnic traits were, and how they helped Japanese Americans in the United States to have such prompt and smooth assimilation in the postwar era.¹

This theme is not new. Various publications have already touched upon it. None of them, however, has treated the theme in a comprehensive manner. They fall short from thoroughness in an examination. This paper hopefully remedies that shortcoming.

It is impossible to achieve a clear comprehension of the postwar assimilation of

¹In a discussion of assimilation of Japanese Americans in the postwar era, there has to be a distinction between Japanese Americans in Hawaii and Japanese Americans in the mainland. One third of Hawaii population were Japanese Americans, while only fraction of the mainland population were Japanese Americans. This made a difference in terms of social, economic, and political conditions each group faced. There has to be a separate study to be made in this topic. The subject of this study is Japanese Americans in the mainland.

Japanese Americans without understanding their prewar settlement.

Japanese immigration in the prewar era started in the late 19th century and ended when the US government passed the Immigration Act of 1924 which terminated all Oriental immigration.² Most of the Japanese immigration settlements in the prewar era took place either in Hawaii or on the West Coast.

Japanese Americans on the West Coast experienced blatant discrimination because of the anti-Asian atmosphere inherited from Chinese immigrants. Unlike the early period of the postwar economic boom, the prewar economy hardly provided sufficient output to meet everyone's needs. Most of the jobs were found in the fields, the forests, the mines, and the mills, over which white Americans and the immigrants competed against each other in order to make a living. In the early 1930s, the Great Depression made already gloomy economic conditions worse. It was natural to see an anti-immigration movement develop. Because of the notion of Asian immigrants as cheap laborers taking away jobs from white Americans and also the notion of their unassimilability in U.S. society because of their cultural background and their outlook—yellow skin versus white skin, Asian immigrants were one of the main targets for such anti-immigration movement on the West Coast.

Responding to this general mood of "anti-Asian immigration," the numerous laws were enforced by the federal and local (California) governments to stop Asian immigration. In 1882, the Chinese Exclusion Act was passed to ban further immigration of the Chinese labors, followed by the Gentlemen's Agreement in 1907–1908 in which the Japanese government agreed to enforce a stricter immigration policy.³ In the late 1910s and the early 20s, when the considerable number of Japanese Americans on the West Coast began to have their own farm lands, the California government quickly enforced a series of laws (the Alien Land Acts: in 1913, 1920, and 1923) to limit Japanese land ownership.⁴ Then, the Immigration Act of 1924 almost completely banned Japanese immigration.⁵ This Asian "bashing" peaked when the internment of 110,000 Japanese Americans on the West Coast took place in 1942 under Franklin Roosevelt's Excessive Order No.9066.⁶

Despite these adverse conditions, the settlement of Japanese Americans in the prewar era was considered successful at least in an economic sense, particularly in

² Hilary Conroy & T. Scott Miyakawa, ed., *East Across The Pacific* (Santa Barbara: American Bibliographical Center Clio Press, 1972), p. 220.

³ Paul R. Spickard, *Japanese Americans: The Formation and Transformation of an Ethnic Group* (New York: Twayne Publishers: An Imprint of Simon & Schuster Macmillan, 1996), pp. 27–28.

⁴ All these Acts made it illegal for Japanese immigrants to own land because of their ineligibility for citizenship. See Stephen S. Fugita & David J. O'Brien, *Japanese American Ethnicity: The Persistence of Community* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1991), p. 8.

⁵ Stephen S. Fugita & David O'Brien, *Japanese American Ethnicity: The Persistence of Community* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1972), p. 22.

⁶ One of the reasons for the internment was that the loyalty of Japanese Americans was questionable because of their unassimilability to US society. See US Select Committee Investigation on *National Defense Migration*, 77th Cong., 2nd Sess., (Washington D.C.: House of Representative, 1942), p. 10974.

agriculture. According to the United States census in 1940, there were 6,000 Japanese-operated farms on the West Coast; Japanese farmers tilled more than 250,000 acres and owned real property to a much greater degree than the general American population.⁷ They succeeded even to the extent that their own success worked against them.⁸

How did they succeed? There are several factors to be considered here. First, there was the level of education Japanese immigrants had. Compared to other ethnic immigrants who normally came to the United States with a little education or none at all, Japanese immigrants were relatively well educated. The Japanese law enforced by the Meiji government required every Japanese citizen, regardless of sex, to have at least four years of compulsory education and another four years of optional education. Thus, none of Japanese immigrants were illiterate. Particularly, those who went to the West Coast were highly educated.⁹ About 60 percent of them finished at least middle school, and about 21 percent had earned high school diploma.¹⁰ (These figures may not sound impressive from today's standard, but one must put in mind that this was at the turn of the century!) Second, perhaps more importantly than the first, there was the role of the Japanese government in creating a stricter immigration policy to select only those who were mentally and physically able to immigrate.¹¹ The Japanese government created this policy to make sure that the humiliating experience of Chinese immigrants on the West Coast would not be repeated in their experience and also to ensure a successful Japanese settlement in the United States so that the reputation of Japan as a rising power would not be denigrated.

These two factors were unarguably helpful for Japanese Americans in achieving their economic success. However, this success would not have been possible without one characteristic of their ethnic culture, "group orientation." This group orientation is, today, recognized both in and out of Japan as the most distinguishing characteristic of Japanese culture. It has even become almost synonymous with Japanese culture.

David J. O'Brien and Stephen S. Fugita find the origin of this group orientation in Japanese feudalism.¹² What they basically argue here is that Japanese feudalism was based on rigid superior-subordinate relationship. That relationship went beyond

⁷Roger Daniels, *Prisoners Without Trial: Japanese Americans in World War II* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1993), P. 17.

⁸The economic success of Japanese Immigrants was one of the key factors for anti-Japanese mood on the West Coast.

⁹Paul R. Spickard, *Japanese Americans: The Formation and Transformations of An Ethnic Group* (New York: Twayne Publishers: An Imprint of Simon & Schuster Macmillan, 1996), p. 15.

¹⁰Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1970," pt. 1. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1975), pp. 379-80.

¹¹The Japanese government put stricter qualification for obtaining a passport in order to control immigration.

¹²David O'Brien & Stephen S. Fugita, *The Japanese American Experience* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991), P. 7.

family structure, which created room for a development of a larger and larger social organization. In such an organization, an individual interest was secondary to the collective interests, and a functional base of an organization was not business like interest but rather one of kinship. The members of the organization felt as if they were related. A typical example of this type of organization is seen in today's Japanese business corporations, in which a harmonious norm of group orientation is considered to be a top priority.

Although O'Brien and Fugita's argument sounds convincing, some scholars find their argument inaccurate. Eiichiro Ishida points out in his book, *Japanese Culture: A Study of Origins and Characteristics*, the basic aspects of Japanese culture and society were formed during the period called the *Yayoi Age* (250 BC-AD 200), through the "collective" work of rice cultivation.¹³ It can be argued that group orientation of Japanese culture may also have its origin in this period.

Whatever the origin, the point here is that this group orientation of Japanese culture gave Japanese immigrants a vital skill to establish an extensive network of associations. In the grim social and economic conditions that isolated Japanese Americans from the mainstream society on the West Coast, nothing could have been better help than that skill. It enabled Japanese immigrants to adopt a method of "collective" survival.

A typical example of this collective survival effort was seen in agricultural industry. Almost exclusively coming from the background of the farming families, early Japanese immigrants found themselves engaging in agriculture. More than half of Japanese Americans in prewar California were farmers. Most of them started as field laborers working for

white farm owners.¹⁴ According to Paul R. Spickard, however, during the decade between 1910 and 1920, this situation drastically changed with the rapid increase of the number of the Japanese run-farms.¹⁵ That number even tripled in Los Angeles County. By 1929, out of the 64,000 Japanese Americans working as farmers in California, about 51,000 were independent farmers exercising various degree of ownership.¹⁶

How did these Japanese Americans manage to have their own farms in such a short period of time in the place where they had no help form anywhere but from themselves? Where did the money come from? They barely had enough money to cross the ocean. An answer to these questions is found in a financial system, called

¹³Eiichiro Ishida, *Japanese Culture: A Study of Origins and Characteristics* (Honolulu: The University Press of Hawaii, 1974), pp. 90-91.

¹⁴"In 1915, 82 percent of California Issei farmers were farmhands, and only 18 percent were owners or managers." See Paul R. Spickard, *Japanese Americans: The Formation and Transformations of an Ethnic Group* (New York: Twayne Publishers: An Imprint of Simon & Schuster Macmillan, 1996), p. 37.

¹⁵Paul R. Spickard, *Japanese Americans: The Formation and Transformations of an Ethnic Group* (New York: Twayne Publishers: An Imprint of Simon & Schuster Macmillan, 1996), p. 38.

¹⁶Paul R. Spickard, *Japanese Americans*, p. 38.

tanomoshi.¹⁷ It was designed to provide financial assistance to Japanese Americans. It consisted of a group of certain number of people, usually from 10 to 20 people. Each member of the group was required to give a fixed amount of money to the group every month for a certain period of time to set up a public fund. The money was then used to assist one member each month until every member of the group was assisted. Who should be assisted at a certain month was usually determined by drawing. For example, let's assume, there was a group of 20 farmers. Each contributed \$50 a month. So, each month, one member of the group could have \$1,000, probably enough money to buy a piece of land in the early 20th century. Within a little over one and half years, every member of the group could have their own farms.

Tanomoshi was widely practiced in other various occupational fields as well. Having no door open for them to get highly skillful and more professional occupation, many Japanese immigrants, beside becoming farmers, found their job option in small businesses such as laundry, restaurant, beauty salon, etc. Tanomoshi provided financial source for them to have their own small businesses.

No legal aspect was involved in Tanomoshi. It was totally based on trust and commitment of each member of the group to his or her obligation. Only the characteristic of group orientation of Japanese ethnicity made a system like Tanomoshi possible.

Another example of a collective survival tactic is the horizontally integrated economic system, which is commonly seen today in Japan's corporate business field, called Keiretsu.¹⁸ In this system, different but related industries form a business group, which functions as one united business body for the purpose of promoting mutual benefits and business stability. For example, a raw material supplier, a producer of goods, a distributor, and a retailer, all agree to establish a business relationship based on mutual interest, trust, and a long term commitment to keep their relationship. Like Tanomoshi, this system was also widely practiced among Japanese Americans on the West Coast. It provided them with business stability and a competitive edge by enabling them to have better efficiency and lower cost in each phase of economy than their competitors.

It is indisputable, as these two examples indicate, that group orientation of Japanese ethnicity provided Japanese Americans with the vital asset for their economic success. However, there is one important notation that should be made here. That is, even though Japanese Americans established economic success, their assimilation into the mainstream society on the West Coast hardly took place in the prewar era.¹⁹

The small business owners had their businesses only in their own community,

¹⁷David J. O'Brien & Stephen S. Fugita, *The Japanese American Experience* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991), p. 27.

¹⁸Kazuo Yagami, "The US-Japan Trade Friction: Is Japan Really A Protectionist As Claimed By Japan Bashers?" *Graduate Thesis* Florida State University, pp. 23-24.

¹⁹According to Ronald Takaki, the Japanese painfully discovered that their accomplishments in America did not lead to acceptance. See Ronald Takaki, *Different Mirror: History of Multicultural America* (Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1993), p. 8.

except the farm owners who had to find markets for their products outside of the community. Even for farming, however, every phase of the business cycle except retail sales was done without going through even a single hand of non-Japanese Americans. With regard to social contact between the Japanese immigrant community and the mainstream society, there was almost none, except in schooling. Mainly because of the small size in number, the children of Japanese American (Nisei—second generation) were allowed to go to the schools attended by mostly white students. However, even there, they found discrimination standing their way. Despite the fact that the children of Japanese American outperformed the white students at school, there was no prospect for them to utilize their education. For example, there were no technically and professionally oriented occupations open for the college graduates of Japanese Americans. Japanese Americans indeed lived as if they were on an “interior island” on the West Coast. The 1942 internment of 110,000 Japanese Americans well symbolized such ostracized lifestyle of Japanese Americans, and bigotry, ignorance, and fear non-Japanese Americans had toward Japanese Americans.

When the war ended, however, they suddenly began to see opportunities coming their way. Some scholars argue that, this change can be explained by the generational change of Japanese Americans. In the postwar era, Japanese immigrants (Issei—first generation) were no longer in charge in their household. They were replaced by new generations: Nissei (second) and Sanssei (third). These new generations were far more acculturated to US society than Issei, which made it easier for them to be accepted. This argument, however, can be refuted by the fact that, when the interment of Japanese Americans took place in 1942, more than 70 percent of Japanese Americans on the West Coast were already Nissei.

So it was not any characteristic change of Japanese Americans—although it surely made some contribution—that opened up the opportunities for Japanese Americans. Instead, one needs to see the changes in economic, political, and social conditions taking place in the end of the prewar and early postwar US society. As discussed below, they were so fundamental and drastic that they had major impact on the perceptual relationship between mainstream America and Japanese Americans.

There were several significant changes. First, there was the change in the US view of Japan. In the 1930s and early 40s, Japan was portrayed as an adversary, having economic and political conflicts with the United States over China and Southeast Asia. When the war ended, however, Japan was no longer an enemy and soon became an ally of the United States. Furthermore, Japan was increasingly becoming important as a buffer zone for Western Democracy when US-USSR rivalry began to escalate in the early postwar era. Second, the United States emerged as a leading power for preservation and promotion of Democracy in the postwar era. In early 1941, a prominent journalist, Henry Luce wrote in *Life* magazine a sensational article titled “American Century.”²⁰ He argued that the 20th Century was the US century; the United States had an obligation to take the leadership to defend democratic principles. Luce’s argu-

ment became reality in the early postwar era. The United States began its positive involvement in the international affairs for defending democracy and free economy. That made it contradictory that the United States claimed itself as a champion of Democratic principles when it was failing to practice them at home. Third, there was the psychological impact on the relationship between non-Japanese and Japanese Americans because of the two significant events in the World War II: 1. the heroic involvement of Nissei soldiers in the war to prove their loyalty to their nation and 2. the internment of Japanese Americans in 1942, over which many Americans, if not all, wished that it had never happened.²¹ Finally, there was the postwar unprecedented economic boom. While the war completely wiped out the economic power of Europe and Japan, US economy remained intact. In fact, it was boosted by the war economy and dominated the postwar world market. It doubled its GNP (growth national product) between 1945 and 1960.

Although there is no measurement to see what degree and how precisely each of these changes contributed to opening up opportunities for Japanese Americans, Japanese Americans found the postwar society far less anti-ethnic and more opportunistic in terms of job and social life. Taking advantage of those opportunities, they achieved quick and smooth assimilation.

As seen in the migration of 20,000 Japanese Americans to Chicago, when the war ended, many of Japanese Americans from the camps moved into the urban cities in the north or the northeast, instead of going back to the West Coast. Today, most Japanese Americans live in Caucasian neighborhoods.²² They have moved up the corporate ladder by getting into more technical and professional jobs. Also in their social life, they are no longer isolated, finding themselves in the midst of the mainstream of US society. They have become American middle class. Today, nearly 60 percent of Japanese Americans marry Caucasians.²³

This "structural" assimilation has not been possible, however, by the mere changes of circumstantial conditions alone. As mentioned at the outset of this paper, one has to answer why Japanese Americans have been so successfully assimilated while the other ethnic minorities have either failed or far less successfully assimilated. The postwar US society became opportunistic not only to Japanese Americans but also more or less equally to the other ethnic groups.

An answer to the question, once again, is found in one unique characteristic of Japanese culture. That is the relativistic ethic in Japanese culture. David J. O'Brien

²⁰See Henry R. Luce, "American Century," *Life* 10: 62-66, Jan-Feb 1941.

²¹Daniel K. Inouye, *Journey to Washington* (New Jersey, Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1967), p. 85.

²²Stephen S. Fugita & David J. O'Brien, "Structural Assimilation, Ethnic Group Membership, and Political Participation Among Japanese Americans: A Research Note," *Social Force* 63:4, June, 1985, p. 26.

²³Stephen S. Fugita & David J. O'Brien, "Structural Assimilation, Ethnic Group Membership, and Political Participation Among Japanese Americans," p. 26.

and Stephen S. Fugita call it "cultural relativism" (duel culture).²⁴ According to their definition, cultural relativism is the adoption of a certain element of foreign culture into one's own culture without losing the essence of its own culture. Then, since group orientation is the essence of Japanese culture, as O'Brien and Fugita point out, cultural relativism and group orientation are inseparable elements of Japanese ethnicity.

As already mentioned, the postwar assimilation of Japanese Americans was structural. They became part of the existing structure of US society. They were no longer living in their own community. When structural assimilation takes place, usually significant cultural adjustment has to be made on the side of the subject group. But because of cultural relativism, this adjustment has been smooth for Japanese Americans to deal with, not having much trouble in adapting themselves to the new cultural traits of the middle or upper class of US society without losing their group identity. They did not experience agonizing feeling, which most of the other ethnic groups did, particularly European ethnic groups to whom structural assimilation was "zero-sum game."²⁵ It was either being assimilated by leaving their old cultural ethnicity completely behind or not being assimilated at all.

One may wonder why Japanese Americans are so persistent about their group identity after they have been so successfully assimilated into US society. The answer is rather simple. They are not "white." Here, the word, "white," does not necessarily mean just in a physical sense but more importantly in a cultural sense. Each group, either white Americans or Japanese Americans, has its own cultural heritage. Whether Japanese Americans are Sanssei (third generation) or Yonssei (fourth generation), it does not really matter. They cannot separate themselves from their cultural heritage. In fact, being a minority, it is easier for Japanese Americans to have a stronger sense of their cultural identity than whites in America or even the Japanese in Japan. The fact that they are minority is a constant reminder of their ethnic identity. Furthermore, the postwar assimilation has not set Japanese Americans completely free from prejudice and discrimination. They face no longer blatant but subtle discrimination.

That is why the Japanese associations, which were established in the prewar era for the purpose of aiding Japanese immigrants in their settlement struggle, mainly in an economic manner, did not die out even when the postwar structural assimilation took place. They continue to exist for different purposes such as helping individuals in various matters such as legal disputes or assisting new immigrants in their adjustment in the United States.²⁶ But their far more important purpose is being a "medium" for keeping a strong connection between Japanese Americans and their

²⁴ David J. O'Brien & Stephen S. Fugita, *The Japanese American Experience* (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1991), p. 93.

²⁵ David J. O'Brien & Stephen S. Fugita, *Japanese American Experience*, p. 93.

²⁶ The immigration legislation of 1954 opened up Japanese immigration in the postwar. See Harry H. Kitano, *Japanese Americans: The Evolution of a Subculture* (New Jersey: Prentice, Inc., 1969), p. 131.

cultural heritage.

Just like in the prewar era, today almost every Japanese American belongs to one or two Japanese associations. Among the numerous associations, the most prominent is the Japanese American Citizens League (JACL).²⁷ It was founded in 1928 mainly to assist the second generation of Japanese Americans (Nissei) in their effort of being accepted to their adopted nation.²⁸ In the postwar era, it has taken the leadership on various issues such as promoting political awareness of Japanese Americans. Particularly, in the issue of redress, they took an active role, which resulted in the Civil Liberties Act of 1988 for monetary compensation to the surviving Japanese Americans of the internment camps.²⁹

The success of JACL in the redress issue has a couple of significant implications. First of all, it symbolizes how successfully Japanese Americans have been assimilated into the mainstream of US society. They are no longer a poor or powerless minority group but considered to be one of the most successful ethnic groups, often as a model ethnic group. Secondly, it symbolizes a "strong persistence" in their effort to keep their ethnicity.

From the above discussions, it is clear that the unique characteristics of Japanese culture and ethnicity remarkably helped Japanese Americans to have the successful postwar assimilation to the mainstream of US society. What is even more remarkable is that such assimilation took place while those characteristics of Japanese ethnicity were being kept almost intact.

While it is most likely that this cultural dualism will continue, because of the high percentage of inter-marriage of Japanese Americans, some scholars today cast doubt on the continuity of this cultural dualism. They believe that this increasingly high assimilation will eventually cost Japanese Americans their ethnicity. No one can deny that there will be some negative effect as seen in the fact that those Japanese Americans who have intermarriage tend to participate less in the ethnic organizations than those marry their own ethnic group. It is too early, however, to obtain sufficient data to make any firm assessment about such effect. Also According to O'Brien and Fugita, the level of participation of Japanese Americans who intermarry in their own ethnic organizations is much higher than that of most of the other ethnic groups. For example, it is ten times higher than that of Italian and Irish Americans.³⁰

²⁷See Bill Hosokawa, *JACL in Quest of Justice* (New York: William Morrow and Company, inc., 1982). It provides an excellent account about JACL.

²⁸Paul R. Spickard, *Japanese American: The formation and Transformation* (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1996), pp. 90-92.

²⁹Leslie T. Hatayama, *Righting Wrong: Japanese Americans and the Passage of the Civil Liberties Act of 1988* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), p. 191.

³⁰David J. O'Brien & Stephen S. Fugita, *The Japanese American Experience* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991), pp. 124-126.

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The Uses of History: Four Narratives of the Pequot War

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From the outset of their endeavor in the New World, the Puritan settlers of New England held a special concept of history and their place in it. The Puritan exegesis held that history was more than a mere concatenation of mundane occurrences driven by material forces. In the Puritan mind, history transcended temporal causality and reflected the particular providences of God. A historical interpretation of these providences provided a framework for human activity, a means of analyzing the spiritual progress of man. Providential history assigned to the Puritans of Massachusetts Bay a mission of singular importance, which governor John Winthrop was quick to declare. "We have taken out a Commission, the Lord hath given us leave to draw our own Articles," Winthrop wrote in 1630. "We shall be as a City upon a Hill, the eyes of all people are upon us." The price of betraying such a mission would be high, however. "If we neglect the observation of these articles," the new governor warned, "the Lord will surely break out in wrath against us...and make us known the price of the breach of such a Covenant."¹

Holding this providential view of history, the Puritan colonists of New England were not averse to drawing an analogy between themselves and the ancient nation of Israel. Cast into the North American wilderness where the Anti-Christ was believed to lurk, they could expect vexing trials.² The trials were not long in coming. In the mid-1630s, the controversies over religious dissidents Anne Hutchinson and Roger Williams shook the nascent Bay colony. This was, however, a mere portent of future afflictions, always a sign of the Almighty's displeasure. In 1637, the outbreak of hostilities with a nearby Indian tribe, the Pequots, provided the settlers with the most strik-

¹John Winthrop, "A Modell of Christian Charity," in *Winthrop Papers*, Vol. II (Boston: Massachusetts Historical Society, 1931).

²See Peter N. Carroll, *Puritanism and the Wilderness* (New York: Columbia University press, 1969, 11).

ing and usable metaphor for their American experience. Indian warfare offered the opportunity to examine the workings of Providence within the New World context. Four contemporary narratives of the Pequot War of 1637 display a hermeneutic quality which perfectly reflects the Puritan concept of providential history. These histories of the war not only offer an explanation for the conflict in terms of God's just punishment upon wayward Puritans, but also vindicate the sometimes wantonly brutal methods of the Puritan soldiers who defeated the Pequots. These narratives, all but one written by participants in the war, established a model for justifying harsh treatment of native Americans during the period in which the English established hegemony in the New England region.

The sanguinary conflict known as the Pequot War had its roots in the tenuous relation between the New England colonists and the Pequots, a tribe situated in southeastern Connecticut between the Thames and Pawcatuck Rivers. The war grew most immediately out of the June 1636 murder of Captain John Oldham by the Block Island Indians. The Massachusetts Bay colony authorities dispatched a military force to exact punishment on these Indians and to accost the Pequots, who were rumored to be sheltering Indians who had killed Captain John Stone in 1634. It is unclear as to why the Bay government should have at this point suddenly demanded vengeance for the murder of the long-dead and little-mourned Stone, who was notorious for his outrageous behavior and furthermore, a Virginian.³ Nevertheless, the punitive expedition looted and burned an Indian encampment on Block Island before heading down the Connecticut River to Fort Saybrook, from which further operations were staged. The only effect of the haphazard English raids was to further enrage the Pequots, who laid siege to Fort Saybrook once the Massachusetts contingent had departed the area. The Pequots confined themselves to intermittent guerilla warfare until April 1637 when "a large body of Indian warriors" descended on the settlement at Wethersfield, killing nine settlers and destroying "considerable" property. This moved the General Court at Hartford to a formal declaration of war on May 1. In June, a force of ninety Connecticut soldiers and several hundred Narragansett Indian allies set out by boat and overland from Fort Saybrook to attack a Pequot fort on the Mystic River. The dawn surprise attack on the sleeping Indians resulted in a terrible massacre in which six to seven hundred Pequots were shot, stabbed and burned to death. Several minor engagements followed, but the Pequots were overwhelmed. Their power broken, they faced virtual extermination at the hands of the English and their Indian allies. The two hundred Pequot survivors were given over to friendly Indians as slaves. This first Puritan conquest, having cost an estimated fifteen hun-

³Stone was an unscrupulous trader whose death was little mourned in Boston. An arrogant and immoral man by Puritan standards, Stone was once brought before Justice Roger Ludlow on charges of adultery. Stone did not help his case by addressing Ludlow as "Just Ass." See Edmund Morgan, *The Puritan Dilemma* (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1958), 97. For a possible explanation of the use of Stone's death as a pretext for a war against the Pequots, see Francis Jennings, *The Invasion of America* (New York: Norton, 1975), 177-227.

dred lives, set a pattern for future conflicts.⁴

Clearly, the Puritan colonists prosecuted the war in a brutal and final manner, "in order that the name of the Pequots should become extinct."⁵ The indiscriminate brutality of the English amazed even their Indian allies, who protested that the English manner of fighting "was too furious and slays too many men."⁶ Despite the overwhelming evidence of unrestrained savagery on the part of the colonists, there is little to indicate that there was any regret over their part in the Pequot War. To the contrary, an examination of the narratives of the war suggests that the Puritans perceived the causes, prosecution and outcome of the conflict in a manner consistent with their concept of providential history. The theme central to all four narratives is the providential character of events. The war itself is cast as a struggle between good and evil, with the Indians as instruments of satanic will, unleashed upon the colonists as a form chastisement. The ultimate outcome of the struggle was predetermined in the Puritan mind. The Puritan exegesis necessitated that the saints overcome the forces of evil if they were to demonstrate the progress of God's plan.

Puritan literature, Perry Miller tells us, had an innately utilitarian quality.⁷ The narratives of the Pequot War reflect this functional and didactic dimension on several levels. They serve as sermon-narratives, designed to lead the reader to the correct interpretation of events. Several reflect the traditional structure of the Puritan sermon, progressing through text, doctrine, exposition and application. The moral lessons to be drawn from the contemporary accounts of John Underhill, Philip Vincent, John Mason and Lion Gardiner are evident. Their accounts reflect a common theme of providential history by depicting Indian war as an affliction, the Indians as instruments of dark forces and the Puritan soldiers as the ultimately triumphant agents of God's wrath. On another more secular level, the narratives reflect dissensions among the colonists and differing interpretations of their place in the New World wilderness. Primarily, however, the narratives serve to justify Puritan behavior in an alien environment. To those few who might have difficulty in reconciling professions of Christian brotherhood with the indiscriminate slaughter of Indians, the narratives served as a comforting exposition of the Puritan mission in the New Israel.

Captain John Underhill's *Newes from America; or A New and Experimental Discoverie of New England* was published only shortly after the conclusion of the war in 1638. A professional soldier who once served with the Dutch, Underhill came to Boston in 1630, where he began a checkered career. His military exploits included partic-

⁴John W. DeForest, *History of the Indians of Connecticut* (Hamden:Conn.: Archon Books, 1964), 85-108.

⁵Lion Gardiner, *Relation of the Pequot Warres* in Charles Orr, editor, *The Pequot War*, (Cleveland:Helman Taylor Co., 1897), 120.

⁶John Underhill, *Newes from America* in Orr, *the Pequot War*, 84.

⁷See Perry Miller and Thomas H. Johnson, editors, *The Puritans* (New York: Harper & Row, 1963), Vol. I, 64-79.

ipation in both the attack on Block Island and the subsequent massacre at Fort Mystic. Returning to Boston expecting a hero's welcome, Underhill discovered instead that his antinomian sympathies and petition on behalf of religious dissident John Wheelwright had earned him the clear displeasure of the General Court. In November 1637 he was disfranchised and discharged from military service. Only a year later Underhill was banished for making contemptuous speeches about the authorities. Later tried for adultery and excommunicated, Underhill returned to service for the Dutch and died in 1672.⁸

Despite Underhill's long history of disputes with Bay political and religious authorities, his account of the war contains the essential elements of providential history. Underhill introduces his account as "a true relation of the New England Wars against the Block Islanders, and that insolent and barbarous nation called the Pequots, who, by the sword of God, and a few feeble instruments, soldiers not accustomed to war, were drove out of their country and slain by the sword."⁹ To Underhill, the cause of the war is obvious. The Pequots were goaded to hostilities because "the old serpent, according to his first malice, stirred them up against the church of Christ." "So insolent were these wicked imps grown," wrote Underhill, "that like the devil, their commander, they run up and down as roaring lions, compassing all the corners of the country for a prey, seeking whom they might devour." The Biblical image of the lion threatening the children of Israel is recurrent in Underhill's narrative. It is also noteworthy that Underhill describes the Indians' relation to the devil in military terms—he is their "commander." The Pequot warriors, "these devil's instruments," are thus equated with the numerous legions of the devil. This belief was evidently cause for some concern about the loyalty of the colonists' Indian allies. Underhill recounts hearing Captain John Mason pray that God "manifest one pledge of thy love, that may confirm us the fidelity of these Indians." Underhill records that "his prayer was granted... that those Indians had brought in five Pequot heads, one prisoner and one mortally wounded... which gave them all occasion to rejoice and be thankful to God."¹⁰

If the devil commanded the Pequots, Underhill was equally certain that God directed the actions of the English troops. In describing the assault on Fort Mystic, he ascribes the accuracy of a preliminary volley of musket shot to divine guidance. "So remarkable it did appear to us," he wrote, "as we could not admire at the providence of God at it, that soldiers so inexpert in the use of arms, should give so complete a volley, as though the finger of God had touched both match and flint." Underhill's account of the assault on the Pequot encampment and his justification for the slaughter of mostly Indian women and children are equally revealing. First he describes the

⁸*Dictionary of American Biography*, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1933), VI, 110–11.

⁹Underhill, 49.

¹⁰Underhill, 67, 69.

massacre of those who fled the burning fort. The panicking Indians were “received and entertained with the point of the sword. Down fell men, women and children... Great and Doleful was the bloody sight to the view of young soldiers that had never been in war, to see so many souls lie gasping on the ground, so thick in some places that you could hardly pass along.” Anticipating objections by the squeamish, Underhill offered his justification for the deadly scope of the attack:

It may be demanded, Why should you be so furious? (As some have said). Should not Christians have more mercy and compassion? But I would refer you to David's war.... Sometimes the Scriptures declareth women and children must perish with their parents. Sometimes the case alters; but we will not dispute it now. We had sufficient light from the word of God for our proceedings.¹¹

The moral is made obvious. The Pequots “sinned against God and man” and thus suffered the wrath of God through his worldly instruments, the Puritans.

Underhill relates yet another lesson to be learned from the war, this one directed towards his fellow saints. This concerns two girls who had been captured by the Pequots. They were not harmed, but “the Indians carried them from place to place, and showed them their forts and curious wigwams and houses and encouraged them to be merry.” Besides soliciting the girls to “uncleanness” the Indians sought to induce them to accept their way of life. But, noted Underhill, “the poor souls, as Israel, could not frame themselves to any delight or mirth under so strange a king.” Instead, the captives meditated upon what wrong they might have done to deserve such an affliction and came to the conclusion that they had shown insufficient trust in God. They then resolved that they would “not fear what man can do to me, knowing God to be above man.” Underhill then applies the lesson:

Better a prison sometimes and a Christ, than liberty without him. Better in a fiery furnace with the presence of Christ, than in a kingly palace without him. Better in the lion's den, in the midst of all the roaring lions and with Christ, than in a downy bed with wife and children without Christ.¹²

The question of trial and affliction had personal significance for Underhill. As an antinomian, he had endured accusations by orthodox leaders that he was a source of contention in the colony. Here his narrative becomes a forum for religious controversy. Underhill suggests that dissensions are but another of God's trials and again draws the parallel with Israel: “...as he said to Israel of old—I did it to prove you, and to see what was in your hearts.” He concludes with an ominous note to his readers: “you that intend to go to New England, fear not a little trouble.”¹³

¹¹Underhill, 78;81.

¹²*Ibid*, 72-73.

¹³*Ibid*, 74;76

Whatever his misgivings, Underhill was an advocate of frontier settlement and the one major digression his account takes is to extol New England's virtues. "The truth is," he suddenly interjects, "I want time to set forth the excellence of the whole country."¹⁴ The digression is ironic, coming as it does between descriptions of Indian atrocities and the aforementioned fiery massacre. But Underhill was first a professional soldier, more skilled in the arts of warfare than in literary craft. His *Newes from America* served a dual purpose; it was at once a vindication of colonial actions and a forum for the unpopular antinomian viewpoint. Its early publication hints at Underhill's urgent concern for the issues involved.

Philip Vincent's *A True Relation of the Late Battell Fought in New England between the English and the Pequet Savages* appeared in 1638, partly in reply to Underhill's account. Vincent was a minister, traveler and entrepreneur who was apparently in new England in 1637, but did not participate in the Pequot War. Little is known of his life, though he evidently returned to Europe after the war. As Vincent's account is a response to Underhill's history, it is somewhat more limited in function. Vincent does not concern himself so much with a providential interpretation of events as he does with disputing some of Underhill's contentions. One minor dispute involved Underhill's conduct during the attack on Fort Mystic, which Vincent portrayed as cowardly. The more significant clash involved Underhill's antinomianism and conflicting views on the course of settlement in New England.¹⁵

Philip Vincent presents the war as dramatic narrative as much as providential history. After beginning his account with a brief description of New England, Vincent seems anxious to proceed. "This is the stage," he writes, "let us in a word see the actors." Upon concluding his account of the war, Vincent declares, "I have done with this tragic scene, whose catastrophe ended in triumph."¹⁶ While Vincent never pointedly portrays the course of events as divinely ordained, he does offer some seemingly contradictory observations about the origins of the conflict. His initial evaluation of the Indians is almost objective and, in the context, even enlightened. "Their outsides say they are men, their actions say they are reasonable," he concedes. "Only art and grace have given us that perfection which they yet want., but may perhaps be as capable thereof as we." Yet this sympathetic view of Indian nature is suddenly complicated by subsequent thoughts expressed in a remarkable passage:

But nature, heaven's daughter, and the immediate character of that divine power, as by her light she hath taught us wisdom, for our own defense, so by her fire she hath made us fierce, injurious, revengeful and ingenious in the device of means for the offense of those We take to be our enemies.... We have in us a mixture of all the elements, and fire is pre-

¹⁴*Ibid.*, 64.

¹⁵See Richard Slotkin, *Regeneration through Violence*, (Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1973), 70.

¹⁶Philip Vincent, *A True Relation of the Recent Batell Fought in New England.* In Charles Orr, editor, *The Pequot War*, 97:108.

dominant when the humors are agitated. All motion causeth Heat; all provocation moveth choler; and choler inflamed becometh a Phrensy, a fury, especially in barbarous and cruel natures. These things are conspicuous in the inhabitants of New England.¹⁷

Presuming that Vincent's "inhabitants" refers to the Pequots, his theory of aggression is congruent with his attitudes towards that tribe. Invariably described in aggressive terms, the Pequots are characterized as "a stately, warlike people...capable of great cruelty." Indeed, Vincent goes on to suggest that the Pequots can only be dealt with in a forceful manner. Recalling the Virginia Indian War of 1622, he concludes, "The long forbearance and too much lenity of the English towards the Virginia savages, had like to have been the destruction of the entire plantation. These barbarians, ever treacherous, abuse the goodness of those that condescend their rudeness and imperfections." Thus Vincent offers a justification for the eradication of a troublesome presence: "Mercy mars all sometimes, severe justice must now and then take its place."¹⁸

There is another, perhaps less conscious aspect to Vincent's contention that "all motion causeth heat," and it applies to a different group of "inhabitants of New England." It must have been evident to Vincent in the conduct of the English soldiers that "fire is predominant when the humors are agitated." The fiery massacre at Fort Mystic could aptly be described as the work of men caught up in "a phrensy, a fury." The bloodshed during the war had "hardened the hearts of the English." This is not to say that Vincent felt that an injustice had been done; on the contrary, he exulted in the subjugation of the Pequots and triumphantly declared that "the English shall have those brutes as their servants, either willing or of necessity, and docible enough, if not obsequious."¹⁹

What appalled Vincent was the degenerative effect that "nature" seemed to have on frontier Englishmen. As historian Richard Slotkin has noted, Vincent opposed the type of unmanaged frontier expansion that Underhill was so enthusiastic about.²⁰ Thus Vincent posts a warning to his readers: "The transcribing of all colonies is chargeable fittest for the princes or states to undertake. Their first beginnings are full of casualty and danger....They must be well grounded, well followed and managed with great stocks of money, by men of resolution, that will not be daunted by ordinary accidents."²¹ Vincent never disputes the providential view posited by Underhill. His narrative suggests, however, that there are dark forces made manifest in the course of the Pequot War which Underhill's account fails to consider. For Vincent, the frontier wilderness remains an unknown quantity not to be trifled with.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 98-99.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 103.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 110.

²⁰ See Slotkin, *Regeneration through Violence*, 72-73.

²¹ Vincent, 108.

Perhaps the most striking providential history to come out of the Pequot War is John Mason's *A Brief History of the Pequot War*. Mason, born in England, received military training in the Netherlands before arriving in New England in 1630. It was Mason who led the Connecticut forces in the attack on the Pequot fort on the Mystic River. As an early biographer noted, Mason was given "the Principal Ensign of Martial Power, to Lead the Armies and Fight the Battles of the Lord and His People."²² Mason evidently agreed with this characterization. He was asked by the Connecticut General Court in 1656 to write an account of the war and his *Brief History* was first published in 1677 by Increase Mather, who erroneously ascribed it to a Connecticut official by the name of John Allwyn.²³ Mason's narrative is the epitome of providential history and served as a model for Puritan accounts of King Philip's War in 1675, which continued the tradition of justifying Puritan conquests as the realization of divine will.

Characteristically, Mason prefaced his history with a note "To the Judicious Reader," in which he carefully explains his motivations and his conception of history. Mason on was intent upon settling the quarrel begun by Underhill and Vincent and observed accordingly: "And although some may think they have Wrote in high Stile and done some notable thing, yet in my opinion they have not spoken truly in some particulars, and in general to little purpose." Continuing in an aphoristic manner, Mason declares "If Truth be wanting in History, it proves but a fruitless Discourse." In a compelling analogy, he observes, "When the Bones are separated from a living creature, it becomes unserviceable. So a History, if you take away Order and Truth, the rest will prove to be but vain Narration." In keeping with Puritan literary form, Mason offers his purpose: "I shall, therefore, God Helping, endeavor not so much to stir up the Affections of Men, as to declare in Truth and Plainness the Actions and Doings of Men."²⁴

Mason's *Brief History* is however primarily concerned with men acting as the instruments of God. Significantly, his account loosely follows the structure of the Puritan sermon. On the title page is printed one of the Psalms, which he takes as his text:

We have heard with our ears, O God, our Fathers have told us, what work Thou didst in their Days, in the times of old; How Thou didst drive out the Heathen, with Thy Hand, and plantest Them: how Thou did afflict the People and cast Them out. For they got not the Land in Possession by their own Sword, neither did their own Arm save them; but Thy right Hand, and thine Arm, and the Light of Thy Countenance, because Thou hadst a favor unto Them.²⁵

²²Thomas Prince, introduction to John Mason, *A Brief History of the Pequot War* in Orr, *The Pequot War*, 8.

²³*Dictionary of American Biography* VI, 367.

²⁴Mason, *Brief History*, 15.

²⁵*Ibid.*, 1.

With this as his text, Mason chronicles a war which comes as an affliction and warning to the unrepentant, and a victory of the Puritan instruments of God's judgment over the heathen Pequots. The doctrine and exposition sections of Mason's "sermon" are not well-organized, but his intention is evident. The sermon-narrative is history offered as justification of a theological perspective and here Mason succeeds admirably. Here the experience of Indian warfare is offered as a metaphor for the American experience.²⁶

"What shall I say?" asks Mason. "God led his people through many Difficulties and Turnings; yet by more than an ordinary hand of providence he brought them to Canaan at last." This perspective characterizes Mason's interpretation of the war. The attack on and burning of Fort Mystic was the principal action Mason participated in and his narrative focuses on the events which transpired there. His account of the destruction of the fort and its inhabitants is apocalyptic; Mason was clearly impressed by the fiery spectacle. Among the first to break into the fort, Mason was angered by the sight of several men "with their swords pointed to the ground" and proceeded to upbraid those who faltered, realizing that "we should never kill them after that manner." It was Mason who, at the height of the battle, determined "We must burn them" and proceeded to torch the Pequots' dwellings. As the flames spread, he recounts, "the Indians ran as men most dreadfully amazed." Here Mason characterizes his actions as those of an agent of God's wrath, seeing in the results "A dreadful Terror...the Almighty let fall upon their spirits."²⁷ The incendiary consequences of his action moved Mason to rhapsodize about the just judgment of God on the hapless Pequots: "Thus were the Stout Hearted spoiled, having slept their last Sleep, and none of their Men could find their Hands; thus did The Lord judge among the heathen, filling the place with Dead Bodies!"²⁸

Herein contained is a lesson of dual significance. Mason presents a religious justification for the incineration of several hundred Indians and simultaneously offers the tale as a reminder to the prideful and wicked that divine wrath cannot be put off. While the Puritan soldiers served as the tools of God's punishment in this case, the implication is that but for God's mercy, the Pequots might well have triumphed. While the war may have been initiated as a manifestation of heavenly displeasure with the colonists, the balance in this instance was tipped in their favor. This last minute reprieve came when a large body of Pequot warriors gathered at Fort Mystic shortly before the colonists' assault, thus making their destruction all the more convenient, as Mason duly noted: "the Mischief they intended to us came upon their own pate: They were taken in their own snare and we through mercy escaped."²⁹ Thus, again was the outcome of the Pequot War determined by Providence. Mason describes the subse-

²⁶See Slotkin, *Regeneration through Violence*, 67.

²⁷Mason, 23; 28-29.

²⁸*Ibid.*, 30.

²⁹*Ibid.*, 30.

quent operations of minor nature and then his return to Fort Saybrook "where we were entertained with great triumph and Rejoycing and Praising God." By way of application, Mason recounted what had occurred: "thus God was seen in the Mount, Crushing his proud Enemies and the Enemies of his People...burning them up in the Fire of his Wrath, and dunging the ground with their Flesh: It was the Lord's doings, and it is marvelous in our Eyes!" The massacre at Fort Mystic effectively finished the Pequots and Mason drew predicable conclusions about the outcome: "Thus the Lord was pleased to smite our Enemies in the Hinder Parts, and to give us their Land for an inheritance."³⁰

For the edification of the more obtuse reader, Mason offers "a word or two by way of comment." He recounts "two or three special Providences" which occurred during the war, most notably incidents in which soldiers were preserved from probably fatal wounds. In one case, a Pequot arrow failed to pierce a man's neckerchief, while another was spared a penetrating wound by "a hard piece of cheese." "Was not the Finger of God in all this?" Mason asserts. "The Lord hath done great Things for us among the heathen, whereof we are glad. Praise ye the Lord!"³¹

Though a soldier by profession, Mason was clearly capable of composing an effective sermon-narrative. His *Brief History* displays little that could be deemed personal style, save for a perhaps unconscious effort at humor, when he refers to a group of Indian prisoners "who we intended to have made shorter by the Head."³² Otherwise, his narrative conforms to the relatively austere style of the Puritan sermon. In stark contrast is Lion Gardiner's *Relation of the Pequot Warres*, which went unpublished until 1833. Gardiner too was a professional soldier, arriving in New England in 1635 to erect and command the fort at Saybrook. His narrative is in a much different vein than those of Underhill, Vincent and Mason. First a soldier, Gardiner offers a different perspective on the war, not eschewing criticism of policies he deemed reprehensible and largely subordinating the providential element of history to a factual accounting of events.³³

Gardiner was aware of the controversy surrounding the Pequot War when he undertook his narrative in 1660 at the behest of friends. In his introduction, he concedes that his account may not be well-received by all:

I have sent you a piece of timber scored and forehewed unfit to join any handsome piece of work, but seeing I have done the hardest work, you must get somebody to chip and smooth it lest the splinters should prick some men's fingers, for the truth must not be spoken at all times, though to my knowledge I have written nothing but the truth, and

³⁰*Ibid*, 35:44.

³¹*Ibid*, 45-46.

³²*Ibid*, 42.

³³*Dictionary of American Biography*, IV, 138.

you may take out or put in what you please, or if you will, may throw it all into the fire; but I think you may let the Governor and Major Mason see it.³⁴

As this marvelous apology suggests, Gardiner was aware of the volatile potential of the criticisms in his *Relation*. Stationed at the furthest edge of the colonial defense perimeter and isolated deep in the wilderness, Gardiner did not take a salutary view of the manner in which the conflict was precipitated. Posted at the mouth of the Connecticut River with a small body of settlers, Gardiner was irritated at the willingness of the Boston authorities to provoke a war from a place of safety. Those in the Bay colony would be secure, he complained, "but myself, with these few, you will leave at the stake to be roasted, or for hunger to be starved." Gardiner also believed that the long-forgotten death of Captain Stone was a flimsy pretext for war: "if they will make war now for a Virginian and expose us to the Indians, whose mercies are cruelties, they, I say, they love Virginians better then us." Lieutenant Gardiner saw in the Bay government's demand for the immediate improvement of his post's defense capabilities a mistaken priority. "I thought no foreign potent enemy would do them any hurt, but one that was near," he wrote. "They asked me who that was and I said it was Captain Hunger that threatened them most."³⁵ Gardiner then offers a simile: "War is like a three-footed stool, want one foot and down comes all; and these three feet are men, victuals and munition."³⁶

Gardiner's apprehensions proved well founded, for in the midst of growing Indian hostility, the force including Underhill arrived at Saybrook after the attack on Block Island. Gardiner's reception was cool, but his words were hot. "You come hither to raise these wasps about my ears," he complained, "and then you will take wing and flee away." Still concerned primarily with securing provisions, Gardiner taunted Underhill's men as they made ready to march against the Pequots. "Sirs, seeing you will go, I pray you, if you don't load your barks with Pequots, load them with corn." After a few indecisive skirmishes with the Indians, the Bostonians left the area, prompting Gardiner to note in disgust that "the Bay-men killed not a man." From this point, his narrative presents a sobering account of life at Fort Saybrook in the months before the outbreak of general hostilities. His warnings to settlers to remain near the fort went unheeded. Some settlers were captured and "tormented," while another was "roasted alive." Gardiner's impatience with the complacency of the Bay government is evident in his account of finding "the body of one man shot through, the arrow going in at the right side, the head sticking fast, half through a rib on the left side. Outraged, Gardiner "took out and cleansed [the arrowhead] and presumed to send it to the Bay, because they said that the arrows of the Indians were of no force."³⁷

³⁴Gardiner, 121.

³⁵*Ibid.*, 123-24.

³⁶*Ibid.*, 124.

³⁷*Ibid.*, 128-30.

Gardiner remains surprisingly nonjudgmental in his depiction of the Indians. Wounded himself in an ambush, he never refers to the Pequots in a deprecatory manner, though he was quite capable of dealing with them ruthlessly. He relates an incident in which a group of Indians sought to confer with him outside the fort. "Then they asked if we did use to kill women and children," he recounted. His ominous response was "they should see that hereafter." Gardiner may not have seen the Indians in a strictly demonic light, but neither did he display much sympathy for them. In an addendum to his story, he writes "now to the comedy" and proceeds to relate a series of cruel "pranks" which were played on the Indians besieging Saybrook. The most notable "pretty prank" involved the construction of a "booby trap" made of "three great doors which were bored full of holes and driven full of long nails, as sharp as awl blades." These were placed on the ground around the fort in anticipation of night-prowling Indians. "They came as they did before," Gardiner notes gleefully, "and found the way a little too sharp for them; and as they skipped from one they trod upon another, and left the nails and doors dyed with their blood, which you know we saw the next morning, laughing at it."³⁸

While Gardiner indulged his humor at the Indians' expense, he did not present the same providential view of the war that other chroniclers did. His simple and unassuming text reflects a greater concern for temporal considerations. For Gardiner there were lessons to be learned from the Pequot War, but they were not of the cosmic variety. Rather, he saw in the war an example of what imprudent and ill-considered policies could cause; in this case, an ill-timed offensive against an enemy who was destroyed only due to fortuitous circumstances. Thus Gardiner felt compelled to warn his readers:

...thus far of the Pequot War, which has been but a comedy in comparison of the tragedies which hath been threatened since, and may come yet, if God does not open the eyes, ears and hearts of some that I think are willfully deaf and blind... Oh! Woe be to the pride and security which hath been the ruin of many nations, as woeful experience has proved.

Gardiner feared a renewed Indian alliance against the English that "would destroy us, man and mother's son." "This I have informed the Governor of these parts," he lamented, "but all in vain... and thus we may be sure that the fattest of the flock are like to go first, if not altogether, and then it will be too late." Gardiner wrote some fifteen years before King Philip's War ravaged New England, but he was remarkably prophetic. For him, the Indian war narrative served primarily as a warning against the complacency he saw besetting New England. Providential history was secondary to the practical need for security. In a final gloomy peroration, evidently informed by contemporary events, Gardiner laments:

³⁸*Ibid.*, 148-49.

And now I am old, I would fain die a natural death, or like a soldier in the field with honor, and not to have a sharp stake set in the ground, and thrust into my fundament, and to have my skin flayed off piecemeal, and cut in bits and pieces, and my flesh roasted and thrust down my throat, as these people have done, and I know will be done to the chiefest in the country by the hundreds, if God should deliver us into their hands.³⁹

Ultimately, these narratives illustrate the diverse uses of history. Gardiner's *Relation of the Pequot Warres* is probably least representative of traditional Puritan historical writing in the seventeenth century. Gardiner was first a military man, however, and viewed events primarily from that perspective. John Mason and John Underhill were also military men, but subordinated that aspect of themselves to their identity as Puritans. Together with Philip Vincent, they composed narrative forms which helped lay the foundations for a Puritan literary tradition in North America. The tradition of providential history was continued by later Puritan historians and the Indian war narrative became one of the most effective vehicles for providential history, persisting through several decades.⁴⁰ A generation after the Pequot War, Increase Mather, writing of the climax of the assault on Fort Mystic, could still describe the destruction of the Pequots in terms reminiscent of Mason's: "God damned them above ground, when they lay frying in the fire that was kindled upon their houses, and making horrible outcries."⁴¹ Perhaps the most eloquent testimony to the enduring tradition of providential history may be seen in Cotton Mather's definitive ecclesiastical history of New England, *Magnalia Christi Americana*. Drawn from the tradition established by the Pequot War narratives, Mather's interpretation of the conflict reflects a perfect Puritan synthesis of providence and history:

These parts were covered with nations of barbarous Indians and infidels, in whom "the prince of the power of the air" did work in a spirit; nor could it be expected that nations of witches, whose whole religion was the most explicit sort of devil-worship, should not be acted by the devil to engage in some early and bloody action, for the extinction of a plantation so contrary to his interests as that of new England was... The infant colonies of New England, finding themselves necessitated into the crushing of serpents, unanimously resolved that with the assistance of Heaven, they would root this "nest of serpents" out of the world.⁴²

³⁹*Ibid.*, 139-40.

⁴⁰Indian captivity narratives served a similar function, offering lessons in faith and humility. For an impressive contemporary interpretation, see John Demos, *The Unredeemed Captive: A Family Story from Early America* (New York: Vintage, 1994).

⁴¹Increase Mather, *A Relation of the Troubles which have Happened in New England* (New York: Arno Press, 1972), 46.

⁴²Cotton Mather, *Magnalia Christi Americana II* (New York: Russell & Russell, 1967), 553.

Florida Conference of Historians



Marriage Alliance: The Union of Two Imperiums, Japan and Ethiopia?

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Luke Roberts of the University of California at Santa Barbara tells a story. While in Japan, an old Japanese historian was driving him to an archive in Aki city in Kochi Prefecture. On the way, around Tei village, they saw a store advertising “Ethiopia Manjuu”—a shiny, brown, sweet, steamed dumpling stuffed with azuki bean paste. Told that Americans would consider such a name racist, the historian simply explained, “Oh, this local product was first developed in the 1930s, and the name was to show solidarity with the Ethiopian people.”¹ How do we explain this seemingly odd connection between Japan in East Asia and Ethiopia in East Africa?

Italy, ruled by Benito Mussolini and his fascists, attacked Ethiopia on October 2, 1935, and in seven months conquered the country to create the Italian Empire. Italy’s military preparations preceding the attack had gone on in earnest for more than a year and resembled America’s military buildup before the Gulf War of 1991—especially for the sustained press coverage and intense, if not always earnest, multilateral diplomacy aimed at averting war. More earnestly the two antagonists sought to find allies and undermine hostile coalitions.²

Of the many reasons that led Italy to decide for war, one stands out for its importance to contemporaries and for the oblivion to which it has been consigned by later commentators. Japan’s real and perceived economic, political, and even military intrusions into its spheres of influence, including Ethiopia, upset Italy. In early 1934, the *Italie Marinara*, the official publication of the Italian Navy League, put the matter

¹E-mail: From Luke Shepherd Roberts, Mar. 20, 96, 02:17:27 p.m. 0800.

²J. Calvitt Clarke III, “Periphery and Crossroads: Ethiopia and World Diplomacy, 1934–36,” in *Ethiopia in Broader Perspective: Papers of the XIIIth International Conference of Ethiopian Studies*, 3 vols., K. E. Fukui and M. Shigeta, eds. (Kyoto: Shokado Book Sellers, 1997), 1: 699–712.

plainly:³

Italy is watching with great interest developments in the Far East and, due to Japan's recent energetic invasion of Italian markets not only in Italy itself but in the Colonies and in the smaller countries bordering the Mediterranean, her attitude is not what might be called pro-Japanese.⁴

The Japanese reacted. The *Yomui* newspaper in January 1934, for example, complained that Mussolini seemed obsessed with the old "Yellow Peril" theory because of Italy's defeat in African markets at Japanese hands.⁵

Romantic Japanese views concerning Ethiopia,⁶ and presumed plans for cotton and opium cultivation in the Ethiopian highlands by thousands of Japanese colonists excited observers the world over. Germany's press in December 1934 echoed that this economic threat also jeopardized white racial supremacy and symbolized the West's progressive decline. Yellow dolls of Japanese manufacture, Germans lamented, were

³Mario dei Gaslini, "Il Giappone nell'economia Etiopica" [Japan in the Ethiopian Economy], in Federazione Provinciale Fascista Milanese, *Corso di Preparazione politica per i giovani* [Course of Political Preparation for Youths] Riassunti delle lezioni tenute nel secondo trimestre (Milan: Tipografia del "Popolo d'Italia," 1935), 99-107.

⁴Italy (Naval Attaché), 2/20/34: National Archives (College Park, MD), Decimal File [hereafter cited as NA] 765.94/4.

Expanding on Italy's fears of commercial rivalries and explaining why Italy had militarily reinforced its colonies of Eritrea and Somaliland, Alessandro Lessona, Under-Secretary of Colonies, proclaimed Italy's position in a speech at Naples:

In the Far East, the political situation tends to get worse. In the face of the complexity and importance of European interests in this region of the world, Japan, for the first time in history, offers the example of a people of 80,000,000 inhabitants extraordinarily developed economically, industrially and in a military way.

The birth rate, energy and spirit of sacrifice of the Japanese, the imperious necessity for always seeking new markets—all these combine to make Japan a very great danger for Europe. Her pretensions and her force are the axle around which turns all Oriental policy.

The more one restrains the Japanese expansion in the East, the more she will try to expand in other sectors and in other continents, as is proved already by Japan's activity in Ethiopia.

Lessona ominously added that Africa could very well represent the final objective of Japanese expansion:

To draw the Dark Continent into her own orbit would signify for Japan not so much in acquisition of power, as a means of depriving Europe of the possibility of using Africa for the defense of her civilization. *New York Times*, Dec. 2, 1934.

⁵"Japanese Press Opinions," *Japan Times*, Jan. 30, 1934, 8.

⁶See, e.g., Oyama Ujio, *Ethiopia Tanpo Hokoku* [Report on a Visit to Ethiopia] (Tokyo: Shunnan-sha, 1934); Oyama Ujio, *Abyssinia Jijo, Madagascaru Jijo, Porutoraru ryo Higashi Africa Jijo* [The Situation of Abyssinia, of Madagascar, and of Portuguese East Africa] (Tokyo: Foreign Ministry, 1928); Aminako Yasuhiro, *Fugen Ethiopia Teikoku no Zenbo* [The Whole Story of the Ethiopian Empire: Source of Wealth] (Tokyo: Osaka-sho, 1934); Shoji Yunosuke, *Ethiopia Kekkon Mondai wa Donaru, Kaisho ka? Ina!!!: Kekkon Mondai o Shudai to shite Ethiopia no Shinso o Katari Kokumin no Saikakumin* [What Will Happen to the Ethiopian Marriage Issue, Cancellation? or Not!!!: I Request the Re-recognition of the (Japanese) Nation by Narrating the Truth of Ethiopia with the Marriage Issue as the Central Theme] (Tokyo: Seikyo Sha, 1934); Tsuchida Yutaka, "Ethiopia o Miru" [Viewing Ethiopia] *Chuo Koron* [Center for Opinion Leaders] 50 (Nov. 1935): 308-15; and Tsurumi Yusuke and Komai Shigetugu, *Fuun no Rutsubo Ethiopia* [A Whirlwind in Ethiopia] (Tokyo: Yashima Shobo, 1935). My thanks to Mariko A. Clarke who has translated these Japanese materials and guided me through the Gaimusho's [foreign ministry's] archives in Tokyo.

replacing white dolls in the hands of "Negro" children in Asia and Africa. The ultimate psychological effect would be enormous.⁷

What we might expect from Nazi Germany, Communist Russia surprisingly underscored. Rejecting its class-based rationalism for passionate nationalism, the *Moscow Daily News* on January 11, 1935, described Italy's imperialism and sympathetically editorialized that Italy had sought Ethiopia's peaceful economic, but,

The reversion of Italian policy in Abyssinia to the old methods of direct seizure is bound up to a considerable degree with the intensification of Japanese economic and political influence in Abyssinia.⁸

One issue, minor in itself, for many in Italy and elsewhere came to symbolize Japanese encroachments; that is, the proposed marriage between an Ethiopian "prince" and a Japanese "princess." The many articles in newspapers and magazines, especially those appealing to women, showed that the proposed marriage had stirred popular excitement.⁹ The emotions generated were genuine and have remained etched in memories to this day. For example, my wife's grandmother, born in western Japan, grew quite excited upon hearing about my work:

There was a nationwide atmosphere of friendship toward Ethiopia in the 1930s, and I, then a girl's middle school student, also have a strong impression on the matter. There was a rumor of a marriage between the Ethiopian royal family and the Japanese nobility. I imagined that Ethiopia must have been a wonderful country. The Japanese prewar-gen-

⁷"White Race Menaced," *Osaka Mainichi & Tokyo Nichi Nichi*, Dec. 22, 1934, 4g. This daily cynically suggested that the German newspaper was reacting because Germany's toy trade was the hardest hit among all the German industries by Japanese competition.

⁸F. Korradov, "Italian Expansion In Abyssinia," *Moscow Daily News*, Jan. 11, 1935, 2f-3b. The editorial added that Japan's strengthening influence in Ethiopia was fraught with dangers not only for Italy's interests there but also for British interests in Egypt and the Sudan—thereby implying its hope that Britain would go along with Italy and France on Ethiopia. For more on this interpretation, see J. Calvitt Clarke III, "Japan and Italy Squabble Over Ethiopia: The Sugimura Affair of July 1935," paper presented to the Florida Conference of Historians, Daytona Beach, FL, March 12-14, 1998; and Clarke, "Periphery and Crossroads," 1: 699-712.

⁹For instance, *Fujin Kurabu* [Women's Club] in March 1934 carried a round table discussion entitled "Fairyland Ethiopia that Will Receive a Bride for the Royal Nephew from Japan" and detailed the process of Sumioka's selection of the bride in its March issue. The magazine continued its interest through the following year and reported on Ethiopia's condition in its October and November issue of 1935. *Shufu no Tomo* [Friend of Housewives], also discussed the Ethiopian conflict in its September/October issues of 1935. See Okakura Takashi and Kitagawa Katsuhiko, *Nihon-Afurika Koryu-shi: Meiji-ki kara Dainiji Sekai Taisen-ki made* [History of Japanese-African Relations: From the Meiji Period to the Second World War Period] (Tokyo: Dobun-kan, 1993), 37-39. See also Unno Yoshiro, "Dainiji Itaria-Echiopia Sensou to Nihon," [The Second Italo-Ethiopian War and Japan] *Housei Riron* 16 (Jan. 1984): 190. For the Girls' Festival celebrated on March 3, a set of dolls bearing the crests of the Kuroda family (Kuroda Masako was Araya's apparent choice for his bride) and the prince of Ethiopia was made specially for her to take to Africa where she was to marry Araya. The Girl's Festival is a beloved, traditional holiday, and in their homes girls formally set up dolls surrounded by special sweets. These dolls often are passed from mother to daughter. "Utopia In Ethiopia," *Japan Times*, Feb. 23, 1934, 8de.

eration people still feel closeness to Ethiopia even today. In the 1970s, Japanese people expressed their support for Abeba, an Olympic marathon runner, because he was from Ethiopia.¹⁰

And in the Spring of 1999, a popular quiz show on Japanese television asked a questions about the marriage.¹¹

One year after signing a Treaty of Friendship and Commerce with Tokyo in 1930, Ethiopia's foreign minister, Blaten Geta Herui, made a grand tour of Japan. The visit dramatized the potentialities of future Ethio-Japanese cooperation in the political, diplomatic, and economic arenas.¹²

One Lij Araya Abeba had accompanied Herui's embassy. Impressed with Japan, Araya, seemingly a prince and nephew of the Emperor Haile Selassie expressed his desire to marry: "It has been my long-cherished ambition," he explained to a Japanese reporter in February 1934, "to marry a Japanese lady. Of all first-class nations, Japan has the strongest appeal."¹³ The initiative was his and a personal decision.¹⁴

Sumioka [Kadooka] Tomoyoshi,¹⁵ a Tokyo lawyer, philo-Ethiopian nationalist, and Pan-Asian activist stage-managed much of the marriage affair. Herui had visited him during his 1931 trip to Japan. Sumioka now wished to facilitate Japanese trade and investment in Ethiopia.

Meanwhile, in 1932, two young men went to Addis Ababa.¹⁶ One of them, Shoji Yunosuke, had played an important role in Herui's reception in 1931. He preached racial unity uniting Ethiopians and Japanese, and approvingly cited a professor who had written:

It is obvious that some superior races moved from West Asia to the Nile basin a long time

¹⁰Makiuchi Yoshiko, Spr. 1998.

¹¹Personal communication from Mark Caprio, April 09, 1999.

¹²Furukawa Tetsushi, "Japan's Political Relations with Ethiopia, 1920s-1960s: A Historical Overview," unpublished paper presented to the 35th Annual Meeting of the African Studies Association, Seattle, WA, Nov. 20-23, 1992. Araya's father was Ato Abbaba Ayalawarq, the cousin of Haile Selassie, and he was the brother of Wayzaro Mazelaqiyawarq-Awarq, the mother of Ras Emeru. His grandmother was Wayzaro Eheta-Maryam-Walda-Mikael, the sister of Ras Makonnen. See Aoki Sumio and Kurimoto Eisei, "Japanese Interest in Ethiopia (1868-1940): Chronology and Bibliography," *Ethiopia in Broader Perspective*, 1: 714, 723. Also see Yamada Kazuhiro, *Masukaru no Hanayome: Masukaru no Hanayome: Maboroshi no Echiopia Ojiji* [Bride of Mascara: Phantom of an Ethiopian Consort] (Tokyo: Asahi Shinbun-Sha, 1998), 59-64, 92-96, 105.

¹³Ishihara Hideko, "First Contacts Between Ethiopia and Japan," unpublished paper presented to the XIIIth International Conference of Ethiopian Studies, Kyoto, Japan, Dec. 1997.

¹⁴Yamada, *Masukaru no Hanayome*, 113, 123, 230-33.

¹⁵The Chinese characters representing his name may be transliterated into English as either "Kadooka" or "Sumioka."

¹⁶See Aoki and Kurimoto, "Japanese Interest in Ethiopia," 1: 714; Herui Walde Sellassie, *Dai Nippon* [Great Japan], trans. Oreste Vaccari and Enko Vaccari (Tokyo: Eibunpo Tsuron, 1934), 3. This is the Japanese translation of *Mahdere Berhan Ha-Ager Japon* [The Source of Light, the Country of Japan] (Addis Ababa, 1932), 91-99. See also Okakura and Kitagawa, *Nihon-Afurika Koryu-shi*, 33, 36-37.

ago...[I]t is uncontroversial that the Ethiopian people a very long time ago had racial connections to some extent with the Japanese people.¹⁷

Upon his return to Japan he explained his relationship with Sumioka:

When I left Ethiopia, the Ethiopian Emperor, who greatly favored Japan, especially permitted his meeting and granted a picture, rhino's horn, musk, etc., to me. At that time he entrusted his recent picture as a gift to Mr. Sumioka Tomoyoshi to me, and I handed it to Mr. Sumioka after my return, which was my first acquaintance with him. Since then, I have been deeply impressed with his excellent understanding and right belief concerning racial issues and world statecraft. I gained an opportunity to be consulted about the Ethiopian marriage issue, as it has progressed, because I fortunately have a close friendship with Prince Araya.¹⁸

The proposed wedding was to be held according to Christian rites in April or May 1934 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia's capital. Presumably, Araya instructed Sumioka to advertise for applicants and from them select suitable candidates. The announcement that Araya was seeking a Japanese bride went out in May 1933. According to press accounts, the twenty-three-year-old Araya was reassuringly light-skinned, monogamous, and Christian. Hence, "[s]cores of adventurous girls who were willing to be a Princess of Ethiopia answered....," apparently at least twenty in all.¹⁹

From those Araya reportedly made two preliminary choices and was to make his final decision in March upon his arrival in Japan on an important economic and political mission. The second choice was Kabata Shigeko [Chiiko], the twenty-two-year-old, third daughter of Tabata Kametaro, a millionaire businessman of Moji. On the morning of January 21, Sumioka announced as Araya's first choice, a young woman who had been among the first applicants.²⁰

Kuroda Masako, the first choice, was the twenty-three-year-old, second daughter of Viscount Kuroda Hiroyuki of the forestry bureau of the Imperial Household. Viscount Kuroda was descended from the former Lord of Kazusa, a feudal lord in Chiba. She had presented her picture and other credentials to Sumioka without her parents' knowledge. Despite initial objections, soon her father prepared to visit Ethiopia. The Kuroda family lived in a tiny suburban house, and she was graduated from the Kanto Gakuin Higher Girl's School in Yodobashi-ku. She spoke English fluently, having been one of the first Japanese girls to take part in an English oratorical contest and to win a prize. At five feet, three inches, she was taller than average. After her enrollment as a candidate for the "prince's bride," she studied the habits and customs of Ethiopia

¹⁷Shoji, *Echiopia Kekkon Mondai*, 5. See Aoki and Kurimoto, "Japanese Interest in Ethiopia," 1: 724.

¹⁸Shoji, *Echiopia Kekkon Mondai*, from the Introduction.

¹⁹"Masako Kuroda Chosen to Wed Ethiopian Prince," *Japan Times*, Jan. 21, 1934, 1; "Prince Advertises for Bride in Japan," *New York Times*, Feb. 18, 1934, IV, 8:6; Japan (Grew), 7/6/33: NA 894.00 P.R./67.

²⁰"Masako Kuroda Chosen to Wed Ethiopian Prince," *Japan Times*, Jan. 21, 1934, 1; "Prince Advertises for Bride in Japan," *New York Times*, Feb. 18, 1934, IV, 8:6.

through books and conversations with those familiar with conditions there.²¹

In school Kuroda had been a keen athlete who enjoyed swimming, basketball, volleyball, and tennis. In an interview in February 1934, she enthusiastically remarked:

I understand that the people of Ethiopia are extremely interested in sports, and I believe that I shall be able to indulge my taste for athletics when I go there. Unfortunately I did not have the opportunity of meeting Prince Abeba when he visited Japan a few years ago, but I have firmly decided to go to his country and I am willing to put up with whatever circumstances come along.²²

She believed that with its ever-increasing population Japan would have to found colonies abroad. She desired to increase the ties of friendship uniting Japan and Ethiopia, and she saw herself as the first of many who would emigrate to Ethiopia. Such statements sparked alarm among those, especially in Italy, who feared Japanese competition in the East African country.²³

In truth, many in Japan saw in the proposed marriage the opportunity to cut into interests of the colonial powers in Ethiopia. Japanese newspapers and nationalists further argued the necessity of uniting the colored races against whites. The marriage would personify this solidarity.²⁴ On the other side of the coin, a faction of Ethiopia's intelligentsia known as the Japanizers were advocating intermarriage between upper class Ethiopians and Japanese.²⁵ These intellectuals for several decades had been

²¹"Masako Kuroda Chosen to Wed Ethiopian Prince," *Japan Times*, Jan. 21, 1934, 1; "Utopia In Ethiopia," *ibid.*, Feb. 23, 1934, 8de; "Prince Advertises for Bride in Japan," *New York Times*, Feb. 18, 1934, IV, 8:6; Japan (Grew), 2/6/34: NA 894.00 P.R./74; Yamada, *Masukaru no Hanayome*, 15-19.

²²"Miss Kuroda Will Visit Ethiopia Even Though Trip Is Disapproved in Japan," *Japan Times*, Feb 25 1934.

²³*Ibid.*: "Utopia In Ethiopia," *ibid.*, Feb. 23, 1934, 8de.

²⁴Kurosawa to Hirota, 1/24/36: Gaimusho Gaiko Shiryo Kan [Record Office, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, hereafter cited as Gaimusho Gaiko Shiryo Kan (Tokyo)] A461 ET/L1, vol. 6. Some African Americans also saw the marriage as heralding the day of Asian-African global unity. The *Chicago Defender* argued, not entirely correctly, that intermarriage was common and acceptable to both races, and that Japanese nationalists had set their hearts on uniting these two ancient houses to forge a strong union between Japan and Ethiopia. "Ethiopian, Italian Armies Face Each Other In Africa," *Chicago Defender*, July 13, 1935.

²⁵Ernest Allen, "When Japan Was 'Champion of the Darker Races': Satokata Takahashi and the Flowering of Black Messianic Nationalism," *The Black Scholar* 24 (Win. 1994): 30. An Eritrean intellectual and Ethiopian patriot, Blatta Gabra Egziabher, is an early example of a Japanizer. He wrote verses extolling modernization:

Let us learn from the Europeans; let us become strong
So that the enemy may not vanquish us, on the first encounter.
Let us examine our history; let us read the newspaper.
Let us learn languages; let us look at maps.
This is what opens people's eyes.
Darkness has gone; dawn has come.
It is a disgrace to sleep by day.

Modernization, for the sake of national strength, found expression in another of his poems,

He who accepts it, fears no one.
He will become like Japan, strong in everything.

Richard Pankhurst, "History of Education, Printing and Literacy in Ethiopia. 9: Educational Advances in Menilek's Day," *Addis Tribune*, Oct. 2, 1998.

implored Ethiopia to model its modernization along Japanese lines

Commercial and economic negotiations were the tangible consequences of such talk. One Japanese business enterprise became particularly entwined in international diplomacy to the detriment of both Japan and Ethiopia. Popularly known as *Nikkei-Sha*, the *Nagasaki Echiopia Keizai Chosa-kai Nikkei-Sha* [Nagasaki Association for Economic Investigation of Ethiopia] had been founded in 1932 in Nagasaki to conduct import/export operations with Ethiopia. Its director, Kitagawa Takashi, went to Ethiopia that same year. In September 1933, he received permission to negotiate a deal with Ethiopia. A glib-talking and unscrupulous fixer, he negotiated with Herui for authorization concerning: the rights to use 500,000 hectares of land in Ethiopia; a permit to grow cotton, tobacco, tea, green tea, rice, wheat, fruit trees, and vegetables; a permit to grow medicinal plants; a grant of fifteen hectares of land for each immigrant Japanese family; and 1,000 hectares of land next to Addis Ababa for a Japanese investigation mission to examine what plants could be grown in Ethiopia. Kitagawa managed little but to earn Ethiopia and Japan international suspicion. His activities certainly provoked Great Britain, France, the USSR, and, especially, Italy.²⁶

On January 18, 1934, *Juo Hyoron* [Free Critics] published an article tying the marriage to the international discord. Entitled, "Warning to Ambitions in Ethiopia: 500,000 Yen Spent for the Engagement!", in part it read:

Although we do not have any ambitions in Ethiopia, the countries such as Italy, France, and England which possess close and unalienable interests in Ethiopia, will most certainly understand the royal engagement as a part of Japan's African ambitions, including colonization. Though England and France are unworthy of any trust in a crisis, Italy as well as Germany are still somewhat the allies of an isolated Japan. It would be capricious of Japan to undertake an adventure that could damage Italy's feelings.

We should firmly eliminate any ambitions toward Ethiopia and warn against rumors for the sake of the integrity of the Japanese lady who is to be sacrificed for concessions worth only 500,000 yen....²⁷

The Japanese government agreed. Tokyo could not allow a free hand to ambitious pan-Asiatic adventurers such as Kitagawa who were going to Ethiopia. Matters reached the point when Japan's Gaimusho [foreign ministry] in February 1934 decided to send a high ranking officer to investigate conditions in Ethiopia. The Second Division of the Trade Section explained why:

It was reported that the Ethiopian government intends to approve a wide land lease to Japanese people, and that Ethiopian royal family wishes to arrange a marriage with a Japanese noble family. Ethiopia recently has shown a pro-Japanese attitude....When the Japanese people extend their business to Ethiopia, we need to understand the domestic

²⁶Tokyo to Blatin Geta Helouf, 9/4/33; Note to Kitagawa, 9/28/33; Gaimusho Gaiko Shiryo Kan (Tokyo) E424 1-3-1.

²⁷Shoji, *Echiopia Kekkō Mondai*, 14-15.

conditions of this country and carefully consider its very delicate international position. Otherwise, our plans will fail, or we will unnecessarily invite the envy and misunderstanding of other major countries. Such a result will negatively influence future relations between our two countries....²⁸

Tsuchida Yutaka²⁹ arrived in Ethiopia just in time. The Ethiopians no longer trusted the Japanese as they had before. They complained that Japan's press had written too much on the *Nikkei-Sha* affair and on the marriage between Araya and Kuroda. An irresponsible press and the Anti-Opium Bureau of the League of Nations had treated the first as if Ethiopia had signed a concession of land for cultivating opium. The second had been presented as if it were the heir to the throne who wanted to marry. The latter had even led to a complaint from Mussolini to Haile Selassie.³⁰

Difficulties rose to the point where Kuroda at the end of February 1934 defensively asserted:

I will go to Ethiopia even in the capacity of a private citizen, if the Imperial Household authorities should disapprove of my trip.³¹

At that time, her mother acknowledged that the Imperial Household Department had not yet sanctioned her daughter's betrothal or proposed trip to Ethiopia. She added that Araya,

was scheduled to visit Japan in May of this year, but his trip has been indefinitely postponed. No direct word has been received from the Royal Family of Ethiopia, but Mr. Sumioka, a lawyer, is negotiating the matter.³²

The American embassy in Tokyo agreed, reporting in February 1934 that the Japanese government had provided little information regarding the marriage and disparaged its political significance.³³ The next month, the embassy reported that the

²⁸Taura Masanori, "Nihon-Echiopia kankei ni miru 1930 nen tsusho gaiko no iso" [A Phase of the 1930 Commercial Diplomacy in the Japanese-Ethiopian Relations], *Seifu to Minkan* [Government and Civilians], *Nenpo, Kindai Nihon Kenkyu* [Annual Report, Study of Modern Japan], 17 (1995): 141-170, quote, 154.

²⁹Tsuchida Yutaka, a Gaimusho secretary, described the Ethiopians as half-black Semites, one-third of whom formed the traditional ruling class and believed in Christianity. The other two-thirds were either Muslim or non-religious. Although often barbaric, Ethiopians were lazy, uncultured, and "benign." Tsuchida visited Ethiopia in 1935. Okakura and Kitagawa, *Nihon-Afurika Koryu-shi*, 21.

³⁰Ishihara, "First Contacts."

³¹"Miss Kuroda Will Visit Ethiopia Even Though Trip Is Disapproved in Japan," *ibid.*, Feb. 25, 1934, *ide.*

³²*Ibid.*

³³Japan (Grew), 2/6/34: NA 894.00 P.R./74.

marriage was about to fall through because of official Japanese opposition.³⁴

Haniyu Chotaro, a businessman from Kamakura, had spent five months in Ethiopia at the Gaimusho's request. Upon his return in April 1934, he publicly discussed the commercial opportunities available in that country. He then declared that the marriage was receiving little attention in Ethiopia while in Japan it had created a sensation. His comments were hardly encouraging:

This matter is very delicate from a viewpoint of the international situation, and I do not like to make any comment on it until I have submitted a report to the Foreign Office.

Prince Ababa [Araya] is called a Prince only in Japan. In Ethiopia, he is called Lij Ababa, and the word Lij means "lord" in English. There are only three Princes of the Blood in Ethiopia. The Japanese Foreign Office has nothing to do with this marriage. Some time ago, an Italian newspaper sarcastically remarked that Japan intends to invade Africa with "kisses between the dark and the black by having a daughter of a Japanese peer married to an Ethiopian." The Ethiopian press from the outset has been taciturn on the matter. If Miss Kuroda really wants to marry Ababa, she had better, I think, personally inspect the actual conditions of Ethiopia.³⁵

Sound comments and sound advice.

The Italian embassy at Tokyo on October 6, 1934 denied the rumor that Italy had in any way ever been interested in the question of the proposed marriage. Yet the projected marriage between the "wealthy" Japanese girl and the Ethiopian "prince" was quashed, many thought by Italy's diplomatic pressure.³⁶ So charged Kato Kanju, president of the National Council of Trade Unions of Japan, the largest group of workers in the country. While visiting the United States in July 1935, he claimed that Mussolini had blocked the marriage.³⁷ While official quarters did not confirm that Italy had anything to do with the ultimate cancellation of the "picture bride," the *New York Times* did not regard the idea as illogical.³⁸ Some believed that Emperor Hirohito was

³⁴Japan (Grew), 3/8/34: NA 894.00 P.R./75. The embassy also reported that the *Tokyo Hochi* had written that Ethiopia's imperial family had become so interested in Japan that it would request a bride for the crown prince. The newspaper gave as its source a letter written by a Japanese cook employed by Ethiopia's Emperor.

³⁵"Ethiopia Promising Market for Japanese Goods," *Japan Times*, Apr. 22, 1934, fig. Presumably inspired by Haniyu's visit, in what appears to be a semi-official letter, in early March 1934 Jacob Adol Mar, self-proclaimed retired counselor of state and friend of Ethiopia's foreign minister, wrote to "C. Hanew" [Haniyu Chotaro] that all "logical thinking" Ethiopians wanted to see the Japanese come to Ethiopia for industrial and commercial purposes. Mar proposed an extensive set of concessions for Japanese commercial and business enterprises. Mar to Hanew, 3/4/34: Gaimusho Gaiko Shiryo Kan (Tokyo) M130 1-1-2.

³⁶Japan (Grew), 11/12/34: NA 894.00 P.R./83; "Mussolini Mobilizes Credit to Stabilize Lira," *Osaka Mainichi & Tokyo Nichi Nichi*, Dec. 18, 1934, 7d-e. "Wealthy" was used by the communist press; see "Imperialism in Abyssinia," *International Press Correspondence* (Dec. 22, 1934): 1722-23.

³⁷"Labor Leader of Japan Here to View Problems," *Chicago Defender*, July 13, 1935.

³⁸"Abyssinian Attack Is Feared by Italy," *New York Times*, Sept. 9, 1934, 6:2; Furukawa, "Japan's Political Relations;" Furukawa Tetsushi, "Japanese-Ethiopian Relations in the 1920-30s: The Rise and Fall of 'Sentimental' Relations," paper presented at the 34th Annual Meeting of the African Studies Association, St. Louis, MO, Nov. 1991.

bitter with Italians because their protests had broken off the proposed marriage between Araya and Kuroda.³⁹

Demonstrating the resonance of Japanese competition in East Africa, Japan's enemies continued to raise the issue of the marriage proposal long after it was dead. In December 1934, meeting with the new Japanese ambassador, Sugimura Yotaro, Mussolini linked the marriage to a number of contentious issues: "Japan is actively supplying weapons and ammunition to Ethiopia, sending a princess, and a newspaper in Tokyo is vigorously maneuvering Japanese-Ethiopian friendship."⁴⁰

Sugimura, who had represented his government at Geneva at the time of Japan's withdrawal from the League of Nations, soon thereafter spoke with *La Tribuna* of Rome. The ambassador endeavored to dispel suspicions of conflicting Italo-Japanese interests in Asia and Africa. Sugimura emphatically denied that the Japanese Army had sent instructors to Ethiopia as had been charged. Regarding economic penetration of Ethiopia by Japan, Sugimura explained that "certain middlemen—mostly Jewish" had purchased goods at Kobe which were finding their way into Ethiopia "by means of these same middlemen and not by direct importation." Sugimura also denied that there was any foundation for the rumor of a projected marriage between a Japanese princess and an Ethiopian prince. Concerning the Far East, Sugimura said that he was convinced that Italy could pursue its interests in that field without fear of Japanese opposition. There was an immense Chinese market to exploit, the Japanese ambassador pointed out. He opined that Japan and Italy might well come to a reciprocal agreement for the exchange of goods which would be advantageous to both. For instance, he suggested, why should not Japan import Italian wine? Finally, after expressing admiration for the Duce and Italian institutions, Sugimura said that he favored an exchange of students and teachers between his country and Italy.⁴¹

In truth, beyond Japanese exports to Ethiopia, there was little by way of direct contact between the two nations. In 1932 fifteen Japanese had settled in Ethiopia, and in 1933 seven more arrived. In 1934, four more. Most, however, did not stay long, leaving after their enterprises had failed. Tsuchida Yutaka noted that not many Japanese visited Ethiopia and that in the summer of 1934 there were only four including himself. In 1935 there were only three Japanese in Ethiopia. Ultimately, although *Nikkei-Sha* did manage to obtain agricultural concessions from the Ethiopian government, failing to find the necessary capital, it could not exploit them and went out of business

³⁹"Ethiopian, Italian Armies Face Each Other In Africa," *Chicago Defender*, July 13, 1935.

⁴⁰Okakura and Kitagawa, *Nihon-Afurika Koryu-shi*, 39. The *Cape Times* in January 1935 concluded that there were no cotton concessions, that Ethiopia's laws and religion prevented any marriage between a Japanese princess and an Ethiopian prince, and that no such marriage had been requested in any case. The newspaper insisted that nearly all rumors of Japanese intentions had been started in Rome. "Japanese and Abyssinia," *Cape Times*, Jan. 4, 1935, in Gaimusho Gaiko Shiryo Kan (Tokyo) E424 1-3-1.

⁴¹Italy (Kirk), 1/25/35: NA 765.94/9. *La Revue du Pacific* of February 15, 1935, printed another of Sugimura's denials of reports regarding a prospective marriage of a Japanese "princess" with an Ethiopian "prince." France (Naval Attache), 3/13/35: NA 765.94/10.

after six months. In August 1935, no Japanese shipping company included Jibuti in its list of ports.⁴²

The *New York Times* on July 11, 1935, summed up the situation nicely: Japan's economic interests in Ethiopia were new and still small; Japan still had no legation in Addis Ababa and Ethiopia was not represented in Tokyo; the number of Japanese residents in Ethiopia was small; reports of Japanese capitalists having obtained concessions for cotton growing in Ethiopia were unfounded; and stories that an Ethiopian prince had been seeking to marry a Japanese princess were groundless.⁴³

The principals, Kuroda, Araya, Shoji, and Sumioka moved off center stage. Mistaken for a communist, Kuroda was taken to the Ueno police station in Tokyo on the night of July 24, 1935. The problem began when a policeman, Tajima Yukio, noted a suspicious-looking woman in black afternoon dress walking up and down the street near Ueno Park for two hours until about 8:00 p.m. The policeman disguised himself as a worker and arrested her. As it turned out, she had earlier reported to him that she had lost her purse containing about ¥5. She had borrowed 20 sen from him but had given a false name—therefore the trouble. Even after she had given her real name and had explained that she had been waiting for a friend, the policeman was still suspicious and took her in. She was, however, shortly released.⁴⁴

In August, the *Osaka Mainichi* and Shoji sponsored a round table discussion in Addis Ababa, and invited prominent Ethiopians including Herui.⁴⁵ The next month as war was ready to break out, Araya suggested that Japan obtain concessions in Ethiopia, according to the *Nichi Nichi* correspondent at Addis Ababa. He said that Ethiopia would gladly grant concessions to Japan for industrial development. The Emperor was ready to approve such grants and Araya offered his services as an intermediary.⁴⁶ Later, in 1943, Araya attended a New York city meeting of the Ethiopian World Federation, and thereafter became involved in its internal politics.⁴⁷

The *Japan Advertiser* of March 28, 1936, reported that Sumioka had been awarded the Commander Class of the Order of Menelik II by Emperor Haile Selassie. In his letter of thanks, Sumioka praised the good will of the Japanese people toward Ethiopia and his own conviction that Ethiopia's brave army would defeat Italy.⁴⁸ A month later,

⁴²Tsuchida, "Echiopia o Miru," 312; Shoji Yunosuke, "Abyssinia Attempting to Modernize." *Osaka Mainichi & Tokyo Nichi Nichi*, Aug. 18, 1935, 4bd; Ishihara, "First Contacts;" Adrien Zervos, *L'Empire d'Ethiopie: Le Miroir de L'Ethiopie Moderne 1906-1935* (Alexandria, Egypt: Impr. de l'Ecole professionnelle des freres, 1936), 483-84.

⁴³Hugh Byas, "Japan Is Shunning Dispute in Africa," *New York Times*, July 11, 1935, 12:3. Iranian papers at the end of summer added their voices to this song. Okamoto (Iran) to Hirota, Report No. 123, 8/26/35; Gaimusho Gaiko Shiryo Kan (Tokyo) A461 ET/11, vol. 2.

⁴⁴"Miss Kuroda Arrested," *Osaka Mainichi & Tokyo Nichi Nichi*, July 26, 1935, 3c.

⁴⁵Furukawa, "Japan's Political Relations."

⁴⁶"Wants Grant to Japan," *New York Times*, Sept. 2, 1935, 5:3.

⁴⁷Roi Ottley, *New World A-Coming: Inside Black America* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1943), 42.

⁴⁸Japan (Grew), 4/16/36: NA 894.00 P.R./100.

Haile Selassie fled his country.

In the meanwhile, only two months after the marriage affair had been put to bed, a military mission headed by Marshal Pietro Badoglio, chief of Italy's General Staff, visited Eritrea to begin planning for Italy's conquest of Ethiopia.⁴⁹

The summer of 1935 had plumbed the depths of Italo-Japanese relations, especially during the so-called Sugimura Affair of July. The contretemps was born of the Gaimusho's inept attempts to "clarify" Ambassador Sugimura's assiduous efforts to reassure Mussolini regarding Japan's interests in Ethiopia. In smoothing over the ruffled feathers, Rome and Tokyo began building in August the foundation for their alliance that ultimately went to war in 1941.⁵⁰ As part of that process and to recognize Italy's control over Ethiopia, Japan's government transformed its newly created Legation in Addis Ababa into a Consulate General. In return, Italy's foreign minister, Galeazzo Ciano, promised to protect Japanese interests there. As if to emphasize that suspicions lingered, he simultaneously referred to the proposed marriage and the Negus' desire to draw closer to Japan. In the end, Rome broke its promises but no matter. Japan had accepted its exclusion from Ethiopia. Japan had left Ethiopia at the marriage altar.⁵¹

⁴⁹A. J. Barker, *The Civilizing Mission: The Italo-Ethiopian War, 1935-6* (London: Cassell, 1968), 11.

⁵⁰Clarke, "Japan and Italy Squabble."

⁵¹"Il Giappone riconosce l'Impero," *Giornale d'Italia*, Dec. 3, 1936: Gaimusho Gaiko Shiryo Kan (Tokyo) M130 1-1-2. Richard Bradshaw touches on many of the issues discussed in this paper. See his "Japan and European Colonialism in Africa 1800-1937" (PhD dissertation, Ohio University, 1992).

The Italo-Ethiopian War of 1935–36 as Fought on the Streets of American Cities

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It was Tuesday, June 26, 1935, a sweltering evening. Thousands of boxing fans—especially those of African and Italian descent—eagerly anticipated “the greatest heavyweight ring battle of recent years”, as publicists called it. The fight matched Joe Louis, “the Brown Bomber” from Detroit and Primo “Carnivorous” Carnera of Italy.¹ Sixty thousand people, one of the largest crowds yet assembled at Yankee Stadium, made their way through the turnstiles. An estimated 15,000 black Americans attended, the majority of whom were from Harlem, Chicago, and Detroit. Fearing that the more daunting fight would take place outside the ring among the fans, 1500 police, equipped with tear gas bombs and other apparatus, patrolled the stadium. At 8:15, the boxers stepped into the ring “to clash for the synthetic championship of two continents.”² Six rounds and a knockout punch later, Joe Louis emerged victorious, as the “newly risen hero of the black race.”³

None of the rioting which police and press feared materialized that night at Yankee Stadium. The crowd was orderly, “good-humored and eager.”⁴ Back in Harlem after the fight, people were “hilarious with joy.” Capturing the enthusiasm of the Brown Bomber’s fans, one reporter wrote,

Intoxicated with the sweet nectar of victory which had come to the hero, their attitude seemed to say, ‘Everything is hotsy-totsy and the goose is hanging high.’⁵

The jubilant spirit that permeated Harlem that night soon gave way to the same racial

¹ *New York Times*, June 25, 1935.

² *The Pittsburgh Courier*, June 15, 1935.

³ *New York Times*, June 25, 1935.

⁴ *Ibid.*, June 26, 1935.

⁵ *The Pittsburgh Courier*, June 29, 1935.

tensions that had burned in the community before; only now there was more fuel for the fire. Soon the streets of Harlem would be rent with rioting between Italian Americans and Black Americans and in boycotts of Italian businesses.

What could prompt these two ethnic groups to come to blows? After the Wal Wal Incident of December 1934 in Ethiopia, Italy was clearly bent on going to war to conquer Ethiopia—a country with a proud history stretching back to biblical times and one of only two independent states left in Africa. Reacting to Ethiopia's plight, many black Americans seemingly put aside their own crusade for civil rights to further the cause in East Africa. J. A. Rogers, a scholar of Ethiopian history, explained the stakes involved: "Ethiopia, sole remnant of black greatness, as Italy is of Roman Power, is a symbol, a rallying point of the Black race."⁶ In other words, an independent Ethiopia affirmed the dignity and worth of millions of African Americans. Teele Hawariate, Ethiopian delegate to the League of Nations, approached American Consul, Prentiss Gilbert in July of 1935, citing the necessity of U.S. support in the impending crisis. "With 11,000,000 negroes in America, you cannot afford to ignore the one independent negro government in the world."

America's blacks were not alone. One observer noted that blacks throughout the world reacted similarly:

The Italian invasion of Ethiopia has heightened race consciousness and solidarity in the whole colored world. Colonial peoples have identified themselves with independent 'justice' both for Ethiopia and themselves.⁷

Throughout 1935, Italy's tortuous buildup of military supplies in preparation for its attack gave plenty of time for complicated international tensions to simmer into a rolling boil. Tensions in the United States were but one page of a multi-volumed work of ethnic tensions generated throughout the world.

Relations between Italian-Americans and African-Americans began to worsen when many black leaders realized the political and racial implications of the Joe Louis fight in the face of the coming Italo-Ethiopian war. Professor Rayford W. Logan of Atlanta University, for example, particularly linked the struggle in the ring with the looming international battle between Italy and Ethiopia:

I am afraid that the defeat of Primo Carnera last night by Joe Louis will be interpreted as an additional insult to the Italian flag, which will permit Mussolini to assert again the necessity for Italy to annihilate Abyssinia.⁸

More pugnaciously, at a rally sponsored by the pan-African Reconstruction Asso-

⁶ *Ibid.*, July 20, 1935.

⁷ William R. Scott, *A Study of Afro-American and Ethiopian Relations: 1896-1941* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University, 1971), 154.

⁸ *New York Times*, June 27, 1935.

ciation, Reverend Harold H. Williamson Jr. demanded, "Let's get right up and tell why we want to knock out Mussolini like Joe Louis did Carnera." Speaking out at a street gathering in Harlem in mid-July, 1935, one man in the crowd exclaimed in a similar vein, "If Joe Louis [can] knock that Giant Carnera on his ear, then Ethiopia's army could march into Rome and lick those Italians with their natural fists."⁹ African-American backing of Haile Selassie's Ethiopia went beyond mere moral exhortation. The Pittsburgh Courier, a prominent black newspaper, received thousands of letters from people willing to volunteer in Ethiopia's army. These letters came after the publication had announced that Haile Selassie would "welcome U.S. volunteers."¹⁰ Thousands more queried other black organizations.¹¹

Many equated support for the Ethiopian cause as a declaration of war against the white world. W. E. B. DuBois, the revered Black leader, deliberately equated international oppression with oppression at home:

Only a word needs to be said concerning the Negroes in the United States. They have reached a point today where they have lost faith in an appeal for justice based on ability and accomplishment. They do not believe that their political and social rights are going to be granted by the nation so long as the advantages of exploiting them as a valuable labor class continue. This attitude the action of Italy tends to confirm. Economic exploitation based on the excuse of race prejudice is the program of the white world. Italy states it openly and plainly.¹²

As events heated up abroad and Mussolini prepared Italy for war against Ethiopia, the pent-up animosities of black Americans toward whites in general found a convenient outlet in their Italian American neighbors. Many blacks called for economic measures against Italian Americans. One speaker at a neighborhood meeting in Harlem called for boycotting Italian icemen. Another man protested,

He wants you to boycott poor Italian icemen who have children to feed even as you and I... Will you kill a giant tree by plucking a single leaf?¹³

Despite this lonely protest, many in the group pledged to boycott two dozen icemen in Harlem.

On a larger scale, Dr. Willis N. Huggins, an African-American educator and author, and his followers urged blacks in the United States to organize an economic

⁹ *Ibid.*, July 14, 1935.

¹⁰ *The Pittsburgh Courier*, July 20, 1935.

¹¹ National Archives, *Records of the Department of State Relating to Political Relations Between the Soviet Union and Other States, 1930-1939*, National Archives Microfilm Publications, Microfilm Publication T1247, Roll 5. Washington, DC: The National Archives and Records Service. General Services Administration, 1980), frame 00800.

¹² *National Archives*, frame 00827.

¹³ *New York Times*, July 14, 1935.

boycott against Italians in New York.¹⁴

Hundreds of blacks heeded the call, but for many this was not enough. Mirroring the actions of their new hero, Joe Louis, African Americans opted to deal with their resentments through hand-to-hand combat. In the weeks following the match, one publication commented that,

Minor clashes between Italians and Negroes have already been reported, and the likelihood of far more impressive disturbances is only too great. Officials in several of our cities regard the future with genuine anxiety, as they weigh the pressure of fanaticism on the race groups involved.¹⁵

Recognizing this restlessness and anticipating further problems, William Pickens, Field Secretary for the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, wrote to Mr. Taub, the head of the American League Against War and Fascism. He expressed concern regarding a parade in support of Ethiopia's independence:

I notice you plan to take in the Italian district as well as Harlem. I would like to know whether you have secured the cooperation of any of the Italian leaders and whether the Italian people will take part in this parade? The object you are seeing is good, but we do not want to make any trouble which will not promote the objective you have in mind.¹⁶

In Jersey City, such fears were realized when Italians, angered by the jeering of blacks responded with threats of what Italian arms would do in Ethiopia.¹⁷ More than words were exchanged. Numerous fistfights between the two groups marked the weeks after the fight. Matters escalated as more news on the crisis reached America and found its way into black and Italian communities. On Sunday, August 11, 1935, rioting broke out between Italian Americans and Black Americans on Railroad Avenue, the dividing line between the two neighborhoods. Sparked by an argument the night before among half a dozen members of each group regarding the international situation, the rioting sucked in more than a hundred people. Stones, knives, baseball bats, and even broomsticks, became the debating points. One press account of the event described the scene with the aplomb of a veteran military correspondent:

As the sound of the struggle spread throughout the neighborhood, scores of reinforcements arrived on the run with make-shift weapons. Negro women, shouting wildly, joined the milling, cursing group under the tracks, and armed with broomsticks, pitched into the battle, threatening for the moment to turn the tide in favor of their men. But Italian reserves rushed up and steadied the wavering ranks.¹⁸

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, July 25, 1935.

¹⁵ *The Commonweal*, 22 (Aug. 30, 1935): 414.

¹⁶ National Archives frame 00698.

¹⁷ *New York Times*, Aug. 12, 1935.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

The battle was at its height with neither side giving ground, when the police arrived, their blue and red lights flashing. The rioters scattered into the night. The police arrested eleven of the slow and five of the injured were sent to the hospital. Heavy police patrols in the days after the rioting ensured that fighting did not break out again.¹⁹ Most had predicted that such fighting would first occur in Harlem, Black America's capital. The events in New Jersey, however, catalyzed the action of those in other northeastern cities who also came to blows over events surrounding the Italo-Ethiopian War.

Animosity between the two groups was high in the weeks after the New Jersey riots, and when the town of Adwa fell to the Italian troops on October 3, 1935, emotions flared anew in Harlem. Black Americans retaliated against Italian-Americans.²⁰ One local paper concluded that,

the first shots of the Italo-Ethiopian War were echoed in New York City...as Negroes and Italians battled in several patriotic skirmishes.²¹

The disorder began with the picketing of Italian businessmen, such as green grocers and icemen, but soon turned violent as black protesters physically assaulted the Italian employees. Displaying the intensity of African-American dedication to the Ethiopian cause, Charles Linous, a thirty-three year-old black man from Harlem refused to leave his position on a stoop near the incident, despite police orders. He stayed, proudly waving the red, orange, and green flag of Ethiopia until the police dragged him to their patrol car.²²

The demonstrations and rioting also found a place in the schools where black and Italian youth battled it out. At Public School 178 in Brooklyn, a fight broke out between two boys, one from each ethnic group. The next day students brought to school handmade weapons, such as sawed off billiard cues, broom handles, and lead pipes. Parents and school officials asked the police for protection when school let out at 3:00. Police called in additional reinforcements to control the threatening crowd that had gathered outside the school.²³

The fall of Ethiopia with the capture of its capital, Addis Ababa, by Italian troops in May 1936, and the subsequent reports of mass executions of Ethiopia's patriots in occupied territory, upset Ethiopia's supporters in New York. They compared the plight of the conquered Ethiopians to their own as many cried, "Stop Mussolini's lynchings!" After a fiery speech by the nationalistic leader, Ira Kemp, four hundred

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, Aug. 13, 1935.

²⁰ William R. Scott, *The Sons of Sheba's Race: African-Americans and the Italo-Ethiopian War, 1935-1941* (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1993), 99.

²¹ *New York Times*, Oct. 4, 1935.

²² *Ibid.*

²³ *Ibid.*, Oct. 6, 1935.

enraged Harlemites vandalized and destroyed Italian-owned businesses in the area, causing many to close temporarily.²⁴ In the months that followed, Harlem became a violent hot-bed filled with high-strung protesters and rigorous police patrols. One historian has compared the streets of Harlem to those of Addis Ababa.²⁵

Reflecting on the 1930s, some might assume that African-Americans concerned themselves only with their domestic condition. In truth, the New Deal years did lay the groundwork for the massive Civil Rights Movement to come in the 1950s and 1960s; however, there also emerged a powerful Pan-African movement, inspired by Marcus Garvey and kept alive partially by the Italo-Ethiopian war. This movement was particularly prominent in the Northeastern cities of the United States. Inspired by Joe Louis, African-Americans during the Italo-Ethiopian War sought to extend the hand of brotherhood to their embattled brothers in Ethiopia.

Some black leaders, however, preferred to focus on domestic issues. In July 1935, the editor of the *Chicago Defender* asked black Americans to rethink their dedication to international affairs. He pleaded,

Why don't you fight lynchings, peonage, bastardy, discrimination and segregation? Why don't you fight for jobs to which you are entitled? Why don't you fight for your own independence? What advantage is there in your rescuing Ethiopia from the Italians and losing your own country to tyranny and prejudice?²⁶

The logic in this editorial did not make sense to those who saw domestic and foreign affairs as intertwined and inseparable. The head of the International Negro World Alliance, Robert L. Ephriam, angrily asserted after being denied a permit to stage a parade,

We have a very definite interest in our blood brothers in Africa. Americans have a right to express their sympathy for Ethiopia and to volunteer such help as they can, without embarrassing their own country, America.²⁷

By supporting their blood brothers in Africa, black Americans were not denying their status as Americans. Interested in fighting injustice wherever it was found, and particularly in their adopted symbolic homeland, many African-Americans equated their struggle at home with Ethiopia's. The Joe Louis victory over Primo Carnera, and later Max Schmelling, united African-Americans in ways that had previously eluded them. The rising tide of Pan-Africanism, intensified by the Italo-Ethiopian War, breathed new life into the crusade for Civil Rights at home by giving African-Americans the confidence they would so desperately need in the trying years ahead.

²⁴ Scott, *Afro-American and Ethiopian Relations*, 317-318.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 318.

²⁶ *Chicago Defender*, July 27, 1935.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, July 6, 1935.

Prelude to Liberation: Ethiopia's Patriotic Resistance Against the Italian Empire

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Fedor Eugenovich Konovalov, A White Russian and former officer of the tsarist army, served as a military engineer and advisor to the Emperor Haile Selassie¹ during the Italo-Ethiopian War of 1935 and 1936. He has dramatically described the final hours of Italy's conquest of Ethiopia and its capital, Addis Ababa, in May 1935.

For three days the town was in a state of agitation and disorder. For the first time in their millennia old history, the Ethiopian people found itself without its own accustomed authorities to guide them...At noon on May 5, the town became more or less silent as it was whispered that the enemy was near; toward three in the afternoon—first barely audible, and then louder and louder, a continuous throbbing of may engines was heard. The sound increased as the head of a seemingly endless column of big Italian lorries appeared on the main road, coming from the direction of the Italian advance. The conqueror, Marshal Badoglio², escorted by light tanks, arrived some time later....³

¹ Emperor Haile Selassie ruled Ethiopia from 1930 to 1974.

² Marshal Pietro Badoglio held many political and military positions throughout his career. He became Italy's ambassador to Brazil in 1923 and in September of 1928 Badoglio accepted the governorship of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica.

³ Fedor Eugenovich Konovalov, "The Konovaloff Manuscript," Hoover Institution, Stanford University, Stanford, CA., 346-47. Changes have been made to manuscript mostly for clarity and consistency while keeping the original meaning clear. Paragraphs have been indented. Hand-written corrections have been used rather than the typed original in the case of obvious spelling errors. Minor punctuation problems have been corrected. American punctuation styles and spelling are used consistently. Portions of version of this manuscript were published as Th. Konovaloff, *Con le armate del Negus (Un Bianco fra I neri)* [With the Army of the Negus (A White Among the Blacks)] trans. Stefano Micciche (Bologna: Nicola Zanichelli Editore, 1938). George Steer, *In Abyssinia* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1937), 298-338, contains a portion of yet another version of this manuscript. An aviator, Konovalov had been a colonel in the tsarist armed forces during World War I. He was also a trained military engineer, and in this capacity he served as a military advisor to the Negus. His eyewitness account of the Italo-Ethiopian War is a most valuable resource.

Konovalov continued his eyewitness account by describing the posters the Italians had hung around the town announcing Ethiopia's annexation to Italy.

Before one of these posters stood an Ethiopian, with a smattering of French translating the text to others. When he reached Mussolini's words, "Ethiopia is Italian," the poor man understood the importance of these words and, turning to me, exclaimed: "Why, why does he say that Ethiopia is Italian? Is it possible? Is it not a temporary occupation?"—What could I say?⁴

The Organic Law of June 1, 1936, formally established the *Africa Orientale Italiana*, the Italian Empire in East Africa. This legalism arguably deprived deposed and exiled Emperor Haile Selassie of a legal foundation to appeal to the League of Nations for help.

On June 30, 1936, nonetheless, Haile Selassie in Geneva warned the League that its members would imperil the security of smaller states if they tolerated aggression against his country.

I ask the fifty-two nations, who have given the Ethiopian people a promise to help them in their resistance to the aggressor, what are they willing to do for Ethiopia? And the great Powers who have promised the guarantee of collective security to small States on whom weights the rest that they may one day suffer the fate of Ethiopia, I ask what measures do you intend to take? Representatives of the World I have come to Geneva to discharge in your midst the most painful of the duties of the head of State. What reply shall I have to take back to my people?⁵

The League rejected Haile Selassie's plea and on July 6 voted to rescind the sanctions it had imposed at the onset of the war in October of 1935. Many states formally recognized Italy's conquest.⁶ As one contemporary historian explained,

The mere paper division of the country into governates and residences helped to convince both the Italian and European public opinion the war was won, the Empire conquered, and the Italian administration almost in place.⁷

The international community had sent a clear and discouraging message that Ethiopia's liberation would rest entirely upon Ethiopian shoulders.

Lij Haile Mariam Mammo is recognized as the first patriot in Ethiopia who acted

⁴ Konovalov, "Manuscript," 346-47.

⁵ *Summary of the Ethiopian Emperor's Address to the League* New York Times, July 1, 1936, 6c. See Anthony Mockler, *Haile Selassie's War: The Italian Ethiopian Campaign, 1935-1941* (New York: Random House, 1984), 151 and Richard Pankhurst, *The Ethiopians* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1998), 236.

⁶ Alberto Sbacchi, "the Recognition of the Italian Empire 1936-1938," in *Ethiopia in Broader Perspective: Papers of the XIIIth International Conference of Ethiopian Studies*, 3 vols., K.E. Fukui and M. Shigeta, eds. (Kyoto: Shokado Book Sellers, 1997), 1:247-62.

⁷ Mockler, *Haile Selassie's War*, 148-49, quote 149.

to regain his country's autonomy. On May 4, 1936, he ambushed a group of Italians in route to Addis Ababa.⁸ His attack earned him the title of "first *arbagna*" [patriot of Shoa]. Mammo's attack showed that Italy's successful conventional war to conquer Ethiopia was transforming into a popular resistance movement to challenge Italy's control.

Before attacking Ethiopia, perhaps Il Duce, Benito Mussolini,⁹ should have read more closely one of his favorite authors, Nicolo Machiavelli. In the sixteenth century, Machiavelli had written that nations with a strong, centralized, and organized governments are difficult to defeat. However, once defeated and the old government swept away, these countries are easy to control. On the other hand, those states without a strong, centralized government may prove easier to conquer, but their complete subjugation is more difficult.¹⁰ Machiavelli had clearly posed the problem Mussolini now faced.

Haile Selassie only managed to maintain loose control over his *Rases*. A *Ras* is both a political and a military position in that it combined the responsibilities and powers of a governor and a general in a semi-feudal-like system. Even while the emperor reigned, his control was often tenuous, and the *Rases* had competed with one another. The emperor's exile merely created greater opportunities to seek greater rewards in their internecine competition. Nonetheless, the *Rases*, despite their quarreling, helped organize, train, and equip the "patriots"—the name now accorded to all those who resisted the Italians. These patriots came from all social classes and included men and women, priests, peasants, servants, governors, and Eritreans.¹¹

Despite a long tradition that extolled a military culture, how could the patriots be effective against a modern and mechanized Italian army supported by close air support and chemical weapons? The patriots dodged Italian technology by favoring exposed targets such as transportation and communication lines. The British journalist and novelist, Evelyn Waugh described one such attack:

A train was derailed and sacked, two bridges destroyed and a station besieged for a day and half. For ten days trains could not get through.¹²

Operating in small bands that could disperse quickly and exploiting the rainy season, the patriots avoided large open battles where mechanized forces and air power were devastating. As the patriot's tactics minimized Italy's technological edge, the Italians replied with increasingly dubious and cruel counter insurgency tactics. On

⁸ Pankhurst, *The Ethiopians*, 243.

⁹ Benito Mussolini is the founder of fascism and ruled Italy as dictator from 1922 to 1943.

¹⁰ Niccolo Machiavelli, *The Prince*, ed. Robert M. Adams (New York: Norton, 1992), 12-13.

¹¹ For a fictional account which discusses the various kinds of people drawn into patriotic resistance, see Abbie Gubegna, *Defiance* (Addis Ababa: Oxford University Press, 1975)

¹² Pankhurst, *History of Ethiopian Patriots*, 176.

June 5, 1936, Mussolini declared that, "all rebel prisoners must be shot."¹³ And on July 8, 1936, an increasingly frustrated Mussolini authorized Viceroy Marshal Rodolfo Graziani,¹⁴

To begin conducting systemically the policy of terror and extermination against the rebels and the accomplice populations. Without the law of tenfold retaliation the wound will not heal quickly enough.¹⁵

Undeterred, the patriots attacked the railway to Addis Ababa many times in June 1936, cutting it and telegraph lines between Akaki and Mojojo and derailing several carriages near Adda.¹⁶

Within Addis Ababa, Italian anxiety soared. Maria Giaconia Landi, an Italian nurse in Addis Ababa, wrote on July 17, 1936,

There is always talk of attacks on the city. They say we cannot be quiet until the rainy season ends. It is thought the Abyssinians will try to make an invasion en masse or else infiltrate one day into the market.¹⁷

Viceroy Marshal Graziani faced a vexing tactical situation.¹⁸ Difficult to defend, the shapeless sprawling city was surrounded by eucalyptus forests and lay in an amphitheater at the foot of Mount Entoto at an altitude of 7,600 feet.¹⁹ Worse, the patriots could infiltrate the capital at any point because it had no definitive entrances and exits. Graziani estimated that to defend the city his troops would have to secure a twenty-five mile perimeter. In light of this, General Italo Garibaldi, the military governor, adopted a flexible defense in depth. Around the city he ordered small forts built to overlook the major avenues of approach such as roads and paths. He dispersed the remainder of his forces in small camps throughout the city ready to repel any breach along the cordon.²⁰ Such arrangements sought to draw concentrated numbers of patriots into the open where the Italians could use technology effectively against them.

Early success inspired the patriots to see the capital's recapture as feasible. Their plan required precise coordination and an unprecedented cooperation between

¹³ Richard Pankhurst, "A History of Early Twentieth Century Ethiopia," *Addis Tribune*, Apr. 3 1997, <http://addistribune.ethiopiaonline.net/Archives/1997/04/03-04-97/20cent-13.html>.

¹⁴ Rodolfo Graziani emerged World War I as Italy's youngest colonel. He grew infamous from his cruel repression of the Senussi in Libya. He became Viceroy of Ethiopia in 1936.

¹⁵ David Shirreff, *Bare Feet and Bandoliers: Wingate, Sanford, the Patriots and the part they played in the liberation of Ethiopia* (London and New York: The Radcliffe Press, 1995), 9.

¹⁶ Mockler, *Haile Selassie's War*, 158; Pankhurst, *History of Ethiopian Patriots*, 176.

¹⁷ Pankhurst, *History of Ethiopian Patriots*, 176.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 158.

¹⁹ Mockler, *Haile Selassie's War*, 156.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 158.

forces. Aberra Kassa was to lead the main attack force from the north and seize the market area of Arada. The plan required Dejaz Fikremariam's forces to infiltrate the capital from the west and occupy the Great Ghebbi. Dejaz Balcha and Zaudi Asfau were to drive their forces into the southern part of the capital. Once reaching the Bole area, they were to destroy the railroad station and airbase. The plan's final element tasked Blatta Takele and Gurassu Duke to overrun the garrison at Ambo in the city's southwest quadrant. The patriots established July 28, 1936 as the attack date.²¹

The battle played poorly for the Ethiopians. Aberra Kassa's patriots marched directly into the center of the city unopposed. Once the alarm sounded, however, the Italians implemented their contingency plans and repulsed the patriots. The other prongs of the assault were equally unsuccessful. The Italians halted Fikremariam's advance short of the Great Ghebbi. Dejaz Balcha engaged the railroad station and airbase a day late. Asfau refused to penetrate the city's defenses because poor communications had disconnected him from the other patriot leaders. Poor communication also compelled Gurassu Duke to abort his mission.²²

The attack plan had been too ambitious considering the patriot's poor communications capabilities, which depended on runners and priests transporting letters in their turbans. Italy's air supremacy had also led to the patriot's failure. The patriot leaders had not anticipated the effectiveness of Italian air power.²³

Chastened, the patriots continued to conduct small, limited raids into the city. The perilous position certainly made the city's Italian inhabitants insecure, but the patriot's prospects for taking the city never reached the same level they had on the first day of the attack.²⁴ Maria Giaconia Landi reported that on August 16 approximately 11,000 patriots were poised to attack the city. On September 26 she reported that 15,000 patriots were already on the march to threaten the Addis Ababa.²⁵

The patriots generally did not gather in such large forces, but usually dispersed into the surrounding forests in small scattered bands. These bands enjoyed advantages in mobility and concealment over Italian mechanized units.

The end of the rainy season in September 1936 permitted the Italians to resume a more offensive posture.²⁶ The war became a glorified patriot manhunt.²⁷ Throughout the guerilla war the Italians tried to enlist the *Rases* aid. Graziani encouraged particular leaders to surrender, and when they did, he often left them unharmed. He specifically looked to *Ras Hailu* to persuade other *Rases* and lesser noblemen to surrender. *Ras Hailu*, with some success, persuaded other nobles to submit and the Ital-

²¹ *Ibid.*, 159.

²² *Ibid.*, 160-161.

²³ *Ibid.*, 160; Pankhurst, *History of Ethiopian Patriots*, 177.

²⁴ Pankhurst, *History of the Ethiopian Patriots*, 177.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 178.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 178.

²⁷ Mockler, *Haile Selassie's War*, 173.

ians to treat them humanly.²⁸

After much fighting, the Italians forced patriot leader *Ras Imru* to surrender. Although *Graziani* courteously welcomed *Ras Imru* at the airport, he immediately imprisoned him in a small house on the island of *Ponza*. Seven years later, ironically, *Mussolini* would be imprisoned in the same house. Other leaders such as *Aberra Kassa* were tricked into believing that their lives were not in jeopardy. The Italians took him to see the General *Tracchia* and later that evening executed him.²⁹

In order to raise morale, *Haile Selassie* dispatched false letters to patriot leaders. One such letter stated that *Haile Selassie's* second son was engaged to a British Princess. Another promised British intervention.³⁰ Such promises spurred the patriots on.

Despite the patriots' ability to interrupt Italian operations, in the field the Italian technology dominated. The Italians effectively used aircraft and freely dropped yperite canisters on the patriots. Yperite is a form of mustard gas, a blister agent, which was first used in France during World War I. General *Guglielmo Nasi* would order deliberate pauses in his attacks to encourage the patriots to regroup into compact bodies.³¹ General *Nasi's* tactics efficiently used the artillery, gas, and air power at his disposal.

A crucial milestone in the war was the attempt on *Graziani's* life by two Eritreans, *Abraha Deboch* and *Mogus Asgedom*, on February 19, 1937. *Graziani* had ordered Ethiopians to come to the ceremony to receive alms—a hypocrisy which had incensed the Eritreans.³² During the ceremony, they hurled as many as ten hand grenades at the Viceroy. One exploded near him, injuring his right leg. He was taken to the hospital to remove 365 shrapnel fragments. The Commander of the Air Force, General *First Liotta*, had to have his leg amputated.³³ In all, the attack killed one and wounded thirty. *Konovalov* described what happened next:

Believing that this was the signal for a general insurrection, the Italians began to shoot in every direction and this attempt led to the massacre of many hundreds of people, most innocent, and to the arrest of everybody who happened to be out to their house at that time.³⁴

For the next three days the Italian militia, the Black Shirts, horrifically massacred Ethiopians. The total number killed is disputed. The Italians admitted to only a few hundred.³⁵ According to the *Manchester Guardian*, on the other hand, the French

²⁸ Mockler, *Haile Selassie's War*, 154.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 171.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 165.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 172

³² *To Feudalism* (Addis Ababa, Ministry of Information, 1975), 2.

³³ Mockler, *Haile Selassie's War*, 174.

³⁴ *Konovalov*, "Konovalov Manuscript," 349.

³⁵ Mockler, *Haile Selassie's War*, 177.

minister in Addis Ababa had reported that 6,000 Ethiopians had been murdered in three days and that the British Consulate knew the names of over 2,000 killed.³⁶ One historian has estimated that between 6,000 and 9,000 Ethiopian civilians were slaughtered.³⁷

The assassination had scared Graziani causing him to lash out at any threat. The Viceroy had already earned a reputation as remorseless butcher in putting down the Sanusi revolt led by Omar al-Muktar in Libya a few years before. Graziani now directed his men to eradicate the all Ethiopian nobles regardless of age.³⁸ A favorite tactic, as many have testified, was to set ablaze Ethiopian homes while the occupants were imprisoned inside. A Hungarian, Dr. Ladislav Sava, has recalled that "Ethiopian houses or huts were searched and then burnt with their inhabitants."³⁹ Dejazmatch Rosario sworn, "I saw young boys coming from burning houses, but the Italians pushed them back into the fire."⁴⁰ American missionaries Herbert and Dellas Hanson lamented, "It made us heart sick to see the devastation, especially where we learned that many of the huts had been burned with their owners in them."⁴¹

During the assassination investigation, the Italians connected the Debra Libanos Monastery and the two Eritreans. On My 19, Graziani ordered his forces to "execute summarily all monks without distinction including the Vice-Prior."⁴² Following their orders faithfully, the Italians executed 297 monks and 23 laymen. Graziani proudly telegraphed Mussolini, "Of the monastery, there remains no more trace."⁴³

The massacres in Addis Ababa and the Debra Libanon Monastery, and elsewhere bolstered the guerrilla forces, in the end creating more of them than the Italians had killed. Ras Abebe Aregai, the principal Patriot leader in Shoa, saw his forces increase by at least 10,000.⁴⁴ The *New Times and Ethiopian News* correspondent reported on March 11 that "Those who fled from Addis well know what to expect from Italy and they will fight again."⁴⁵ The Ethiopian patriots continued to make trouble. In Dessye, a region located north of Addis Ababa, Italian claims that it was secure contradicted the fact they had to bolster outposts with more machine guns to guard against anti-Italian outbreaks.⁴⁶

The Italians also tried to disarm the population. By March 21, 1937, the Italians had

³⁶ Pankhurst, *History of Ethiopian Patriots*, 186.

³⁷ Shirreff, *Bare Feet*, 10.

³⁸ Mockler, *Haile Selassie's War*, 177.

³⁹ Pankhurst, *History of Ethiopian Patriots*, 184.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 184-85.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 185.

⁴² Mockler, *Haile Selassie's War*, 180.

⁴³ Pankhurst, *Twentieth Century Ethiopia*, 30.

⁴⁴ Pankhurst, *History of Ethiopian Patriots*, 186.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 186.

⁴⁶ *Ethiopian Raiders Feared at Dessye* New York Times, Feb. 25, 1937, 13d.

collected 170,795 rifles, 782 machine-guns, 165 cannon, and 1,380 pistols.⁴⁷ The *London Daily Telegraph* reported that by September 30, 1937, the Italians had collected 283, 954 rifles, 999 machine-guns, 196 cannon, and 1,422 pistols.⁴⁸

Despite these efforts the patriots continued to rebel. The *New Times* and *Ethiopian News* reported, "Everywhere the Abyssinian Chiefs have collected bands, and sworn a solemn oath to liberate their country or die."⁴⁹ On April 7, 1937 the *New York Times* reported that in the provinces of Kaff, Siodamo, Wollega and Ball large bands of Ethiopians were operating against the Italian forces.⁵⁰ The rebellion continued to spread much to the dismay of the Italians. In September 1937, Pirzio Biroli, the Italian governor at Gondar, reported that "the rebellion seemed to be spreading to Begemder."⁵¹ Mussolini ordered Graziani "to act with the maximum energy, using all means against the rebels, including gas."⁵² When he failed to quell the massive rebellion, the Duke of Aosta replaced him.⁵³ The Duke instituted new, more conciliatory policies and did much to ameliorate the situation.⁵⁴

In the end, however, whether Graziani's cruel repression or Aosta's gentler conciliation, Italy failed to assimilate Ethiopia. The patriots had only to hang on until a general war broke out. This allowed the patriots a degree of flexibility regarding when, where, what, and how to fight. They had only not to lose so badly as to disable their ability to resist.

Once Rome declared war on Britain in June 1940, Italy's empire became a minor outpost at the far end of an impossible supply route. In a combined effort the British Army and the Ethiopian patriots combined to throw the Italians out of Ethiopia. Emperor Haile Selassie triumphantly reentered Addis Ababa on May 5, 1941, a mere five years after his ignominious flight. Konovalov witnessed this event too.

As the cars passed by me, another picture came involuntarily before my eyes. Only about five years ago, an apparently endless column of big Italian lorries and young, sunburnt, and happy Italian soldiers on them, had entered the same town from the North; they were looking around with vivid curiosity, satisfied with the campaign they had started and with its end. The short-lived...new Italian Empire belong to the past... Now, a British Military Administration was temporarily established and, a little while later, the Emperor himself entered his own capital.⁵⁵

⁴⁷ Pankhurst, *History of Ethiopian Patriots*, 190.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 193.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 191.

⁵⁰ *Only Vatican Runs Ethiopian Missions* *New York Times*, Apr. 7, 1937, 17c.

⁵¹ Pankhurst, *History of Ethiopian Patriots*, 191.

⁵² Pankhurst, *History of the Ethiopian Patriots*, 192.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 196.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 200.

⁵⁵ Konovalov, "Konovalov Manuscript," 366-67.

Italy's Diplomacy and the West: From Allied Occupation in World War II to Equality in Nato, 1940s-50s

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1. Introduction: from the Failure of Imperialism to Euro-Atlantic Renewal

Fascist Italy's military collapse in World War II marked a radical watershed in Italian foreign policy with the demise of her long quest since 1860 to emerge as a leading Mediterranean Power against stronger regional rivals, who routinely undercut her ambitions at regional prestige and pre-eminence. Until 1918 an "Irredentist" Liberal Italy was consumed by Austria-Hungary's control over the Adriatic, residual Italian provinces (Trentino, Friuli, Istria, Dalmatia) and the Balkans, while being contained in the Mediterranean by Britain (the hegemonic maritime Power) and France (whose colonial empire kept expanding in North Africa encircling Italy), while both Western Powers excluded firmly Russia from the basin in 1800s-1939. In such context, Italy's national security suffered, while being hindered as well by structural imbalances (developing economy, budget constraints), popular passivity and wrong security priorities (Adriatic supremacy vs. Mediterranean influence; land-defense vs. a high-seas strike-Navy). Thus, Rome had to settle into the traditional ways of the weak by relying on international treaties, diplomacy and alliances to secure her national security and interests as best she could, while inflating her international importance through expensive "state-of-the-Art" Navy and large Army.¹

Notwithstanding sharp domestic politico-ideological differences, both Liberal Italy (1860-1922) and Fascist Italy (1922-45) were constrained by the same geo-strate-

¹Pietro Silva, *Il Mediterraneo* (Varese: ISPI, 1939); Denis Mack Smith, *The Making of Italy, 1796-1870* (New York: Harper & Row, 1968); D. Mack Smith, *Italy. Modern History* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1959).

gic and security frustrations, which they sought to overcome through alliances and opportunistic reversals, arms races and imperialist expansions. The main diplomatic difference between Liberal and Fascist Italy was instead one of degree and strategic vision: all of Liberal Italy's leaders (Cavour, Crispi, di Rudinì, Giolitti, di San Giuliano, Salandra) always kept a cautious balance between the limits of Italy's foreign expansionism and the burden of domestic politico-economic shortcomings and international constraints. Instead Mussolini's aggressive foreign policy and propaganda bluffs jacked-up international tensions against all neighbors, while the regime's diplomatic-ideological clash against inferior adversaries (Greece, Albania, Yugoslavia, Ethiopia, Spain), blinded him to the actual limits of Italy's power.²

In both periods, Italy's Navy and Army served as prestigious foreign policy-tools to assure national security and alliance-building with other Powers, but constrained peace-time military budgets and limited war-time experience only further exacerbated Rome's quest for symbolic Great Power status, rather than devise an effective long-term expansionist strategy. But this dangerous gap between ambitions and military unreadiness was routinely discounted in peace-time under the prestigious veneer of empty diplomacy and power-politics, nationalist rhetoric and limited military strikes against weaker enemies. Only whenever easy diplomatic victories, or the quest for immediate geo-strategic gains to cut off rivals propelled Italy towards improvised military campaigns, she often discovered that the structural wide gap between means and preparation denied her victory, just as much as did enemy efforts. Thus, Italy's dream to dominate the Mediterranean was never fulfilled except briefly in 1940-42 during the final struggle against Britain, and was doomed since the beginning by a systemic lack of long-term strategic vision and hard military planning. Defeat led to routine blind domestic rejection of imperialism as a "failed" policy, not to a more realistic revision of national interests and effective means to achieve them, while any lessons learned the hard way were quickly forgotten (1866-74, 1887, 1896-1900, 1919-22, 1943-45). Victory as well, although rare, never stimulated the necessary strategic adjustments in means and doctrine to expand the new conquests.³

In World War II Fascist Italy's dreams of regional supremacy were doomed: left alone by land-oriented Germany (bent on conquering Europe and Soviet Russia), Italy's critical sea-power struggle with Britain over the Mediterranean never succeeded in breaking the naval stalemate on her favor, squandering instead dwindling resources in ill-planned, impulsive campaigns. Even Italy's long coveted prizes were

²A.J.P. Taylor, *The Struggle for Mastery of Europe, 1848-1918* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1954); Glen St.J. Barclay, *The Rise and Fall of the New Roman Empire* (London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1973).

³Cedric J. Lowe & Frank Marzari, *Italian Foreign Policy, 1870-1940* (London-Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1975); Gerhard L. Weinberg, *A World at Arms. Global History of World War II* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994); Gabriel Kolko, *The Politics of War and U.S. Foreign Policy, 1943-45* (New York: Random House, 1968).

mostly secured through German help in 1940–42, not Italian might: Albania, the demotion of France, Nice, Corsica, Dalmatia, Slovenia, control of Greece, a pro-Italian Croatia and Montenegro, Kosovo and Tunisia. By 1942–45 the Allies' aero-naval conquest of East Africa, the Mediterranean and Southern Italy left the country defeated, devastated and under Allied occupation. Thus, Italy quickly relapsed into the inward-looking mentality of a neutralist, medium-Power.⁴

Yet paradoxically, in few years Italy found herself restored to a measure of international respectability as a new democratic, industrial Western member of NATO and the European Union when the East-West Cold War and nuclear balance of terror since 1946–55 privileged new alliance-cohesion between winners and losers within the democratic U.S.-led West. Meanwhile the loss of all past dangerous dreams of regional Power in World War II finally forced Italy into a more realistic reappraisal of national security during the Cold War (1945–91) and afterwards. Interlocking alignments with the West (United States, NATO, European Union) guaranteed "Atlantic Italy's" national security, prestige and economic growth at little cost to herself: 1/2) NATO and "Pax Americana" insured her long-term land, sea, air and nuclear security from foreign threats; 3) the European Union's cross-national integration and large-scale domestic industrialization within the global U.S.-led Western capitalist system insured economic development, trade and emigration. However, throughout the Cold War Italy's inward consociative, but unstable political system, was consumed by the DC's quest for domestic monopoly over the economy and all coalition governments until 1992 to keep the rival Communist Party (second-largest party) in the opposition due to its pro-Soviet ideological ties.⁵

2. The Price of Defeat: Italy under Allied Control, 1943–1947

Military defeats in World War II and the Allied invasion of Southern Italy led to Mussolini's overthrow by Army Marshall Pietro Badoglio's military-monarchist coup of 25 July 1943. Overnight the regime collapsed to the consternation of both Germany and the Allies, while exposing Fascism's inner weakness and the deep cleavage that an unpopular war had created. King Vittorio-Emanuele III and Premier Badoglio had both supported Fascism in the past and now sought to preserve the domestic socio-political monarchic-conservative order through a secret "reversal of alliances" to join the Allies and offset the country's imminent defeat and Hitler's wrath. But at home an equally pro-Allied democratic opposition emerged in 1943 as an openly anti-Fascist

⁴Sari J. Gilbert, *Armistice to Alliance: Goals & Methods in Italian Foreign Policy, 1943–49* (Ph.D. Dissertation, Baltimore MD: Johns Hopkins University, 1967); Stephen E. Ambrose, *Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy, 1938–98* (New York: Penguin, 1998); Norman Kogan, *Italy & Allies* (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1956).

⁵Amb. Sergio Romano, *Guida alla Politica Estera Italiana. Dal crollo del Fascismo al crollo del Comunismo* (Milano: Rizzoli, 1993), p. 1–3, 5–7; Giorgio Bocca, *Storia della Guerra Fascista*, 2 vols. (Bari: Laterza, 1972).

and anti-monarchist front of Christian Democrats, Socialists, Communists, Actionists and Liberals.⁶

Italy's hope to join the Allies on a base of equality and steer their landings north of Rome to force a quick German retreat from the Peninsula, reflected the best Savoyard tradition of exploiting since the 1600s Europe's changing balance of power to expand or minimize losses. But by 1943 such plans were utterly unrealistic: 1) in 1915 Italy's successful diplomatic "reversal of alliances" to the Allied side was really due to her prior neutrality and untapped military might at a time of wild uncertainty over the Great War's military balance and future outcome; 2) in 1940 Mussolini had been courted both by Hitler and Britain to enter the war on their sides, or remain neutral in exchange for confused colonial cessions; 3) by 1943 the Allies' superiority was poised to destroy the Axis, regardless of fresh German help to defend Italy. Badoglio now overestimated Italy's bargaining power and geo-strategic role, given the Anglo-American *Casablanca Declaration* on the Axis' unconditional surrender; the sharp Anglo-French hostility to Italy, which hampered Allied diplomatic responses to Badoglio's peace overtures (July–August 1943); and contempt for Italy's combat capability.⁷

Britain held the dominant politico-military influence on Anglo-American decision-making and joint war-operations in the Mediterranean, while the United States, although more lenient towards Italy, deferred loyally to Britain's policy in the basin. Thus, London sought both Italy's transition from Fascism to a pro-British conservative monarchy, and her complete military demotion as a Power (Italy's loss of Navy, Armed Forces, colonies, Albania, the north-eastern borders, and possible independence for Sicily and Sardinia). Badoglio was finally forced to sign Italy's unconditional surrender (Cassibile *Short Armistice*, 3 September 1943). Although a compromise would have greatly helped the Allied effort by shortening the war and enlisting Italy's full contribution against Nazi Germany, Badoglio was denied both Allied or Co-belligerency status, while the Allied Military Command took over the administration of all "liberated territories", albeit the Anglo-American *Québec Document* (August 1943) was attached to the *Short Armistice* and ambiguously promised future leniency on the unconditional surrender on the basis of Italy's actual support of the Allies.⁸

But Germany's swift occupation of North-Central Italy (July–September 1943)

⁶S. Romano, *Politica Estera Italiana*, p. 5–6, 13–14; Bernard Ireland, *The War in the Mediterranean, 1940–43* (London: Arms & Armour, 1993); Denis Mack Smith, *Mussolini's Roman Empire* (New York: Viking Press, 1976).

⁷S.J. Gilbert, *Armistice to Alliance*, p. 20–43; N. Kogan, *Italy & Allies*, p. 39–67, 171–185; G. Kolko, *Politics of War & U.S. Foreign Policy*, p. 3–421; Alfredo Breccia, *Italia e Difesa dell'Europa* (Roma: Istituto De Gasperi, 1984).

⁸Giuseppe Filippone-Thaulero, *La Gran Bretagna e l'Italia, 1943–45* (Roma: Ed. Storia & Letteratura, 1979); B. Ireland, *War in the Mediterranean*, p. 111–212; G.L. Weinberg, *A World at Arms*, p. 408–470, 587–600.

undermined both Badoglio's secret alliance-reversal and set astray the pre-planned Allied air-borne landing to secure Rome from German retaliations. While the Allies' amphibious landing at Salerno (between Rome and Naples) was stuck, the King and Badoglio ignominiously fled to the "liberated" South, leaving the 2 million-strong Italian Armed Forces without orders or directions to resist the Germans and regroup. Under heavy German fire the deeply demoralized Italian Army disintegrated in few days: 61 fully armed divisions in Italy, France and the Balkans were soon reduced to just 7, with the majority disintegrating in a rush home, and 700,000 prisoners of war (POWs) deported to Germany. This deprived Badoglio of the only valuable politico-military asset left to resist both Allied military controls and the German invasion. The Allies who still held the contradictory hope of quickly freeing Italy with the active support of the Italian Army were now confirmed in their distaste of Italy. Yet the Italian Navy's efficient transfer of her still mostly intact forces to the Allies at Malta allowed them to bolster control of the whole basin and Atlantic, while diverting large Anglo-American naval forces to the 1944 Normandy invasion. The harsh clauses of the *Long Armistice Accord* (Malta, 29 September 1943) imposed post-war demilitarization and the loss of Navy and colonies, while the Allied Control Commission monopolized Italy's diplomatic, military and domestic policies. Italy disappeared as a Power and was divided in three warring sides (Germany's occupation and liberation of Mussolini turned Northern Italy into the satellite Fascist Republic of Salò versus the Allied support for the "Reign of the South", and the rival partisans anti-Fascist civil war in the North).⁹

When Badoglio finally declared war on Germany (11–13 October 1943) Italy became a weak Co-belligerent, but never a partner and full Ally, dashing his hopes of eliminating the armistice before a Peace Treaty to strengthen the Monarchy's waning domestic authority. Nevertheless Badoglio and Foreign Minister Prunas, as later their democratic successors, kept pressing the Allies to modify the armistice, while using diplomacy to divide them (Americans against British; Soviets against the West) and secure Italy's re-entry as an equal, independent Power unto the post-war international scene.¹⁰

In both the pro-Allied South and in the German-occupied North, Badoglio and the King were challenged openly by the anti-Fascist Committee for National Liberation (CLN), which since Fall 1943 also provided the politico-military umbrella for local grass-root Partisan groups in a civil war to reunite Italy under a progressive, democratic, republic, while rejecting both Allied controls and Badoglio's rival mon-

⁹S. J. Gilbert, *Armistice to Alliance, 1943–49*, p. 20–43; N. Kogan, *Italy and Allies*, p. 58–66, 171–206; Pierre Renouvin, *Storia delle Relazioni Internazionali* (Firenze: UNEDI, 1966/71), v.8, p. 100–107, 114–117, 123–126, 145–159.

¹⁰G. Filippone-Thaulero, *La Gran Bretagna e l'Italia, 1943–45*, p. 5–178; A. Breccia, *L'Italia e la Difesa dell'Europa, 1943–54*, p. 5–78; N. Kogan, *Italy and the Allies*, p. 6–345; G. Kolko, *Politics of War, 1943–1945*, p. 5–267.

archist politico-military command. The Anglo-Americans in 1943-44 propped-up the Savoyard monarchy against Communist inroads (given their success in Yugoslavia, Albania and potentially Greece too), but a sympathetic President Roosevelt still rejected Badoglio's pleas for Allied status (January 1944), unless he form a new democratic government with his CLN enemies. The CLN instead opposed Allied pressures to join Badoglio in a pro-Allied democratic government of national unity, unless Badoglio and the King resigned ("Institutional Crisis", October 1943-April 1944). The Allies were frustrated by their inability to dominate the bitter inter-Italian political clash: London steadfastly backed the Savoyard and Badoglio government even against the local Anglo-American Head-Quarters, which supported America's new pro-CLN posture (February-March 1944).¹¹

To break their isolation, Badoglio and Prunas sought to split and neutralize both the Allies and the rival CLN with the Prunas-Vyshinskij Accord (14 March 1944): Palmiro Togliatti returned to Italy to head the Communist Party (PCI, the largest CLN party and best partisan force), while the USSR formally recognized Badoglio's government (the first by any Allied Power), supported Italy's wish to a restored Mediterranean role, and ordered the PCI to cooperate with Badoglio and the Savoyard monarchy throughout the war ("*Svolta di Salerno*", 24 April 1944). Notwithstanding Anglo-American and CLN outrage, Badoglio and the PCI forced all other democratic parties into his Salerno government, without jeopardizing either the monarchy or allowing radical socio-economic changes. Stalin's wild diplomatic gamble in Italy allowed the otherwise isolated USSR to bypass the Anglo-American politico-military monopoly over the Mediterranean. But Stalin refused to support diplomatically Italy's attempts at neutralist "equidistance"; then in 1944-45 the USSR backed Yugoslavia's claims (Trieste, Istria) and sought 20% of Italy's Navy to the USSR as war-reparations. Stalin soon abandoned Italy to the West's area of influence (unless the Italian Communists wrestled Italy away from the West), while exploiting Western regional supremacy as an international precedent to impose his own politico-military and communist ideological supremacy over Eastern Europe.¹²

Instead, the Anglo-Americans saw Prunas' diplomatic offensive to regain independence from Allied controls as the last act of Italian duplicity. The Anglo-Americans keenly opposed any Soviet, or Italian influence in the basin, while London until 1946 mercilessly squeezed Italy (backed by France, Yugoslavia and Greece), because any independent democratic Italy could again threaten her national interests in the basin, just like a Red Italy would do. With the Allied June 1944 conquest of Rome the CLN finally succeeded in forming a strong anti-Fascist government by dropping

¹¹Norman Kogan, *A Political History of Italy* (New York: Praeger, 1983), p. 5-83; S. Ambrose, *Rise to Globalism*, p. 1-37, 54-116; N. Kogan, *Italy and the Allies*, p. 6-19, 43-49, 57, 63-67, 78-79, 159-160, 163-164, 171-205.

¹²S. Romano, *Politica Estera*, p. 9-54; N. Kogan, *Italy & Allies*, p. 6-164; S. Ambrose, *Rise to Globalism*, p. 1-116.

Badoglio and isolating the Savoyard monarchy (Churchill's opposition was overrun for the first time by Roosevelt), while Italian military and partisan operations were expanded and the CLN pressed the Allies to revise the 1943 Armistice and extend Lend-Lease aid.¹³

America's interests in the Mediterranean had always been essentially commercial and cultural. The United States supported Italy's unification in 1848-70, but with minimal direct involvement. America returned to the Mediterranean only in World War I when she emerged as a Super-Power influencing Europe (1917-22), but still shied away from burdensome regional responsibilities. Only in the 1930s-40s the rapid expansion of U.S. oil interests in the Middle-East/Persian Gulf region, and the opposition to Fascist Italy's Ethiopian and Spanish Wars brought America back to a nebulous Mediterranean consciousness. Yet the United States emerged as a reluctant Mediterranean Power only by World War II, mostly through joint politico-military and economic cooperation with Britain in North Africa (1942-43), Italy (1943-45), France (1944) and protecting the Middle-East's oil resources and Britain's regional hegemony (1943-47). America readily accepted Britain's leadership, hegemony and military strategy to rescue her Mediterranean Imperial life-line to India through "peripheral offensives" throughout the basin. But Anglo-American cooperation in the Mediterranean and Italy soon waned by 1944: America pressed relentlessly for the Normandy Invasion of Nazi-held Continental Europe, while strongly opposing Britain's obsession on occupying first the Balkans and Greece to forestall the USSR's drive towards Europe and the Mediterranean. Only the Cold War forced the U.S. to side with Britain to contain the Soviet threat, but Britain's fatal economic and politico-military demise in 1947-56 forced her gradual withdrawal from the region on behalf of America's own security system (1947 Truman Doctrine and 1949 NATO).¹⁴

In 1943-48 Italy unwillingly became both a key test-case for Allied cooperation and brewing East-West tensions. Under U.S. pressures the Roosevelt-Churchill *Hyde Park Declaration*, 26 September 1944) praised Italy's democratic evolution, expanded her limited self-government and extended UNRRA aid for economic reconstruction. Roosevelt's intervention on behalf of Italy was dictated both by natural sympathy and by the politico-electoral impact during the 1944 presidential elections of the Italo-American vote (mostly lost in the 1940 elections) and the domestic and international lobbying efforts on Italy's behalf by the Catholic clergy, Italo-American communities in the United States and Latin America, as well as by the strong psychological difference that the U.S. public opinion saw between Italy and the fearful Japanese-German threats. America became also aware of her new role as a prestigious Super-Power

¹³S. Ambrose, *Rise to Globalism*, p. 1-116; N. Kogan, *Italy & Allies*, p. 63-79, 159-164, 171-187, 190-192.

¹⁴G. Filippone-Thaulero, *Gran Bretagna e Italia, 1943-45*, p. 146-178; A. Breccia, *Italia e Difesa dell'Europa, 1943-54*, p. 5-78; N. Kogan, *Italy & Allies*, p. 19-193; S. Ambrose, *Rise to Globalism*, p. 1-37, 54-116.

compared to a declining Britain and a bankrupt Europe. Thus the CLN was assured that Italy's national integrity would be respected, although U.S. support was often curtailed by Anglo-Soviet hostility to Italy. Yet all Allied concessions to Italy remained more apparent than substantial. Only in December 1945 Rome finally regained most politico-administrative controls and by January 1947 was fully freed from British interference.¹⁵

Against the Nazi-Fascists the stalled Allies pitted 14 Anglo-American infantry divisions and 6 brigades (including Italy's Southern Royal infantry-groups), plus 3 armored divisions and 6 brigades, while the German Army Group C had 16 infantry divisions, one RSI Northern Italian Fascist infantry division, 3 Panzer divisions and *Panzergranadiere*. In 1944-45 behind the lines 5-6 additional German and 3 RSI infantry divisions operated exclusively against local CLN partisans, which by January 1945 reached 307,000 men in 178 groups (44,720 dead and 21,168 wounded), including 30,305 abroad (Yugoslavia, Greece, France), plus 134,793 patriots (9,980 died) and 43/45,000 political prisoners in Nazi Lagers (4/5,000 survived). Mussolini's Fascist RSI lined by 1944-45 only 143,000 men in 4 infantry divisions and 150,000 men in the National Republican Guard, plus 20,000 Black Brigades and 10,000 Italian SS; the RSI Air-Force had 79,000 men mostly paratroopers, anti-air defenses and few airplanes; and the RSI Navy 26,000 men. Although Italy's partisan/civil war was second for magnitude in Europe (excluding Russia) only to Yugoslavia, the ideological clash often played second fiddle: most partisans were predominantly concerned with fighting German occupation and secondly the RSI Fascists (a task ideologically closer to the Communist partisans). The Allied war effort won at last, but the constant partisan attrition on German rear-lines and the frequent anti-guerrilla operations hampered the Nazi-Fascists until the April 1945 general partisan insurrection in Northern Italy's key urban-industrial areas prior to the Allies' victory.¹⁶

The Anglo-Americans feared that the partisan CLNAI would autonomously "liberate" Italy, implement a veritable socio-economic and political revolution abolishing the Savoyard monarchy and purging her ex-Fascist conservative supporters ("Wind from the North"), thus reversing Allied influence like the "independentist" French, Yugoslav and Greek partisans had done shocking the Anglo-Americans. But the Anglo-Americans could neither block, nor divide the CLNAI, and had to openly acknowledge its autonomous military cooperation, especially after the diversion of large Allied military forces for the 1944 invasion of France. But at war's end (April-May 1945) as Mussolini was executed by Communist partisans, the Allies systematically disarmed and disbanded all guerrilla units to avoid the repeat of any destabiliz-

¹⁵G. Filippone-Thaulero, *Gran Bretagna e Italia, 1943-45*, p. 146-178; S. Ambrose, *Rise to Globalism*, p. 1-37, 54-116; N. Kogan, *Italy & Allies*, p. 19-22, 104-120, 132; S.J. Gilbert, *Armistice to Alliance, 1943-49*, p. 30-39, 47-48.

¹⁶Giorgio Bocca, *Storia dell'Italia Partigiana* (Bari: Laterza, 1966).

ing local Leftist insurrection as in the Balkans.¹⁷

Britain finally allowed the long delayed 1944 *Hyde Park Declaration* to be implemented with increased economic aid and significant reductions in the local Allied politico-military and diplomatic controls by February 1945. Rome's war effort by April 1945 had produced over a million fighting men on the Allied side: 400,000 in the Navy and Army; 150,000 in Northern Italy's partisan groups; 150,000 dislocated units and partisans in the Balkans helping the Greek-Yugoslav partisans; 380,000 POWs in Allied territories assigned to local administrative duties (and other 650,000 POWs still in German Lagers). Italy's last effort to overcome diplomatic isolation was her declaration of war against Japan (15 July 1945). Although marginal and controversial, the war against Japan was seen by Italy's leadership as a diplomatic tool to capitalize on U.S. support and anti-Japanese feelings. But Roosevelt was countered by Anglo-Soviet opposition until the Allied Potsdam Conference (June-July 1945), thus turning Italy's anti-Japanese war in a farce devoid of benefits at the 1946-47 Peace Conference.¹⁸

While being sharply divided on the issue of retaining the colonies, the Italian governmental coalition started to develop its own key post-war foreign policy positions: the Vatican-inspired DC under De Gasperi was deeply split between utopian Catholic-based neutralism and pro-Western military alliance against the USSR; the pro-Soviet PCI (under Togliatti) expanded its electoral base through its decisive role in the Partisan war and fully supported Soviet foreign policy goals, opposing colonial retention and Italy's war against Japan; the neutralist PSI (under Nenni) was allied since 1943 with the PCI to create a common progressist front against Fascist backlashes and Anglo-American capitalist control; and other minor parties shared similar conservative, nationalistic, anti-British and pro-Western views. All recognized in 1943-47 that military defeat, reconstruction and politico-economic-military dependency on foreign Powers could be reversed only by openly renouncing Mussolini's past imperialist diplomacy of force in favor of a durable, democratic and cooperative foreign policy with all her ex-enemies. But as the Cold War forced the collapse of the wartime Grand Coalition (Britain, U.S.A., USSR), Italy's domestic politics became ideologically polarized. Both U.S. and Britain opposed Communist influence: a Leftist pro-Soviet Italy would threaten Anglo-American supremacy in the Mediterranean, given Italy's geo-strategic position, in a far worse way than the USSR in Greece, Albania, or Yugoslavia could. U.S. aid now supported both openly and covertly De Gasperi as Premier (1946-53) against the Left, with Sforza as Foreign Minister (1947-51).¹⁹

¹⁷G. Kolko, *Politics of War & U.S. Foreign Policy*, p. 5-267; N. Kogan, *Italy & Allies*, p. 123-134, 181-183.

¹⁸Amb. Alberto Tarchiani, *Dieci Anni fra Roma e Washington* (Milano: Mondadori, 1955), p. 33-38, 73-78, 90-109; Dean Acheson, *Present at the Creation* (New York: Norton, 1969); N. Kogan, *Italy and Allies*, p. 135-183.

¹⁹S.J. Gilbert, *Armistice to Alliance, 1943-49*, p. 90-105; N. Kogan, *Italy & Allies*, p. 135-141, 169-193, 206-207.

Although the Cold War gradually reversed Italy's diplomatic isolation as a vanquished enemy in the 1947-49 period, Rome's post-war foreign policy inevitably became dependent on U.S. support against British, Soviet and European hostility. De Gasperi assiduously demanded Italy's readmittance into the international community as a United Nations member to overcome diplomatic isolation, while trying to cushion the harsh peace clauses. Having preserved Italy's unity, the government restored the economy and democratic institutions, while opposing territorial amputations (colonies, Istria, Süd Tirol) and foreign interference. But neither Italy's wartime military-diplomatic efforts, nor U.S. support could lighten the heavy peace-treaty, while Cold War winds aggravated East-West tensions.²⁰

Regardless of American support, Italy's fate was sealed with the 1947 Peace Treaty: total loss of Istria, the Dodecanese and colonies; territorial Alpine adjustments for France; total loss of the Navy and demilitarization of the Alpine borders, coasts and islands; minimal Armed Forces (250,000 troops, including the Carabinieri and 200 tanks; 25,000 Air-Force personnel with 200 fighters, 150 transport planes, no bombers, or missiles and atomic bombs; 25,000 Navy personnel with 2 old battleships, 4 cruisers, 4 destroyers, 20 corvettes, 16 P.T.-Boats, no carriers, no submarines, or MAS); and \$ 3,473 billion in reparations (\$ 100 million to the Soviet Union; \$ 125 million to Yugoslavia; \$ 105 million to Greece; \$ 25 million to Ethiopia; \$ 5 million to Albania). America, Britain and France renounced to their reparations and post-war U.S. aid helped foot much of the remaining reparations, while U.S. support kept Trieste for Italy under Allied administration.²¹

Italy's leadership had deceived herself and the nation since July 1943 by trying to offset defeat and switch sides to join the Allies: rather than becoming a Western ally or co-belligerent Italy was consistently berated internationally as a vanquished enemy, while De Gasperi's diplomatic attempts for a lenient Peace Treaty by extolling Italy's democratic evolution, wartime support of the Allies and Resistance were brushed aside. Strong international pressures and U.S. threats to cut-off vital aid forced Italy to sign the punitive Paris Peace Treaty (10 February 1947). At home De Gasperi and Sforza were personally blamed for the loss of lands and expulsion of 350,000 Italians from Istria, Dalmatia, Ethiopia, Eritrea and Libya. Yet most of the nation accepted tacitly the Peace Treaty as a symbol of closure given Italy's weakness and inner politico-moral cleavages: Centrists, Catholics, nationalists and ex-Fascists bitterly opposed it, while Communists, Socialists and Sicilian secessionists saw it as a "just" defeat for the "oppressor" state, or divine punishment according to most Cath-

²⁰Rosaria Quartararo, *Italia e Stati Uniti, Anni difficili, 1945-52* (Napoli: Ed. Scientifiche Italiane, 1986); Leo J. Wollemborg, *Stelle, Strisce e Tricolore* (Milano: Mondadori, 1983), p. 3-13; S. Ambrose, *Rise to Globalism*, p. 55-104.

²¹E. Timothy Smith, *United States, Italy & NATO, 1947-52* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991); A. Tarchiani, *Dieci Anni fra Roma e Washington*, p. 50-155; Egidio Ortona, *Anni d'America, 1944-51* (Bologna: Mulino, 1984).

olics. De Gasperi and Sforza were painfully aware that Italy's post-war diplomacy would be tainted by wartime defeat, diplomatic isolation, military vulnerability, economic difficulties and heavy politico-economic dependency on foreign Powers. Regardless of mutual distrust, Italy had to re-establish close ties with the Western Powers by ratifying the Peace Treaty and joining both the United Nations and the 1947 Marshall Plan for the economic recovery of Europe.²²

3. Cold War Diplomacy: from Neutralism to Europeanism and NATO, 1947-57

Under De Gasperi all major Italian parties (DC, PSI, PCI, PRI) formed a governmental coalition to perpetuate their old CLN anti-Fascist wartime alliance and conduct national reforms and economic reconstruction. But the pervasive domestic impact of the Cold War, which ideologically pitted the Leftist PCI-PSI bloc against the DC and the Centrist parties underlined the government's fragility until the fateful 1948 elections that would decide Italy's domestic political struggle and foreign policy. While domestic politics remained in a state of flux throughout 1945-1948, Italy's foreign policy promoted a non-committal neutralist "equidistance" between the emerging Soviet East and Western blocs: given Italy's bitter past experiences with imperialism and her current state of disarray, only a diplomacy openly based on "equidistance" and good relations with both blocs could preserve a modicum of domestic foreign policy consensus and a hope of independence for a shattered country. However, geo-strategy and international economic dependency increasingly tipped diplomatic and domestic politico-ideological alignments also in Italy towards the West. The United States fully backed the DC and related array of Catholic, monarchist, conservative and moderate forces alike, hoping to mold a broad national anti-Leftist coalition to keep Italy within the fragile Western fold.²³

The PCI's dependence on Moscow's foreign policy directives and its stress on immediate radical reforms made it the symbol of revolutionary change. De Gasperi reacted by pursuing a more decisive pro-Western foreign policy to obtain vital U.S. politico-economic support: De Gasperi's political survival depended on constant infusions of foreign economic aid and some form of diplomatic success to neutralize the Left. Ambassador Tarchiani had already secured U.S. aid in rebuilding the Italian Merchant Marine, while the Anglo-Americans renounced their quota of the Italian combat Navy. U.S. economic aid to Italy in 1944-46 totaled \$ 1,12 billion, but the dual pressure of reconstruction and rise in consumer demand on a still weak domestic economy reinforced the high inflation rate and governmental trade deficits, precipitating another wave of politico-economic strikes that sent De Gasperi to America

²²Ilaria Poggiolini, *Diplomazia di transizione. Alleati e Trattato di Pace Italiano* (Firenze: Ponte Gra-zie, 1990).

²³N. Kogan, *Italy & Allies*, p. 181-185; S. Romano, *Politica Estera Italiana*, p. 7-9, 15-16, 50-54.

(January 1947) for more aid and closer politico-military support to help Italy.²⁴

De Gasperi's first trip to the United States in January 1947 was a major success and most of his requests were granted, but the U.S. government and Congress relentlessly pressed Italy to drop the Left from the government if she wanted future aid. But De Gasperi was loathe to provoke the open hostility of the USSR or a show-down with the Left, so he resisted U.S. pressures, while forcing the Left into supporting the ratification of the divisive Peace Treaty. By May 1947 De Gasperi finally disbanded the government and with the external support of the Centrist parties and Vatican formed a DC-only government without the PCI-PSI bloc. With diplomacy now pro-Western, Rome used U.S. support to gain full readmittance as an equal into the international community and the United Nations. Yet, such major political changes took place in Italy only after Churchill's spirited call to arms to fight the Cold War against the USSR (1946 *Iron Curtain Address*, Fulton, Missouri). With Soviet threats against Greece, Turkey and Iran, America abandoned isolationism and protected Europe and the Mediterranean by *containing* Soviet expansion and "satellization" of Eastern Europe (1947 Truman Doctrine), while obtaining the PCF's exclusion from France's government (February 1947).²⁵

Nevertheless, Containment could not rely only on the U.S. monopoly of the new devastating atomic bombs was overvalued as a security umbrella, because it could not stop a Soviet conventional strike, but only incinerate its cities. Washington also feared a generalized socio-economic collapse of the ravaged Western European democracies, which would promote Communist propaganda, especially in Italy and France. Thus the 1947 Marshall Plan used billions of U.S. dollars in aid to financially spur Europe's reconstruction as a democratic, industrial bulwark against the USSR and rebuild her armed forces (stimulating U.S. trade and economic growth, without any build-up of U.S. troops). Concerning Italy, De Gasperi's January 1947 trip to the United States and troubled participation in June-July 1947 to the Marshall Plan (forced on London and Paris by Washington), led to her abandonment of neutralist "equidistance" between the blocs and her gradual reentry as an equal into the international community of Western nations, which cleansed her national psyche of her post-war shame and diplomatic isolation. By reinventing herself as a supporter of European democratic federalism and by renouncing all trappings of national sovereignty and militarism, Italy pursued a policy of firm support for a gradual European economic union. De Gasperi and Sforza stressed that politico-economic neutralism was tantamount to suicide for Italy in her weakened state, while European integration instead would assure economic growth and off-set the 1947 Peace Treaty by providing a cohesive European

²⁴Amb. Alberto Tarchiani, *Le 10 Giornate di De Gasperi negli Stati Uniti* (Milano: Rizzoli, 1947); A. Tarchiani, *Dieci Anni fra Roma e Washington*, p. 35-105; N. Kogan, *Italy and the Allies* p. 151-154.

²⁵S.J. Gilbert, *Armistice to Alliance*, p. 125-153, 207-213; E. Ortona, *Anni d'America*, p. 1-324; S. Ambrose, *Rise to Globalism*, p. 54-116; Thomas G. Paterson ed., *Origins of the Cold War* (Lexington MA: Heath, 1974).

security against the Soviet threat, solve the German problem, keep Euro-Mediterranean peace and buttress Italy's defenses. In this context, Rome consistently backed in 1946–1957 all inter-governmental Europeanist projects culminating with the 1950–1954 European Defense Community, the 1951 European Coal and Steel Community, and the 1957 European Community. The Left accused the Marshall Plan to sever Italy's economic ties with Eastern Europe and the USSR, imposing complete U.S. politico-economic supremacy. This would force Italy and Europe into the West and an inevitable new war against the USSR, leading to internal insurrection.²⁶

Throughout 1947–48, both Washington and the Vatican intervened on behalf of De Gasperi. After January 1947 following De Gasperi's state visit to America, Italy was included within the U.S. sphere of influence and anti-communist containment zone. Situated like Germany on the Iron Curtain border, Italy played an irreplaceable geo-strategic role for U.S. strategy in the Mediterranean. America's support of De Gasperi in this period was so thorough that with Rome's tacit approval America directly intervened in Italy's domestic electoral process with massive supplies and undercover funding for all pro-Western parties, while engineering a massive letter-campaign by Italo-American emigrants to their relatives and friends in support of the De Gasperi government. De Gasperi also secretly asked America to send the U.S. Sixth Fleet before the 1948 elections to cruise along Italy's coast to intimidate the Left, but was turned down. Yet Washington made public its threat to stop all aid and diplomatic support of Italy if the Left won, while Moscow opposed Italy's claims on Trieste. But the 1948 Yugo-Soviet Split unexpectedly tossed Yugoslavia in the Western camp and cut the USSR from the Mediterranean. Thus, the West froze the Trieste dispute until 1954.²⁷

In Italy the critical elections of 18 April 1948 turned into a massive DC landslide with 48% of the vote plus 11,3% for its governmental allies, and De Gasperi could now fully impose his foreign and domestic programs against a divided opposition (31% PCI-PSI front and 4,8% to the anti-Communist Right). De Gasperi's overwhelming electoral victory on the Left also doomed the PCI/PSI alliance: after 1948 the PSI gradually broke from the PCI to regain its political independence and by the 1960s rejoined the government ("Opening to the Left"). De Gasperi immediately formed a new pro-Western Centrist government with his weaker allies to establish the broadest possible Catholic-Lay coalition to isolate permanently the Left in opposition and so strengthen the democratic reform-minded Centrist forces. Given the DC's mixed nature, inevitably the old conservative groups soon stalled needed socio-economic reforms, while De Gasperi struggled to preserve the government's and DC's political independence from both the Left and Vatican's constant interferences.²⁸

²⁶Michael J. Hogan, *Marshall Plan* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987); S. Ambrose, *Rise to Globalism*, 54–116; John L. Harper, *L'America e la ricostruzione dell'Italia, 1945–48* (Bologna: Mulino, 1987).

²⁷S. Romano, *Politica Estera Italiana*, p. 35–36; S.J. Gilbert, *Armistice to Alliance, 1943–1949*, p. 171–182.

²⁸Nico Perrone, *De Gasperi e l'America* (Palermo: Sellerio, 1995); S. Romano, *Politica Estera Italiana*, p. 35–36, 72–75; Pietro Pastorelli, *La politica estera Italiana del dopoguerra* (Bologna: Mulino, 1987).

These sharp contrasts in foreign and domestic policy often embarrassed and paralyzed the government, given the contrasting neutralist and Europeanist pressures inside the DC against De Gasperi's domestic "secular" policies and pro-U.S. foreign policy, or even joining any European-based defense-system like the Brussel Pact. Created to counter the 1948 Czechoslovak Communist coup and America's unwillingness to guarantee a U.S.-based permanent military defense of Europe, the Brussels Pact (Britain, France, Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg; later renamed Western Union in 1954) was the West's first peacetime military alliance against either a future *revanchist* Germany, or the more likely current Soviet threat. As such it strongly conditioned also Italy's foreign and domestic policy, although Rome was never formally invited to join it. While the United States and Britain sent in 1948 vague feelers and goodwill gestures to encourage Italy to petition her membership in the Pact, soon all Western countries became greatly disturbed by Italy's indifference and strong neutralist leanings, although it was commonly assumed that Italy's initial exclusion from the newly-formed Brussels Pact would be only temporary until a strong Western government emerged after the 1948 April elections. But De Gasperi feared any hasty Western alignment would have split the DC between nationalists and pacifists, while galvanizing the Left's challenge for power. "Equidistance" and "Neutrality" remained easy, but empty diplomatic formulae that all parties could share, while the government deferred any controversial decision after the 1948 elections. Yet this exposed Italy to U.S. criticism and hostility from the other European countries who condemned Italy's diplomatic ambiguity, just when the Cold War was pushing all European countries to take sides.²⁹

Parallel to these concerns, it soon became evident that the Brussels Pact alone could not provide a realistic military response to the threat of a Soviet invasion without direct U.S. military-economic assistance. Any open Italian neutrality required economic self-sufficiency, still impossible to achieve after the embarrassing failure of Fascist autarky and the persistent Italian trade dependence on the basin's sea-routes on the industrialized West. Neutrality also required for its viability high military spending and fortifications, both prohibited by the 1947 Peace Treaty. Italy's security remained totally dependent on America and open politico-military alignment with the West. Thus, De Gasperi promoted a national debate to sway the neutralist domestic majority (from the Left to the Catholics and Liberals) to back the West, while unsuccessfully subordinating any Western Alliance membership to America's diplomatico-military help. But U.S. military strategy in 1948 focused on a conventional World War III-type worst-case scenario following a Soviet invasion of Western Europe, with a U.S.-Western first-line of defense on the Rhine, to then fall back on a more solid, long-term peripheral defense-line in the British Isles, the Pyrenees and

²⁹Ennio Di Nolfo, H. Romain Rainero & Brunello Vigezzi, *L'Italia e la politica di potenza in Europa, 1945-50* (Settimo Milanese: Marzorati Ed., 1988); S.J. Gilbert, *Armistice to Alliance*, p. 241-267.

North Africa from where to prepare a later Normandy-type invasion and a "third liberation" of the Continent from hegemonic conquests. In these plans also Italy's long-term defense was discounted as impossible, given the PCI's role as a potential "fifth column", except for her vital geo-strategic islands (as Rome feared most).³⁰

Once the 1948-49 Berlin Blockade raised the fear of an imminent World War III, Truman expanded American support to Europe through direct military involvement with the *Vandenberg Resolution* (11 June 1948), authorizing him to enter in any peacetime military alliance deemed vital to preserving America's national security within the United Nation's Collective Security framework. Although its stated intent was the military security of the whole Western Hemisphere through the Organization of American States in 1948 (providing a regional alliance between the United States and all Latin American countries), secret negotiations also started in earnest to form an enlarged NATO Western alliance in Europe involving the United States, Canada and the Brussels Pact Powers (June-December 1948). As leader of this North Atlantic Treaty the United States no longer would remain neutral in another global conflict, only to join and win it at the end like in both World Wars. But contrasts emerged between America, Britain and France over the effective scope and size of the Atlantic Pact: America wanted its immediate expansion to all Marshall Plan members, while the Anglo-French sought a delayed limited enlargement (excluding Italy) after the U.S. prior rearmament of the original Brussels Pact Powers. As Tarchiani learned in July 1948 of this momentous change in U.S. foreign policy he redoubled his efforts to convince Rome to abandon neutralism and adhere to the future Atlantic Alliance to secure national defense as an equal with the other European countries. Italy's membership in the NATO Alliance was strongly resisted by London and Paris out of past hostility, fear of communist coups there, contempt for her ambiguous neutralism and opposition to indirectly strengthening Rome's claims on Libya through her inclusion in such an unprecedented vast Western military bloc. European uncertainty and distrust of Italy were shared also by Washington, which although keen on enlarging the Western Alliance to Italy and the Mediterranean, was now baffled by Rome's silence to earlier American feelers since Summer 1948. Washington made it clear that any further Italian delay in answering would increase its own embarrassment and make it difficult to oppose the Anglo-French anti-Italian posture: only Italy's unconditional entry into both the Brussels Pact and NATO would have extended U.S. protection.³¹

Washington, London and Paris still envisioned the West's main line of defense on the Rhine, but only Britain strongly insisted in keeping the alliance geographically limited to Continental Europe. Rome finally focused on NATO by September 1948,

³⁰A. Tarchiani, *Dieci Anni fra Roma e Washington*, p. 145-149; A. Breccia, *Italia e difesa Europea*, p. 5-39; S.J. Gilbert, *Armistice to Alliance*, p. 241-248, 250-252, 266-267; S. Romano, *Politica Estera Italiana*, p. 5, 43-45, 52-54.

³¹Francis Heller & John R. Gillingham eds., *NATO. Founding the Alliance* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992)

when Paris switched position supporting now Italy's membership as vital for French and Mediterranean security. If Italy was still weak, so too were many other proposed members: Denmark, Norway, Iceland, Portugal, Sweden and Ireland were hardly Powers at all, but were instead invaluable geo-strategic assets to NATO, thanks to their air-naval facilities and bases. However uncertainties still persisted at the White House (Truman), influential advisors (like George F. Kennan the "father" of anti-Soviet Containment), the State Department (when Dean Acheson replaced General Marshall as Secretary of State in January 1949) and the Joint Chiefs of Staff which thought Italy of minor strategic value: anti-Soviet military plans in case of World War III called for sustained regional defense of the British Isles-Pyrenees-North African theaters and retaining control only of insular and Southern Italy, while the President's National Security Council strongly supported NATO and Italy's immediate inclusion in NATO, because America's security posture and Italy's own vital geo-strategic role in the Mediterranean made her too important even without prior Italian entry into the Brussels Pact (NSC Meeting, 21 November 1948).³²

The flurry of diplomatic traffic in Fall 1948 led to De Gasperi's secret decision to join the Atlantic Alliance, formally applying in late-December 1948. But domestically, both the Italian Left and the equally influential and vocal Catholic circles inside the DC and Vatican rallied one last time to oppose any national alignment with NATO, thus making Italy's support of the Western Alliance still ambiguous and hesitant all through Winter 1948-49. The Catholic front was sharply divided between pro-Western and neutralist-nationalistic factions within the DC and Vatican, until De Gasperi finally convinced Pope Pius XII to openly support a pro-Western military front as a necessary tool to stem the advance of atheist Communism in Europe and secure Italy's own national protection (December 1948). A key role in the Vatican's open political stand was the pro-Western influence of its Acting Secretary of State Mons. Montini (later Pope Paul VI), whose close ties with many DC leaders and skill in drawing upon Pope Pius XII's anti-communism. Thus the Pope's open pro-Western position undercut all clerical oppositions. Then on December 1948 Italian Parliamentary debate awoke Italy to the running battle between government and opposition on foreign policy, while helping De Gasperi overcome the anti-Western opposition of both Left and Right, and gradually sway popular opinion towards participation to such Western military alliance. De Gasperi went to great pains to stress how European unity was the only viable policy for Italy's security compared to any impractical neutralism, while no official commitment to a Western military bloc had been, or would be undertaken by the government, who pursued instead friendship with both West and East.³³

Italy's most influential ambassadors pressed Rome to rapidly take an open stand

³²A. Breccia, *L'Italia e la difesa dell'Europa*, p. 5-39; S.J. Gilbert, *Armistice to Alliance*, p. 248, 297-354.

³³S.J. Gilbert, *Armistice to Alliance*, p. 359-406; A. Tarchiani, *Dieci Anni fra Roma e Washington*, p. 159-163.

on NATO. Given the American domestic mixed feelings towards Italy and the Mediterranean, Washington clearly warned Rome of the impossibility of securing from an indifferent U.S. Congress. Sforza's and De Gasperi's lingering fear of a negative domestic reaction were overcome by Tarchiani's prodding and the influential intervention of Pope Pius XII who publicly condemned neutralism and isolationism, while stressing collective security and military alliances as vital to achieve peace against Communism (*Christmas Message* 1948). It is perhaps surprising how rapidly the Italian government piloted Italy's entry in NATO (its first post-war military alliance) in December 1948–March 1949, overcoming all domestic oppositions, while remarkably succeeding in harmonizing domestic feelings with Italy's quest to attain full diplomatico-military reintegration into the West by exploiting the fast changing international situation and the country's Europeanist orientation. In the end, Italy's economic integration in a united Europe and military integration in the West, helped her regain an equal status (although only as a medium Power) within the wider international community, while tacitly achieving the revision of the Peace Treaty. Both policies (Europeanist and Atlanticist) were successful only within the framework of a close U.S.–Italian friendship and France's final diplomatic pressures, which forced Rome to finally face and prevail over domestic opposition and Anglo-European hostility.³⁴

By February–March 1949, France's and Truman's direct intervention finally overcome all internal and international doubts over Italy's membership, as Truman and Acheson reluctantly agreed that her inclusion was unavoidable. Italy, Norway, Portugal and Iceland joined NATO as founding members (Washington, 4 April 1949), while Francoist Spain was rejected and Sweden remained neutral to avoid the Soviet satellization of neutral Finland. Parallel to NATO's birth, West Germany finally became independent (8 April 1949), albeit still divided, demilitarized and under Allied occupation. Given the later Cold War crises and 1950–53 Korean War, the United States would have in any case forced Italy out of her ambiguous neutrality and into NATO by 1952, even if domestic neutralism and the Anglo-European Powers had succeeded in initially weathering the American dissatisfaction and rejected Italy's early entry in NATO in 1949 (and twice in 1949 and 1952 on Francoist Spain and West Germany). Finally, the 1950–53 Korean War allowed America to weather European opposition: West Germany joined NATO by 1953–55; in 1952 the Southern Flank was expanded to Greece and Turkey; and bilateral U.S. treaties defended Francoist Spain and Japan.³⁵

De Gasperi now forced a new parliamentary vote of confidence on the government's Atlanticist policy (11 March 1949), steamrolling Leftist, neo-Fascist and inter-

³⁴S. Romano, *Politica Estera Italiana*, p. 47–49; S.J. Gilbert, *From Armistice to Alliance, 1943–49*, p. 420–421, 424–425, 427–438, 441–448, 513–523; A. Tarchiani, *Dieci Anni fra Roma e Washington*, p. 168–169.

³⁵S.J. Gilbert, *Armistice to Alliance*, p. 450–560; A. Tarchiani, *Dieci Anni fra Roma e Washington*, p. 163–164, 508–513; E. Timothy Smith, *U.S., Italy & NATO*, p. 1–176; Dean Acheson, *Present at Creation* (New York: Norton, 1969)

nal DC oppositions (Dossettians and Gronchists), while stressing to the parliament that NATO was a defensive, non-automatic military alliance, void of onerous financial obligations (or U.S. military bases) for Italy, and vital to strengthen Euro-American solidarity. Italy's influence as a Western nation no longer tainted by the Fascist defeat in World War II, or diplomatic isolation, would be guaranteed by her membership in NATO as an equal founding member, while national security would be assured by the alliance with the United States, the new hegemonic maritime Mediterranean and Continental land-Power (thus merging the two traditional Italian security directives and helping to repeal also the remaining 1947 Peace Treaty military limitations). The Left remained locked in its futile, anti-Western, nationalist-neutralist cries of betrayal against the government's pro-U.S., NATO and Europeanist foreign policy.³⁶

Italy's membership in NATO and the Western bloc revived her international image and sense of identity: with NATO Italy could fully remilitarize, while providing an excellent geo-strategic and logistic support for the U.S. Sixth Fleet and NATO forces in the basin. Moreover, given NATO's concentration in Germany and its total control over the Mediterranean since the anti-Soviet Yugoslav split of 1948, even a lightly-armed "Atlantic Italy" risked little immediate Soviet threat from land, or sea. Thus, throughout 1949-75 Rome safely relied on her loyal pro-American and Europeanist image, without having to shoulder much of the actual NATO military burden during a period when "*Pax Americana*" aptly symbolized the global reach of a wealthy and semi-omnipotent U.S. Super-Power. In time U.S.-Italian bilateral relations became more balanced and flexible within NATO and the West, while nearly all segments of the Italian public opinion and political forces support and perceive NATO as both the symbol of today's "Atlantic Italy's" post-war national renewal, and of America's strong commitment to back a Western alliance of partners in a democratic, united Europe. America, NATO and the European Union became the three pillars of Italy's new diplomacy and international identity, deeply conditioning her political and economic growth: 1) U.S. support rescued Italy since the difficult Cobelligerency years of 1943-45, then developed as the vital guarantor for Italy's own industrial modernization and national security through her nuclear umbrella and politico-diplomatic support of NATO and Europe's integration; 2) NATO guaranteed national security on land and sea against both the new Soviet threat and old intra-European ethno-nationalist rivalries; 3) European integration (ECSC, EDC, E.C./E.U.) assured such political partnership, unimpeded economico-financial support, capitalist growth, free-trade and intra-European emigration relief.³⁷

³⁶A. Breccia, *Italia e difesa dell'Europa*, p. 5-39; S.J. Gilbert, *Armistice to Alliance*, p. 468-470, 500-555.

³⁷N. Kogan, *A Political History of Italy*, p. 5-83; P. Vannicelli, *Italy, NATO & European Community*, p. 1-52.

4. Conclusion: Italy's return to the West

Throughout the Cold War's turbulent times, America's close friendship and protection together with Italy's membership in the U.S.-led NATO Alliance finally solved Italy's post-1861 traditional attempts to enhance her international Power-image and interests through a combination of diplomatico-military alliances in Europe and the Mediterranean with the respective hegemonic land-Powers (France, Germany, U.S./NATO) and sea-Powers (Great Britain and America) of the time, backed by occasional independentist foreign ventures. During the Cold War and afterwards, NATO fully secured Italy's quest for sea-land protection, partnership and support through a politico-military alignment more durable, egalitarian and wider than the Triple Alliance (1882-1914), the Axis (1936-1945), or the Entente/Western Alliance (1904-1919, 1938-1946) could ever provide. But for all her shows of diplomatic and military cooperation with NATO, Italy never truly reciprocated this Euro-Atlantic security blanket with a national military contribution of her own. Instead, Italy's military contribution to NATO always remained primarily geo-strategic and logistical, with a thorough modernization of the national Armed Forces along current Western standards repeatedly delayed until the late-1970s. Every Italian government since De Gasperi saw Italy's NATO membership not as a chance to ideologically and militarily integrate her defenses with the West for a future World War III against the Soviet bloc, but as a purely diplomatic tool to avoid a dangerous isolation within the West, while exploiting European integration for international recognition and economic growth.³⁸

³⁸S. Romano, *Politica Estera Italiana*, p. 165-203; E. Timothy Smith, *U.S., Italy & NATO, 1947-52*, p. 1-176.



The Civilized and the Savage: The Army's Ethical Conduct in The Second Seminole War

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The idea that nations should try to wage just wars was first articulated by the Roman lawyer and statesman Cicero in the first century B.C. Later Cicero's just war principles were given a Christian context, and re-introduced by Saint Augustine to encourage pacifist Christians to defend Constantine's empire from the Barbarians. In his *Summa Theologica* treatise, Saint Thomas Aquinas took Augustine's principles and systematized them into a just war doctrine that was eventually canonized by the Roman Catholic Church. Originally this doctrine concerned itself primarily with the legitimate conditions for going to war or, *jus ad bellum*. During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries however, the Counter-Reformation theologians Francis de Vitoria and Francisco Suarez developed *jus in bello*, or additional conditions that had to be observed if a war was to be waged justly.

Unfortunately, the Church proved incapable of honoring its own just war doctrine. During the Thirty Years War the Catholic Church often endorsed the use of unlimited violence in its holy crusade to purge Europe of Protestant heretics. The horrors of this religious war prompted Hugo Grotius' seminal work, *On the Law of War and Peace*, which successfully merged both *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello* criteria into a secular, humanistic version of the earlier Catholic doctrine and created the international rules of war later recognized by Western Europe and the fledgling United States.

The Second Seminole War, one of America's most protracted Indian wars, presents an excellent case study for examining how well professional military values held up in the context of North American Indian conflicts. While several scholars have evaluated the war from a *jus ad bellum* perspective, this paper will focus primarily on the principles of *jus in bello*, or whether the United States waged a just war against the

Seminole Indian Tribe of Florida.¹

This investigation of potential just war violations by the U.S. military during the Second Seminole War addresses three important questions. First, were the alleged perpetrators of these crimes familiar with just war concepts? Second, what was the nature of these charges, or how did the United States Army violate *jus in bello* criteria during the war? Finally, if regular army officers did violate just war rules during the Second Seminole War and other North American Indian conflicts, why did they do so?

From the very beginning of the English Colonial experiment in North America, many professional English military officers were familiar with the international conventions governing warfare. For example, during the Colonial Indian wars in New England, Puritan soldiers like John Mason and Myles Standish justified their sometimes questionable military conduct using principles derived from the mediaeval just war code.² Later, in the early national period, the new American government also carefully tried to observe this international legal code both in its foreign relations with Europe and its relations with neighboring Indian tribes. The Northwest Ordinance affirmed that the Indians "land and property shall never be taken from them without their consent; and in their property, rights, and liberty they shall never be invaded or disturbed unless in just and lawful wars authorized by Congress."³ Secretary of War Henry Knox reiterated the Ordinance's language in a letter to President George Washington stating, "Indian land can only be taken from them by consent or by right of conquest in a just war."⁴ Even outspoken Western nationalists like Andrew Jackson, surely no friend of the Indian, were familiar with just war principles governing retaliation against recalcitrant tribes.⁵

By the 1820s, the new United States Military Academy at West Point was institu-

¹ A few of the modern scholars who have addressed the causes underlying the war include John Mahon, Francis Prucha, Michael Rogin, and Ronald Satz. For the best modern treatment of the war, see John K. Mahon's, *History of the Second Seminole War, 1835-1842*. (Gainesville, Florida). In his final analysis of the Payne's Landing and Fort Gibson Treaties, Mahon concludes that the Seminoles did not recognize the removal treaties as legitimate and it was this rejection that ultimately provoked the war. See John K. Mahon, "Two Seminole Treaties: Payne's Landing, 1832, and Ft. Gibson, 1833," *Florida Historical Quarterly*, XLI (July, 1962), 1-21.

² James Drake, "Restraining Atrocity: The Conduct of King Philip's War," *New England Quarterly* (70:1:1997), 35-36. Drake argues that the destruction of the Mystic Village in the earlier Pequot War, along with its inhabitants, was completely justified according to the "Law of Nations," because the fortified village had failed to surrender.

³ Richard Perry and John Cooper, *Sources of Our Liberties: Documentary Origins of Individual Liberties in the United States Constitution and Bill of Rights*. (Buffalo: William S. Hein & Co., 1991), "Northwest Ordinance," 396.

⁴ Rogin, *Fathers and Children*, 128. Originally cited in Merritt Pound's *Benjamin Hawkins: Indian Agent* (Athens, Ga, 1951), 52.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 160. Jackson revealed as much during the War of 1812, when he threatened Pensacola's Spanish governor with a letter noting, "It is not on the heads of helpless women and children that retaliation will be made, but on the head which countenanced and excited the barbarity. He is the responsible person, and not the poor savage whom he makes the instrument of execution."

tionally committed to the ideal of fighting just wars against its future enemies. The U.S. Military Academy had adopted Vattel's internationally recognized text, *Law of Nations*, as its official source for the rules of war. In his legal treatise, Vattel devoted considerable space to a modern discussion of Grotius's *jus in bello* principles. These *jus in bello* principles dealt with three principal issues: (1) who could lawfully be attacked in a war between two nations; (2) what means could lawfully be used to attack them; and (3) how should enemy hostages and prisoners be treated?⁶

So how well did these new professional military values hold up in the context of a North American Indian war? In the case of the Second Seminole War, not so well as some U.S. officers were apparently more concerned with defeating the Seminoles than honoring their professional code of conduct. Allegations concerning the army's violation of truces, use of unnecessarily extreme measures, and mistreatment of hostages and prisoners during the war must therefore be carefully examined.

The most flagrant examples of the U.S. Army violating truces with the Seminole Indian Tribe took place during the third year of the war. In December, 1836, Brevet Major General Thomas Sidney Jesup was transferred to Florida with orders to subdue the Seminoles and ship them west, a task his two predecessors had proven incapable of completing. During the first months of his command Jesup appeared to be optimistic about the course of the war. Hard fighting in January of 1837 had forced some of the Seminole leaders to come to the bargaining table. A truce was negotiated at Fort Dade, and in March some of the Seminole leaders agreed to establish a permanent cease-fire and immediately migrate west of the Mississippi.⁷ By the end of April however, with the truce still in effect, it had become clear that some bands of the Seminole Tribe, including Osceola's, had no intention of honoring the March migration agreement.

Perhaps the most frustrating defeat for Jesup came on June 2nd, when Osceola led a raid on the detention camps housing Seminoles awaiting transport to the West. Nearly 700 Seminoles, including those who had come in since January, escaped.⁸ Jesup, who had received prior warning of the raid and tried to circumvent it, blamed his subordinates for the fiasco and became increasingly bitter about the Seminoles' continued resistance. He now accepted his predecessors' conclusion that the Indian migration strategy was doomed to failure, and in June asked his superiors to be relieved of command.

Before leaving Florida however, Jesup decided to try and redeem his military reputation and punish the Seminoles for their intransigence. Over the summer months

⁶ Paul Christopher. *The Ethics of War and Peace: An Introduction to Legal and Moral Issues*. (New York: United States Military Academy, 1994), 100.

⁷ Mahon, 200. The Fort Dade "Capitulation" was negotiated with Jumper, Holatoochee, and Yaholoochee. While Osceola and others refused to honor its terms, Yaholoochee, Micanopy, Jumper, Cloud and Alligator did and later entered the white detention camps in preparation for their travel west. They were subsequently freed by Osceola's and Sam Jones' June 2nd raid.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 204. Some scholars believe that Jesup's attempt to divide the Seminoles from their African allies during this sensitive period of negotiations helped incite Osceola's attack.

Jesup stepped up his campaign to divide the Seminoles from their African-American allies, and this strategy produced immediate results. One of the ex-slaves that came in was John, a slave that had served King Philip, the head of the Seminole Tribe. John agreed to lead his captors to Chief Philip's secret hideout, which led to Philip's capture. Three weeks later, on October 27, 1837, Osceola and Coa Hadjo sent word that they wished to arrange a parley. Jesup agreed to the peace conference but ordered his subordinate, General Hernandez, to try and capture the two Seminole leaders during the meeting. When the two opposing parties met near Fort Peyton under a white flag of truce, General Hernandez sprang his trap, and surrounded the Indian party with 250 mounted soldiers. Osceola and Coa Hadjo, and over eighty of their fellow tribesmen and allies, were taken into captivity.

In late December, the U.S. government also sent in a Cherokee delegation to try and convince Micanhopy, the chief of the Alachuas, to surrender. Once again, Jesup repeated his treacherous strategy. The Cherokee delegates successfully persuaded Micanhopy and his chiefs to come in under a white flag of truce to parley with Jesup. When the Cherokees failed to bring in the rest of the Seminoles, however; Jesup seized Micanhopy and his headsmen as hostages and had them transported to St. Augustine's Castillo de San Marcos. The Cherokee delegation was understandably outraged. They protested that Micanhopy had come in under a flag of truce and added that they had personally guaranteed his safe conduct, but Jesup remained indifferent.⁹

Jesup's tactics may have helped turned the tide in the Second Seminole war, but when word leaked out about his methods, national newspapers condemned his acts of duplicity.¹⁰ One such example was the *Niles National Register*, which after congratulating Jesup for his capture of Osceola disclaimed "...all participation in the "glory" of this achievement of American generalship, which, if practiced towards a civilized foe would be characterized as a violation of all that is noble and generous in war."¹¹

The U.S. House of Representatives also immediately passed a resolution calling on the Secretary of War to answer "whether any Seminole Indians, coming in under a flag of truce, or brought in by Cherokee Indians, acting as mediators, have been made prisoners by General Jesup." The subsequent report included a letter drafted by the government's Indian agent, John Ross, which castigated Jesup's interference in the Cherokee diplomatic mission. In his letter Ross expressed his outrage over this "...unprecedented violation of that sacred rule which has ever been recognized by every nation, civilized and uncivilized, of treating with all due respect those who had ever presented themselves under a flag of truce before their enemy..."¹²

⁹ Mahon, 223.

¹⁰ George H. Walton, *Fearless and Free: The Seminole Indian War, 1835-1842*. (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1977), 163.

¹¹ *National Register*, November 4, 1837. Fifth Series, No. 10, Vol. III, 1.

¹² *Ibid*.

Regular Army officers serving in Florida also privately voiced their disapproval with Jesup's actions, which were a clear violation of the rules of war.¹³ Vattel had been very specific in his instructions concerning truces: "if the truce has been entered into...it would be bad faith to make use of it to gain some advantage....[and] To seize subjects of the enemy or property belonging to him, unless some special provocation has been given, is an act of hostility, and consequently not permissible during a truce."¹⁴

Though never formally proven guilty, Jesup spent the rest of his life trying to assert his innocence in the matter.¹⁵ The most troubling aspect of Jesup's defense, however, was its evolving nature; the accused kept changing his story. His first explanation of his conduct, offered in a letter submitted to the *Army Navy Chronicle*, claimed that it was Osceola's raid on the white detention camps and attempt to use the parley to capture white hostages which justified the means used to capture him. The irony of course was Jesup's accusation that Osceola intended to use a parley to seize hostages for use as bargaining chips described exactly what Jesup himself had done with Osceola and Micahopy. In the official report Jesup submitted to Congress, however; the principal reasons listed for seizing the Indian delegation were the Seminoles' murder of a white settler, the Indians' past deceptions, and their unsatisfactory answers to General Hernandez' questions.¹⁶ At the time, Jesup offered no detailed explanation for his violation of the second truce which had been negotiated by the Cherokees.

In a later recollection of the event, however; Jesup introduced arguments broad enough to justify violating both truces. He claimed he did not have to honor truces made with Seminoles because they were prisoners of war, or hostages who had violated their parole by not surrendering and moving west. Therefore Jesup had every right to disregard a truce negotiated with Seminole criminals. Technically, according to Jesup's interpretation of the just war doctrine, he could have executed Osceola and his subchiefs as bandits, but Jesup had instead mercifully spared their lives in the interest of humanity and hopefully hastening the end of the war.¹⁷ This radical re-interpretation of *jus in bello*, however, which viewed subjects of a nation who broke a treaty as bandits worthy of death, clearly contradicted the spirit of Vattel's advice concerning hostages.¹⁸

¹³ Walton, 168.

¹⁴ Vattel, 327.

¹⁵ Walton, 166-167.

¹⁶ "Seminole Indians Made Prisoners of War," *H Doc. 327*, 25 Congress, 2 session, April 11, 1838, 2-5. Hernandez also reported discovering loaded weapons in the Seminole camp, but not until after Osceola's party had already been apprehended.

¹⁷ Thomas Sidney Jesup, *Seminole Saga: The Jesup Report* (Fort Myers, Island Press, 1973), 18. Reprint.

¹⁸ Vattel, 197-198. According to Vattel hostages who escaped were to be returned to their original captivity without suffering any additional punishment.

Jesup also argued that the policy of his command had always been to seize and detain any Seminoles bearing white flags.¹⁹ Yet this was obviously not true. Jesup had allowed Phillip's son Coacoochee, or Wildcat, to come in and go out freely under the white flag of truce in October. On this occasion Jesup wrote: "The Seminole chief Coacoochee having, as General Hernandez informs me, come in as a bearer of a flag, I have, on full consideration of all the circumstances of the case, considered it due to the sanctity of the flag to permit him to return."²⁰

Perhaps the most damning evidence of his guilt came from Jesup himself. On June 7, several days *after* Osceola's "illegal" liberation of the Seminole hostages, Jesup made the following revelation in a letter addressed to Secretary of War Poinsett:

The principal Seminole chiefs met me in council on the 1st instant [sic], and I might have seized them and captured their camp; but such an act would have been an infraction of the treaty, and the capture of two or three hundred Indians would have been a poor compensation for the violation of the national faith; the Indians now have no confidence in our promises, and I, as the representative of the country here, was unwilling to teach a lesson of barbarism to a band of savages.²¹

After his humiliating June 2 defeat by Osceola, Jesup's despair over his lost opportunity began to fuel a strong desire for revenge against his Seminole enemies. Having abandoned the traditional constraints of civilized warfare, for Jesup it was no longer a question of which means could lawfully be employed against the Indians, but which means would likely be severe enough to break their resistance. Jesup wrote bitterly to Secretary of War Poinsett that:

To rid the country of them you must exterminate them. Is the government prepared for such a measure? Will public opinion sustain it? If so, resort must be had to the bloodhound and the northern Indian.²²

According to Vattel, when determining whether a given war measure was lawful, civilized countries should always ask two questions: first, was it absolutely necessary for overcoming the resistance of the enemy; and second, could a less severe method secure the same end?²³ In light of these questions, the use of Spanish bloodhounds to defeat the Seminoles was probably both extreme and unnecessary.

As early as the spring of 1837, Jesup had sent word to Osceola that if he and the other subchiefs did not come in, the army would loose Spanish bloodhounds on them.²⁴ Three years later, Governor Reid of Florida tried to fulfill Jesup's threat by

¹⁹ Jesup, 16.

²⁰ U.S. War Department, Executive Documents, 25 Congress, 2 session, 108.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 159.

²² *Ibid.*

²³ Vattel, 279.

offering the army sixteen fierce Cuban-imported Bloodhounds that had previously been used to track down runaway slaves. Although the animals proved incapable of tracking the Indians through Florida's numerous swamps and lakes, when news of the Bloodhound experiment reached the American public, dozens of memorials poured into Congress from all around the country denouncing the contemplated use of this uncivilized weapon against the Indians.²⁵ The *Niles Register* asked, "...what can compensate for the impression to be made on the civilized world by the fact of a Christian people employing brute beasts as allies against the untutored savage?"²⁶

In Congress, legislators defending the army's use of the Bloodhounds tried to dismiss the memorials by claiming they were the product of emotional women and children. These supporters were probably chagrined; however, when illustrious Senators like Daniel Webster and Thomas Benton; and prominent anti-slavery Representatives like Joshua Giddings and John Quincy Adams all took turns publicly addressing the issue.²⁷

Congressional critics of the policy were later relieved when they learned that the national government had not instigated the importation of the Bloodhounds, but they nonetheless passed a special resolution to investigate the affair.²⁸ In the end, while the hounds were rarely used against the Seminoles, the threat to use such means—delivered to the enemy and circulated throughout the states—cast a dark shadow on the army's reputation.

Besides violating truces and adopting unnecessarily extreme measures against the enemy, in his desperate bid to redeem his military career after the disastrous Fort Dade affair, Jesup also mistreated Seminole hostages and prisoners of war. In addition to condemning the murder of hostages, Vattel's *Law of Nations* also denounced the practice of threatening hostages or prisoners with bodily injury or death. Here, Vattel's comments about threatening the life of a besieged enemy commander to hasten victory seem appropriate:

But although you should gain greatly by unlawful conduct, you are not therefore justified in resorting to it. The threat of unjust punishment is itself unjust; it is both an insult and an injury.²⁹

In his discussions related to the treatment of prisoners of war, Vattel claimed that the same just war arguments that gave nations the right to kill their enemies during

²⁴ Mahon, 200.

²⁵ *Niles National Register*, February 15, 1840, 2-3.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 1.

²⁷ Walton, 210. Here Walton discusses the use of the Seminole War in some of the Congressional debates over slavery.

²⁸ "To the Employment of Bloodhounds Against the Hostile Indians in Florida," *S Doc. 187*, 26 Congress, 1 session, February 17, 1840, 1-3.

²⁹ Vattel, 282.

wartime also placed limits on that right. Typically, when the enemy submitted and laid down his arms, a nation no longer had the right to take his life. Vattel's rules of war made two important exceptions, however, in the case of an enemy which had gravely violated the laws of war and in the event of a war against savages:

There is one case however, in which we may refuse to give quarter to enemies who surrender, or to accept any terms of capitulation from a town reduced to extremities. This is when the enemy have rendered themselves guilty of some grave violation of the Law of Nations, and especially when they have violated the rules of war. Such a refusal to spare their lives is not a natural consequence of the war, but a punishment of their crime, a punishment which the injured person has a right to inflict. But in order that the punishment may be just, it must fall upon those who are guilty. When a sovereign is at war with a savage nation which observes no rules and never thinks of giving quarter he may punish the Nation in the person of those whom he captures (for they are among the guilty), and by such severity endeavor to make them observe the laws of humanity; but in all cases where severity is not absolutely necessary mercy should be shown.³⁰

Vattel argued that in wars with savages it was permissible for nations to take the lives of enemy prisoners, but he added two corollaries to his interpretation—that punishment should only fall on the guilty, and that whenever possible, nations should treat their enemy mercifully. Thus, while savages were technically guilty and could therefore be killed, Vattel urged that in most cases mercy should triumph over judgment. He clarified exactly what he meant in the next section of the *Law of Nations* entitled "Retaliation":

It is a dreadful and extreme measure thus to inflict a miserable death upon a prisoner for the fault of his general and if we have already promised to spare the life of that prisoner, we can not retaliate upon him without injustice. However, as a prince, or his general, is justified in sacrificing the lives of his enemies for his own safety and that of his people, it would seem that if he is dealing with an inhuman enemy who frequently commits atrocities such as that above mentioned, he may refuse to spare the lives of certain prisoners whom he captures, and may treat them as his own men have been treated. But the generosity of Scipio is more worthy of imitation. That great man, having reduced to subjection certain Spanish princes who had revolted against the Romans, told them that if they broke faith with him he would not hold innocent hostages accountable, but themselves; and that he would not avenge himself upon unarmed prisoners, but upon soldiers in open battle....It is thus that an enemy who violates the laws of war is to be checked...³¹

According to Vattel then, even when nations confronted savages—a situation where the enemy could legitimately be denied quarter—nations should mercifully spare the lives of unarmed prisoners. Vattel's commentary on retaliation contained three important principles. First, in the rare event when justice required that enemy prison-

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 280.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 281.

ers be punished; only the guilty enemy leader or party should be targeted. Second, if a promise had been made to honor an enemy's flag of surrender, it would be unjust to take the lives of those that had laid down their arms. The third and final principle suggested that the truly just nation did not avenge its enemies' crimes by punishing innocent victims, but instead destroyed its adversaries on the battlefield.

The first recorded incident involving Jesup's mistreatment of hostages occurred a little over a month after Osceola's June second liberation raid. An Indian named Holata Mico was threatened with hanging if he did not reveal the location of the Seminole bands that had escaped.³² Other captives were also told they would be hung if they did not cooperate. Following King Philip's capture in September, Jesup told Philip's son Wildcat that if he failed to bring in Philip's bands, Philip would pay for it.³³ Wildcat had little choice but to obey Jesup's instructions, and surrendered along with his bands. In December; however, Wildcat successfully escaped from his confinement at St. Augustine's Castillo de San Marcos. Infuriated by this second successful Seminole escape, Jesup again threatened to punish the father for his son's actions. Jesup initially declared that Philip would be hung if Wildcat did not immediately turn himself in. After further contemplation however, Jesup instead had Philip and the rest of the Indian captives placed in chains—a punishment most Indians loathed more than death.³⁴

Even after Jesup left the Floridian theater, new commanders continued his deplorable practice of mistreating hostages and prisoners of war. For example, in 1841 General William Jenkins Worth threatened to hang the recently recaptured Wildcat, together with fifteen of his warriors, unless the rest of his tribe surrendered immediately.³⁵ While these threats were rarely carried out, the Seminoles seemed to take them very seriously. Given their unpredictable relationship with whites from 1820–1840, the Seminoles understandably assumed the worst.

Since the wartime experiences of General Jesup and other officers who served in Florida indicate that even model U.S. Army officers violated Vattel's just war code, perhaps it would be helpful to try and understand why they did so. These men were not ignorant concerning the rules of war. For over two decades West Point had been equipping its graduates with an ethical framework for waging war, and judging from the defense Jesup offered for his behavior, even older officers who had not graduated from the Academy were familiar with the principles of just war. These crimes were also not the result of battlefield chaos or stress. Jesup's illegitimate seizure of Seminole

³² Mahon, 209.

³³ *Ibid.*, 214.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 229. While Jesup rescinded this order after a few days, he must have known that this was an especially demeaning punishment for the proud Seminoles. In his history of the Second Seminole War, Mahon even suggests that Indian Agent Wiley Thompson's decision to humiliate Osceola by placing him in chains may have been a major cause of the war.

³⁵ Walton, 229.

peace delegations and mistreatment of hostages were carefully premeditated strategies, not random acts of violence.

In Jesup's case frustration with a protracted and seemingly endless guerilla war probably played an important role in motivating these war crimes. In the spring of 1837 Jesup believed he had successfully pacified the Seminole Tribe. When Osceola's raid deprived him of his anticipated victory, the general apparently could not reconcile himself to the defeat. Anxious to redeem his reputation and escape Florida, Jesup probably implemented his morally questionable policies because he hoped they would hasten the war's end.

Another important factor may have been the American cultural perception of the Indian himself. Most Americans viewed Indians as either noble savages who could be successfully civilized and absorbed into a superior English culture, or more sinisterly as deadly creatures of the forest.³⁶ In either case, the Indian was somehow not quite as fully human as his or her white counterpart. Thus, as the Second Seminole War progressed, Indians once deemed capable of making treaties with other sovereign nations were gradually transformed into murderous wolves.

The newspaper letters written by the inhabitants of Florida between 1839-1841 help flush out this devolving, racist image of the Indian. In one such letter, written during the debate over the proposed use of Bloodhounds against the Seminoles, a frontier inhabitant of Florida completely rejected the Seminole's humanity:

Men, women and children, of every age and color, are slaughtered with wolf-like ferocity....Why, then, should they not be pursued and destroyed by dogs, as are other wild beasts of prey?....Toward such wretches the ordinary rules of war do not apply. They have thrown themselves out of the pale of humanity...³⁷

In other words, the inhumanity of the Indian, and his failure to abide by the rules of war justified whatever means the American soldier employed to destroy him.

If anything, this tendency to view uncooperative non-whites as dangerous animals, in need of severe discipline, became even more prevalent in the latter part of the 19th Century as the country looked to scientific racism and Social Darwinism for answers to its Negro and Indian problems. The nation's deteriorating racial climate may explain why some of America's worst Indian atrocities occurred between the years of 1860 and 1890.³⁸ During this period, American politicians finally reached a consensus concerning the Indian problem: uncivilized savages who stood outside the pale of humanity would have to either submit to the government's new reservation

³⁶ Rogin, 118.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, August 19, 1840, 1-2.

³⁸ Richard H. Dillon, *North American Indian War*. (New York: Facts on File, 1983), 139-250. See for example the "Indian massacres" at Fort Flaunteroy (Fort Lyon), Sand Creek, Washita, and of course, Wounded Knee. Some of these so-called massacres were actually one-sided skirmishes where U.S. cavalry troops armed with cannons attacked villages filled with women and children.

system or suffer extinction. Thus, when the Plains Indian Tribes later resisted the government's new policy, General Sheridan and other regular army officers understandably shared their belief that the only good Indian was a dead Indian.³⁹

There were, however, always a small minority of Americans who rejected this racist image of the Indian and who viewed the Army's alleged war crimes against the Seminoles with horror and disgust. Even some of the army personnel fighting in Florida privately sympathized with the Indians. John T. Sprague thought the Seminoles only sin was that they were patriotically defending their homes. Other officers believed the government had imposed unjust treaties on the Seminole Tribe, and now had to fight an unjust war to enforce them.⁴⁰ Upon learning of the army ethical violations in Florida, one concerned citizen felt compelled to remind Americans that the Seminoles were human beings and the U.S. was still a civilized country:

For whatever may be the opinion of some that Indians are not men, (and from the treatment they have received, we are borne out in the conclusion that they are considered by some, at least, as not within the pale of human beings and, therefore, not entitled to human treatment, or human sympathies,) I shall so consider them, and I believe the great mass of mankind will agree that they should be so considered. Well, then Indians being men, we have but to appeal to our own consciousness, and ask, what means are those which operate most effectually to allay our excitements, and subdue our rage?... Will force—overwhelming force? Ah, yes, sire, that may conquer, but even that cannot *subdue*. It may enslave, but can never make a *friend*. It may exterminate—annihilate, I admit this... [but] in what age of the world would the murderous resort be adopted, and the peaceful, *as a first step*, rejected? Humanity, Christianity, sir, with a voice that may be heard over the length and breadth of the land, answers “NOT IN THIS—NOT IN THIS.” No thank God! The age of the barbarian is gone by with us...⁴¹

From a historical perspective, the Second Seminole War represented a critical crossroads for the recently professionalized U.S. Army. Would the army's new professional military standards hold up in the context of a savage Indian war? Although the Army initially tried to fight within its ethical framework of war, unexpected Seminole resistance ultimately convinced several officers to abandon it. During the Plains Indian Wars, this pattern of behavior would be repeated with even greater frequency as the Army conducted ruthless police actions against intransigent tribes unwilling to submit to a new reservation system. Periodic violations of the Army's just war code became the norm, and not the rare exception.

The Army's professional military code had ultimately proved incapable of overcoming America's racial hatred of the Indian. Some regular officers obviously had a stronger commitment to their racial stereotype of the Indian than they had to a just

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 162. Whether or not the expression originated with Sheridan is still debated by historians.

⁴⁰ Mahon, 270.

⁴¹ *Daily National Intelligencer*, March 29, 1841, 3.

war code. Had the Army's professional code really been enforced by military authorities, it might have helped curtail some of these war crimes against Indians, but it was not. Although unethical military behavior was repeatedly condemned by the public and in national newspapers, it was never seriously addressed by the Army.

In the end, the Seminole Tribe's successful resistance to the treaties that dispossessed them of their homeland severely tested the U.S. Army's ability to fight under its new professional code. In their overwhelming desire to bring the war to a successful conclusion, some officers failed that test. They eventually discarded the rules of civilized warfare and employed savage means to defeat the Seminoles. Frustration with a protracted guerilla war and racial hatred had ultimately blurred the line between the civilized and the savage.