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Thomas M Campbell Award

Beginning with Volumes 6/7, the Florida Conference of Historians has presented the Thomas M. Campbell Award for the best paper published in the Annual Proceedings (now Annals) of that year.

Thomas M. (Tom) Campbell was the driving force behind the creation of the Florida Conference of Historians, at that time called The Florida College Teachers of History, over 40 years ago. It was his personality and hard work that kept the conference moving forward. Simply put, in those early years he was the conference.

Tom was a professor of US Diplomatic history at Florida State University. The Thomas M. Campbell Award is in his name so that we may recognize and remember his efforts on behalf of the Florida Conference of Historians

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From the Editors

It is with great pleasure that we introduce this volume of *FCH Annals: The Journal of the Florida Conference of Historians*. 2012 marks the second year that Florida Gulf Coast University has served as editorial home for the *FCH Annals*, and it continues to be a tremendous honor to serve the FCH in this way.

The essays published in this volume represent a selection of the strongest papers presented at the 2011 Annual Meeting of the Florida Conference of Historians, which was held in Fort Lauderdale, Florida, and hosted by Broward College. Papers were submitted by their authors during the summer of 2011, and then reviewed anonymously by multiple members of the editorial board during the fall of 2011. Co-editors Nicola Foote and Michael S. Cole made the final decision as to which papers should be selected for publication, based on the recommendations of the editorial board.

The Florida Conference of Historians continues to expand its range and breadth. Articles published in this volume of *FCH Annals* cover almost all parts of the world, including Asia, Africa, Latin America, Europe and the United States. Their authors are equally international, with the scholars represented based in the Caribbean, Ethiopia, and India, as well as much of the United States. This year's recipient of the Thomas M. Campbell award for best paper reflects this intellectual diversity, and the award goes to Christopher Williams of University College Cayman Islands for his article entitled "Did Slavery *Really* Matter in Grand Cayman, Cayman Islands? Confronting Roy Bodden's Anti-Slavocratic Statements."

One of the strengths of the Florida Conference of Historians has long been its commitment to undergraduate research. The FCH is one of the few professional conferences that has a separate section for undergraduates. Student presenters are able to gain the benefit of feedback, mentoring and support from a range of professional historians when they attend the conference. Thanks to the generous initiative of Jay Clarke, past-president of the FCH and two-time winner of the Thomas M. Campbell award, this commitment is now being institutionalized through the establishment of the J. Calvitt Clarke III Prize for best undergraduate paper. The prize will be awarded for the first time in 2013 and will contribute enormously to training the next generation of historians.

There were many people who helped bring Volume 19 of the *FCH Annals* to fruition and to whom we extend our thanks. Donna Henry, Dean of the College of Arts and Sciences at Florida Gulf Coast University, provided funding for the publication costs associated with the volume. Bob Klein, Graphic Designer and Photographer at FGCU, graciously offered training in Adobe InDesign, thus allowing us to format the journal correctly. Corey James, as Graduate Research Assistant in the M.A. Program in History, played an essential role in the process of copy-editing and layout. Corey also corrected a number of errors in the final proof.

Anthony Atwood, Blaine Brown, Julian Chambliss, David Harvey, Jesse Hingson, Sean McMahon, Jack McTauge, and David Proctor helped to select the winner of the Thomas M. Campbell Award. Thanks also to all members of the FCH Steering Committee for their help at every stage of the process.

Nicola Foote and Michael S. Cole
Florida Gulf Coast University
5 April 2012

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“You Can’t Hug a Newspaper”: Janet Chusmir and Newspaper Management in Miami

Kimberly Wilmot Voss
University of Central Florida

For years, women in newspaper management had few role models. If they were mentored at all – then it was by a man. Many of these male managers were hard-hitting, tough-talking former editors. Those first female leaders in journalism rarely had families – there was simply no career path that included children. Miami editor Janet Chusmir was the exception. After earning a journalism degree and spending more than a decade raising a family, she entered the workforce as a reporter in 1963. After a few years working in the women’s pages of a small Florida beach community newspaper, she rose through the ranks to become the executive editor of the *Miami Herald* in 1987 – one of the top newspapers in the country at the time. She achieved success in this position while openly discussing her additional roles of wife and mother of two children. In 1990, she died suddenly of a brain aneurysm at age sixty. Before her death she addressed the need for women in journalism to have both a career and a family life, saying: “You can’t hug a newspaper.” This is her previously untold story.

Women and Newspaper Management

Janet Chusmir was one of the first women to lead a non-family owned metropolitan newspaper. When she was named executive editor of the *Miami Herald* in December 1987, about 85 percent of top newspaper editors were men, according to the American Society of Newspaper Editors (ASNE). ASNE’s membership of 1,000, included only 80 females. Chusmir was a trailblazer, and her career was significant for two reasons. First, she followed a unique career path by raising a family before starting her career. Second, she was an advocate for women and minorities in journalism. Unlike the rhetoric of some female firsts such as Helen Thomas,¹ who claimed that the news and the newsroom were the same regardless of gender, Chusmir recognized the difference. She acknowledged that her leadership and her gender were intertwined. As Chusmir’s friend and famed journalist Tad Bartimus wrote, “Every woman who has a ‘first’ label attached to her name walks in the steps of countless foremothers.”²

While Chusmir’s name is usually included on the list of “firsts” in the field, little scholarship has been devoted to her career. With the growing literature on women in journalism, her story is an important addition to the record. It is

¹ Helen Thomas was the first woman in the journalism Gridiron Club and the first female member of the White House Correspondents’ Association. Her comments about gender were made in *She Says: Women in News, Out of the Blue Films*, PBS, 2002.

² Tad Bartimus, “Every Woman Makes History,” *Among Friends*, March 10, 2010.

especially significant to understand how women climbed the corporate ladder and the approach they took when in a leadership position. There are still few women in top positions at newspapers, and in that group, few have children. Chusmir was a groundbreaking editor and her story is an important part of Florida and journalism history.³

Background on Women in Journalism

The early 1970s were an ideal time for women in newspaper journalism. After years of being largely confined to women's sections, lawsuits, new legislation, and the increased consciousness spread by the women's liberation movement led to promotions of women into new positions. Prior to the late 1960s and early 1970s, women journalists typically worked as women's page editors. In previous decades, the only newspaper work available were limited stints as sob sisters, stunt girls, war-time work, and Eleanor Roosevelt's women-only press conferences. Women journalists were generally excluded from hard news coverage, and promotions into management positions were rare. Yet, changes were on the horizon. Another of the more visible women journalists of this era was Carol Sutton, who in 1974 was named managing editor of the Louisville *Courier-Journal*. It was a "first" nationwide for a major metropolitan newspaper, and her accomplishment was lauded as a breakthrough for women. Sutton's promotion received national recognition, and she was named one of twelve "women of the year" on the cover of *Time magazine* in 1976. Sadly, she only lasted 18 months in the position before being demoted due to inadequate training and a lack of management support.⁴ It would be several more years before women would again break into newspaper management.

Meanwhile, while some newspapers were making voluntary changes and promotions, other news organizations had to be forced into gender awareness. Beginning in the 1970s, numerous women filed class-action lawsuits against newspapers, magazines, and a wire service for fairness in pay and promotions. Two well-known class-action sex discrimination lawsuits in the 1970s were against the *New York Times* and the Associated Press. The women plaintiffs in both

³ June O. Nicholson, Pamela J. Creedon, Wanda S. Lloyd & Pamela J. Johnson, eds. *The Edge of Change* (Urbana-Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 2009).

⁴ For a description of women and journalism the 1940s, 1950s and 1960s, see Kay Mills, *A Place in the News: From the Women's Pages to the Front Pages* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), 35-126; Maurine H. Beasley and Shelia J. Gibbons, *Taking Their Place: A Documentary History of Women and Journalism* (State College, Pennsylvania: Strata Publishing, Inc., 2003), 53-109; Jan Whitt, *Women in American Journalism: A New History* (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2008), 37-61. For information on African-American women in journalism, see Rodger Streitmatter, *Raising Her Voice: African-American Women Journalists Who Changed History* (Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky, 2009). In 1963, Betty Friedan published the landmark book, *The Feminine Mystique*, which has been cited as an igniting force for the women's movement. Friedan, a former journalist, detailed the intellectual oppression that middle-class, college-educated women were experiencing because of limited opportunities. The book inspired thousands of women to examine their roles as homemakers. (Betty Friedan, *The Feminine Mystique* [New York: Bantam Doubleday, 1983]). Kimberly Wilmot Voss, "Carol Sutton and the Louisville Courier-Journal: The Problem of Being First," *American Journalism*, Winter 2010.

cases were an impressive and credentialed group. Yet, they had been overlooked for key promotions and bureau assignments on a consistent basis. The defenses used by these news organizations ranged from the First Amendment to claims that the women lacked necessary qualifications. The lawsuits were settled in the 1980s, and the settlements led to more hiring, mentoring, and promotion of women. Media historian Kay Mills wrote: “Enlightenment alone did not unlock newsroom doors. Legal action helped.”⁵ Ultimately, the lawsuits led to the presence of more women in positions of power at newspapers and wire services by the 1980s. For the *Miami Herald*, awareness of the need for diversity in the front office was growing as Chusmir’s career was developing.

Chusmir’s Journalism Career

Chusmir’s career did not follow the typical path taken by most newspaper executives. She was born Janet Zoll in 1930 and raised in Boston. She earned a degree in journalism from Boston University in 1949, and a week later she married Leonard Chusmir the editor of her college newspaper. She then spent the next fourteen years at home as a wife and mother. After a move to Miami in 1963, Chusmir was hired by the Knight newspaper, the *Miami Beach Daily Sun* to write stories for \$2.50 an article. She went on to report, edit her own stories and take her own pictures – and basically developed a one woman operation. Only six months after she began working for the *Daily Sun*, she became women’s editor of that newspaper. During Chusmir’s initial job interview she was asked if she really needed the money, and who was going to take care of her children. This was not uncommon at the time. Louisville *Courier-Journal* Publisher Barry Bingham Jr. admitted to *Newsweek* that he had asked the previously-mentioned Sutton if her promotion to managing editor, along with caring for her two daughters, would cause too much strain. He confessed, “I don’t think I would have asked that if she had been a man.”⁶

In 1968, Chusmir was hired as a general assignment reporter for the women’s section of the *Miami Herald* – under the leadership of legendary women’s page editor Marie Anderson. The *Herald* had one of the most significant women’s pages in the country. Throughout the 1960s, the *Herald*’s women’s section won three Penney-Missouri Awards in a row – the top recognition for the section under Anderson’s direction. After a fourth win, the *Herald* was retired from the competition.⁷ Chusmir’s coverage of the women’s page included traditional

⁵ Kay Mills, *A Place in the News: From the Women’s Pages to the Front Page* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), 149-172.

⁶ Marc Fisher, “Beach Newspaper Had Rich, Splashy Style,” *Miami Herald*, 28 December 1985. Janet Chusmir, “Women in Management Seminar,” *New England Newspaper Association*, 21 January 1986, 1. (quoted in Mills, 288).

⁷ Kimberly Wilmot Voss and Lance Speere, “A Women’s Page Pioneer: Marie Anderson and Her Influence at the *Miami Herald* and Beyond,” *Florida Historical Quarterly*, Spring 2007: 398-421; Kimberly Wilmot Voss, “Penney-Missouri Awards: Honoring the Best in Women’s News,” *Journalism History*, Spring 2006: 43-50.

content, but often with an edge. For example, in 1968 she wrote a two-part series about menopause – a topic not openly discussed at the time. She quoted experts who noted that men went through a kind of psychological menopause themselves. Other articles were more typical feature pieces. In 1969 she wrote a story about the furnishings in the new homes of astronauts with a Houston dateline. It began: “Eight years ago, there was nothing much here except jack rabbits, cows, wild deer and dust.”⁸ She also covered hard, event-based news like the Republican Convention and the Florida Legislature proceedings. She could be a dogged reporter. During the 1972 Democratic Convention in Miami, she bluffed her way onto a yacht docked in Biscayne Bay where a private party for Hubert H. Humphrey was being held. She was soon recognized as a reporter and forced out of the party. She later recalled: “I still get mad about that. It would have been a wonderful scoop.”⁹ Also that year, while listed as a staff writer at the *Herald*, Chusmir won a Penney-Missouri Award for her work.¹⁰

In the early 1970s, Chusmir was made editor of the women’s section which was renamed “Living Today” – renaming the sections was a popular trend at the time as it was thought to be more inclusive of men and women. By 1977, she had been promoted to assistant managing editor for features – overseeing eight sections. Her husband Leonard Chusmir was the publisher of the *North Dade Journal* in 1977 when the *Herald* began its “Neighbors” section. “Neighbors” was created in the couple’s living room. Janet Chusmir recalled: “He wrote the proposal and edited it. (He tends to be wordy.) Within weeks it was approved and “Neighbors” was born.” A decade later, “Neighbors” included twelve sections that ran twice a week; there were sixty newsroom employees.¹¹

Chusmir and her husband moved to Colorado in 1982, where he was hired as a business professor at a university in Boulder, and she was named president and publisher of another Knight-Ridder newspaper – *The Daily Camera* in Boulder. She became the first female chief executive of one of the chain’s newspapers. Knight-Ridder Senior Vice President Richard G. Capen, Jr. said of Chusmir in an interview: “In nearly 20 years in the newspaper business, she has consistently demonstrated the qualities of leadership.”¹² She was a success – making budget for forty-four straight quarters. Her publisher said of her work, “Janet left an imprint on everything she touched.”¹³ At this time, Chusmir began speaking out about the need for more women in newspaper management – especially married women.

⁸ Janet Chusmir, “Where the Astronauts Play,” *Miami Herald*, 16 July 1969.

⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰ Janet Chusmir, “Menopause: Confidence, Understanding A Must,” *Miami Herald*, 23 September 1968; Thomas Rosenstiel, “Journalism History Made: A Woman Lands the Top Newsroom Job at Major Daily,” *Los Angeles Times*, 12 June 1987; Janet Chusmir, letter to Robert Hosokawa, director of the Penney-Missouri Awards, 26 January 1972, Papers of the Penney-Missouri Awards, Missouri Historical Society.

¹¹ Janet Chusmir, “The Parents are Proud of this 10-year-old,” *Miami Herald*, 20 July 1987.

¹² Associated Press, “Boulder Publisher Named,” *Boca Raton News*, 10 March 1982.

¹³ Steve Garnaas, “E-Boulder Publisher Dies,” *Denver Post*, 23 December 1990.

Chusmir urged other media companies to find new ways to appeal to women. She said:

Newspapers that want to attract women have to do some research to understand what it will take to get them. That translates into making their packages worthwhile, possibly helping their ‘significant other’ with a job search, directing them to the services in the community, even child care. Women are ready. Now, Mr. Decision-Maker, it’s your move.¹⁴

Motherhood and News

Although a few women had succeeded in newspaper management before her, Chusmir’s role was treated as a female first in press coverage. (At the time of Chusmir’s promotion, Katharine Fanning was the editor of the *Christian Science Monitor* and Barbara Henry was the editor of the *Rochester Democrat & Chronicle* (N.Y.). Like Carol Sutton, whose role as a mother was addressed in newspaper coverage, Chusmir’s role as a mother was central to the news coverage about her promotion. This was the lead in a *Los Angeles Times* article – which ran on the newspaper’s national wire – about Chusmir’s Miami promotion states: “To the personnel office, Janet Chusmir seemed a bad risk. She was a 33-year-old housewife with two adolescent kids with no job experience.”¹⁵ Yet, for Chusmir, her role as a mother was beneficial to her journalism career. She noted that her years as a stay-at-home mother helped her become a better reporter as she got story ideas from her children. One example of this is her story about increased immunizations for children because of new illnesses introduced to Miami by immigrants.¹⁶ She wrote in a letter, “I’m typical of the woman we often write about who launches a career after she has launched the kids.”¹⁷

Chusmir’s motherhood role also guided her approach to management. She told other female executives that having a career did not mean forsaking a family. As noted earlier, she said: “I always remind myself that I can’t hug a newspaper.”¹⁸ She practiced a nurturing approach as a manager. Humor columnist Dave Barry, who worked for Chusmir and spoke at her funeral, noted: “She was the only editor who ever gave me a hug.”¹⁹ *Herald* reporter Tom Fiedler said of Chusmir: “Her office door was never closed, the opinion of others were never ignored.”²⁰ *Herald* editor Gene Miller said: “It is not a good practice to love your editor. Janet Chusmir was

¹⁴ Thomas Rosenstiel, Janet Chusmir, “Women will move – if the offer is too good to refuse,” *ASNE Bulletin*, January 1986, 21.

¹⁵ Thomas Rosenstiel, “Journalism History Made: A Woman Lands the Top Newsroom Job at Major Daily,” *Los Angeles Times*, 12 June 1987.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷ Janet Chusmir letter to Robert Hosokawa, 26 January 1972, Papers of the Penney-Missouri Awards, Western Historical Manuscript Collection, University of Missouri.

¹⁸ Dennis Hevesi, “Janet Chusmir, Executive Editor of The *Miami Herald*, Dies at 60,” *New York Times*, 23 December 1990.

¹⁹ Author interview with Dave Barry, 7 April 2010; Steve Garnaas, “Ex-Boulder publisher dies,” *Denver Post*, 23 December 1990.

²⁰ Steve Garnaas, “Ex-Boulder Publisher Dies,” *Denver Post*, 23 December 1990.

a wondrous exception.”²¹ This attitude was part of what Chusmir had developed as she found her own management approach. In a 1986 speech she said to other female journalists: “Respect your own style. We women who have few role models spend too much time watching the men and expecting ourselves to be like them. Instead, we should respect what we are and honor our differences.”²² She authored many columns re-introducing herself to her readership and later explaining her editorial approach. She wrote that her hobbies were baking, reading, swimming and dieting. Her favorite place in South Florida was her balcony at sunset, and the person she admired most was Larry Jinks, who at that point was the publisher of the *San Jose Mercury News*.²³

That Chusmir was able to balance her various roles of editor, mother, and wife does not imply that it was easy. In a videotaped interview from a seminar on women in newspaper management, Chusmir described the difficulty she faced entering the workforce after time at home: “The problem I faced was that I had children, 11 and 13, who had been used to my being at home. They went through a terrible adjustment problem. I went through enormous guilt because they were so unhappy. And my husband was used to coming home and finding a wonderful meal on the table and he had some problems with that. It was the family and what was my role?”²⁴

Feminism

In her obituary, Chusmir was described as “a feminist who understood the potency of understatement.”²⁵ She regularly gave speeches about the role of women in newspapers and to women’s groups about how to strive for equality. She told a group of Miami women: “Pick your battles. It’s not good to be fighting over each little thing and male chauvinistic action. Instead, fight for the important things: equal pay and equal respect. Fight smart.”²⁶

In a 1986 speech, she recounted the management lessons that she had learned along the way. In one example, she mentioned that in her early months as head of the women’s section, there had been a discussion about whether to run a potentially scandalous wire story about the first sexual experiences of celebrities. Chusmir was against running it, but the managing editor said the story was already well known because it was in the magazines. Ultimately the story ran, and there was a negative reaction from readers. After the outcry, the managing editor did not speak up about his previous support of the story – leaving Chusmir to take the blame for

²¹ Ibid.

²² Janet Chusmir, “Speech Given Before the New England Newspaper Association,” Women in Management Seminar, 21 January 1986.

²³ Janet Chusmir, “Meet Some of the Folks at the *Herald*,” *Miami Herald*, 24 September 1989.

²⁴ Janet Chusmir, “From ‘Newspaper Girl’ to Journalist: Some Social Barriers,” Women in Newspaper Management, Indiana University, 1976. Tape available from Indiana University.

²⁵ Dennis Hevesi, “Janet Chusmir, Executive Editor of the *Miami Herald*, Dies at 60,” *New York Times*, 23 December 1990.

²⁶ Ibid.

the decision. She recalled: “It was a very good lesson for me. If you are going to take the heat, make the decisions.”²⁷

Chusmir was a tall figure who projected authority in the newsroom. One *Herald* columnist described Chusmir as: “A hell of an editor – smart, tough, she knew what news was, she knew what bullshit was.”²⁸ He also said, “I’ve never seen a boss who inspired so much respect and at the same time so much love from a group of journalists, and I don’t think I will again.”²⁹ Two decades later, he noted that it was still true. On the other hand, a *Los Angeles Times* story featured an unnamed reporter who said Chusmir would do: “whatever the men above her wanted her to do. She was no different than the climbing corporate men.”³⁰

Yet, most sources in stories about Chusmir noted that not only was she known for her warmth, she did not shy away from discussing the challenges of her gender in management. By 1977, she had been named assistant managing editor for features. When her supervising editor asked how she would make deadline, Chusmir wryly responded: “Did you ever give a dinner party for 60 people?”³¹ Husband Leonard Chusmir said there were two versions of his late wife: The first was “the firm, tough, aggressive, confident editor.” The other was “the very shy New Englander whom I met and fell in love with when she was 16 and I was 19.” He also said she was “soft, yet despite the softness, she has a very quiet strength.”³²

Chusmir was also in a position to address the inequities for women in the field. She said: “We aren’t happy with the representation of women in our news pages, bylines or supervisory positions. Frankly no newspaper in this country should be.”³³ In another example, she told the industry publication *Editor & Publisher*, “as long as men – white men – hold most of the keys to power throughout our society, it will be their pictures we see most often on Page One, their comments we read most often in stories, their voices we hear most often from the editorial pages.”³⁴

Chusmir’s Management

The *Herald’s* content came under public scrutiny several times during Chusmir’s tenure – so much so that she began a 1988 column: “The last couple of weeks I’ve been on TV a lot. Too much.”³⁵ Much of the attention was due to the *Herald’s* coverage of presidential candidate Gary Hart. After questions of his fidelity were raised, he invited the press to follow him in an attempt to prove his faithfulness. It was then that the *Miami Herald* reporters uncovered Hart’s affair, and the revelation

²⁷ Janet Chusmir, “Women in Management Seminar,” *New England Newspaper Association*, 21 January 1986, 4.

²⁸ “*Herald’s* Janet Chusmir Honored Posthumously,” *Miami Herald*, 28 February 1991.

²⁹ *Ibid.*

³⁰ Thomas Rosenstiel, “Journalism History Made: A Woman Lands the Top Newsroom Job at Major Daily,” *Los Angeles Times*, 12 June 1987.

³¹ *Ibid.*

³² *Herald’s* Janet Chusmir Honored Posthumously,” *Miami Herald*, 28 February 1991.

³³ John K. Hartman, *The USA Today Way* (Ashland, OH: Bookmasters, 1992), 103.

³⁴ George Garneau, “ASNE Survey: Men Dominate the Front Pages,” *Editor & Publisher*, 14 April 1990, 13.

³⁵ Janet Chusmir, “Doing What Any Responsible Newspaper Should Do,” *Miami Herald*, 7 February 1988.

ended his campaign. The question over the decision to cover Hart's affair was heavily scrutinized. Chusmir responded to her readers that it was a legitimate news story and they had documented the facts before publication. She wrote: "Gary Hart wondered aloud, 'What did I ever do to the *Miami Herald*?' The answer is nothing....The messenger is not the problem."³⁶ (It should be noted that the actual Hart stakeout occurred a month before Chusmir took over the helm as the editor.)

Chusmir was often in the position of explaining why difficult decisions were made at the newspaper. In one story, the widows of the Challenger astronauts were upset by the coverage of their husbands' deaths. Chusmir apologized for any pain that the *Herald* article may have caused, yet, she also said: "We feel that it is important that the truth be known about the deaths of the astronauts and the efforts made by NASA to repress the circumstances."³⁷ In another case, Chusmir had to explain the *Herald's* coverage of County Manager Sergio Pereira and address questions of whether ethnicity was the reason for the negative coverage. Chusmir responded: "The problem is not the *Herald*. The problem is Mr. Pereira's failure to comply with state law and report a profit of \$127,000 on a land transaction."³⁸ By 1990, she wrote a column requesting feedback from readers about decisions the newspaper made in its coverage. Two weeks later she wrote that 125 readers had responded with a mix of praise and criticism. Some lauded the efforts to hold officials accountable for ethical lapses while others found the newspaper coverage to be too aggressive.³⁹

Chusmir made one decision that she said she regretted. Under her watch, the writing of future Pulitzer Prize winners Gene Weingarten and Dave Barry contributed strong humor content to the *Miami Herald*. It was a decision connected to those men that led to her biggest regret in journalism. Weingarten and Barry were discussing the cover image for the *Herald's* Sunday magazine, *Tropic*. The NBA had granted Miami a basketball franchise, and granted Orlando a team the following year. Barry was writing a satirical article about Orlando which addressed the pending rivalry. The two men hatched a plan to have Barry dressed in a Miami Heat uniform. The cutline underneath read: "Mr. Dave Barry of Miami, Fla., cordially welcomes the City of Orlando into the fraternity of NBA teams." He was pictured spinning a basketball – on his middle finger. Weingarten recalled that he boasted he could convince Chusmir to run the controversial image. He said: "Janet liked and trusted me, and I framed the decision in complex philosophical terms, referenced the structure of humor."⁴⁰ Readers were not pleased. A few months before she died, she told Weingarten that the decision on the Barry's cover was her

³⁶ "The Gary Hart Story: How it Happened," <http://www.unc.edu/~pmeyer/Hart/hartarticle.html>.

³⁷ "Widows Upset About Article on Challenger," *Miami Herald*, 15 November 1988.

³⁸ Martin Merzer, "Discussion Evolves into Debate on Media's Role," *Miami Herald*, 3 February 1988.

³⁹ Janet Chusmir, "We're Responding to Your Suggestions and Advice," *Miami Herald*, 24 June 1990.

⁴⁰ Author interview with Gene Weingarten, 9 April 2010.

biggest regret in her journalism career.

One of the greatest successes of Chusmir's career was being named Editor of the Year by the National Press Foundation in late November 1990. The honor was for "transforming the *Herald* to serve the unique multicultural population of Greater Miami."⁴¹ The Foundation noted that under Chusmir's watch, there were circulation gains and two Pulitzer Prizes. In addition, there was an increase in reader phone calls and community roundtables. Chusmir said of the honor: "We are covering our multiethnic community a lot better. At the same time, we've not compromised our aggressive, investigative mission, and we have not pandered."⁴²

While still in the position of executive editor, Chusmir collapsed after a day at work and died of a sudden brain aneurism in 1990. There were several tributes to Chusmir. In one of the stories, more about her role as a female manager was revealed. Reporter Jacquée Petchel recalled a conversation with her late boss about the difficulties of being a journalist and a mother, which provides insight into Chusmir's character that may have not been otherwise revealed due to her early death:

Several weeks ago, Janet, (another female employee) and I were standing by my desk and talking about being strong. Specifically, about being strong women, torn between men we loved, children we have and want and a newspaper life it seems inconceivable to live without. You can never let down in this business, especially if you're a woman. You can't give up, or the momentum will stop. And it wears on you, we all agreed. It tears you up inside because half your time is spent keeping the strength. Keeping the faith. You smile, you fight for yourself, you keep going. Sometimes, you even pretend to be a barracuda when all you really want to do is fall into the fetal position and cry. In this conversation together, we decided we were tired of being strong. All of us. But the next day, there we were in this very newsroom. Being strong.⁴³

A new editor was named two months after Chusmir died. At that time, *Miami Herald* publisher David Lawrence, Jr., said that following Chusmir's death, "I made you a promise: I would not forget Janet's great blend of toughness and caring as I searched for a successor."⁴⁴ Eight years after her death, Chusmir was named a South Florida Woman of Achievement.⁴⁵ Today, the Gender and Diversity Division of the Academy of Management gives out the Chusmir Award. According to the organization, it is given in Chusmir's name because: "She represented a role model for the professional woman in the career she had selected and the advancements she had received. She was an extraordinary voice for women and people of color

⁴¹ "National Press Foundation Makes Herald's Chusmir Editor of the Year," *Miami Herald*, 28 November 1990.

⁴² *Ibid.*

⁴³ Martin Merzer, "A Boss Who Inspired Respect and Affection," *Miami Herald*, 23 December 1990.

⁴⁴ David Lawrence, Jr., "An Editor for the Generation to Come," *Miami Herald*, 3 March 1991.

⁴⁵ "Some South Florida Women of Achievement," *Miami Herald*, 19 July 1998.

in journalism—the stories of her mentoring and support are legion.”⁴⁶

Chusmir’s Legacy

Chusmir’s role as a pioneer helped women to move into new places at many newspapers. Sandra Mims Rowe wrote about her own experience of being named the managing editor of the *Norfolk Ledger-Star* in 1980 and the story written about her as a first: “Looking back, I’m amazed we reacted to the absurdities of the time with more acceptance – even amusement – than anger. Today, enough women occupy high-visibility leadership roles that their gender isn’t pointed out as if it were part of their name every time they are introduced. Just being the ‘editor’ or ‘publisher’ rather than ‘first woman editor’ feels like success after so many decades.”⁴⁷

One of Chusmir’s most important roles was that of mentor. Mary Jean Connors, who went on to become an executive with the newspaper chain Knight-Ridder, wrote about working for Chusmir at the *Herald*: “It was very liberating to work for her, and she made me feel like I belonged, after all.” The mentoring and training of women into newspaper management positions has significantly improved since Chusmir was promoted – most notably with the establishment of the Women in Newspaper Management Institute at Northwestern University. Yet, the question regarding motherhood while in newspaper management has not been fully addressed. Women in top management positions still rarely have more than one child, if any. As longtime women’s page editor Dorothy Journey said in a 1978 speech, the roles of wife and mother in the lives of women added to, rather than limited, their journalistic abilities. “These experiences do not rob an able woman journalist of traditional news concepts,” she said. “Rather they add dimension. She sees news value in many new areas.”⁴⁸ Chusmir’s sudden death has kept her from telling her story about being a “first” in women in newspaper management. Yet, her work was significant in showing the success a woman could have at the head of a newspaper. Her success normalized women in newspaper management in Florida and nationwide. She broke ground as a first – which deserves its place in the historical record. Yet, she was able to manage without being defined by her gender. In addition, her non-traditional career path – which included time off to raise children – was and continues to be unique. Attention to alternative career paths may be what is needed to increase the small number of women in newspaper management today.

⁴⁶ Janet Chusmir / Sage Distinguished Service Award, Academy of Management. http://division.aomonline.org/gdo/awards/awards_service_about.htm.

⁴⁷ Sandra Mims Rowe, “Moving From Women’s Pages to the Editor’s Office,” *The Edge of Change: Women in the 21st Century Press* (University of Illinois Press, 2009), 77-85.

⁴⁸ Jeanne Palmer and Martha I. Finney, *The Human Resources Professionals Guide* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 2004), 51. Dorothy Journey, Talk at Carolina Symposium, 4, n.d. Papers of Dorothy Journey, Western Historical Manuscript Collection, University of Missouri.

Hunting and British Hunters in Colonial India, 1900-1947: New Technology, Humanitarian Hunters, and Growing Conservationist Awareness

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British hunters grew in number during the late colonial period in India. Many of them worked for the British *Raj* as forest administrators, military personnel or the like. Yet these hunters always relied on *shikaris* or indigenous Indian hunters. This paper surveys the experiences of British hunters and demarcates the main changes that occurred in the twentieth century. It also explores how distinct differentiation between tribal peoples/poachers and British sportsmen became more clearly defined in the twentieth century. By the beginning of the twentieth century, humanitarian hunters, who only hunted to protect villagers, appeared; new technology became intertwined with hunting, a greater sense of nostalgia for the past made its presence; artificial rearing appeared in the subcontinent, and *sahibs* emulated *maharajas*. The aforementioned changes along with a strong sense of restraint and a conservationist awareness were some of the markers that differentiated most, but certainly not all, twentieth century hunters from their nineteenth century counterparts. In essence the British male hunter was a gentleman and imperialist at the same time.

Reliance on shikaris & the creation of the gentlemanly sportsman

As historian Joseph Sramek has stated, although they claimed to be masculine men, the British heavily relied on Indians. As a result, masculinity in Imperial India could not be tailored to the typically assumed idea that independence was part and parcel of masculine prowess. Instead it was coupled with the imperialist idea of having free or low-paid help at one's fingertips. In fact, the imperialist idea of having others serve you stemmed from the middle-class bourgeois and upper-class mentality indicative of the Victorian and Edwardian eras.

The excitement of the hunt was a constant in both the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. James Best wrote of the adrenaline rush that he experienced while hunting in Kashmir when he stated: "my heart in my mouth and all my attention [was] fixed Four of them looked huge heads to me; my wrists froze, my heart pumped and I was overwhelmed by all the symptoms of buck fever. Khuzra held back my rifle until I steadied."¹ The shikari or Indian hunter played an important role in breaking the British sportsman away from the trance that often accompanied the excitement and sense of adventure that they experienced when out in the jungles. Indian shikaris were no less excited with the prospect of game.

¹ James William Best, *Forest Life in India* (London: J. Murray, 1935), 31.

The author of *Sport on the Nilgiris* wrote of the excitement that most Indians felt when they found or located a tiger. Shikaris literally ran back to their sahibs to tell them about it. His shikari said “*aiyah, aiyah pillee pille*” roughly translating to “Sir, sir a tiger a tiger.”²

The relationship between the British and Indian hunting partners was full of tension and condescension. The reliance on shikaris often meant that British resident hunters’ roles in hunting were limited to simply hiking and pulling the trigger. Anglo-Indian men or British nationals who resided in India often got very upset when they had to do more than their fair share of work, showcasing the imperial nature of their role as premier sportsmen. Lieutenant-Colonel Charles Hugh Stockley noted that “there are plenty of frauds among shikaris, however, none are worse than the man who knows little about tracking and will never admit he is wrong The greatest fraud of all, as a class, is the Kashmiri. He is often a poor climber and indifferent stalker . . . and consequently a lover of villages, with no desire to penetrate the remoter stalks of game.”³ Indian shikaris were a dying breed in areas where plenty of game could be located because many local villagers took up hunting as well and were not as skilled as ancestral shikaris. Similar to Lieutenant-Colonel Stockley, Alexander Wardrop had a very poor opinion of shikaris. Wardrop who was a Major in the British artillery in India states, “the shikaries and their myriad [illegible] are usually members of criminal tribes, Bhils or Ramses.”⁴ Nevertheless, the British had to put up with these “criminal tribes” because of their ability to track game. On the whole, many British sahibs enjoyed the companionship of their shikaris.

Sportsmen also recommended shikaris to fellow sportsmen. In Chamba, for example, the author of *The Sportsman’s Book for India* recommended Dhassa, Mullah, and Bhagia. To locate these shikaris one had to simply write a letter “c/o Postmaster, Tissa, Chamba to get in touch with any of these men for the purposes of employment.”⁵ Recommendations from British sportsmen allowed a shikari to receive a steady income. Positive recommendations also meant that a sahib would write a good *chit* or employment record card for that shikari.

Shikaris and hunters worked together in the twentieth century. For example, James Best, who worked for the Indian Forest Service, stated how his shikari told him he “would watch if I slept.”⁶ By taking turns, shikaris and hunters worked together throughout the hunting process. He was referring to watching out for game during overnight stays, up in a machan or platform in the jungles. By rotating night watchman positions, the shikari and the British sahib worked together as a

² F. W. F. Fletcher, *Sport on the Nilgiris and in Wynaad* (London: MacMillan, 1911), 194.

³ Lieut.-Col. Charles Hugh Stockley, *Shikar: Being tales by a sportsman in India* (Bombay: Oxford University Press, 1928), 191-192.

⁴ A.E. Wardrop, *Modern Pig Sticking* (London: Macmillan, 1914), 285.

⁵ George Aflalo Frederick, *The Sportsman’s Book for India* (London: H. Marshall and Son, 1904), 89.

⁶ James W. Best, *Forest Life in India* (London: J. Murray, 1935), 56.

team to ensure that each one would get their share of rest while making sure that the other person was not in harm's way. However, shikaris often had a reputation to uphold and therefore sought to bag the biggest game and therefore saw eye to eye like Anglo-Indians who also desired the same, meaning that they shared the same views. Shikaris were frequently treated like equals as most received pay or meat for their services by some British sportsmen. Anglo-Indian hunters advised others to take care of their coolies or menial laborers and shikaris, mainly because the shikaris survival and health meant a bigger bag for the sahib or British sportsman. For example, an Anglo-Indian hunter who used the pen name of Ajax advised Anglo-Indians to "see that your servant's tent is comfortable and rainproof."⁷ This sort of camaraderie was often seen in the British-Indian partnership in the jungles.

British sportsmen emphasized the need for religious tolerance. The hunting arena was a place where religious tolerance occurred. In Burma, shikaris performed a *pooja* or devotional worship in order to kill lots of game without harming themselves. The *pooja* required coconuts, plantains, spirits, pickled tea leaves, egg, a spoon of cooked rice, tobacco and betel nut leaves. Sydney Christopher, a hunter and barrister at law does not describe what the shikaris did with them, but we can assume that they were offered to a deity in return for a wish. They may have been offered in a circular motion to the deity. Christopher writes that "this ceremony pleases them immensely and there are no reasons why the sportsman should deny them this pleasure as it costs him very little or nothing."⁸ Christian and Western ways were not superimposed on Indians because most sportsmen respected Hindus and did not interfere with their customs of prayer. This further supports the contention that sahibs respected their shikaris and believed them to be on an equal plane with them. Christopher is important because he shows how sahibs were tolerant of their shikaris.

Even though there was an aura of equality between the sahib and the shikari, the law always ruled against the shikari. There could be dangers to a shikari when hunting, apart from being attacked by wild game. For instance, if a shikari directed the European to a *nullah*, where shooting is forbidden, the shikari would be responsible for this mistake, rather than the European. Ajax, a British sportsman, shot an animal in a *nullah* and later found out it was forbidden. Instead of Ajax's sportsmen's license being revoked, the shikari was fined four months of wages and his license to accompany sportsmen was cancelled permanently.⁹ The shikari would no longer have a way to provide for his family as his career had officially come to an end. The repercussions on the Anglo-Indian hunter were comparatively miniscule. The Indian shikari, on the other hand, had his reputation forever tarnished and his ancestral occupation stripped away. Although it mostly seemed

⁷ Ajax, 'Good Hunting!'; or, *What to Do on Shikar and How to Do it* (Calcutta: Thacker, Spink & Co., 1913), 25.

⁸ Sydney Albert Christopher, *Big Game Shooting in Lower Burma* (Rangoon: Burma Pictorial Press, 1916), 69.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 53.

that hunting was a sport where Indians were on equal terrain with British residents, it was not always the case. Indians were therefore ultimately responsible for all the possible pitfalls and dangers associated with the well-being of the Anglo-Indians.

Certain shikaris had a vested interest in killing game, just as much as the drive that British sportsmen possessed. James Best writes, “Three times in my life I have seen a shikari on the verge of tears when luck went really wrong; they were as keen as I was.”¹⁰ Actual tears flowing down one’s face translated to a lack of manliness and this was never seen, but the feeling of despair and regret led these men to become teary eyed and filled with emotions of despair. However, they held back their tears, repressing their feelings while showcasing their utmost desires of killing game, in order to receive satisfaction and a feeling of accomplishment. Indians and the British worked in collaboration in the jungles.

Some experienced Anglo-Indian hunters, who had been hunting for years, were knowledgeable about where to locate game. However, many British hunters lacked this skill. Nevertheless, a hunter noted that “in districts where the buffalo herdsmen having extracted the cream from their milk, throw the buttermilk into a regular place every morning, and bears being very fond of this can be fairly easily shot over a pool [where the cream was dumped] at dusk.”¹¹ Milk production was a common activity that attracted wild game and it often led to bears terrorizing villages. Wild animals continued disturbing many Indians and the British in the twentieth century. E.D. Miller discusses finding a boar in the sugar cane fields because it was attracted to sweetness and was able to arrange for 200 *coolies* for that single boar. Many preferred to defer to Indian shikaris to let them know where these locations were, as there are several accounts where Anglo-Indians applauded their expertise in tracking and their accumulation of local knowledge.

Indian orderlies had incentive to find game for the sahib. Finding game could also supplement a coolie’s salary as most reputable sportsman paid for knowledge about the whereabouts of game, especially if they were not unable to find it themselves. Hunting etiquette made the payment of *khabbar*, or news customary. Frank Nicholls, who worked as an Assam planter, admits to offering a personal reward of Rs. 2 for news of any big game and Rs. 10 if it was shot by him and Rs.20. for a tiger or leopard.¹² Coolies, when not at work, were presumably out looking for game or keeping their ears open about hearing for any game. This made the sportsman’s job quite easy as he did not have to be on the lookout and news came to him.

¹⁰ James William Best, *Forest Life in India* (London: J. Murray, 1935), 24.

¹¹ Ajax, ‘*Good Hunting!*’, 13.

¹² Frank Nicholls, *Assam Shikari: a Tea Planter’s Story of Hunting and High Adventure in the Jungles of North East India* (Auckland: Tonson, 1970), 27.

Differentiation of Indians

By the twentieth century, the British believed they had a duty to uphold honor in Indian hunters by extension upholding the worthiness of the title of sportsman. While there was some indifference in the nineteenth century among British sportsmen on killing female and baby game, most sportsmen restrained themselves from shooting female and baby game. However, by the twentieth century a sportsman's reputation was at stake if he did not follow game laws and status quo of fixing one's prize a huge male trophy. Hunting etiquette in the twentieth century demanded that only mature male game should be killed at the hands of the hunter. E.D. Miller's brother, a British sportsman, told a syce or horse groomer's son who had killed a sow that "he was never to kill a sow again if he values his reputation as a sportsman, whereupon he was very sorry."¹³ This exchange shows the remorse of the young Indian man and emphasized the triumph of the British in their teachings that were disseminated to their Indian subordinates. The feeling of guilt and wrongdoings represented the success of the mission.

It was automatically assumed that tribals did not have a conscience regarding the killing of game. This was another common tool that the British used to demean tribal shikaris. F.W.F. Fletcher states in a letter dated the 18th of May in 1916 to Charles Kofoid the requirements for hunting in the Ghat forests. Fletcher was a British hunter and Charles Kofoid was an American professor at the University of California. He asserts that in order to legally hunt in the Ghat forests, a license was needed from the collector of the Malabar coast. Fletcher, who resided in the Nilgiri Hills writes, "I know shikaris who are without my scruples, who would jump at the chance of shooting an elephant if you can get the necessary license."¹⁴ The emphasis in this quote is "*my* scruples," which helps differentiate other Indian shikaris from British sportsmen, who had reservations against some forms of hunting. Indian shikaris allegedly did not have second thoughts about killing an animal like an elephant – an animal that did not pose a danger to people, that helped with transportation purposes, and was not a "sportful" shot. Hunting elephants was also against the law, unless it was a rogue elephant and permission was granted to shoot it.

In reality, shikaris were just like every other human being. Shikaris did not just enjoy shooting. They did have a conscience just like everyone else. While that is not expressed from their writings, accounts by British sportsmen relayed the thoughts of some of these shikaris and their families. Tribals were often depicted as meat hungry people who have no reservations against killing animals because they were not knowledgeable about religion from the *shastras* or law books. Christopher writes that "Relatives and friends will try all in their power to dissuade him from

¹³ Lieut. E.D. Miller, *Fifty Years of Sport* (London: Hurst and Blackett, Ltd., 1925), 107.

¹⁴ Letter. FWF Fletcher to Charles Kofoid. 18th May 1916. Charles Atwood Kofoid Correspondence. Banc MSS 82/39cz UC Berkeley Bancroft Library.

taking life,” suggesting that they know it is morally wrong to hurt another living being.¹⁵ Hunting was not a sport to these tribals, for they clearly understood the danger of what they were doing and what their family members were engaging in.

British sportsmen also differentiated themselves from Indian shikaris. British sportsmen emphasized the determination and will that they possessed, which made them superior sportsmen because they never gave up on trying to bag an animal (even if they missed killing the animal the first time). Hunting etiquette did not customarily allow for sportsmen to leave wounded animals because it would ruin another sahib’s sport. James Best writes of the superior nature of British sportsmen as he states: “I could quote three instances from after years, when by going out myself next day after a wounded beast I succeeded in bagging him, when all the natives had given up. The reason is that a native’s patience is child-like It is the will of Allah.”¹⁶ Muslim shikaris, according to Best, believed it was not meant to be if they did not seize the animal; it was their fate. There was no resolve among Muslim shikaris who understood that if they did not catch the animal it was because God did not want them to; but there was a great sense of perseverance among British hunters, mainly because they assumed that no animal was a match for them.

Poachers, who were mainly Indians, took the wrath for not following hunting etiquette and hunting laws. By the twentieth century hunting associations took up preservation to the best of their abilities without restricting the fun of their members. Poachers were the main target for pigstickers or men on horseback who speared wild boars with special spears. Wardrop writes “Now for the poachers; they are the devil, . . . kagis, sansis, aherias, ruffians all.”¹⁷ Wardrop writes that all these tribal poachers were responsible for the decline of boars and therefore they harm the sport of pigsticking. Wardrop called all members of tent clubs throughout India to action. Members and other concerned sportsmen were to lobby the collector of the district and *zamindars*, or landlords, to help catch and reprimand the poachers. Elite Indians were for the first time used to support preservation efforts. Pig sticking or tent clubs as they were called had a vested interest to preserve pigs for the good of the association. Tent clubs also had the exclusive rights to all pigs in the district for which the tent club as located.

The few villagers that possessed guns for their own defense and that of their agricultural produce and domesticated livestock, were often viewed as men who consistently had “bad shots” and only aggravated the game. British hunters commented how Indians had no sense of etiquette. As Thomas Metcalf states, differentiation was crucial to establishing the ideology of the Raj and

¹⁵ Sydney Albert Christopher, *Big Game Shooting in Lower Burma* (Rangoon: Burma Pictorial Press, 1916), 68.

¹⁶ James W. Best, *Forest Life in India* (London: J. Murray, 1935), 27.

¹⁷ A.E. Wardrop, *Modern Pig Sticking* (London: Macmillan, 1914), 214.

demarcating the subjects from the imperialists.¹⁸ Hence, by the twentieth century, this differentiation was crystallized in the minds of many Anglo-Indian residents. Hunting was part of the identity of Anglo-Indian residents. C.E.M. Russell, a Late Senior Deputy Conservator of Forests in the Mysore service, commented that “Sport, as distinguished from butchery, needs neither apology nor excuse; [as] the former is moderate and [a] humane exercise of an inherent instinct worthy of a cultivated gentleman, the latter the revolting outcome of the undisciplined nature of the savage.”¹⁹ The aforementioned statements show how the British constructed and displayed themselves as sportsman, while the Indian tribal or village hunter was clearly a poacher. Gentlemen hunt for sport whereas Indians are constructed as butchers who are not worthy of the title of sportsman. The savage here is implicitly the Indian. Russell states that the poaching native was one that:

Generally he possesses a gun – an antiquated, long-barrelled weapon as a rule With his bare feet he can walk almost as noisily as a cat; he knows every water-hole, salt-lick, and gale in the jungle near his home . . . together with his intimate acquaintance with the habits of the game, added to an unlimited store of patience, and a total disregard of the value of time There are many other human poachers, particularly gypsy-like wandering tribes who do not use guns, but who are extremely expert in every conceivable device for capturing game, both large and small...of a tame buck with nooses fastened to his horns By this method, bucks only are taken, but another plan for the wholesale capture of the animals, without regard to sex or age, is practiced with only too much success in parts of Mysore. A large number of natives, each with a long cord, to which at intervals nooses of strong gut are attached, proceed together to a place towards which . . . the cords are then firmly pegged down in a long and often double line and the men by making a very wide, circuit, endeavour to get round the herd...should the operation prove successful, several of the animals are often caught by the legs, and promptly butchered by the poachers.²⁰

These were Indians who according to Anglo-Indians did not have any etiquette, moral restraint, or display any sportsmanlike character. Furthermore, they did not practice the long, cherished stalking process and the European style of hunting with a gun. Notions of racial difference are quite evident in this passage. The lack of guns, the extreme torture to the animals, and the lack of discrimination of sex was a problem to many Anglo-Indians as the Wild Birds and Animal Protection Act of 1912 stated that female of goral, serow, buffalo, bison, deer, antelope

¹⁸ Thomas Metcalf, *Ideologies of the Raj* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 27.

¹⁹ Charles Edward Mackintosh Russell, *Bullet and Shot in the Indian Forest, Plain and Hill. With Hints to Beginners in Indian Shooting* (London: W. Thacker & Co., 1900), 1.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 347-348.

and bird could not be killed during some parts of the year.²¹ But Indian poachers seemed to ignore this ruling.

The inhumane methods of killing animals broke the unwritten code of etiquette that sportsmen followed. The savage hunter was painted as an Indian tribal or shikari who tended to “butcher” their game by inflicting painful methods of death such as pelting stones at the animals, capturing in snares, nets, poisoned arrows, poisoned bait or any other similar fortune. Similarly, excessive shooting of game was seen as a lack of restraint which did not allow the sportsmen to hold the title of a “gentle and tender hearted” man.²² The gentleman was the new sportsman who was the sportsmen that others had to aspire to be. Poachers tended to wound rather than kill the animal. The British did not like to shoot at animals that had been shot at before because it gave the British the upper hand in the hunting arena and fairness was the main motto of the hunter in the twentieth century. Poachers had an infinite amount of time to hunt because they had no real job unlike respectable Europeans who did not hunt for a livelihood. Sport in the mentalities of the English, did not take up a respectable man’s entire life, however it did take a few hours of his time on specific excursions or several days should he be an enthusiast.

New Technology and Improvements in Hunting

The twentieth century was also a time when artificiality was implemented in a wide-scale in the hunting arena to deal with the dwindling stocks of game. The demand as well as the craze for game led to more artificial methods of shooting. In *Fifty Years of Sport* by E.D. Miller, he wrote that Moosohurs and Donghurs “supply the planters with game birds of all kinds, such as snipe, duck, quail etc., which they capture alive in nets. The duck and quail are put into specially constructed duckerries and quail houses, and are fattened up and till the shooting season is over, so that planters were able to get delicious game practically through all the hot weather.”²³ Miller refers to tea estates managers or factory owners living near Motihari, Bihar. Surprisingly, the very people who were providing game to the British were actively undermining the Raj. The Mosohurs are described to be low-caste individuals, who were active in dacoity and petty theft, by the Inspector-General of Police Lower Provinces of Bengal.²⁴ Even though they were shikaris in their own right, they also served as beater or someone who beat back dense foliage in the forests for pig sticking events arranged by large planters. Moosohurs and Donghurs, therefore, did the hardest work of the shoot by locating game and literally bringing it within arm’s reach for the British. Furthermore, hunting with nets was acceptable provided they were obtaining game for the British and not for

²¹ Augustus Somerville, *Shikar Near Calcutta*, 111.

²² Russell, *Bullet and Shot*, 1.

²³ Lieut. E.D. Miller, *Fifty Years of Sport* (London: Hurst and Blackett, Ltd., 1925), 107.

²⁴ Lt. Col. J.R. Pughe, *Report on the State of Police in the Lower Provinces of the Bengal Presidency for the Year of 1867 Volume 1* (Calcutta: Thomas Smith Press, 1868), 110.

themselves. Their “poaching” methods were not denigrated because small winged-game was a delicacy for British tables. As big factory owners or managers of tea estates, there were few instances when shikaris took them far away from their residences. Shikaris also did the duties of gamekeepers when artificial rearing of game, such as partridge and pheasants occurred. In addition to sport, this game that was reared in the duckeries and quail houses and served the dual purpose of appeasing the stomach and trigger happy index finger for British males.

In addition to the Indian servants, by the mid-twentieth century, photography was commonly combined with the hunting experience. A camera became a must, because many wished to capture the looks of a *tahr* (Himalayan wild goat) or *gooral* (another type of goat), the scenery, and also the “strange looking natives.”²⁵ Voyeurism of natives was a common activity and photography helped document it for Europeans in Britain. Bernard Cohn states this documentation and classification of objects in the Indian subcontinent was a form of domination.²⁶ Photography was also commonly used to depict the hunt as a “grand experience” or one that documented man’s control over nature. The most common hunting pose was one in which the foot was placed over the animal’s carcass prior to the skinning process. As Tina Loo has stated in her deconstruction of the trophy, it is a masculine object as well as a masculine project to obtain it.²⁷

Natural history was intricately connected to the hunting experience. Wardrop commented on how pigs had rather good eye sight.²⁸ Discussions of natural history often included informing the reader about the animal’s Indian name, its Latin name, a little background about its species, where its primary habitat was, and a little about its character. The description often sought to educate and satisfy the reader’s curiosity. A typical entry is appended here.

Pigmy Hog (*Porcula Salvania*): This tiny animal, which is said by Mr. Hodgson to resemble in size and shape a young one of the preceding species[pig] of about a month old, weighs only from seven to ten pounds. Its habitat is the saul forests of Sikkim, and the Nepaul Terai The vernacular names for this animal are *Chota-soor*. According to the same author, the pigmy hog goes in herds, and the males will courageously attack intruders.²⁹

This information would also be published in the gazette of Bombay Natural History. The ordering and classification of animals can be regarded as an imperial trait that became part of the Anglo-Indian character to understand the world in which they were living and name animals in India.³⁰

²⁵ Ajax, ‘Good hunting!’, 29.

²⁶ Bernard Cohn, *Colonialism and Its Forms of Knowledge* (Princeton: University Press, 1996), 3.

²⁷ Tina Loo, “Of Moose and Men: Hunting for Masculinities in British Columbia, 1880-1939.” *Western Historical Quarterly*, Vol. 32, No. 3 (Autumn 2001): 297-319.

²⁸ Stockley, *Shikar*, 32.

²⁹ Russell, *Bullet and Shot*, 345.

³⁰ Cohn, *Colonialism and Its Forms of Knowledge*, 3.

By the twentieth century, there was a large following of men who had strong feelings of nostalgia when it came to viewing tribals whom they often met when hunting in the jungles. The British had made great advances in education and missionaries had worked tirelessly to convert many tribals to Christianity. Therefore, tribals who still retained “elements of savagery” especially those who had not yet converted to Christianity were often sought after simply for their presence and the educational benefits they garnered about their particular tribe. James Best writes of his time in Bilaspur district in 1905 when he states: “I consider myself lucky to have seen as much of these people as I did before they too, are spoilt by our civilizing education and turned from truthful and natural savages into imitation Europeans.”³¹

Furthermore, being a part of the tribal life by participating in shikar together made the British sportsmen knowledgeable and even expert anthropologists on tribal customs and languages. James Best writes that “here I was working with a party of Gonds and took the opportunity to learn a few words of their language, which amused them intensely.”³² Part of the Anglo-Indian project for many sportsmen was to become conversant in vernacular languages for sporting purposes. Therefore, the quest to become more cultured was a dual edged one.

Paternalism

Paternalism and a sense of masculine responsibility can be discerned from the Anglo-Indian hunting experience. Mrinalini Sinha writes that “the real test of British masculinity was in the ‘chivalric’ protection of white women from native men.”³³ The other test of British masculinity was in protecting Indian men and women from dangerous game. Frank Nicholls, an honorary game warden of Assam’s Forest Department often had villagers come to him to request a shooting of animals who destroyed the rice paddies or to report khabbar or news of tiger sightings.³⁴ He was someone who used his rifle in the aiding of many villagers. One of the chapters in *Assam Shikari* captures the spirit of how British paternalists felt about dangerous game with the title “*Sala Bagh*.” *Sala* is a crude swear word and is representative of the certitudes that most sportsmen had towards game. It was a pestilence for those in tea plantations and those in one’s district, as well as for those who had to protect their district or their subordinates from the depredations of wild animals. It was an imperial guarantee that the British promised to their subordinates, however, it was one that weighed heavily upon their bodies and minds. An active role in the community as a protector was another facet of the British sportsman.

³¹ Best, *Forest Life in India*, 82.

³² *Ibid*, 86.

³³ Mrinalini Sinha, *Colonial Masculinity: The ‘Manly Englishman’ and the ‘Effeminate Bengali’ in the Late Nineteenth Century* (Manchester: University Press, 1995), 51.

³⁴ Nicholls, *Assam Shikari*, 84, 17.

In order to maintain the honor that a sahib must uphold, guns had to be carried at all times. This was not a requirement, but it was expected of a well-rounded sportsman in British India. Sahibs were supposed to walk around with guns in order to protect the natives from dangerous animals like tigers. Killing a tiger or any other large animal was seen as an honorable thing to do. A sahib writes that a man without a gun cannot kill a tiger and that this incident “greatly lowered [lowers] the *izzat* of the sahib in native eyes.”³⁵ *Izzat* translates to honor. Therefore, to uphold the honor that is due to the sahib, laziness must never prevail and a gun must always be on hand. By the twentieth century a lot of Indians had guns in their possessions. Nevertheless Indians were still dependent on the British to protect them from dangerous animals.

Jim Corbett was one of the most renowned hunters of the twentieth century who was a paternalistic hunter. Corbett developed a great sense of conservationist feelings and was instrumental in the creation of Corbett National Park in 1935. Although Corbett was a hunter, his views changed radically after witnessing first-hand the depredations caused by tigers on entire villages. Corbett later chose to only hunt man-eating tigers. Corbett, unlike any other British sportsman, was one of the first to attempt to explain why tigers chose to kill and eat humans. This approach would later be followed by Indian hunters and Indian conservationists who attempted to give a reasonable explanation of tigers as animals that needed protection, rather than labeling them as blood-thirsty beasts. Corbett explains that wounds and old age tended to make tigers man-eaters because they lost their physical strength with the two aforementioned conditions and were forced to rely on easy prey: humans. Other reasons that led tigers to kill men and women was the loss of typical prey, like deer, because of human encroachments on forest habitat and in the decline in number of deer or other fair game. Excessive deaths of humans, due to epidemics like cholera, also led to man-eating leopards who enjoyed the taste of dead humans and then sought to kill live humans.³⁶ The lack of proper cremation of bodies in times of epidemics led to the piling up of bodies, which attracted other man-eaters like leopards. Corbett’s reasoning reflects a great sense of moving away from blaming the tiger to understanding the problem by studying the environment as a whole – an approach used by later conservationists. Corbett refers to the tiger as a “large-hearted gentleman” and this phrase is representative of decades of imperial connections to tigers as the rajahs of the jungles.

The distress caused by man-eaters is evident in the many stories that Corbett includes in his book *Man-Eaters of Kumaon*. The Champawat tigress of Kumaon had killed 200 people in Nepal and 234 in Kumaon.³⁷ Before shooting the tigress, Corbett made it clear that he wanted the government reward for killing the tiger

³⁵ Afialo, *The sportsman’s Book for India*, 19.

³⁶ Jim Corbett, *Man-Eaters of Kumaon* (Bombay: Oxford University Press, 1946), xix.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 4.

void because he did not want to be “classed as a reward-hunter.” He wanted to be viewed as a hunter who hunted for the good of people thereby displaying a great sense of hunting etiquette and serving the Empire as a gentlemanly sportsman. The case was so bad that people were scared to go outside into the village. Villagers readily cooperated with Corbett and gave him information about the tiger and he studied the clues the tiger left behind while searching for footprints and other details. Corbett was a godsend to the villagers because of his courage in dealing with dangerous animals in protecting the people. His presence alone gave villagers the peace of mind to continue their daily farm chores. Wheat was cut by villagers only after Corbett stood among them as a guard.³⁸ The gratitude expressed by Indians for Corbett’s efforts was quite deep and sincere. One woman bent down to touch her hands to Corbett’s feet- a traditional sign of respect and deferment to one’s elders.³⁹

Corbett was not alone in his effort to help kill man-eating tigers. Local elites did their best to assist the sportsman in his efforts. In the case of the Champawat man-eaters the *Tahsildar* or Chief Revenue Officer provided Corbett accommodation in a bungalow. Corbett initially began his hunt for man-eating tigers after hearing stories of the deaths of humans and also by request of the Government. The killing of the Champawat tigers began on request of the Deputy Commissioner of Naini Tal. While the sahibs, or in this case Corbett, took much of the credit for bravely killing the man-eating tigress, the government did display a sense of appreciation for the efforts of Indians in helping exterminate the man-eater. Sir John Hewett, the Lt. Governor of the United Provinces, offered the Tahsildar of Champawat a gun and a knife to give to the village man who assisted Corbett at a *darbar* in Naini Tal.⁴⁰

As representatives of the empire, British officials were obligated to maintain the general welfare of their particular district and in many cases they were personally motivated to do so because they genuinely wanted to help less fortunate villagers. J. E. Carrington Turner, the Divisional Forest Officer of Naini Tal (part of Kumaon and home to several man-eaters) not only helped take revenge against man-eaters, but livestock killers as well. At the death of a pair of bullocks, he bicycled for five miles to his home to get a gun and go after the cattle-killer for he knew the value of bullocks to a villager and knew that he would be at a loss without them.

A strong sense of personal ethics often restrained hunters from unnecessary killings. Turner was one such individual who had a strong sense of resolve and determination that resembled Jim Corbett. Turner states that after he asked priests in Mahableshwar if the tiger lurking in the area was a man-eater, they replied no. He instantly asserted that “in that case I can see no reasoning for killing him. The

³⁸ Ibid, 7.

³⁹ Ibid, 13.

⁴⁰ Ibid, 32.

animal is following the natural pattern of his life, hunting his prey in the forest, and so reducing the damage done to your crops by deer and wild pig. Such an animal must surely be regarded as a protector of your livelihood.⁷⁴¹

The quick action taken to avenge the killing of a human being was most pronounced by district officials who worked at hasty speeds to catch up with the man-eater and deliver justice on the spot with a gun at hand. Turner describes how he walked seven miles with two other Indian helpers at an extremely fast pace. Turner did not foresee coming back until the man-eater was gone. After hearing news of a kill he writes about “hastily packing some sandwiches and a generous supply of biscuits in my haversack”⁷⁴² and proceeding with no delay. Upon arriving at the scene, questions were asked about information of the man-eater. Then a general search commenced in the forests to track the tiger.

The presence of a British official in any village led to the bombardment of requests to that said official by local villagers, usually for taking revenge on a man-eater, administering medical care or acquiring meat for them. For example, Turner describes how Maratha villagers who lived adjacent to forests near Mahabaleshwar asked him to shoot a pig for them, so that they could eat it and use its fat for medicinal purposes. Upon its death there was great joy and the task of the British official was to ensure that everyone received their fair share, thereby demanding an equitable distribution of meat. Similarly, if a British man was simply standing in the presence of an animal attack or intrusion, local people expected him to compensate them for losses incurred by that animal. A bear that had eaten grain in a man named Guman Singh’s house led to great pandemonium; the pandemonium was instantly silenced after Turner offered compensation for the grain that had been eaten by the bear.

As Jim Corbett has often relayed in his man-eating tiger stories, work remained at a standstill when news of man-eating tigers abounded. It was therefore the duty of forest service officials to ensure that felling of trees occurred and construction efforts continued. That usually meant that the man-eater needed to be killed, so that large cities like Bombay could have their supply of timber and development of new bungalows could go unobstructed. British officials had an equal interest in stopping the man-eater or cattle killer for the general welfare of one’s district. Just as villagers demanded compensation or revenge and took their loss personally, as the rightful owners of livestock or relatives of a person that had been killed, so too did British officials — whose sense of ethics and paternal qualities were seriously challenged when nature decided to interfere with a British man’s district. Turner writes how he “was outraged by the sudden loss of this young thing and determined to shoot the killer.”⁷⁴³ Turner was referring to a baby camel that had been killed.

⁴¹ J.E. Carrington Turner, *Man-Eaters and Memories* (London: Robert Hale Ltd., 1959), 14.

⁴² *Ibid.*, 21.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 127.

As camels were indispensable for transportation, the loss was particularly moving. British men also gave their word that they would find the man-eating animal. Turner gave his word that he would locate and kill a man-eating leopard to Narbat Singh, and upon the death of the said leopard of Chowkooree, Turner was sure that the man's spirit would rejoice after he killed the leopard.

Sportsmen in the twentieth century continued their roles of serving as medical doctors to Indians. One shikar. "Kildeer" wrote in his *Timely hints to Shikaris*, that castor oil, Epsom salts, quinine, permanganate of potash and lime juice were extremely important to keep on hand as medications and should be given to Indian servants if they became sick with such illnesses as bowel disorders or fever.⁴⁴ Taking care of Indians was part of the imperial duty that sportsmen encountered and many diligently saved countless lives. Indians typically did not go to the hospital when sick and often died. The British paternalist sportsman made sure Indians were treated and their survival rate exponentially rose.

Paternalism also meant to take care of the Indians and be a responsible imperial model for one's subsidiaries. As Sydney Christopher wrote: "you are not expected to regale them with spirits, nor is it a practice I would recommend as a sportsman Shans are particularly fond of strong drinks . . . and will drink themselves to stupefaction if given the opportunity."⁴⁵ The British needed alert shikaris, and alcohol would prevent shikaris from being alert. The British also believed that they had the responsibility to emphasize righteous behavior among the tribals. The British had an imperial responsibility to protect the Indians from dangerous behavior and avoid instances where a drunk Indian man might not appear subservient to the British.

Credit for the killing of wild animals was customarily given to the British, though Indian shikaris and coolies did most of the work that went into bagging an animal. In *The Asian*, a newspaper that was circulated in Rangoon, Burma stated: "Mr. Christopher Barrister at law has killed another tiger 7th November 1903. Two sportsmen went out to shoot bison last Sunday, a few miles out of Rangoon, and one of them had the good fortune to kill a fine young male tiger measuring 8 feet."⁴⁶ Shikaris were not mentioned whatsoever in the account even though we know Christopher always used shikaris. The shot fired at the tiger takes precedence over tracking the tiger, setting up of a machan or platform, and finding the tiger were all necessary activities of an Indian. The British were clearly represented as men who protected the lands and got rid of dangerous animals.

⁴⁴ Kildeer, *Timely Hints to Amateur Shikaries* (Madras: Higginbotham & Col, 1909), 11.

⁴⁵ Sydney Albert Christopher, *Big game shooting in Lower Burma* (Rangoon: Burma Pictorial Press, 1916), 65.

⁴⁶ *Ibid*, 148.

Regal Hunts

Regal hunts flourished during the twentieth century; however, they can hardly be categorized as masculine, even though they were clearly imperial and ceremonial in nature. One particular royal shoot in the princely state of Bikaner hosted by none other than the Maharaja of Bikaner included Lord Louis Mountbatten, the Prince of Wales and Sir Philip Grey Egerton. These important grandees and dignitaries were given royal treatments at hunting camps, such as the Nepalese Terai, with servants galore.

Because of the large number of servants and the goal of big bags to commemorate a royal shoot, these shoots were often more artificial than regular shoots. For example, during a hunting shoot at Kodamdesar on 3 December 1921 an artificial water tank and fake cranes were placed at the shooting site. Real cranes were then attracted to the artificial water source. Servants also informed the shooters when cranes were close enough for shooting, so all the shooter had to do was point his gun at the crane and shoot. Men did not have to engage in actual hunting, for when the crane was close enough they could easily shoot. This type of hunting was akin to target practice. For the elites in the early twentieth century, there developed a more civilized or gentlemanly masculinity, which is showcased in the regal shoots. In this manner shooting commenced in the mornings when birds frequented a pond or stream to drink water. Similarly, when Lord Hardinge hunted, an Indian man was placed in his charge “whose task it was to count the birds I [he] shot.” There were also some “fine young Indians, almost naked” whose job was to collect all the ducks he shot for the viceroy.⁴⁷ Large bags were obtained during royal shoots, more so than in regular shoots of small game. The Prince of Wales’s party shot 1,006 imperial sand grouse, 6 ducks, and 262 sand grouse.⁴⁸ This was much more than the hundreds which were generally bagged at regular shoots. Shooting was not simply for one day but continued typically for a week. On 5 December 1921 more modest large game bags in Gujner also in Bikaner were obtained. For example, Lord Louis Mountbatten shot only four *chinkara* or gazelle and the Prince of Wales shot two black buck and a *chinkara* on 6 December 1921 in Gujner.⁴⁹

In the twentieth century, there were changing definitions of masculinity and the ruthless killing of animals was increasingly frowned upon. Therefore, it is difficult to categorize hunting during this period as a masculine activity in a traditional sense. This was generally the case for upper-class hunters, and not so much for hunters who organized their own hunting expeditions. For example, Baron Charles Hardinge noted how he “pursued *chinkara* [gazelle] in a motor car”⁵⁰ in the princely state of Bikaner in the North. Shooting by motor car became common for

⁴⁷ Baron Charles of Penhurst Hardinge, *On hill and Plain* (London: Murray, 1933), 39.

⁴⁸ Cuthbert Ellison Bernard, H.R.H. *The Prince of Wales’s Sport in India* (London: W. Heinemann, Ltd., 1925), 149.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 143.

⁵⁰ Hardinge, *On hill and Plain*, 8.

the elite in the 20th century. The amount of masculine prowess, muscle, and energy required for the hunt was clearly minimal, as humans had an unfair advantage over the wildlife. This grand hunt however encapsulated the paternalistic, imperialist trait that was evident in the Anglo-Indian hunting experience. Anglo-Indians, even of the upper-class, tended to detest this organized form of hunting as it took some of the effort and adventure out of the hunt. It was also detested because it was a non-traditional form of hunting. It nevertheless had its own form of excitement, as many were amazed by how many animals they could kill in a short time and also on the ease with which they were able to get good shots. Certainly, the hunt became more staged and orchestrated; however, the royal and elite British accepted this because it was viewed as a “civilized way” to hunt in “style.”

Anglo-Indians of the upper class believed that they were skilled in hunting because they knew the methods, procedures and traditions of hunting. It was commonly assumed that Indian servants were not aware of the intricacies related to the hunting experience. For example, a British aristocratic hunter stated that he resorted to having his servant simply carry his rifle because the servant did not understand the “importance of the direction of the wind when stalking.”⁵¹ The servant’s lack of communication in English and knowledge about stalking procedures helped place Anglo-Indian hunters on a higher pedestal than Indian servants and shikaris. Hardinge also had experience hunting in Scotland. This does not contradict the view of Indians as skilled and knowledgeable hunters because one man’s view does not change the majority of sportsmen who understood the knowledge that Indians possessed.

British recreation revolved around shikar as a sport, as it was an integral part of the identity of British residents in India. While the British imperialists sought to control the Indian animals present in the forests and in other domains for paternalistic and personal reasons, they were nevertheless dependent on the native shikaris, servants, or maharajas. While some British sportsmen praised their native partners and appreciated their expertise, many others did not. In the case of British elites, regal hunts solidified alliances between Indian royalty and privileged British officials. This shows the ambiguity of British attitudes: on the one hand they were derogatory and distrustful, and on the other praising and appreciative of local knowledge. There appears to be a rise in gentlemanly masculinity that is dependent on Indians. A British sportsman would simply have to have great marksmanship skills and pull a trigger, albeit outside in the hot weather. British hunters also differentiated themselves from Indian shikaris, especially the tribals who were distinguished from British sportsmen. The British sportsman in the twentieth century differed from the British sportsman in the nineteenth century

⁵¹ *Ibid*, 25.

in that there was more restraint, as female game were not killed and traditional methods of hunting (with a gun) were customarily used.

Non-Alignment: Nehru's Wisdom

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Jawaharlal Nehru was a keen observer and keeping India's past traditions formulated its policies—internal as well as external. Nehru was not unconscious of his indebtedness to the Indian history, culture, and tradition as a determining factor in the formulation of his thought and policy of “non-alignment.” It was born out of a sharp intellect but was the direct result of the old ways and the old mind, which moulded its policies during the freedom movement. In the first statement of the Government policy made by Nehru in the Interim Government in September 1946, he said: “in the sphere of foreign affairs, India will follow an independent policy, keeping away from power politics of groupings, aligned one against the other.” Since then India has been consistently following the policy of non-alignment, with, of course, modifications that became imperative with the change of circumstances and the passage of time.

The internal interests of nations constituted the foundation of the concept of non-alignment. But the elements of national interest change with the variations in national and international circumstances. The leaders of the non-aligned nations were the persons whose ideas has been shaped by the traditions of their ancient civilization as well as by the westerns liberal education in which they had been trained in the formative years of their life. This enabled them to take an enlightened and broader view of their national interest. As such, in determining their national interest, they attempted a synthesis of nationalism and internationalism, a combination which gave much of the positive content to the concept of non-alignment. This enlightened national self-interest became the most important aspect of non-alignment. Nehru had spoken about a free India, working for world peace and an end to imperialism, and of the need for a new Asian unity including China. He was an exponent of a peaceful approach and devoted to the techniques of negotiation and co-operative understanding.

The policy of non-alignment was an indigenous product, emanating from India's long struggle for freedom. So were probably the compulsions of leaders of Asian, African and Latin American countries who were able to assert their national identities mainly by adopting the policy of non-alignment. Certain broad parameters, which served as basic commitments in the formulation of India's foreign policy were laid down during India's freedom struggle. For instance, even before the establishment of the Congress, the Nationalist leadership condemned British Colonial wars in Asia and Africa and the use of Indian troops in them. The Indian National Congress, which served as the vanguard of the freedom struggle, advocated as early as in 1897 a foreign policy of peace. Significantly in his Presidential address Shri C. Sankaran Nair, President of the Congress in 1897

(Amravati), stated: “Out true policy is a peaceful policy With such capacity for internal development as our country possesses, with such a crying need to carry out the reforms absolutely necessary for our well being, we want a period of prolonged peace.”

The Foundations of Non-Alignment

Jawaharlal Nehru was not unconscious of his indebtedness to Indian history, culture, and tradition as a determining factor in the formulation of his thought and policy of non-alignment. Non-alignment had profound ideological significance as well as being a realistic and pragmatic way of protecting India’s interest in the Cold War situation. An essential feature of the policy of non-alignment was the emphasis on peace, universal disarmament, and elimination of the element of fear. Nehru’s views were full of idealism. He emerged as a philosopher of peace and freedom. It was a thought out course of action for achieving objectives in foreign relations as dictated by the ideology of national interest. India’s geo-political situation increased its strategic importance among other nations of the world. On the one side of India is West Asia, whereas on the other side is South East Asia, besides China in the North and Indian Ocean in the South.

Nehru formulated India’s foreign policy on Ashoka, the Great (269-232B.C.) and Buddha’s realistic political principles and philosophy. Foreign policy has been defined by George Modelski, the great philosopher, as: “the system of activities evolved by communities for changing the behaviour of other states and for adjusting their own activities to the international environment.” Thus, foreign policies are a synthesis of the ends (i.e. national interest) and means (i.e. power and capabilities) of nation states. Foreign policy is a thought-out course of action for achieving objectives in foreign relations as dictated by the ideology of national interests.

Nehru formulated India’s foreign policy on Buddha and Ashoka’s principle of peace, charity, tolerance, equality and freedom, as well as India’s basic principle of ‘*Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam*,’¹ i.e. the whole world is a family. An independent thinking on foreign policy, meaning independent of British Indian Government, started in the beginning of the 1920’s. In 1921 the All India Congress Committee, at its Delhi Session held on the 4-5 November, passed a resolution which could be regarded as a “landmark in the history of India’s foreign relations.”² It was the first time that the Congress had passed a general resolution on foreign policy, which

¹ A Sanskrit phrase composed of ‘*Vasudha*,’ i.e earth; ‘*eva*,’ emphaziser, and ‘*Kutumbakam*,’ family. ‘*Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam*’ means that the whole world is one single family. It is considered as an integral part of Hindu philosophy and finds its mention in the literature of Hindu organizations. It is an exclusively Indian contribution to world peace. This Ancient Nation evolved a world view based on the motto “*Loka Samasta Sukhina Bhavantu*” (Let the entire world be happy) thousands of years before any League of Nations or United Nations was thought of to avoid global strife. In fact the ideal of human unity, of a world free from all traces of conflict and misery has been in the Indian philosophy since times immemorial.

² Norman, D. Palmer, “Foreign policy of the Indian National Congress Before Independence,” in *Studies in Indian Foreign Policy*, ed. K.P. Misra (Delhi: Vikas Publishers,1969), 22.

made it clear that the British Indian Government, in no way, represented Indian opinion.³ This resolution laid down the basis of an independent foreign policy. One of the key tasks in founding the new Indian nation after independence was to achieve Indian international identity and standing, which meant fashioning both coherent foreign policy and Foreign Service to conduct the nation state's relations with the outside world. Before independence, Nehru had spoken about a free India working for world peace and the dissolution of imperialism, and of the need for a new Asian unity, including China. He was an exponent of a peaceful approach and was devoted to the techniques of negotiation and cooperative understanding.⁴

For Jawaharlal Nehru, the policy of non-alignment was an indigenous product, emanating from India's long struggle for freedom. So were probably the compulsions of the leaders of the Asian, African, and Latin American countries who were able to assert their national identities mainly by adopting the policy of non-alignment. Non-alignment was not a negative policy of being neutral in great power disputes or staying equidistant from the two super powers. The emerging Cold War between the U.S.A. and the Soviet Union, which intensified in the 1950s (the period also saw the emergence of the new Asian, African, and other nations free from the colonial yoke), provided the ground for adoption of the policy of non-alignment, which was essentially suited to the requirements of the newly independent Asian and African countries.

Certain broad parameters, which served as basic commitments in the formation of India's foreign policy were laid down during India's freedom struggle. For instance, even before the establishment of the Congress, the nationalist leadership condemned British colonial war in Asia and Africa and the use of Indian troops in them. The Indian National Congress, which served as the vanguard of the freedom struggle, advocated a foreign policy of peace, as early as 1897. Significantly, in his presidential address, Shri C. Sankaran Nair, President of the Congress in 1897 (Amrawati), stated:

our true policy is a peaceful policy With such capacity for internal development as our country possesses, with such crying need to carry out the reforms absolutely necessary for our wellbeing, we want a period of prolonged peace.⁵

The Congress party's foreign policy, since the mid-1920s, was formulated to a very large extent by Jawaharlal Nehru. His visit to Europe in 1926-27 as the representative of the Congress to the International Congress of Oppressed Nationalities held in Brussels in February 1927, which assembled on one platform the representative of the colonial peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America,

³ Ibid.

⁴ V.P. Verma, *Modern Indian Political Thought* (New Delhi, 1961), 417-419.

⁵ *Mainstream*, XLVII, no. 24 (2009).

brought him in touch with Left-wing political workers, organizations, and thinkers from all parts of the world, and constituted a landmark with the formation of his ideas and attitudes. Jawaharlal Nehru's visit to the Soviet Union in November 1927 made a deep impression on him. His admiration for the Soviet Union as the greatest opponent of imperialism was deepened by this visit. Following Jawaharlal Nehru's lead, the Indian National Congress at its Calcutta Session (1928) declared that the Indian struggle was part of the worldwide struggle against imperialism. The Congress also decided to set up a Foreign Department to develop contacts with their counterparts in the other parts of the world. Consequently, Jawaharlal Nehru emerged as the chief architect in formulating all the resolutions on India's foreign policy.

India's outlook, in regard to foreign policy, was at a crucial turning point in 1926-1927. It began to acquire international perspectives under the able guidance of Jawaharlal Nehru, who played the most notable role in the formation, growth and development of this outlook as well as in the conduct of the foreign policy during the early years of independent India. Nehru attended the Brussels Congress of Oppressed Nationalities as a delegate of the Indian National Congress. At the Brussels Congress, as Nehru wrote in his autobiography, "it was felt more and more that the struggle for freedom was a common one against the thing that was imperialism, and joint deliberation and, where possible, joint action were desirable."⁶ Nehru, on his return from Brussels, made the Indian National Congress agree to associate itself with the League Against Imperialism, which was working under the influence of the Comintern.⁷

The Congress Session held in Madras in 1927 also passed a resolution that protested against the use of Indian troops in China, Mesopotamia and Persia and deplored the "extensive war preparations which the British Government [was] carrying on in India."⁸ From that time onwards Congress, through its various sessions, condemned the aggressive acts of Imperialist powers. Thus, the Indian National Congress, at its Session held at Calcutta in 1928, sent its greetings to the peoples of Egypt, Syria, Palestine and Iraq "in their struggle for emancipation from the grip of Western Imperialism."⁹ At the Tripura Session in 1939, the Congress strongly disapproved the British foreign policy and disassociated itself from it. In its opinion it was urgently necessary for India to direct its own foreign policy as an independent nation, thereby keeping aloof to both imperialism and fascism and pursuing the path of peace and freedom. Congress, through its various sessions, condemned the aggressive acts of Imperialist powers.

⁶ Jawaharlal Nehru, *An Autobiography* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1936), 161.

⁷ Cecil Kaye, *Communism in India* (Delhi, 1926), 47-48.

⁸ Palmer, "Foreign Policy," 2.

⁹ Galpal, Sarvepalli, *The Viceroyalty of Lord Irwin -- 1926-1931* (London, 1957), 79-87.

However, the basic tenets of India's foreign policy found expression for the first time in the statement by Jawaharlal Nehru which he made on 7 September 1946 on All India Radio as the Vice-President and Member-in-Charge of External Affairs in the Interim Government which had taken over on 2 September 1946. He said emphatically:

we propose, as far as possible, to keep away from the power politics of groups, aligned against one another, which have led in the past two World Wars and which may again lead to disasters on an even vaster scale. We believe that peace and freedom are indivisible and denial of freedom anywhere must endanger freedom elsewhere and lead to conflict and war. We are particularly interested in the emancipation of colonial and dependent countries and peoples and in the recognition in theory and practice of equal opportunities for all races. We repudiate utterly the Nazi doctrine of racialism, wheresoever and in whatever form it may be practiced. We seek no domination over others and we claim equal and honourable treatment for our people wherever they may go, and we can not accept any discrimination against them.¹⁰

Thus, Nehru's statement spelt out the basic tenets of free India's foreign policy, which became the guiding principles, i.e. non-alignment, anti-colonialism, and anti-racialism.

There were three basic theoretical and practical considerations behind Nehru's policy of non-alignment in foreign politics. First, India was a newly emergent nation state and it had to concentrate on economic and social reconstruction. Secondly, non-alignment was supported on historical grounds. Hence, non-alignment is regarded as a political expression of India's traditional philosophy of peace and good-will for all in place of being joined to any one group against a hostile league of groups. Thirdly, non-alignment was supported by the exigencies of international power politics. In a hostile world rent up into armed sections, it was a wise policy to strengthen the peace area.¹¹

Nehru's statement was the first-ever declaration of the now famous policy of non-alignment, which in subsequent decades attracted an increasing number of adherents in Asia, Africa and Latin America and brought forth the emergence of the world-wide non-aligned movement. This movement was meant to keep away from bipolarity, the Cold War, ideological crusades, the arms race and military blocks, all of which were the chief characteristics of international politics of the era following the Second World War.¹²

¹⁰ Jawaharlal Nehru, "India's Foreign Policy," *Selected Speeches, September 1946-April 1961* (New Delhi: The Publication Division, 1961), 2.

¹¹ Nehru's address at the U.S. Congress in Washington 1949.

¹² K.P. Mishra, *The Concept of Non-Alignment, Its Implications and Recent Trends* (Delhi: Vikas Publishers, 1969), 91-92.

The national interests of nations constituted the foundation of the concept of non-alignment. However, the elements of national interest change with the variations in national and international circumstances. The leaders of the non-aligned nations were persons whose ideas had been shaped by the traditions of their ancient civilization, as well as by the western liberal education in which they had been trained during the formative years of their life. This enabled them to take an enlightened and broader view of their national interests. As such, in determining their national interest, they attempted a synthesis of nationalism and internationalism, a combination that contributed most of the positive content to the concept of non-alignment. This enlightened national self-interest became the most important aspect of non-alignment. To Nehru, national self-interest was not a narrow self-centered concept, but one in which there was compatibility with the interest of other nations.

The non-aligned countries were interested in their own development. They were keen on giving economic content to their newly achieved political freedom, which could only be possible through peace in the world. Thus, owing to their faith in world peace, the non-aligned nations gave unstinted support to the United Nations and opposed the use of force in international relations. It was this policy of non-alignment, which became the most characteristic and abiding feature of India's foreign policy from 1946 onwards. However, until 1950, India's non-alignment appeared to have "a pro-western orientation." From 1951 to 1956 it "moved from a western-oriented non-alignment towards a more strictly middle-of-the-road position." During this period India's relations, both with the Soviet Union and with China, improved; while relations with the U.S. deteriorated and those with Britain showed some considerable fluctuations.¹³

The Indian National Congress condemned colonialism and extended its support to the on-going freedom struggle in many countries, even before independence. The Congress, in its 55 Session held in Jaipur on 18 December 1948, unanimously passed a resolution to the effect that the foreign policy of India must be passed on the principle of "the promotion of world peace, the freedom of all nations, racial equality and ending of Imperialism and Colonialism," and noted in particular that the Congress was interested in the freedom of nations and peoples of Asia and Africa who had suffered under various forms of colonialism for many generations.¹⁴

India was one of the initiators of the historic Bandung Conference of Afro-Asian Countries (18–24 April 1955). Nehru articulated the urge, desire and determination of the entire Afro-Asian world when in his address to the Conference expressed the determination "not to be dominated in any way by any other country or continent

¹³ Bimal Prasad, *An Overview – India's Foreign Policy: Studies in Continuity and Change* (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1979), 497-98.

¹⁴ A.M. Zaidi, and S.C. Zaidi, eds., *Encyclopedia of the Indian National Congress 1946-1950* (New Delhi: S. Chand & Co., 1981), 154-55.

and to bring happiness and prosperity to this part of the world and to discard the age old shackles that had tied them not only politically but economically . . . the shackles of colonialism.”¹⁵ The Conference discussed, inter-alia, the problem of dependent peoples or colonialism. The Conference was one in condemning colonialism with its attendant evils. It affirmed its support for those “still struggling to attain their independence and called upon the powers concerned to grant them independence.”¹⁶

India’s interests were not confined to the political emancipation of the Afro-Asian Countries alone. Nehru understood the link between political freedom and economic emancipation. India looked to its national movement as the harbinger of an Afro-Asian resurgence and claimed for itself “the role of the natural leader of the new states.”¹⁷ When India became independent, many of these countries were still groaning under the yoke of foreign colonial rule. On 7 September 1946 on the occasion of assuming charge of the Foreign Affairs Portfolio in the Interim Government, Nehru announced:

we are particularly interested in the emancipation of colonial and dependent countries and peoples and in the recognition in theory and practice of equal opportunities for all races, we repudiate utterly the Nazi doctrine of racialism, whosoever and in whatever form it may be practiced.¹⁸

Though Nehru had been brooding over the problems of the Third World for a long time, and this often found expression in his speeches, a consistent and elaborate formulation of approach towards the Third World evolved in his thinking in the years following India’s independence in the light of practical experiences gained. He perceived the world as a divided one—divided between the rich and the poor, the developed and the underdeveloped, the under populated and the overpopulated, the White and the Colored. He viewed the Soviet-U.S. detente and world peace as essential for the salvation of the Third World as that would lead to the transfer of resources to the underdeveloped parts of the world. He viewed non-alignment as imperative in the context of the military and technological revolution of our times because it would facilitate the replacement of the salience of the so called East-West conflict by the salience of the North-South issues. He needed for India, and he believed that others needed for their respective countries, aid, assistance, and technology from the First World and the Second World.¹⁹ He rejected the concept of total self-reliance in a village oriented India. He talked of “international cooperation” as a key to human progress and rejected the idea of

¹⁵ See Nehru’s Speech on 7 September 1946 on the occasion of assuming charge of the Foreign Affairs Portfolio in the Interim Government in Jawaharlal Nehru, *India’s Foreign Policy*, 270.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 276.

¹⁷ Peter Lycon, “India’s Foreign Policy” in S.P.Verma and K.P.Mishra (eds.), *Foreign Policy in South Asia* (New Delhi: Orient Longman, 1969), 171.

¹⁸ Jawaharlal Nehru, “India’s Foreign Policy” *Selected Speeches*, 2.

¹⁹ Sisir Gupta, *A Policy For the Third World* (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1979), 302.

confrontation with the other two worlds. Nehru believed that common background of colonial rule and common problems would “inevitably” bring the nations of Asia and Africa closer.²⁰

The problem of emancipation of subjugated peoples in Asia and Africa became an emotional involvement for India. For a long period following its independence, almost every important foreign policy statement issued on behalf of India contained strong words denouncing imperialism. Even with regards to extending support to a particular colony in its struggle for independence, it can be said without fear of contradiction that there was not a single colony that did not receive sympathy from India. In fact, Indian statesmen went farther than those of any other state, except the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China, in the choice of words for conveying their views.²¹

Nehru had no doubt that imperialism would die. But he had apprehension that in the process of fading away, it might bring in its wake a catastrophe on a large scale. Nehru’s concern for dependent peoples was not limited to their attaining political independence. It was also interested in their economic development. It should be noted here that Nehru, the architect of the policy of non-alignment, had visualized the need for steering clear of the two power blocks — not only to preserve India’s newly won independence, but also to be able to give undivided attention to the problem of how to provide necessities of life to the teeming millions. This view was shared by all the liberated nations of Asia and Africa. The community of interests of all these countries, with various levels of industrial development, inadequate infrastructure and divergent cultural ethos, led them to seek a common goal.²² The strategy of non-alignment, as developed by the founding fathers Nehru, Tito and Nasser, while directly towards peace, was equally aimed at securing political and economic objectives of development. Ever since its inception, the non-aligned movement emphasized “self-reliance” and “collective self-reliance” for the economic development of the Third World.²³

Nehru’s urge for the economic emancipation and democratization of international economic relations was equal to the struggle for liquidation of colonialism in all its forms. The process of decolonization had coincided with the establishment of a new economic system known as the Bretton Woods system, which primarily aimed at rebuilding the war-shattered European economics and did not address itself to the problems of economic recovery of the Third World.²⁴ On the contrary, it tended to perpetuate the essentials of the colonial nexus in relations between the former metropolises and the newly independent countries. It proved to be a new order for

²⁰ Jawaharlal Nehru, *India’s Foreign Policy*, 542.

²¹ Swadesh Rana, *India, the United Nations and the World Peace* (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1974), 183-284.

²² M.K. Saini (ed.), *Aspects on Non-Alignment* (New Delhi, Kalamkar Prakashan, 1980), 1.

²³ *Ibid.*, 21-25.

²⁴ P.K. Mishra, *South Asia in International Politics* (Delhi: Udh Publishers, 1984), 78-80.

the developed market-economy countries only. Therefore, its transformation into a just economic order became the goal of the struggle of the Third World against colonialism, neo-colonial exploitation, and structures of economic dominance. There was a generic linkage between non-alignment and the demand for new international economic order which passed through three stages. The first stage synchronized with the late forties and the fifties. In it, the non-aligned countries developed a growing awareness that the reordering of international economic relations was essential for their growth and development. In this first stage, economic issues largely remained in the background, as non-alignment at this stage was pre-occupied with the political aspect of decolonization and the preservation of peace, independence, and national sovereignty. World politics of the time were dominated by a strategic security paradigm; when survival itself seemed to be at the stake, nothing else was likely to receive greater attention or emphasis. In the second stage, which passed through the sixties, the non-aligned nations identified and articulated the important elements of a new international economic order and took initial steps for their realization. Economic emancipation was now seen as an essential ingredient in political decolonization. The third stage synchronized with the seventies. Against the backdrop of the shortfalls and disappointments of the sixties, the third stage saw the mood of the non-aligned change to one of increasing determination for assertive action, and even to militancy to accelerate change and development.²⁵ Thus, Nehru's concern was to protect and preserve the independence, political as well as economic, of newly born nations of Asia and Africa as well as Latin America.

Nehru, more than any other statesman of the post-war world, had the foresight of freedom that many nations and peoples were aspiring for. The policy of non-alignment and its loud and persistent advocacy by Nehru gave a new dimension to the game of international politics. In the nuclear age, he felt that such a policy of non-alignment was imperative, as much in the national interest as in the interest of the world community at large. Nehru was certain that the most important and even compulsive element of national interest of any nation was peace, without which, newly independent nations would be unable to promote the other elements of their respective national interests. Without world peace, these new nations would be unable to promote internal socio-economic development, colonial liberation, racial equality and even the progressive strengthening of the International Organization. Thus, the policy of non-alignment, which was formulated and articulated by Jawaharlal Nehru, was not only a means of safeguarding India's own national interest, but also constituted an earnest attempt to democratize international relations.

²⁵ K.B. Lall and S.D. Muni, "NIEO:Third World Assertiveness" in M.K. Saini, ed., *Aspects on Non-Alignment* (New Delhi: Kalamkar Prakashan, 1980), 87-92.

Rosie the Riveter Never Lived in Puerto Rico : The Home Front in a Caribbean Island during the Second World War

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The years prior to the Second World War were characterized by seasonal unemployment, low wages, and absentee ownership of huge expanses of land. The damaging effects of these conditions had been intensified by population growth. Unemployment reached extraordinary levels. Working conditions were dismaying. The Great Depression's disastrous effects on Puerto Rico's agrarian economy induced a sharp reduction in the flow of private capital from the United States, which in turn caused a fall in the price of sugar. The sugar industry's capacity for employment dropped to a mere ten thousand workers. By 1940, the value of exports decreased to only two million dollars. Although the monthly per capita income had risen to a hundred and twenty-one dollars, the island's economy was convalescing. In rural areas, most people lived in huts, and depended on subsistence agriculture.¹

The Second World War began in Europe in September of 1939. It had been decided that Puerto Rico was to become the "keystone" of Caribbean defense against a very possible Nazi attack on the United States through the northern coast of South America and the Arch of the Antilles; thus, a steady flow of U.S. troops began arriving in Puerto Rico almost immediately. The construction of military and naval installations provided employment relief to a small portion of the previously laid-off workforce. Social changes began to take shape in the form of black market activity, the proliferation of bars in the vicinity of military and naval installations, and all kinds of illicit endeavors.

A year later, a number of Puerto Rican laborers were recruited and sent to the Panama Canal,² and in October, the Puerto Rican National Guard and the U.S. Army Organized Reserve Corps were called to Federal Active Duty by President Franklin Delano Roosevelt.³ These actions, however, did not provide the much-needed reduction in unemployment. Rexford Guy Tugwell, then Governor of Puerto Rico, wanted the implementation of the Selective Service law because it would provide employment relief, at least temporarily. All of the available evidence, however, indicates that the U.S. Army did its very best to keep Puerto Ricans out of its ranks, just as it had during the First World War, based on racism and eugenics. Tugwell, however, who had been FDR's college roommate, managed

¹ Rafael Picó, *Nueva geografía de Puerto Rico, física, económica y social* (San Juan: Editorial Universitaria, Universidad de Puerto Rico, Río Piedras, 1975), 315, 366.

² Adolfo de Hostos, *Tesoro de datos históricos*, vol. IV. (San Juan: Universidad de Puerto Rico, Río Piedras, 1994), 63.

³ United States, Department of War, U.S. Army Forces in the Antilles, *The Puerto Rican Induction Program and The Use of Puerto Rican Troops*, April 1948, 1. U.S. Army Center of Military History, Section VI of "Antilles Department Historical Studies," Washington, DC.

to convince his old sidekick to apply the draft, and the latter gave the order to implement the Selective Service law in Puerto Rico in early 1941. Approximately 60,000 men and women either volunteered or were drafted throughout the War, not including Puerto Ricans who lived in the United States. Still, unemployment continued to run rampant, even with 30,000 Puerto Ricans enrolled in the various defense construction programs of the Works Progress Administration.

It was not until 1945, almost at the War's end, that 200 Puerto Rican women were finally admitted into the Women's Army Corps (WAC). Less than two dozen made it into the Navy's Women Accepted for Voluntary Emergency Service (WAVES). There were no Puerto Ricans in the Army's Women's Air Force Service Pilots (WASP), or the Women's Reserve of the Marine Corps. Only a handful were accepted into the Army Nurse Corps, and very few into the Nurse Cadet Program. Just as had happened with Puerto Rican men, the Army and Navy doubted the efficiency of Puerto Rican women, and for the same reasons.

Nevertheless, a limited number of civilian women served in various capacities in the Caribbean home front. It must be kept in mind, however, that the prevailing mentality in the Caribbean was, and still is, predominantly "machista;" thus, it should not be surprising that most women served in "womanly" jobs.

Protection of Civilians and Vital Resources

Within the Civil Defense, women served as volunteers on the staff, supervising other women serving as Canteen Attendants and Milk Station Attendants. Canteen Attendants hosted coffee-and-doughnut distribution points, while Milk Station Attendants served milk to poor children. Other "womanly" specialties in the Civil Defense were Nursing Assistant, Messenger, Cook, and Auxiliary Lady, the latter of which entailed a variety of duties.

There were only a handful of women serving with the Insular Police during the period in question, mostly in administrative functions, and an even smaller number served as detectives. There were no women at all serving with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Home Guard, or Coast Guard. Those with the Insular Department of Sanitation were limited to clerical duties, rather than prostitution control or animal vector control functions.⁴

Shortages

The Island produced only sixty-five percent of the foodstuffs required to sustain its mostly-unemployed two million inhabitants. The remaining thirty-five percent was imported from the United States.⁵ Puerto Rico's already ailing economy and socioeconomic conditions were literally obliterated by U-boats engaged in

⁴ See Héctor R. Marín Román, "El Caribe en camino a la segunda guerra mundial, 1938-1941" (unpublished manuscript approved for publication by the Academy of History of Puerto Rico, San Juan).

⁵ Luis A. Izquierdo, *Ideología, programas y actividades* (San Juan: Departamento de Agricultura y Comercio, 1945), 53-54.

Operations *Paukensschlag* (the American Patrol) and *Neuland* (the Caribbean Patrol), as well as the ensuing Caribbean Campaign of the *U-Bootwaffe*.⁶ Shortages of foodstuffs led to the implementation of rationing; yet rationing was defeated by a black-market controlled by men, and sponsored mostly by women.

The initial shortages included rice, lard, olive oil,⁷ wheat, and beef,⁸ followed by flour and yeast, with the latter two being the principal ingredients of bread.⁹ Rice with beans, the principal staple of Puerto Rican food, had to be replaced with *funche* (*fungi* in the Lesser Antilles), which was a mixture of red kidney beans with corn flour. The recipe for a blood sausage, called *morcilla*, a typical Christmas delicacy made with hog's blood and rice packed into a casing of hog tripe, had to be altered because rice was not available.¹⁰ While each family was indeed entitled to half a pound of rice per week, women devised ways to obtain more than their families' allocation, either by standing in line twice a week, or by having other family members stand in line simultaneously. Vendors and overseeing policemen usually looked the other way, since their wives were doing the same.¹¹ Meanwhile, in Louisiana, there was sixteen million pounds of rice destined for Puerto Rico, but there were no ships to transport it.¹² By April 1942, the black market price for rice was no longer subject to bartering; one either paid the price, or one did not have any rice at all.

To replace commercial lard, women began to call on their local slaughterhouse to obtain unprocessed hog lard with which to cook.¹³ Olive oil was replaced with mineral oil, which could not be readily contained inside the human body. Wherever people sat, an oil stain was left. This led to the wartime expression, "You're leaking oil!" While in the United States the rationing of meat products was imposed in 1943, in Puerto Rico it was implemented in 1942, largely because of the shortage created by the sinking of merchant ships by Nazi submarines. As an emergency measure, the colonial government eventually authorized the slaughter of cattle infected with tuberculosis, and the subsequent distribution of the meat.¹⁴ Politicians talked about allowing millers to mix flour with *yucca* to make bread, but such projects were not passed by the legislature because of partisan politics.¹⁵

Hundreds of indigent persons, many of them women, gathered leftovers--particularly those from Army and Navy mess halls--with which to feed their

⁶ Michael Gannon, *Operation Drumbeat* (New York: Harpers & Row Publishers, Inc., 1990); Gaylord T.M. Kelshall, *The U-Boat War in the Caribbean* (Annapolis, Naval Institute Press, 1994).

⁷ Francisco M. Rivera Lizardi, *La segunda guerra mundial en Caguas* (Caguas, Francisco M. Rivera Lizardi, 2003), 321.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 68.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 127.

¹⁰ Francisco M. Rivera Lizardi, *La guerra y yo* (Caguas, Francisco M. Rivera Lizardi, 1991), 63.

¹¹ Rivera Lizardi, *La segunda guerra*, 141.

¹² *Ibid.*, 172.

¹³ Carlos I. Hernández Hernández, "Historia y memoria: representaciones de la Segunda Guerra Mundial en la ciudad señorial de Ponce" (Ph.D. diss., University of Puerto Rico, Rio Piedras, 2005), 167.

¹⁴ *El Mundo*, 23 October 1942, 1.

¹⁵ Rivera Lizardi, *La segunda guerra*, 61.

families. Eventually there were riots at the garbage crematorium, staged by both hungry civilians and hungry police.¹⁶ The food situation was worsened by the presence of hundreds of survivors from sunken ships, refugees from the French Antilles attempting to join De Gaulle's forces, dependents of military personnel, and defense contractors and their families, all of whom needed to be fed.¹⁷ Not even laundry soap could be obtained, so many women crafted it with the fat of slaughtered cattle. They also made trousers with bale fabric.

Tires and Fuel Oil

The campaign to save rubber tires was implemented in the United States three weeks after the attack on Pearl Harbor. In early 1942, the program was implemented in Puerto Rico. The program had a negative effect on trucks working in defense projects, as well as on taxis and buses. It also affected the recreational use of cars, which in turn worsened the food shortage situation, because city families were not able to visit their relatives in the rural areas to obtain produce. Truck drivers, most of them involved in defense construction projects, went on strike for several weeks. Worn-out tires were kept in use by filling them with leaves, grass, and twigs. Synthetic rubber tires were never made available to Puerto Ricans.¹⁸

In the United States, gasoline rationing began as a measure to force the saving of tires, for it was not until 1943 that fuel actually began to become scarce. In Puerto Rico, however, the problem was different. The shortage of gasoline had begun in 1942 because of the drop in commercial ship traffic due to the fear of Nazi submarines. To aid fuel conservation efforts, street lighting was extinguished at 11:00 P.M.,¹⁹ and to facilitate circulation of vehicles and people, the edges of sidewalks were painted white.²⁰ Puerto Rican women did not usually drive motor vehicles of any kind, since this was considered to be a manly endeavor. Strange as it may sound, however, women were exhorted to dress in white at night, so that men would be able to see them. In fact, during January 1942, various society magazines published articles aimed at women on how to party through blackouts. The Office of Price Administration finally established a ration coupon system, but these were easily forged. The authorized ration in Puerto Rico was limited to three gallons per week, which was a gallon less than the stateside allowance.²¹ To stretch gasoline it was mixed with alcohol²² or kerosene.²³

¹⁶ *El Mundo*, 31 December 31 1942, 15.

¹⁷ United States, Department of the Navy, *Caribbean Sea Frontier War Diary* (Washington, D.C.: Naval Historical Center).

¹⁸ *El Mundo*, 5 January 1942, 1.

¹⁹ *El Mundo*, 28 April 1942, 1.

²⁰ *El Mundo*, 5 April 1942, 3.

²¹ Izquierdo, *Ideología*, 88-89.

²² Rivera Lizardi, *La segunda guerra*, 123.

²³ *Ibid.*, 157.

Collection of Strategic Materials

As was done in the States, silk, rayon, nylon, metals, and rubber were collected in Puerto Rico, usually by the Boy Scouts and Girl Scouts of America. On the island, the twist was that an experimental silk factory was established using large spiders, rather than worms. However, the spiders escaped and caused havoc in the adjacent population.

Economic Support and Other Campaigns

Various support groups were organized, such as The Victory Orators, Library Committees, and Victory Clubs, the latter to facilitate communication between civilians and soldiers.²⁴ Four-Minute Orators harangued the people.²⁵ Units of the Victory Corps were organized in almost every high school. The Island consistently exceeded its quotas of monies assigned for the American Red Cross War Campaign,²⁷ and the National War Campaign.²⁸ A Puerto Rican girl organized a branch of the First Dollar Received (FDR) club, to which the Island's children would donate the first dollar they earned.²⁹

War Bond drives yielded funds to cover the cost of building the anti-aircraft cruiser *USS San Juan*, the submarine *USS El Capitan*,³⁰ the Liberty Ship *Santiago Iglesias*,³¹ and ten *Boeing B-29 Super Fortresses*, which were long-range bombers.³²

Some programs were launched to support the Allies. The Friends of France in Puerto Rico collected clothing and other articles, and also sponsored dances to gather funds for *France Combatant*.³³ The Free France Committee of Puerto Rico collected money and clothing to be sent to Corsica.³⁴ The Wings for Britain organization raised the funds necessary to buy a *Spitfire* fighter aircraft for the Royal Air Force, to be flown by a Puerto Rican volunteer pilot. A map of Puerto Rico was painted on both sides of the plane's fuselage.³⁵ Twelve thousand persons paid entrance to a show entitled "A Homage to Russia."³⁶

The Recreation Situation

The United Services Organization for National Defense was established in Puerto Rico in 1940, although its constituent components, namely, the American Red Cross, the Young Men's Christian Association (YMCA), the Young Women's

²⁴ Ché Paralicci, *No quiero mi cuerpo pa' tambor; El servicio militar obligatorio en Puerto Rico* (San Juan, Ediciones Puerto), 237-240.

²⁵ *El Mundo*, 3 March 1944, 13.

²⁶ *El Mundo*, 21 December 1942, 12.

²⁷ *El Mundo*, 8 June 1943, 1.

²⁸ *El Mundo*, 1 March 1944, 11.

²⁹ Rivera Lizardi, *La segunda guerra*, 95.

³⁰ *El Mundo*, 3 October 1944, 3.

³¹ *El Mundo*, 2 May 1943, 8.

³² *El Mundo*, 14 May 1945, 6.

³³ Paralicci, *No quiero*, 234.

³⁴ *El Mundo*, 21 January 1944, 7. "La France libre" was later called "France Combatant."

³⁵ *El Mundo*, 27 September 1942, 1.

³⁶ *El Mundo*, 8 November 1942, 3.

Christian Association (YWCA), the Salvation Army, the National Jewish Welfare Board, and the National Catholic Community Service, remained more or less independent. In general terms, Puerto Rican soldiers did not like the soft activities sponsored by these organizations, and instead preferred the local bars, house parties, and patron saint festivities. Just like Army mess halls had to implement two separate diets, one for continentals and one for Puerto Ricans, the USO had to adapt in order to meet its mandated goal of providing recreational opportunities to all servicemen. A few Puerto Rican women operated the activities of these organizations.

Puerto Rican women also participated in the war effort by becoming official Army Hostesses, organizing dances and other recreational activities, and operating post libraries.³⁷ Sports championships between military and civilian teams were organized by Army Special Services Officers assigned to the various commands. All of these officers were Puerto Rican males.³⁸

Puerto Rican soldiers did not like the typical “soldier show” presented in the United States by soldiers themselves, principally because rehearsals consumed most of their free time. In addition, if their role required impersonating a female, they were ridiculed by their fellow soldiers for quite a long time. They did not like the entertainment troupes coming from the States either; their music was foreign, and the language was English, which most Puerto Rican soldiers could not understand. Local artists organized themselves into Spanish-speaking *troupes*, which eventually presented variety shows on every single Caribbean island in which Puerto Rican troops were stationed. A lower number of women were able to participate in these *troupes* as singers.³⁹

The Insular War Emergency Program

In 1942, the Federal Government announced it could appropriate to Puerto Rico only twenty-five million dollars in two years.⁴⁰ The colonial government responded by instituting a War Emergency Program to be coordinated directly with federal agencies.⁴¹ The program took effect in early 1943, and consisted of agricultural, mining, and construction projects, as well as direct economic assistance to 90,000 families.⁴² Victory Gardens were planted and 4-H Clubs were organized. While in the United States the purpose of these programs was to increase the quantities of farm produce to be sent overseas, in Puerto Rico the objective was to reduce the quantity of produce imported from the States. The Government of the Dominican Republic offered to take in five thousand Puerto Rican families, and establish an

³⁷ *El Mundo*, 3 June 1943, 9.

³⁸ *El Mundo*, 19 April 1944, 7, 10.

³⁹ *El Mundo*, 24 April 1945, 4.

⁴⁰ Rivera Lizardi, *La segunda guerra*, 215.

⁴¹ Izquierdo, *Op. Cit.*, 60-61.

⁴² *El Mundo*, 23 December 1942, 10.

agricultural town to be decreed “Puerto Rican Soil,” but the U.S. Government did not allow it.⁴³

Mining for manganese,⁴⁴ tin⁴⁵, nickle, lead, and gold proved to be unsuitable for commercial exploitation or the war effort.⁴⁶ Three plants extracted salt, while another three extracted limestone.⁴⁷ Evidence of the participation of women in mining activities has not been found.

Restrictions were placed on the sale of construction materials, mainly because ships bringing such materials to the island were being sunk by U-boats.⁴⁸ Also, most civilian construction projects were additionally hampered by the military, since the latter’s projects took priority, and construction materials were scarce. To ameliorate these effects, the Army developed an equivalent to cinder blocks, manufactured with what they called “Bitudobe,” made with bitumen and adobe.⁴⁹ Since construction was deemed a manly job, women did not participate.

In early 1943, the insular government began to provide a monthly direct economic assistance stipend of seven dollars and fifty cents to 15,000 families. A Maternity and Child Support Program was established. Government officials were sent to Congress and the White House to plead for the inclusion of Puerto Rico in the Social Security Program, since all territorial possessions had been excluded from the legislation.⁵⁰ Also in that year, the insular government established two manufacturing plants that produced field packs and fatigue uniforms for the Army.⁵¹

Puerto Rican War Industry workers in the United States

In August 1943, the government announced the existence on the island of 40,000 skilled war laborers available for employment, but there were no ships with which to transfer them to the United States. Language problems prevented the contracting of most, and only a little more than 2,000 eventually found their way to farms, canneries, railroad companies, chemical plants, and mines in the United States.⁵² An even smaller group made up of professionals found jobs in the federal government. We know of only one woman—a nutritionist—hired by the Veterans’ Administration.⁵³ Probably there were other Puerto Rican women employed in the United States, but they are for all intents and purposes invisible to history. Finally, a few hundred Puerto Rican men found war industry jobs in shipyards and munitions factories.

⁴³ *El Mundo*, 26 December 1942, 8.

⁴⁴ *El Mundo*, 17 December 1942, 5.

⁴⁵ *El Mundo*, 27 December 1944, 5.

⁴⁶ Picó, *Nueva geografía*, 326.

⁴⁷ Vicente León, Jr., *Directorio industrial de Puerto Rico* (San Juan: Asociación de Industriales de Puerto Rico y Asociaciones Afiliadas, 1945), 79.

⁴⁸ *El Mundo*, 14 April 1942, 5.

⁴⁹ *El Mundo*, 21 October 1942, 1.

⁵⁰ *El Mundo*, 17 October 1943, 8.

⁵¹ *El Mundo*, 16 June 1943, 4.

⁵² *El Mundo*, 29 March 1944, 1.

⁵³ *El Mundo*, 6 March 1945, 4.

Closing

The war efforts in the United States and in Puerto Rico were very different, and almost incompatible. Programs that were successful in the United States were totally inapplicable to Puerto Rico. Yet the federal government insisted on applying them. In the United States, the war effort was meant to support the Armed Forces, in order to help them win the War. In Puerto Rico, the war effort meant survival of the local population while attempting to support it. The majority of the male workforce remained unemployed, which caused most Puerto Rican women to stay at home and endure the shortages caused by the Nazi and Italian submarine campaigns. Yet they still had to find the ways and means to feed their families. Rosie the Riveter, that iconic personage who exemplified the takeover of industrial operations by women so that men could be called upon to fight the Axis, never lived in Puerto Rico.

Starving the Mill of Soviet Propagandists: Understanding President Eisenhower's Response to the Little Rock Desegregation Crisis

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A year after the *Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka* decision mandated the desegregation of public schools, Georgia Governor Eugene Talmadge published a reactionary diatribe entitled *You and Segregation*. In searing terms, he took the United States Supreme Court to task for invading the legal prerogative of state and local governments to run their education systems. In a parting shot at the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), which had argued in court that racial segregation harmed America's image overseas and gave the Soviet Union a propaganda issue, he thundered, "Too many things are being done in this country and by our country because we keep looking back over our shoulders at the Communists. Who cares what the Reds say? Who cares what *Pravda* prints?"¹

It is ironic that many historians who examine the Little Rock crisis implicitly agree with Talmadge that Cold War pressures had no application to a dispute over whether white and African American students could attend the same public high school in the Arkansas capital. It is the argument of this paper that the correct answer to the Georgia governor's query is no less of a person than the President of the United States, Dwight David Eisenhower. The President's decision to employ soldiers in order to guarantee the desegregation of Central High School cannot be understood without taking into account the harm done by segregation to America's image overseas. By acting decisively, Eisenhower hoped to turn back embarrassing Soviet propaganda, avoid diplomatic fallout with newly independent nations in Africa and Asia, and showcase democratic reform under the rule of law. These diplomatic concerns were so deep that they overrode the President's opposition to the *Brown* decision, his embrace of states' rights doctrine, and his conservative racial opinions.

According to traditional explanations, Eisenhower dispatched the 101st Airborne Division and federalized the Arkansas Guard in order to protect the Constitution, the authority of the federal government, and the rule of law. Also, as a former general, the President did not take kindly to Arkansas Governor Orval Faubus practicing insubordination and unilaterally obstructing the implementation of an order given by the nation's highest court. As journalist David Halberstam remarked, Eisenhower "did not look kindly on frontal challenges by junior

¹ Eugene Talmadge, *You and Segregation* (Birmingham: Vulcan Press, 1955), vi.

officers.”²² The most recent book on the crisis by Karen Anderson similarly asserts that “[Eisenhower] felt the same contempt for Faubus as he would have felt for an insubordinate and duplicitous junior officer.” Although later in her work she does state that he acted “to protect the authority and prestige of the presidency and the international prestige of the country,” the Soviet Union and the Cold War in general are completely absent from her account.³

The argument of this paper is not that historians who provide these explanations for Eisenhower’s motivations are incorrect, but rather that they only partially illuminate the President’s thinking. In his public statements during those tense days in September, the Commander-in-Chief himself often defended his actions on the basis of constitutional necessity to protect the rule of law. In a key telegraph to Faubus on 5 September 1957, for example, he was very blunt in lecturing the Governor, “the only assurance I can give you is that the Federal Constitution will be upheld by me by every legal means at my command.”²⁴ A more thorough examination of Eisenhower’s racial beliefs, his Cold War diplomacy, and his private admissions during the crisis adds another dimension to his willingness to use force in support of the Brown decision. He took executive action, according to this interpretation, also because he feared the international repercussions of inaction, most especially a Soviet propaganda coup that might give the communists momentum in wooing peoples of color world-wide, then in rebellion against European colonialism. If he did not intervene, the credibility of the leader of the free world would be tarnished. Consequently, Asians and Africans might declare neutralism in the Cold War--as twenty-nine nations did at the 1955 Bandung Conference--or might even pivot their allegiance toward Moscow. As he succinctly stated in his memoirs, he worried that the Little Rock crisis would “feed the mill of Soviet propagandists who by word and picture were telling the world of the ‘racial terror’ in the United States.”²⁵

There is consensus among historians that President Eisenhower did not support the Civil Rights Movement’s use of the courts to advance minority rights and opportunities. This was partly due to his insistence that overt racism, though morally wrong, would only effectively subside gradually through voluntarist approaches such as education, exposure, and example. He saw no paradox in believing that private interactions between racial groups and the practice of tokenism would inspire change, even though the entire Jim Crow structure of the South mitigated against such interracial relationships forming in schools, on the job, or within neighborhoods. Perhaps this perception was due to his fundamental ignorance of African Americans, which made him uncomfortable when meeting

²² Quoted in Thomas Borstelmann, *The Cold War and the Color Line: American Race Relations in the Global Arena*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001), 103.

³ Karen Anderson, *Little Rock: Race and Resistance at Central High School* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), 69.

⁴ Quoted in Kasey S. Pipes, *Ike’s Final Battle: The Road to Little Rock and the Challenge of Equality* (Los Angeles: World Ahead Publishing, 2007), 220.

⁵ Dwight Eisenhower, *The White House Years: Waging Peace, 1956-1961* (Garden City: Doubleday, 1965), 171.

blacks or even discussing civil rights issues before and after his ascension to the White House. Raised in segregated Abilene, Kansas, schooled at whites-only West Point, and appointed to posts throughout the South and in the Panama Canal Zone, Eisenhower gained little personal exposure to African Americans in his formative years. In 1948, he testified in Congress against the desegregation of the military, and in eight years as President, he met with a group of civil rights leaders only once, for less than an hour. In his 1952 campaign, the “C₂” of the “K₁C₂” slogan referred to corruption and communism, not civil rights. E. Frederick Morrow, who as the Administrative Officer for Special Projects in the White House was the highest ranking African American on Ike’s staff, offered a bleak assessment of his boss’ stance on matters of race. “President Eisenhower’s lukewarm stand on civil rights made me heartsick...his failure to clearly and forthrightly respond to the Negro’s plea for a strong position on civil rights was the greatest cross I had to bear in my eight years in Washington.” The only time the candidate addressed the issue, tellingly, was to speak against segregation in the nation’s capital, which had angered non-white diplomats who could not eat in Washington restaurants with their white counterparts. He called it “a humiliation to this nation [and] this is the kind of loss we can ill afford in today’s world,” and thus the issue became important to him only because of its impact on the nation’s image overseas.⁶

Eisenhower’s political principles reinforced his personal beliefs against using the power of government to enact civil rights laws. As a moderate Republican, he sought to peel away white Democratic voters in the South by insisting that the national government had no authority to enforce racial equality. After the expansion of federal authority that accompanied the New Deal and Fair Deal, he correctly interpreted the national mood as opposing increased federal regulation of the economy and society. Therefore, he saw civil rights as an issue best left to state and local officials. He refused to speak in support of the Brown decision, remained silent during the Montgomery Bus Boycott and after Emmet Till’s brutal lynching, demurred on meeting Montgomery Bus Boycott hero Dr. Martin Luther King, and maintained a laissez-faire attitude toward a weak civil rights bill focused on voting rights. As historian Robert Fredrick Burk asserted in his study of the president’s civil rights initiatives, “The general’s racial opinions, taken together with his anti-statist program designed to maximize private freedom and voluntary cooperation, suggested that he would support only executive actions in civil rights consistent with the goal of limiting federal power.”⁷

With Europe ideologically divided, the sudden death of Joseph Stalin, a bloody stalemate in Korea, an emerging nuclear arms race, and an ongoing

⁶ E. Frederick Morrow, *Black Man in the White House: A Diary of the Eisenhower Years by the Administrative Officer for Special Projects, The White House, 1955-1961* (New York: Coward-McCann, 1963), 299. See also Borstelmann, *The Cold War*, 86-88.

⁷ Robert Fredrick Burk, *The Eisenhower Administration and Black Civil Rights* (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1984), 16.

capitalist-communist race for influence in Asia and Africa, President Eisenhower devoted more time to foreign affairs than domestic policy. He favored a policy of containment while seeking ways in which the United States could expand its power and influence globally at the expense of China and the Soviet Union.⁸ One diplomatic tactic of immense interest to him and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles was the utilization of public diplomacy, including psychological warfare, to advance American positions and influence around the world.⁹

Eisenhower came into the international propaganda battle as it pertained to civil rights with two disadvantages that would become apparent during the Little Rock crisis. One was technical, as Moscow had long used radio in particular to expose both foreign and domestic audiences to its party line. Since 1933, Radio Moscow had broadcast programs externally using shortwave technology, and by 1956, its 147 shortwave and medium range transmitters beamed content to North and South America, the Middle East, Europe, and South Asia. The United States, in contrast, with a history of privately owned and operated media, had to fight public skepticism of governmental information mechanisms whose “naturally” untruthful, biased, or nationalistic content could undermine a free society and uncomfortably remind citizens of communistic or Nazi modes of propaganda.¹⁰ In addition, bureaucratic rivalries between the Department of State, the National Security Council, and the Central Intelligence Agency had stunted the growth and capacity of American post-war propaganda efforts under Truman. Even before he took the oath of office, Eisenhower told publisher and WWII psychological warfare veteran C.D. Jackson to recommend changes for a more unified and effective governmental voice abroad. The result was the United States Information Agency (USIA), created just eight months into Eisenhower’s presidency, with a mandate to “affect the actions of governments of other countries by using communication techniques to influence effective public opinion within those countries, in order to further the aims of U.S. foreign policy.” Despite bureaucratic streamlining and the president’s commitment to public diplomacy, the existence of the private media and the presence of foreign reporters in Little Rock prevented administration control of the pictures, television footage, and print accounts received by people around the world.¹¹

Another key disadvantage was contextual, as the Soviet Union had already repeatedly spotlighted segregation, lynchings, and disenfranchisement to cast

⁸ For an excellent systemic analysis of Eisenhower’s foreign policy, see Robert R. Bowie and Richard H. Immerman, *Waging Peace: How Eisenhower Shaped an Enduring Cold War Strategy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998.) For a broader survey, see Robert Divine, *Eisenhower and the Cold War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981).

⁹ The two best overviews of Eisenhower’s public diplomacy are by Scott Lucas, *Freedom’s War: The American Crusade Against the Soviet Union* (New York: New York University Press, 1999); and Nicholas J. Cull, *The Cold War and the United States Information Agency: American Propaganda and Public Diplomacy, 1945-1989* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).

¹⁰ Lee Kerbel, “The History and Development of Russian Broadcast Propaganda Effort” (National Archives Library College Park, unpublished typescript, 1963), 6.

¹¹ “U.S. Information Agency Strategic Principles” in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954*, vol. II. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1984), 1762.

doubt on American support for and identification with democratic and human rights ideals. Back in 1945, Yale political scientist and communications expert Harold Lasswell had explained the central dilemma that would confront Eisenhower in explaining America's racial sins to foreign peoples of color. "The Russians have a reputation of being remarkably free of racial prejudice," he asserted, "We, on the contrary, are vulnerable in this respect. Abroad we must play up our progress; and at home we must continue to lose racial biases."¹² His prescription partially outlined the steps Eisenhower was willing to take in response to Little Rock. Unwilling due to personal and political reasons to champion civil rights progress at home, but unable to ignore a main theme of Soviet propaganda as the Cold War became a worldwide battle over hearts and minds, the President was forced on the defensive when an unexpected act of civil rights defiance hit the news on 2 September 1957.

At 10:30 p.m. on the night before classes were to begin in Little Rock, Governor Faubus announced on the radio that he had ordered the Arkansas National Guard to prevent nine African American students from desegregating Central High School. This action seemed surprising, given the Little Rock School Board's voluntary passage of a high school desegregation plan, Faubus' own support for integrating public transportation and his reputation as a racial moderate, and a federal court order mandating the admission of students who would become known as the Little Rock Nine. Historians and journalists have speculated as to Faubus' motives. Perhaps he saw an opportunity to obtain the support of white conservatives who had almost defeated him for reelection in 1956 while deflecting criticism for a recent sales tax increase he endorsed (ironically to provide more revenues for schools). Also, he must have believed he had little to fear from Washington. Not only had Eisenhower refused to comment on the Brown decision, but he had refused to intervene in Clinton, Tennessee and Mansfield, Texas in 1956 when organized violence prevented the integration of public schools. What made this situation different, though, was the very *public* challenge to a federal *court order* by a *governor* on an issue that was *already* an Achilles' heel for the United States internationally.¹³

Over the next three weeks, as the Eisenhower and Faubus administrations negotiated a solution that would admit the Little Rock Nine and provide political cover for the governor, the Soviet Union and its ideological allies made a bumper crop for their propaganda grist mill. The central theme, according to White House staff notes, was that "white-faced but black-souled gentlemen commit their dark deeds in Arkansas, Alabama, and other southern states, and then those thugs put on white gloves and mount the rostrum in the U.N. General Assembly, and hold forth about freedom and democracy."¹⁴ A week after Faubus' radio address, the *New*

¹² Cull, *The United States Information Agency*, 29-30.

¹³ David A. Nichols, *A Matter of Justice: Eisenhower and the Beginning of the Civil Rights Revolution* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2007), 170; Anderson, *Little Rock*, 31-52.

¹⁴ Quoted in Kren, *Black Diplomacy*, 101.

York Times reported that the confrontation was getting “wide play” in the USSR, with a U.S. Information Agency source stating, “Let’s face it. This Little Rock story is a tough one for us; a majority of the world’s people are colored.”¹⁵ A few days later, *Pravda* carried a full-page story with pictures of a white mob yelling at an African American schoolgirl.¹⁶ Harry Schwartz, the *New York Times* editorialist and expert on Soviet affairs, remarked that “Soviet and Communist propaganda throughout the world has exploited the disturbances over school integration in Arkansas and other states as a weapon against the United States.”¹⁷ Headlines in Russian and communist-oriented papers in Western Europe spoke in sweeping tones: “Explosion of racist Hysteria in the United States,” “Nigger Go Back Where You Belong: Arkansas Governor Whistles at Federal Government,” and “Shame of Arkansas Envelops American Nation.” Eleanor Roosevelt, fresh from a visit to the USSR, reported that Little Rock had done “so much harm in the world” and that it was almost the only foreign story she read in the Soviet press.¹⁸ These widespread reports provided Little Rock Mayor Woodrow Wilson Mann with a reason to implore the president to intervene. He telegraphed the White House in plaintive tones, stating, “I am pleading with you as President of the United States in the interest of humanity, law and order, and because of democracy world-wide to provide the necessary troops within several hours.”¹⁹

For Eisenhower and Dulles, the crisis was quickly spiraling out of control. With 250 National Guardsmen ringing the school and a governor determined to obstruct federal court orders, the day of reckoning arrived on September 4. In front of a national television audience, the Little Rock Nine ran into a frenzied white mob and armed guardsmen. Elizabeth Eckford, separated from the others due to a communication failure, faced cries of “lynch her!”²⁰ Radio Moscow reported that she had actually been murdered.²¹ Photographs splashed on the front pages of newspapers around the world vividly displayed the dichotomy of white adults, faces twisted in anger, and a young girl with an expression of quiet strength and dignity. Stating the obvious, John Foster Dulles told the *New York Times* that “those pictures would not be helpful to the influence of the United States abroad.”²² Privately, the President worried that “the mouthpieces of Soviet propaganda in Russia and Eastern Europe were blaring out that ‘anti-Negro violence’ in Little Rock was being ‘committed with the clear connivance of the

¹⁵ *New York Times*, 11 September 1957.

¹⁶ *New York Times*, 15 September 1957.

¹⁷ *New York Times*, 29 September 1957.

¹⁸ William DeJong-Lambert, “Rethinking Little Rock: The Cold War Politics of School Integration in the United States.” *European Education*, 38 (Winter 2006-2007), 69.

¹⁹ Burk, *The Eisenhower Administration*, 175.

²⁰ Clayborne Carson et al, *The Eyes on the Prize Civil Rights Reader: Documents, Speeches, and Firsthand Accounts from the Black Freedom Struggle* (New York: Penguin, 1991), 97-103.

²¹ Pipes, *Ike’s Final Battle*, 226-27.

²² *New York Times*, 11 September 1957. For examples of how Little Rock played out in the press in Western Europe, Africa, and Latin America, see Azza Salama Layton, *International Politics and Civil Rights Policies in the United States, 1941-1960* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 122-131.

United States government.”²³ The Justice Department immediately prepared to sue Faubus to demand compliance with federal court orders. The president, though, counseled patience, as he did not want to force a confrontation he might otherwise avoid. Faubus, for his part, was out of options. He alternated between paranoia, accusing the White House of tapping his phone and planning to “take into custody by force the head of a sovereign state”²⁴ and defiance, by draping his actions in the cloak of states’ rights. He realized, though, that he had backed himself into a corner, from which he sought to escape by appealing to Eisenhower for a one-on-one meeting. The two politicians met for twenty minutes in Newport, Rhode Island, where Eisenhower was on vacation. It quickly became apparent, though, that neither man wanted any compromise. Faubus went home, cultivating an image of a small-state governor who had stared down the Commander-in-Chief. He responded to a new federal court order banning him from using the National Guard to enforce segregation by simply withdrawing the troops from the Central High School grounds on 20 September. He awaited a reaction from the White House. “Now begins the crucifixion,” he self-righteously intoned.²⁵

The climax occurred three days later, when another white mob gathered again to prevent the desegregation of Central High. This time, its members failed to prevent eight African American students from slipping into the school, escorted by local police. Once over 1,500 protesters surrounded the school and challenged the security barricades, though, the police withdrew the students for the safety of everyone there. Mayor Mann, deep in despair, contacted Eisenhower and announced that as mob rule had broken out in his city, only federal intervention could prevent violence and uphold the rule of law.²⁶ The next day brought an even more urgent telegram from Mann, this time invoking the international repercussions of the Little Rock crisis. “Situation is out of control and police cannot disperse the mob. I am pleading to you as President of the United States in the interest of humanity, law and order and because of democracy worldwide to provide the necessary federal troops within several hours.”²⁷

Eisenhower’s response directly answered Governor Eugene Talmadge’s rhetorical questions that began this paper. He did care what *Pravda* printed in this case. On Tuesday, September 24, Eisenhower took three main steps to end the confrontation, each of which dramatically illustrated his knowledge of the crisis’ international dimensions. First, while still on vacation in Newport, he signed Executive Order 3024 directing that 1,000 men of the elite 101st Airborne Division travel from the base at Fort Campbell, Kentucky to Central High School. While

²³ Eisenhower, *The White House Years*, 168.

²⁴ Anderson, *Little Rock*, 67.

²⁵ Quoted in Anderson, *Little Rock*, 69.

²⁶ Nichols, *A Matter of Justice*, 184-191; Anderson, *Little Rock*, 69-78; Pipes, *Ike’s Final Battle*, 234-239.

²⁷ Mann to Eisenhower, September 24, 1957, accessed 30 January, 2011, http://www.eisenhower.archives.gov/Research/Digital_Documents/LittleRock/New%20PDFs/Mann_to_DDE_92457.pdf.

contemplating being the first president since Reconstruction to impose martial law on part of the South, he recalled wondering what message his action might send. “It will be a sad day for this country—both at home and abroad—if school children can safely attend their classes only under the protection of armed guards,” he wrote in his memoirs.²⁸ Secondly, he flew back to the White House immediately to deliver a nationally televised speech that night to explain his decision. After outlining a draft on the plane and consulting with Secretary of State Dulles, the Commander-in-Chief hit the airwaves in an appropriately somber grey single-breasted suit. He first defended the deployment as a response to a small group of extremists who refused to obey a valid court order (though he deliberately left open the question of whether he agreed with it). He then launched into a spirited explanation of the diplomatic reasons that impelled him to act:

It would be difficult to exaggerate the harm that is being done to the prestige and influence, and indeed to the safety, of our nation and the world. Our enemies are gloating over this incident and using it to misrepresent our whole nation. We are portrayed as a violator of those standards of conduct which the people of the world united to proclaim in the Charter of the United Nations. There they affirmed “faith in fundamental human rights” and “in the dignity and worth of the human person” and they did so “without distinction as to race, sex, language of religion.”²⁹

To ensure a wide distribution of the president’s message, the USIA translated it into 43 languages for foreign newspapers and for broadcasting over the Voice of America’s radio transmission network.

With the arrival of soldiers, Little Rock faded from national and international headlines. Remnants of the 101st stayed in the city for two months, but their presence did not prevent the Little Rock Nine from enduring verbal and physical abuse by some of their white classmates. Faubus, interpreting the tumultuousness as a result of forced integration, successfully closed all four public high schools for a year while planning to reopen them as segregated private academies. His move failed before the Supreme Court,³⁰ and a year later, Central High School opened again with an integrated student body. On 12 August 1959, three African American students walked through its front door, but only after police and firefighters had dispersed a crowd of 250 protesters.³¹

²⁸ Eisenhower, *The White House Years*, 169.

²⁹ Press release of “Text of the Address by the President,” September 24, 1957, accessed 30 January 2011, http://www.eisenhower.archives.gov/Research/Digital_Documents/LittleRock/New%20PDFs/Press_release_92457.pdf.

³⁰ *Cooper v. Aaron*, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).

³¹ For a first-hand account of the crisis by one of the Little Rock Nine, see Terrence J. Roberts, “Fear is Portable” in *President Dwight D. Eisenhower and Civil Rights* (Washington, D.C.: The Eisenhower World Affairs Institute, 2000), 10-24.

To offset the damage to America's image abroad, Eisenhower turned to public relations and marketing techniques. By the late 1950s, both Moscow and Washington had inked a series of agreements that provided for mutual exhibitions and cultural exchanges. High on the priority list were demonstrations of American progress in harmonizing race relations. Tours by jazz musicians, USIA press releases and in-depth biographies highlighting African American celebrities, as well as construction of a display on the nation's racial status quo entitled "Unfinished Business" at the 1958 World's Fair were a few aspects of this marketing offensive.³²

Ultimately, though, it was not up to the federal government to determine the timetable for civil rights based in part on diplomatic judgments and foreign pressures. Civil rights activists soon led the charge, and they too would often use arguments based on Cold War logic. As Gunnar Myrdal concluded in *An American Dilemma*, his monumental 1944 analysis of American racial sociology: "If America should allow its own deepest convictions, its well-being at home would be increased directly. At the same time America's prestige and power abroad would rise immensely *America is free to choose whether the Negro shall remain her liability or become her opportunity.*"³³ The Little Rock crisis was part of this national decision-making process that would continue into a new decade with a new president, new civil rights activists, and a New Frontier in diplomacy that would forge a consensus in favor of desegregation.

³² For more information on the Eisenhower administration's exhibitions, see Walter Hixson, *Parting the Curtain: Propaganda, Culture, and the Cold War, 1945-1961* (New York: St Martin's Griffin, 1998); and Robert H. Haddow, *Pavilions of Plenty: Exhibiting American Culture Abroad in the 1950s* (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1997).

³³ Gunnar Myrdal, *An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1944), 1021. Italics in the original.

Into The Wilderness: Bishop Sheen's Crusade during World War II

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Bishop Fulton J. Sheen (1895-1979), a prominent member of the Catholic Hierarchy during the Cold War, effectively used radio and later the new medium of television to attract millions of Americans to his crusade against communism. Sheen used the Bible and Christian theology to condemn communism on *The Catholic Hour* radio program in the 1930s and continued to crusade against communism during World War II despite the fact that the United States was allied with the Soviet Union. In the late 1940s and into the 1950s Sheen shifted to television with his own prime time show, *Life is Worth Living*. He called on Jews and Protestants to join together to oppose the threat that communism posed to America and the West. His show enjoyed widespread popularity and he won an Emmy for outstanding television Personality in 1951. Although Sheen's popularity was arguably higher than that of any other religious figure, his strident anti-communism and Cold War role has been largely forgotten. In fact little has been published on Sheen's life in general.¹

As World War II engulfed Europe, Sheen proclaimed that communism represented a grave threat to the world and that if it was not stopped it would destroy the United States. Sheen condemned the war in Europe and the actions of Adolph Hitler and Benito Mussolini but his major concern was always Joseph Stalin and communism. Like many politicians who had advocated appeasement of Germany because it would serve as a bulwark against communism, Sheen hoped that Hitler and Stalin would begin hostilities and destroy each other.² After the United States entered World War II and joined with the Soviet Union against fascism, Sheen continued to attack communism. He later claimed that his radio broadcasts were censored when he said anything that might be considered derogatory toward the USSR and the Great Alliance of the United States, Great Britain, and the USSR. His anti-communism did not receive national media attention during the war and he was forced to take his crusade to smaller audiences who would be receptive to it. When Sheen attacked communism, it was often in Catholic publications or before sympathetic Catholic audiences, where he could condemn Stalin and

¹ Until recently the main published works on Sheen were: D.P. Noonan, *The Passion of Fulton J. Sheen* (New York: Dodd Mead, 1972) and Sheen's posthumous biography *Treasure in Clay* (San Francisco: Ignatius Books, 1980). In 2001, Thomas Reeves published the first full-length biography of Sheen since Noonan's work, but he does not attempt to analyze Sheen's role in the Cold War. Thomas C. Reeves, *The Life and Times of Fulton J. Sheen* (San Francisco: Encounter Books, 2001). Kathleen Field's dissertation "Bishop Fulton J. Sheen: An American Catholic Response to the Twentieth Century" (Ph.D. diss., University of Notre Dame, 1988) attempted to locate Sheen's place in the history of American Catholicism but does not focus on his Anti-communism. Anthony Smith's "American Catholicism and the Construction of a Public Tradition, 1932-1962" (Ph.D. diss., University of Minnesota, 1995) focuses on those figures as representatives of American Public perceptions of Catholicism.

² For a discussion of appeasement see Keith Robbins, *Appeasement*, (Malden Ma: Blackwell Publishers, 1997).

the Soviet Union without fear of censorship. Sheen continued to be vehemently opposed to communism and near the end of World War II he warned that Russia would take control of Eastern Europe. He was ignored until the beginning of the Cold War when he once again gained national and international attention for his views on communism.

Sheen predicted that events in Europe would bring about a renewed interest in Christianity. The Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact would lead the American intelligentsia toward the church because of their disillusionment with the Soviet Union.³ Sheen argued that an increase in the number of letters he received showed more interest in religion. He claimed that his correspondence had grown from an average of one thousand letters a week to over six thousand a day. He also urged Catholics to be more open to those individuals who might be seeking information on Catholic doctrine, and he declared his intention of personally giving instruction on the church to anyone that requested it. Sheen assured his audience that the war in Europe would not bring about the end of civilization but he did argue “It is not possible to save democracy apart from Christianity and religion and Christianity must be saved first.”⁴ In Sheen’s mind, democracy and Christianity were linked together because Christianity promoted the idea of freedom, which was the basis of democracy. Thus Christianity must be preserved in order to keep democracy. He continually demonstrated his devotion to Christianity and his faith and contended that it could improve the world and even preserve democracy.

The advent of World War II led Sheen to write a number of books and articles to reassure Americans that God was in control of the universe. After partitioning Poland between itself and the USSR in the fall of 1939, Germany took Denmark and Norway in the spring of 1941. Hitler then turned his attention to the Low Countries, where German armies soon overran Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Belgium. France and Great Britain tried to stem the German advance but France fell in June 1940. Great Britain remained at war but lost the majority of its weapons, tanks, and artillery when it was forced to evacuate its army from the port of Dunkirk before the fall of France. It fought an air war with Germany during the autumn of 1940 which some feared was the precursor of a Nazi invasion of the British Isles. The war had not directly affected America except for Lend-Lease but many Americans were concerned and Sheen wanted them to know that Christianity would triumph over evil.

In the first of many publications, Sheen attempted to set the war in Europe within a theological context by proclaiming it a judgment from God.⁵ He wrote that there were two reasons for war in the eyes of God. War came in the name of God or from the hand of God. Wars were fought either to further the cause of the Kingdom of

³ “Sheen Calls War A Spur to Religion,” *New York Times*, 12 February 1940, 12.

⁴ “Prelate Sees Bright Future: Msgr. Sheen Says Conflict will Not End Civilization,” *The Edgecliff*, 6 June 1940.

⁵ Fulton J. Sheen, *Whence Come Wars* (New York: Sheed & Ward, 1940).

God or they came because God was displeased with humankind because they had disobeyed him. The war then raging in Europe was from the hand of God because the modern world had forsaken the morality accepted in Christian Europe since the Middle Ages. He chastised Americans for condemning Nazism for inflicting persecution on the Jews while not condemning Soviet Russia for taking away religious rights. Sheen was not overtly anti-Semitic but his remarks could be taken as demonstrating his apathy to the treatment of the Jewish people in Germany. However, it was his fixation with the danger that communism represented to Christianity which led him to make statements of that nature. He remained firmly convinced that Americans were ignoring the real risk to their country by being distracted by the atrocities of Hitler.

Sheen continued to explore the relationship between religion and government when he argued that Western Civilization had banished religion from public affairs and had consequently become anti-religious.⁶ He contended that men had rejected what he termed God-given true liberty in order to embrace a false “liberty of indifference”⁷ to God. This liberty of indifference manifested itself in a variety of ways.⁸

Sheen wanted to see a resurgence of God ordained patriotism in the United States to counterbalance the growing influence of communism in world affairs. Sheen was so obsessed with the threat of communism that he contended it should be more feared than fascism. He was so focused on communism that he virtually ignored the actions of Adolph Hitler and Benito Mussolini. In early 1940, he went so far as to suggest that communist influence in Nazi Germany should be a major concern for the United States. He alleged that the Moscow government had German citizens who he referred to as “Stalin’s fifth column,”⁹ working to bring a communist government to power in that country. Even in light of Hitler’s conquest of Poland and the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact of the previous year, communism still remained the major enemy of the West in Sheen’s view. Sheen had earlier condemned Stalin for the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact of 1939. Shortly before the outbreak of World War II, Sheen had predicted that as “Pilate and Herod were enemies and became friends over the bleeding body of Christ, so one day communism and Nazism which are now enemies will become friends over the bleeding body of Poland.”¹⁰ Stalin’s agreement with Hitler concerning Poland and Eastern Europe allowed the Nazis to invade Poland without fear of interference. Sheen ignored the fact that the Soviet Union signed a pact with Germany only

⁶ Fulton J. Sheen, *Freedom Under God* (Milwaukee: Bruce Publishing, 1940).

⁷ *Ibid.*, 12.

⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹ “How Strong Are the German Communists: Stalin’s Fifth Column in Germany,” *The Tablet*, 20 January 1940.

¹⁰ *Sheen, Treasure in Clay*, 88.

when negotiations with the Western powers failed.¹¹ He once again showed his implacable antagonism to communism by assuming that the Soviet Union bore more of the blame for the Non-Aggression Pact and the war than Germany.

In the early 1940s, Sheen's myopic view of communism led him to warn that the war going on in Europe was nothing in comparison to what would come if the United States befriended the Soviet Union.¹² At this point, the Soviet Union and Germany were still officially observing the Non-Aggression Pact. He charged that "Russia... brought on the conflict in Europe hurling nations at each other in a death struggle that will allow no victor but Russia which will feed on a war torn continent and over-run it."¹³ He also condemned Germany for bombing a shrine in Czestochowa, Poland. Sheen contended that:

we live in a day of disintegrating culture. . . . Capitalism in its present form will not survive. False liberalism will not live. Education alienated from religion will perish. These changes will come not from outside but from within men. Corruption comes from the heart in a sort of spiritual fifth column activity.¹⁴

In a commencement speech at Notre Dame University in June 1941, Sheen warned that America must prioritize what was worth saving in a world beset by crisis.¹⁵ He contended that in times of crisis there is a tendency to try to save things that are not important. America faced with the threat of war would seek to preserve its way of life exactly as it existed. Sheen told the graduates that certain portions of the American way of life should be jettisoned as unproductive to the best interests of the country. He strongly recommended that this country let perish a "monopolistic capitalism" that resulted in most of the wealth being under the control of a small minority. The present education system that excluded religion and morality should be done away. The American legal system should be changed because it maintained that the state was the source of individual rights, and often trampled on those same rights. He attacked the social system that promoted divorce and in Sheen's view led to the destruction of international treaties. America needed to take time and prioritize what was really important and what would ultimately offer the greatest benefit to the country. In Sheen's view only a return to a society based on Christian principles was worth considering.

By the autumn of 1941, Sheen came to accept the idea that America would eventually be drawn into the war in Europe, but he warned that it should do

¹¹ French and British envoys were in Moscow to talk about the three countries joining forces. Nikita Khrushchev in his memoirs argued that Stalin knew the British and French were only trying to turn Hitler against the Soviet Union rather than negotiate a real alliance. (Nikita Khrushchev, *Khrushchev Remembers* [Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1970], 128). For a complete discussion of these negotiations see Michael Jabara Carley, *1939: The Alliance That Never Was and the Coming of World War II* (Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1999).

¹² "Sheen Denounces Soviet-U. S. Amity" *New York Times*, 8 December 1940, 61.

¹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵ The speech was given on June 1, 1941. Fulton J. Sheen, "The Decline of Patriotism," *Vital Speeches* 7 (1 August 1941) 623-625.

so on its own terms. He vehemently argued that any aid sent to Russia should have certain conditions attached. When Hitler attacked the Soviet Union in June 1941, bringing it into the war, debate ensued in the government and among the American people on whether to extend Lend Lease aid to the communist regime. An opinion poll in August 1941 showed only 38 per cent of the American people were in favor of sending aid to Russia. By September, Roosevelt was desperately seeking support from American Catholics and had asked the Pope to declare that aiding Russia through lend-lease would not be supporting communism.¹⁶ Sheen continued to argue that if aid were given to the Soviet Union conditions must be attached to make sure that it did not in any way help in the spread of communism.

As the subject of aid to the Soviets was being debated, Sheen declared that any aid should be contingent upon the USSR accepting conditions that would ultimately bring about the end of communism.¹⁷ He argued that this country must force the Moscow government to give religious freedom to its people and release religious prisoners. Sheen assumed that the Soviets would be so desperate for American aid that they could be forced to accept any conditions to obtain it. Sheen contended that America should prove that “we are aiding the Russian people and not communism, by driving all Communists out of the United States,” through deporting them.¹⁸ He did not specify where we would send them, since he argued that we needed to work to bring about the end of communism in the Soviet Union, that country would not need any additional communists. He also stipulated that the Soviet Union should be warned that it would have no place in the Council of Nations after the war if it still had a communistic government. The United States had a moral imperative to use its economic power in the form of military aid to force the Soviet Union to give up communism.

In October, Sheen reported that his list of conditions for aid to Russia had been sent to President Roosevelt.¹⁹ Sheen had been angered by statements Roosevelt made in September that suggested that Russia had the same kind of religious freedom, as did the United States. In fact, the Roosevelt administration had been urging the Soviet Union to assure the United States that it did have religious freedom in order to placate religious leaders in this country and ease their opposition to lend-lease aid.²⁰ Sheen supplied statistics to both the *Washington-Times Herald* and the *New York Daily News* that proved religious freedom in the Soviet Union was a sham. Both newspapers published articles on October 4 that lauded Sheen for exposing this fraud. Sheen continued to demand his three conditions for aid and condemned Roosevelt for his remarks on religious freedom right up to the time of Pearl Harbor.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 296.

¹⁷ “Msgr. Sheen Asks Red Guarantees,” *Philadelphia Record*, 27 September 1941.

¹⁸ “Msgr. Sheen Asks Red guarantees.”

²⁰ “Msgr. Sheen Urges F.D.R.,” *Novena Notes*, 24 October 1941.

²⁰ Roosevelt knew that Russia did not have religious freedom but he wanted Congress to extend lend-lease to Russia to keep it in the war against Hitler until such time as the United States might join the war. Dallek, 296-299.

Sheen later offered more details about his conditions for aid to the USSR in a Catholic publication.²¹ He was still reacting to remarks that Roosevelt had made about the necessity of aiding the Soviet Union. He used Roosevelt's analogy on aid to the Soviets about lending a neighbor a fire hose to put out a fire. Sheen argued that in that situation one might not ask about your neighbor's religious beliefs but one would be concerned if the neighbor had helped start the fire. He contended that the Soviet Union had helped start the war in Europe by its actions in Poland, Finland, Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania and therefore should not be trusted. Sheen stated the same conditions for aid to the Soviet Union that he had previously given, and he said that if America did not impose the conditions it would be favoring one form of "barbarism" over another. He also warned his readers to remember that there was a difference between communism and the Russian people and that good Catholics should be prepared to restore Russia to its place among Christian nations should the war lead to the end of communism.

In November 1941 with German troops near Moscow, Sheen finally attacked what he called "Nazi paganism" and declared that the United States must destroy it.²² Sheen maintained that even though Hitler claimed he was trying to destroy communism, that his actual goal was the conquest of Russian territory. Sheen declared that Hitler might set up a puppet Christian state in former Soviet territory but it would only be for propaganda purposes because he would rid the world of Christianity if it were within his power. Sheen argued that the best outcome in the present conflict would be, "Have Stalin swallow Hitler and have him choke to death."²³ A total Soviet victory would be the worst outcome of the war. He warned those who promoted aid for the USSR did so for one of three reasons. They believed that Nazism represented a greater threat than communism or they were swayed either by Soviet propaganda or by a group of American journalists that were promoting Stalin as a "great guy." These lies led to confusion in the United States on the aid question. Sheen was so obsessed with the dangers of communism that he still worried more about the threat it presented to the world while German troops occupied most of the eastern Soviet Union and the ultimate survival of that country was in question. He wanted to make sure that even if America did aid the Soviet Union, the American people would not forget the horrors of the communist regime.

Sheen found himself in a difficult situation once the United States entered World War II as an ally of the Soviet Union. He wanted to continue his crusade against communism, but he did not want to appear disloyal to the United States. Sheen claimed that his radio broadcasts were carefully monitored, and if he suggested that the USSR was anything but a democracy, his microphone would be shut off.

²¹ Fulton J. Sheen, "Soviet Russia May be Helped but Russia Must Be Reformed," *America*, 18 October 1941, 33-35.

²² "Mgr. Sheen Says Nazi Paganism Menaces World Christianity," *New York Times*, 17 November 1941, 3.

²³ *Ibid.*

The Roosevelt administration had rejected outright censorship of the press during the war as unworkable, but it did seek to influence the media through “a system of voluntary restraint coupled with a government policy of withholding sensitive information at the source. It encouraged the media to portray the Soviets in a positive manner throughout the war.”²⁴

In his autobiography, Sheen offered only one illustration of how he was censored during the war. He intended to refer to Poland as being crucified between two thieves as Jesus had been. One thief was Nazi Germany and the other the Soviet Union. When Sheen submitted his manuscript prior to broadcast, the Bishop’s Conference asked him not to refer to America’s ally as a thief. Sheen suggested tongue in cheek that perhaps he could use the line if he referred to Russia as the “good thief.”²⁵ This incident which Sheen later referred to as censorship did not come directly from the government but from the Bishop’s Conference of the Catholic Church. Once the United States entered the war, the Bishop’s Conference wanted to emphasize Catholics’ patriotism and their support for the war effort.²⁶ The bishops did not want the growing acceptance of Catholics in the American mainstream to be stopped. Although Sheen did not openly defy the bishops, he still continued his crusade against communism whenever possible.

During the war, Sheen strongly objected to the favorable treatment that the American media gave the Soviet Union and Stalin. He charged that Stalin “had been sold to the American people” in books, in magazines, on radio, and in the movies. Sheen condemned the popular pro-Russian alliance film, *Mission to Moscow*. In fact, that film had been made after President Roosevelt made a phone call to the head of Warner Brother’s studio and asked him to consider making a movie based on the pro-Soviet memoir of journalist Walter Duranty.²⁷ Sheen agreed with those that felt this film that glorified the Stalin regime might be more appropriately be entitled *Submission to Moscow*.²⁸ Sheen was probably angered also by the fact that Warner Brothers spent over two hundred thousand dollars to buy advertising space in newspapers, particularly religious publications.²⁹ The studio hoped to entice Jews, Protestants, and Catholics to the movie, which portrayed the Soviet leadership as being trustworthy. To support his position, Sheen returned to his familiar theme of a lack of freedom of religion in Russia as another indication that Stalin could not be trusted.

²⁴ Richard W. Steele, *Propaganda in an Open Society: The Roosevelt Administration and the Media, 1933-41* (Westport Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1985), 109.

²⁵ Sheen, *Treasure in Clay*, 88.

²⁶ George Flynn in *Roosevelt and Romanism: Catholics and American Diplomacy, 1937-1945* (Westport Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1976) argued that when Germany attacked the Soviet Union in June 1941, 65% of Catholics in the United States supported total victory by the Russians while some prominent Catholics including Sheen continued to be outspoken against the Soviet Union. However, American involvement in the war led the Bishops Conference to promote the idea of Catholic loyalty to the war effort. (Flynn, 150-1, 195-6).

²⁷ Colin Shindler, *Hollywood Goes to War: Films and American Society 1939-1952* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1979), 57-59.

²⁸ Flynn, 151.

²⁹ Shindler, 58.

After the Japanese attacked the United States fleet at Pearl Harbor in December 1941, Sheen began a series of radio addresses on *The Catholic Hour* entitled "Peace,"³⁰ in which he sought to comfort America at war. He asked Americans of all faiths to spend an hour each day in prayer. In this series, he returned to some familiar themes, such as why God did not stop the war.³¹ He reiterated his earlier arguments that for God to stop the war would be to deprive man of his freedom of choice. He tried to reassure his listeners that an all-powerful God could stop the war but chose not to do so. Sheen also emphasized that the decline of Western Civilization and morals as evidenced by the three dictators, Hitler, Mussolini, and Stalin, had helped bring about the war.

After American entry into World War II, Sheen reacted to criticism of the Pope.³² Pius XII, who had been elected Pope just months before the German invasion of Poland, was being severely criticized for his failure to condemn Mussolini and Hitler. Even today, Pius XII's attitude toward the fascist dictators continues to generate controversy. A recent book by John Cornwell accuses the Pontiff of not condemning Nazi regime because he believed that the allies could not win the war.³³ According to Cornwall, Pius XII feared communism much more than fascism and remained silent even during the Nazi holocaust to keep from antagonizing Hitler. Cornwell based his book on published Vatican documents but many Catholic publications have criticized his interpretation.³⁴

Sheen's own softness on fascism during the war probably derived from the Pope's ambiguity about fascism. He argued in defense of the Pontiff that he could only "impose penalties on those persons who are members of the Church and obviously neither of them is."³⁵ He further asserted that the church condemned the philosophies represented by Mussolini and Hitler, fascism and Nazism respectively. He also included communism for good measure. Here again, Sheen continued to emphasize that one could not condemn Hitler and Mussolini without including the communist dictator, Stalin. However, in these broadcasts, Sheen did lighten his anti-Communist rhetoric to more indirect condemnations of the Soviet Union. Throughout this series he focused on Hitler and Mussolini but always managed to include communism. In a March 1942 Lenten service, Sheen predicted that Hitler would eventually commit suicide. He argued that Hitler would do this because he was a "Judas" who had betrayed France and Czechoslovakia as surely as Judas

³⁰ He began the series on 21 December 1941 and ended on 3 April 1942. The National Council of Catholic Men who sponsored the broadcasts later published them in book form.

³¹ Fulton J. Sheen, "The Divine Cost of Stopping This War," originally broadcast 8 March 1942 on *The Catholic Hour*, reprinted in *Peace*, published by the National Council of Catholic Men.

³² Fulton J. Sheen, "Papacy and Peace," originally broadcast, 8 February 1942 on *The Catholic Hour*.

³³ John Cornwell, *Hitler's Pope: the Secret History of Pius XII* (New York: Viking, 1999).

³⁴ The *National Catholic Reporter* printed excerpts from an October 8, 1999 Vatican news conference where Father Pierre Blet, the leading Vatican historian, called Cornwell's ideas "laughable as history." ("Vatican Historian Comes to Pius XII's Defense," *National Catholic Reporter*, 22 October 1999, 14.) Vincent Lapomarda also heavily criticized Cornwell in his review of the book in *The Catholic Historical Review*, January 2000, 154.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 72.

Iscairiot had betrayed Jesus to be crucified.³⁶ His prediction came true on 20 April 1945, not because Hitler felt guilty, as Sheen suggested, but because Soviet troops were about to take Berlin.

Sheen later came to the Pope's defense in early 1944 when the Soviet newspaper *Izvestia* called Pius pro-fascist. Sheen defended the Vatican in an article in the *Tablet* calling the Soviet attack unwarranted. It came about because Russia lacked freedom of the press and freedom of religion. He contended that the Vatican had issued encyclicals that condemned fascism on several different occasions. Sheen blasted Russia for helping fascism. He wrote:

no country in the world has contributed as much to Fascism as Russia. for it was only through the Soviets giving the Nazis the green light in the pact of 1939 that the Nazis were able to extend their form of fascism all over Europe.³⁷

Sheen asserted that "fascism is really communism in its dotage, communism is the Asiatic form of Fascism."³⁸ He warned that Russia would attempt to control religion in Europe because they would have control in Europe after the war. Therefore, they had attacked the Vatican to discredit it in European affairs. Sheen concluded by suggesting that with this attack on the Vatican, Americans would realize that Stalin "is not a cross between George Washington and Sir Galahad."³⁹ Sheen published his defense in a Catholic publication because he believed that the national media was unwilling to publish anything derogatory about the Soviet Union.

Sheen never paid as much attention to the war in the Pacific against Japan as he did to the European conflict. Sheen's Eurocentric view and his fixation on Western Civilization left him with little interest in Asian affairs. The fact that Europe was home to the Vatican and contained more Catholics than did Asia also contributed to his lack of interest in that area of the world. In 1943, Sheen did assail the United States government for naively trusting Japan before the war began.⁴⁰ Even after World War II when a communist government came to power in China, he only sporadically focused his attention on that part of the world.

Sheen never abandoned his anti-communism and he attacked whenever he found a sympathetic audience.⁴¹ He argued in 1943 that the world stood at the threshold of "the last chance that Western Civilization will have to save the world." The degeneration of Western Civilization led to the present regimes in

³⁶ "Suicide of Hitler Is Seen By Sheen," *New York Times*, 9 March 1942, 16.

³⁷ "Attack by *Izvestia* on Vatican answered by Monsignor Sheen," *The Tablet*, 5 February 1944.

³⁸ *Ibid.*

³⁹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁰ Even in this instance, Sheen is not really addressing the Pacific war; he is arguing that the West must be careful to not naively trust nations like they did Japan before the war. This was once again a veiled warning against trusting the Soviets. "Our 'Naïve Trust in Japan' is Assailed by Sheen as 'False Optimism' of the West," *New York Times*, 15 March 1943, 9.

⁴¹ A transcript of the speech was sent to Sheen in May 1943 for him to edit before it was entered into printed proceedings. J.H. Leroy Chambers, Chairman 180th District Conference to Fulton J. Sheen, Catholic University. A copy is located in the Sheen Archives, St. Bernard's Seminary, Rochester, New York.

Russia, Germany, and Japan. Sheen outlined the history of Russia from the time that Christianity came to Russia to his own time. He argued that since Russia received its Christianity from Constantinople rather than Rome, it became lost to Western Civilization until the time of Peter the Great. He wanted to illustrate that communism came to Russia because it did not have the advantages of the Roman Catholicism during its formation.

Sheen later turned from communism, saying he had no time to talk about the political war that Russia was waging against its allies and then gave a history of how Western Civilization had failed both Japan and Germany. In the case of Germany, he went back to the time of the Roman Empire. He also stated that Germany should have been broken apart at the end of World War I and he hoped that America would subdue Germany at the end of the war then being fought. At the end of his speech, he charged that the United States had a “moral obligation” to lead the world in returning to the traditional religious ideas upon which Western Civilization had been built.

In November 1943, Sheen reacted strongly to statements made at the Quebec Conference in which representatives from Great Britain, the United States, and other countries met to discuss war strategy.⁴² Sheen took issue with a speech made at the conference by Bredan Bracken, the British Minister of Information, who claimed that the Soviet Union had never broken its word. Sheen argued that the USSR had broken their word in many treaties in the last fourteen years, beginning with the Kellogg Pact of 1928, wherein the signers had agreed not to use war as an instrument of international policy.⁴³ He contended that Russia had broken treaties with all of the nations of Eastern Europe that it now occupied and that the United States was praising Russia because it was an ally and unity was necessary among allies. However, he declared that:

when such unity is born of blindness to historical fact, there lurks within it a grave psychological danger, namely appeasement. Are we not already beginning to take the same attitude toward Moscow that we took at Munich in 1938? Could it be possible that as one demand after another was granted to Hitler to stop war, so now Stalin's demands will be satisfied to prevent a conflict with him?⁴⁴

Sheen did suggest that the United States and Great Britain would appease Stalin by allowing him to keep the Baltic States of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, which he had overrun in 1939. Sheen also asked, “As Chamberlain was condemned for going to the first Munich, will a day come when newer Chamberlains will

⁴² Fulton J. Sheen, “Moscow-The Second Munich,” *The Sign*, 23 November 1943, 197.

⁴³ Sheen had argued after the signing of the pact that disarmament would not assure peace but would only limit weapons. To ensure peace, a moral change was necessary in the souls of men to have them seek out peace. “Arms Cut Viewed as War Measure,” *New York Times*, 9 December 1929, 40.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

be condemned for going to Moscow?" Sheen brought out a point that would be argued in the early days of the Cold War. Did the United States allow the Soviet Union to have too much latitude in Eastern Europe? Others would contend later that President Roosevelt had "sold out" to Stalin at the February 1945 Yalta Conference.⁴⁶ Sheen and others would compare it to Joseph Chamberlain, the British Prime Minister in 1938, attempting to deal with Hitler at the Munich Conference.⁴⁷ Sheen's antagonism toward communism led him to predict what many have since argued actually occurred at the Yalta Conference. He was right about this.

Sheen also expressed his apprehension about what might happen after the war in Germany when he suggested that the Soviet Union might ally with the Nazi movement after Hitler had been defeated. The combined forces would then turn on the West. He revealed that a meeting of communist agitators from a number of nations had been held in Mexico City in November 1941. They were told that while Hitlerism was the major enemy, they should make a distinction between Hitlerism and Nazism, because Nazism might aid them in destroying the United States and Great Britain after the war. Sheen did not reveal the source of his information, but in the Sheen Archives there are typewritten pages of the minutes of that meeting.⁴⁸ Sheen often referred to documents that he had acquired which revealed the inner workings of the communists. He used the 1941 meeting as another example of how Stalin could not be trusted and to demonstrate that his ultimate goal was the destruction of his capitalist allies.

Sheen continued to be concerned about the post-war future of Eastern Europe, particularly Catholic Poland, as the war progressed. In January 1944 with Soviet troops pushing the German army backward toward their homeland, he predicted that the USSR would dominate Eastern Europe after the war. He also claimed that unless the United States stood up to the Soviet Union on the issue of freedom in post-war Poland, that area would face "barbarism" for twenty-five years.⁴⁹ He further predicted that the Soviets would "own Europe" after the war and control the East. The United States must face its moral obligation to keep Poland from Soviet control. In March, Sheen contended that World War III would grip the world twenty-five years after the end of the present conflict.⁵⁰ That war would

⁴⁶ According to Robert Dallek, Roosevelt wanted to come to some kind of understanding with Stalin about what would happen in Europe after the war as well as to secure Russian help against Japan. Some have accused Roosevelt of going too far to placate Stalin or perhaps being too ill to effectively deal with the Soviet dictator. (Dallek, 506-525).

⁴⁷ The Munich Conference took place in Munich, Germany, during October 1938. Chamberlain met with Hitler and other European leaders to discuss Hitler's claims to the Sudeten region of Czechoslovakia. Because Hitler later broke the agreement and took over all of the country, Chamberlain was viewed as having given in too much to Hitler. (Synder, 56-57).

⁴⁸ Typewritten report entitled "The Meeting of the Central Bureau of the Third International" held November 16-19, 1941. There is no explanation of how Sheen obtained it, but at the top of the first page is a notation, "how does it operate document." Fulton J. Sheen Archives, St. Bernard Institute, Rochester, New York.

⁴⁹ "Justice for Poland Demanded by Sheen," *New York Times*, 24 January 1944, 11.

⁵⁰ "Mgr. Sheen Sees Future as Dark," *New York Times*, 6 March 1944, 22.

occur because religion would no longer be tolerated in Europe and America that would complete the degeneration of Western Civilization from within.

Sheen also warned the Allied troops in Italy that they should not bomb the Vatican lest they bring the judgment of God upon them. He expressed this sentiment as American and British troops fought their way up the Italian Peninsula. Mussolini's regime collapsed and in September 1943, the new government accepted unconditional surrender. However, German troops took control of northern Italy and reinstalled Mussolini in a puppet government. Heavy fighting continued as the allied troops were forced to fight their way slowly against heavy German opposition. Sheen continued to warn the allied forces not to bomb Rome because it would not fulfill any military objective.⁵¹ He also predicted that if we did bomb Rome this country would suffer either in the war or through pestilence. Sheen was more concerned about the fate of the Vatican than a quick allied victory that might have saved lives.

Throughout World War II, Sheen continued his crusade against communism despite the Pro-Soviet attitude adopted by the American government and many of its citizens. He could not speak out on his radio broadcasts as he had before the war, but whenever possible, he continued to warn of the dangers of communism. He had no use for the fascist dictators, but he felt that Americans were being deceived about the Soviet Union because of the alliance between the United States and the Soviet Union. Sheen argued that conditions should be attached to any aid that was sent to Russia.

Sheen's anti-Communist message was largely ignored during the war. It appeared in print only in Catholic publications. He also warned audiences of the dangers of communism and the Soviet Union when he was not on the radio. Sheen's time "in the wilderness" came to an end after the war when the Cold War led to a reassessment of communism and the Soviet Union in this country. The national media ignored Sheen's anti-communism during the war since it went against the pro-Soviet portrayal that the government endorsed during the war to promote the alliance with the Soviet Union. After the war when the United States government began to question Soviet intentions in Europe and elsewhere, Sheen's anti-Communist views began to receive far more attention.

⁵¹ "Unveiling of Painting to be Given to Holy Father," *New York Times*, 27 March 1944, 15.

New Deal or Raw Deal? African American Employment and the Civilian Conservation Corps

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This paper examines African American participation in the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC) and determines if the CCC had any effect on their employment. The CCC was one of the largest programs created from New Deal legislation, and has often been described as a program that gave people work and compensation for their work, along with vocational skills and a general education. While this description is correct, it is correct only in the most abstract and general sense, and ignores key behaviors of the program's administrators which, while not built into the program's design, were nonetheless inherent in the program's daily operation, and which were contrary to the program's stated goals.

Those stated goals were several. First, the CCC employed people who lost their jobs due to the Great Depression, and compensated them for work done to preserve the landscape not only in national parks but also for cities and small towns. Second, the CCC functioned as an educational organization, which taught enrollees skills that would make them more useful to employers after their jobs with the CCC ended. Third, the CCC functioned as a civic organization that, at least according to Franklin Delano Roosevelt, taught enrollees personal discipline and through their work gave them an appreciation for nature.

These goals were perverted and ignored almost from the program's beginning. Several factors acted together to pervert the program's goals: racism, political convenience, and presidential fiat, in particular against African American CCC enrollees. With some exceptions detailed herein, African Americans faced a paradox: an openly racist program which denied them work and pay in favor of white counterparts, yet within an organization created to give everyone well-paid, honest work. The CCC was in practice not run in accordance with any national law, but subject to state and local customs and mores. With few exceptions, the CCC operated on racist and prejudicial principles.

The Creation of the Civilian Conservation Corps

The Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC) creation has many roots. The stock market crash of 1929 left millions out of work, and as the Great Depression continued, the government grew in size. In this expansion the CCC was created, and the idea of an agency with the deliberate purpose of land conservation, as well as education and discipline, was born of several smaller programs, all founded or directed by Franklin Delano Roosevelt (FDR).

The first and smallest program that FDR headed was the conservation program on his own estate in Hyde Park, New York. When he first bought the land, the

soil was devoid of nutrients and the land was devoid of trees. Roosevelt restored that land, and in the process reaffirmed his belief that tending to the land was an important part of a fulfilling life.¹ Later, as Chief of the New York State Fish and Game Committee, he proposed a reforestation plan, and land restoration was again a theme during his unsuccessful bid for the vice-presidency in 1920.² It is unknown whether his New York State reforestation plan was successful. As governor of New York, he successfully sponsored and was instrumental in the passing of an amendment to the state constitution authorizing state funds for a state reforestation program, which in turn temporarily employed over 10,000 people.³

FDR's 1932 Democratic Party nomination acceptance speech again echoed land conservation. In the speech, he claimed that his conservation plans would employ a million men, and that the work would be self-sustaining.⁴ FDR believed that conservation work was beneficial to the mind and body, although it bears resemblance to the idea of national service from essayist William James. In 1906, James wrote the essay *The Moral Equivalent of War*, which offers a similar idea of national service for America's youth. The differences between James' and FDR's ideas was that FDR's conservation program was voluntary, whereas James' was not, and whereas FDR's program stressed working with the environment in particular, James' program forced the youth to create and maintain infrastructure.⁵ When questioned about whether he had borrowed James' ideas or not, FDR replied that he had read James' essay, but did not "consciously connect" it with his own idea.⁶

A high hurdle for the CCC was giving it legislative form. Democrats and Republicans alike raised issues that would have to be resolved, such as compensation for CCC workers, and how practical the program would be once in motion. The bill underwent many changes, and FDR signed the bill into law on March 31, 1933. It is important to note that the bill contained an equal opportunity amendment, introduced by the sole black Congressman at the time, Oscar De Priest. Over the life of the CCC, the amendment would be repeatedly ignored, but at the same time would be the source of much contention between national, state and local program controllers. The amendment reads, "no discrimination shall be made on account of race, color, or creed."⁷

¹ John A. Salmond, *The Civilian Conservation Corps, 1933-1942: A New Deal Case Study* (Duke University Press, 1967), http://www.nps.gov/history/history/online_books/ccc/salmond/chap1.htm (accessed October 27, 2010).

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ William James, *The Moral Equivalent of War* (1906), <http://www.constitution.org/wj/meow.htm> (accessed October 27, 2010).

⁶ George P. Rawick, "The New Deal and Youth: the Civilian Conservation Corps, the National Youth Administration, and the American Youth Congress" (Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, 1957), 41.

⁷ Ibid., 53.

With the CCC signed into law, the next step was to make it work. FDR appointed Robert Fechner as administrator of the Emergency Conservation Work Office. This office would direct the CCC at the national level.⁸ Fechner was chosen for status within national labor unions. Some labor leaders initially protested that the CCC was a form of government fascism, socialism, and totalitarianism, not because the CCC was any of those things in practice, but because the CCC was a government-run labor organization, and took control of laborers away from those same labor leaders. Fechner was able to convince the labor leaders to assent to the legislation.⁹ FDR chose W. Frank Persons as the CCC selection official – the person in charge of granting permission to states in accepting applicants to the CCC program.

The next step was organizing how to transport, feed and clothe the enrollees. The plan on paper was that the Department of Labor would choose which applicants were accepted into the program, and the U.S. Army would train and transport enrollees to the work site. Work sites were usually, though not always, forests or other wooded areas, and depending on the location and the type of work, either the National Park Service or the U.S. Forest Service would direct the enrollees in their tasks. The Emergency Conservation Work Office would direct this whole process.¹⁰

Most of the work in selecting people for the CCC fell to state and local controllers. As CCC director, Robert Fechner set a quota for each state, based on the total number of people on welfare rolls in each state relative to the total number of people on welfare rolls nationwide. This total was passed to W. Frank Persons, ostensibly for approval, who then passed these totals on to state controllers. From there, state controllers then divided their state quota between counties based upon the approval of county and local controllers. An applicant's eligibility for the program depended on the state or local controller's judgment of that applicant, and it was here that many African American applicants were denied for racial reasons. Arthur James, the Virginia Commissioner of Public Welfare, described the selection process as "a matter of social work, judgment, and conscience, over which no one except the communities has any real control."¹¹

The plan worked well on paper. In practice, it was problematic. The division of responsibility was too specific, and none of the agencies had the preexisting size or technological development to make the program work on a national scale. Theoretically, the U.S. Army was responsible only for training and transporting enrollees to and from work sites. Because the plan forced a stiff division of labor, with too much work going to too many, in practice the U.S. Army was the only part of government with the preexisting size, coordination, and infrastructure capable

⁸ *Ibid.*, 56.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 47.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 62.

¹¹ Michael Shane Hoak, "The Men in Green: African Americans and the Civilian Conservation Corps, 1933-1942" (master's thesis, College of William and Mary, 2002), 13-14.

of running a program of such size, and over time, it took over other aspects of the CCC program. In practice, the CCC for its duration was an Army-run organization, and this would raise problems of enrollment, particularly for African Americans.

The CCC was also subject to decisions made by FDR based on whims—decisions that ran counter to CCC stated goals. If the CCC goals were to conserve and preserve land, the most logical choice would be to move the CCC camps closest to where such work could be done, and allow enrollees to work there. One such counterproductive decision was FDR's choice to move CCC camps closer to roadways and towns, in order to give the public the idea of a present and working CCC, as opposed to a hidden organization.¹² CCC enrollees would also spend their money in these towns, yielding a small increase in the economy. This decision to move CCC camps closer to roads and towns posed problems for African American enrollees, who were denied work because of the irrational fear, held by town residents, that they would cause trouble. Such racism, on the part of town residents and CCC directors, would plague the CCC for its whole existence.

Rawick describes the final, actual leadership structure of the CCC: “now the CCC would have to struggle along under a heavy load of administrative difficulties . . . with its division of authority, its Administrator [Fechner] who did not administer, and its [sic] Army which did.”¹³ When alerted to the problems this structure would give, FDR replied that it did not matter.¹⁴ While on paper, and in addresses to the public, the CCC was a noble organization that conserved and preserved land, in practice, it was beset by bureaucratic problems, and run by those never intended to run the CCC. African Americans in particular would suffer from the rigid structure imposed by the Army, and were at times treated harshly. Living facilities were at times of poor quality. Many younger enrollees left before their allotted time was up.¹⁵ To the public, the CCC was responsible for many great acts of conservation. To the enrollees, the CCC was responsible for giving them honest work and decent pay, while at times unjustly denying them the same.

The Civilian Conservation Corps Enrollment Policy

The wording of the law that created the CCC was clear – it did not allow discrimination because of race, color, or creed.¹⁶ This was a noble but repeatedly ignored principle, particularly for African American enrollees. In the years before the 1929 stock market crash, it was difficult but still possible for African Americans to find menial work. In the post-crash economic environment, it was all but impossible to find even menial work, as such work was taken by poor whites,

¹² Rawick, 62.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 67.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 132-134.

¹⁶ Salmond, http://www.nps.gov/history/online_books/ccc/salmond/chap5.htm (accessed October 27, 2010).

who received racial preference in many places. Thus, African Americans turned to public assistance programs such as the CCC.¹⁷

Two problems prevented the enrollment of African Americans in the CCC. The first was racism at the state level. Many whites did not want a “Negro” camp close to their town because of the widespread fear that African American enrollees would cause trouble. The second problem was that the US Army was a segregated institution, and thus did not allow for mixed-color campsites. The reports of discrimination against African Americans came early and often, and the attempts to cover up the problem of discrimination would be a constant problem for the CCC lifespan.

Clark County, Georgia represents an example of racism in CCC enrollment practices. In 1933, the county was 60 percent African American, and when it was confirmed that there were no African Americans picked for CCC work, Atlanta resident W. H. Harris complained about this disparity. All of the enrollment places had gone to whites, despite whites composing only 40 percent of the town population. When questioned as to why this inequality existed, the Georgia CCC state director replied simply that the white applicants were needier than their black counterparts. The federal government’s solution to the problem was to write a letter asking that African American enrollees be treated fairly.¹⁸ Washington County, Georgia presents another strong case. African American comprised more than sixty percent of county residents, yet no African Americans were selected for CCC work. In Georgia, the problem of racism was especially stubborn, and while state CCC directors eventually allowed African Americans to enroll after much stalling, the ratio of African American to white enrollment never reached parity.¹⁹

Florida is another state with the same problem. State director John C. Huskisson reported that no African Americans merited enrollment, even though there was a large presence of African Americans in the state. After CCC National Selecting Director W. Frank Persons contacted Huskisson in response to this complaint, the state selection committee relented and enrolled African Americans into the CCC. Alabama was more cooperative at the state level, but many town and county CCC councils attempted to ban African Americans from enrolling at CCC stations.²⁰ In 1933, Mississippi had the worst African American enrollment record; only 1.7 percent of CCC enrollees in the state were African American. In South Carolina in the same year, thirty-six percent of CCC enrollees were African American.²¹ Virginia is an unusual case – though it never achieved parity by enrolling in the CCC a percentage of African Americans proportionate to those living in the state,

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Ibid.

African Americans composed 15 percent of Virginia's CCC enrollees for 1935.²² According to the 1930 census, African Americans composed 26.8 percent of the Virginia state population, and CCC enrollment for 1935 exceeded both the minimum enrollment level for African Americans as set by Robert Fechner at 10 percent, as well as the five to ten percent enrollment average in most other southern states.²³ Each state represented a separate battle for fair enrollment for African Americans, and in response, national CCC directors Fechner, Persons and others attempted to increase African American enrollment.

The solution for the attempted increase in African American enrollment was not straightforward. The solution had to satisfy both the US Army, which executed the program on local and state levels, and state and local CCC controllers. The solution was to hire a number of African American enrollees equal to the number of African Americans who left the program. Such a solution was deemed equitable by the US Army and state and local controllers, but not by the African Americans themselves. This solution had the effect of slowing African American enrollment almost to a complete stop in the fall of 1935. W. Frank Persons saw this solution as violating De Priest's amendment, but CCC director Fechner defended the law mainly due to quiet complaints from southern congressional representatives who echoed their constituents' fears of having "Negro" camps next to white towns.²⁴ It is important to note that all-African American CCC camps were reported to perform just as well, if not better, with regard to discipline, as their white counterpart camps.²⁵ African American mobility slowed further by FDR's order restricting African Americans to their home state, and mandating that they could work on state projects only with the consent of their state's governor.²⁶ Opportunities for new African American enrollees decreased further as African Americans already in the program did not want to forfeit their work or their pay. This forced African Americans outside the program to continue to compete with poor whites for menial work, work for which they were deemed unfit because of their skin color. Fechner rationalized this situation by writing: "it is unfortunate that racial feeling prevails in this country but we have not yet reached that state of perfection where it can be totally avoided."²⁷

The racially biased CCC administration was not only the result of prevailing social norms. It was the consequence of a poorly planned program. The inner workings of the program were decided both by government sanction and convenience, with the actual results of the program – whether or not the CCC

²² Hoak, 15.

²³ *Ibid.*

²⁴ Charles Johnson, *The Army, the Negro and the Civilian Conservation Corps: 1933-1942* (Military Affairs, Vol. 36, No. 3, October 1972), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1985308>, 82-83 (accessed October 13, 2010).

²⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁶ Jerrel H. Shofner, "Roosevelt's 'Tree Army': The Civilian Conservation Corps in Florida," *The Florida Historical Quarterly* 65, no. 4 (1987): 447.

²⁷ Calvin W. Gower, "The Struggle of Blacks for Leadership Positions in the Civilian Conservation Corps, 1933-1942," *The Journal of Negro History* 61, no. 2 (April 1976), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2717266>, 126 (accessed October 27, 2010).

achieved hiring parity, for example – was not so much a concern as was placating state and local CCC controllers. Prevailing social norms made the US Army a segregated institution, and this segregated mindset naturally extended to the camps the US Army administered. As the government, and possibly FDR himself, shared the same racist beliefs concerning African Americans, little action was taken in accordance with written law. The implicit and explicit racism held by the US Army, state governors, local mayors, and possibly FDR himself made for a circular negatively reinforcing problem that would persist until the CCC's dissolution in 1942. Rawick describes CCC hiring practices:

The basis for discriminating against the Negro population in the first place lay in the procedure for setting up the CCC camps. The Office of the Director [Fechner's office] would request the Governor of the State to designate which of the allotted camps in the state were to be for white and which were to be for Negro enrollees. While there was pressure on the governor to allow for at least a token number of Negro camps, there was no method of forcing him to comply. Negroes would be enrolled solely in accordance with the number of places available in the designated camps. From then on, they would be enrolled only to fill vacancies as they occurred in the existing Negro camps or when the number of Negro camps was increased.²⁸

Enrollment for African Americans was not always a negative experience. Although the CCC never made any noticeable improvements in hiring practices, and never achieved enrollee parity, there were times when those close to CCC camps stood on principle and realized small victories. In 1937 in Wayayanda, New York, six African American camps were closed and none were reopened, while no white camps closed in that period. New York State Governor Lehman and New York City Mayor Fiorello La Guardia protested to Fechner, claiming discrimination. Fechner denied this, saying there were no openings for African Americans in the state. Neither Lehman nor La Guardia was convinced, so they repeated their exchange with Fechner, this time making the situation public. Fechner capitulated, and allowed African American enrollment.²⁹ Such instances were rare, due to the collective pressure to conform to social norms.

The African American Experience in Civilian Conservation Corps Camps

Despite prejudicial enrollment practices, the African American experience in CCC camps was not entirely negative. Several accounts describe CCC camp functions in detail. One example appeared in a 1935 edition of *The Crisis* magazine. Author Luther C. Wandall describes two CCC camps.³⁰ He

²⁸ Rawick, 143.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 160.

³⁰ Luther C. Wandall, "A Negro in the CCC," *The Crisis* (August 1935): 244, 253-254, <http://books.google.com/books?id=CVgEAAAAMBAJ> (accessed October 28, 2010).

entered the CCC system in New York, and with other enrollees, was transported to New Jersey. He experienced some forms of prejudice, such as being forced to stand in segregated lines while his application was processed. He comments on the poor quality of food, and the short tempers of his tent-mates. He was then transported to a second, unknown camp, described as being “rich in Colonial and Revolutionary history.”³¹ He tells the reader that he sleeps in a barracks, not in a tent, and that while the food is poorly cooked, there is plenty to eat. He describes the work as worthwhile, and mentions that both the athletic director and vocational teacher are African American. There is a library at this second camp, and sport is encouraged. Wandall explains the prejudices he faced were a part of working for the Army, and ends optimistically: “for a man who has no work, I can heartily recommend it.”³²

CCC enrollment policies did not allow new African American enrollees to enter until older ones had left. Thus, African Americans were placed into a uniquely poor position. Many stayed inside the program for fear of competing with – and losing to – whites for what little work was available outside the program. This situation forced potential new enrollees who were denied the opportunity to remain often times without work and pay. The CCC system pitted those on the inside against those on the outside.

This is not to say that African American enrollees accepted discrimination without protest. Michael Hoak’s work describes a CCC camp in Yorktown, Virginia, where enrollees successfully manipulated the “separate but equal” doctrine to provide for all-black CCC education classes, a strategy begun by the NAACP.³³ It was a CCC directive that all enrollees would have to view educational films and lectures provided by CCC instructors. This rule was enforced without regard to skin color. As many enrollees were close to forests, such films and lectures had gripping titles such as “Life History of the Mosquito” and “Preparing for a Garden.”³⁴ All-black education classes were created with the permission of white supervisors through legal manipulations. Initially, white camp commanders were wary of letting African Americans become teachers, as they feared it would lead to African Americans as supervisors. One response to such racism was to point to Virginia schools. Even before the CCC began operations in Virginia, black teachers were allowed to teach all-black classes in all-black schools. If whites could have their own teaching facilities, it would follow that blacks would have their (albeit substandard) teaching facilities as well. The coordination of a routine that employed black CCC instructors and black instructors from a nearby all-black college helped overcome such racial blocks. The African American CCC enrollees

³¹ *Ibid.*

³² *Ibid.*

³³ Hoak, 27.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 28.

at the Yorktown camp embraced their new classes, even after days of manual labor. This also allowed the development of more interesting lecture and film topics, such as African American history in Virginia. Many students first learned to read and write in these classes.³⁵ The all-black education classes started at the Yorktown CCC camp over time became the model for all-black education classes in the whole CCC program.³⁶

The development of these education classes at Yorktown CCC camp is significant for several reasons. First, it represents the use of a legal code against the code's authors, with productive results. Second, it was a nonviolent way to move around obstacles to education and literacy. Third, it demonstrated that the best gains against openly racist practices were made at the grassroots level. While racism infested the entire CCC structure, it had the greatest opponents and proponents closest to the workers.³⁷ Robert Fechner and W. Frank Persons, administrators at the top of the CCC structure, approved of bad practices at the bottom and did little to intervene. This was not only because of racism, but because it was impractical to enforce the laws at every CCC campsite across the country – no such enforcement mechanism existed in the written law, and no such enforcement mechanism could exist in practice. Therefore, racism continued almost unchecked, and opposition to racism could exist as well.

Living and working against such obstacles produced camaraderie amongst African American enrollees. The education classes at the Yorktown CCC camp are one such example. Life in a CCC camp was not a complete reversal from life outside the CCC; African American enrollees were subject to discrimination both inside and out, but bonding together through work and education made camp life better for many.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the Civilian Conservation Corps had two faces – one on land conservation, and the other on its relation to the public. On land conservation and preservation, the CCC was a success – enrollees planted over one billion trees, built 5,000 miles of roads, and constructed most of the infrastructure of today's national parks.³⁸ On relating to the public, and in particular to African Americans, the CCC did little to combat racism, and many times the program reinforced cultural norms.

This is not to say that the African American experience was entirely negative. Because the national CCC structure allowed local camp commanders to run their camps as they saw fit, camp enrollees resisted in whatever ways they could. One of the stated goals of the CCC, as articulated by FDR, was to bring people together by caring for the land. The CCC accomplished this goal, though not in the

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 30.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 27.

³⁷ *Ibid.*

³⁸ Hoak, 2.

intended way. African American enrollees were brought together not only by their common work but also by their common struggle. The CCC acted as a nationwide experiment in discrimination and resistance to that discrimination.

The Historical Context of the Declaration of Independence

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Since its inception, the Declaration of Independence has been elevated to an almost mystical status, and it is purported to have influenced revolution throughout the world. Free people crying out for an end to despotism, and an elevation of the rights of man, frequently cite the Declaration of Independence as their inspiration for instituting concrete changes and even overthrowing governments in the name of freedom. Yet at its adoption on July 4th, 1776, it was not viewed as the most important event of the week. The motion on independence had been approved two days earlier and was the decisive action of the Second Continental Congress. John Adams pointed to that fact with his praise of that date which he said would be celebrated with, “Pomp and Parade, with Shews, Games, Sports, Guns, Bells, Bonfires and Illuminations from one End of this Continent to the other from this Time forward forever more.”¹

There can be little doubt that Mr. Jefferson’s masterpiece has had the most influence on the American people as a whole. The post-revolutionary generation saw in the Revolutionary period a pantheon of demi-gods who secured liberty and freedom against all odds. Indeed, perhaps America’s greatest president, Abraham Lincoln, frequently cited the spirit of the Declaration of Independence as his driving force for interpreting the Constitution and the Bill of Rights to extend to blacks the rights and privileges of citizenship. It was also the driving force behind Lincoln’s personal interpretation of his sense of Union. Historians of all ranks have expressed their admiration for the declaration and criticism of it for not going far enough to include more in its promises. The historian Gordon Wood captures the essence of the document when he writes: “The Declaration of Independence set forth a philosophy of human rights that could be applied not only to Americans, but also to peoples everywhere.”² The Declaration of Independence’s tone and message are essential to understand in the historical context of the struggle with Great Britain. One cannot separate the political climate from the magnificent words contained in the parchment. “The Declaration of Independence is one of the greatest statements of defiance ever written.”³

Thomas Jefferson claimed to have used no direct outside sources to compose his declaration, instead relying on his numerous hours reading philosophy, history, and even poetry. In fact, the sage of Monticello stated that he wrote, “Neither aiming at originality of principle or sentiment, nor yet copied from any particular or previous

¹ Benson Bobrick, *Angel in the Whirlwind* (New York: Penguin Books, 1987), 203.

² Gordon S. Wood, *The American Revolution* (New York: Random House, 2002), 57.

³ Kevin J. Hayes, *The Road to Monticello: The Life and Mind of Thomas Jefferson* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 190.

writing, it was intended to be an expression of the American mind.”⁴

The phraseology of the Declaration of Independence is recognized as Thomas Jefferson’s strength as many sections are referred to with a near reverence of admiration. Americans have long quoted Thomas Jefferson’s hallowed phrase “all men are created equal,” and the historian Pauline Maier does not disappoint with her examination of the origins of it. A scrutiny of that phrase is necessary for all Americans to understand the complexities of its development and the impact it had on future generations of political thought. She correctly points out that fellow Virginian George Mason was drafting the Virginia constitution and, with Jefferson’s work on the Virginia preamble, produced the finished product. Jefferson produced a most interesting variation of the natural rights philosophy with his phrase “created equal.” Being a lawyer, he was familiar with the concept that one word can change the entire meaning of the passage.

George Mason wrote, “men are born equally free and independent,”⁵ which clearly states the fact that the biological process of birth produces an inherent freedom. And while the colonists were crying out for freedom from England in the most passionate of terms, phrases such as this could have potentially opened a proverbial can of worms for future generations who took Mr. Mason at his words. The obvious questions future Americans would ask would be, “What about slaves? Are they included in Mason’s phrase as being ‘born equally free?’” This is not a semantically gravitating argument; it has merit, for the revolutionary generation would be raised to a godly status in the subsequent years after the struggle.

Thomas Jefferson’s version of Mason’s phrase deserves examination. The Declaration of Independence substitutes “created” for “born.” There seems to be an inherent trap that Jefferson may have considered when penning the “created equal” phrase. As Benson Bobrick pointed out in his book *Angel in the Whirlwind*, Jefferson was “born into slaveholding” and felt the collective guilt of keeping souls in bondage.⁶ For a Virginia slaveholder to include the phrase “born equal” would seem duplicitous given the fact he had a whole plantation of humans who were slaving for his prosperity. They were neither free nor independent, and his inclusion of the Mason phrase would violate the very spirit of the document. Pauline Maier argues that the Virginia Convention of 1776 had to change Mason’s original draft of the Virginia Constitution. Mason wrote that men were born free and equal with inherent rights derived from nature. The change came by adding the phrase, “when they entered society.”⁷ Clearly, slaves were not part of Virginia society as they had no rights under Virginia law. This was a convenient way to

⁴ Hayes, *Road to Monticello*, 179.

⁵ Pauline Maier, *American Scripture: The Making of the Declaration of Independence* (New York: Vintage Books, 1997), 165.

⁶ Bobrick, *Angel in the Whirlwind*, 199.

⁷ Maier, *American Scripture*, 193.

eliminate the liberating effects of Mason's words which were being emulated by Jefferson in Philadelphia.

Jefferson recognized correctly that the inequality of life is something that occurs *after* birth and is thereby out of the Creator's hands. God *created* man equally, but it is circumstances on earth that create the subsequent inequality. This line of logic can be taken in many directions. There exists natural disparities of income and wealth. God did not create them; events on earth dictated that one family might prosper while another family must labor in relative obscurity. This is not God's doing, but man's and perfectly fits Jefferson's "created equal" line of rhetoric. Finally, it was not God's hand that created slavery, for he had created all mankind equally. It was humans who began the evil practice of slavery on earth in violation of God's law. Thomas Jefferson wanted to end that practice by denouncing the evil institution in the Declaration of Independence. Indeed, the slave clause was a passionate plea by Jefferson to indict King George III for instituting the slave trade and an attempt to absolve the colonies of blame for perpetuating the evil practice.

Having solved the dispute between "born" and "created" equal, one must recognize the tremendous effect Jefferson's words have had on subsequent generations. Historians today still debate whether the phrase "all men are created equal" included those of African descent and even landless whites. Was it a promise for future generations to embrace, or was it limited to the landholding whites of European descent? Historian Paul Johnson seems to get carried away about the liberating effect of that phrase when he flatly states, "the word 'equality' remained in the text [of the Declaration of Independence], and the fact that it did [it was] a constitutional guarantee that, eventually, the glaring anomaly behind the Declaration would be rectified."⁸ To men such as Mr. Johnson, Jefferson's phrase was not only a promise but a course of action that was inevitable.

Praise for Thomas Jefferson's version of the equality of men reaches epic proportions by historians who see the Declaration of Independence as the bulwark of liberty against oppression. Gordon Wood, recognizing the ingenuity of Jefferson's assertion, despite the fact Jefferson stated he was not creating anything new, writes, "That only education and cultivation separated man from one another was the most explosive idea of the eighteenth century, indeed, of all modern thinking."⁹

The very crafting of the slavery clause of the Declaration of Independence is crucial evidence that Thomas Jefferson did feel remorse for holding slaves and embraced the corrupting influence argument that early abolitionists used to condemn the institution. Jefferson was an opportunist; he saw in the liberation of the colonies the chance to free the slaves and put an end to the barbaric practice. The villain would not be the slaveholders--and himself--but the despot King

⁸ Paul Johnson, *A History of the American People* (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1997), 156.

⁹ Wood, *The American Revolution*, 102.

George III whom he blamed for perpetuating the institution of slavery and just about every other ill of American society. One historian believes Mr. Jefferson had additional motivations to ending the slave trade by indicting King George III. Paul Finkelman, in an essay entitled “Treason Against the Hopes of the World,” argues that the reason Jefferson’s clause condemning the king for the slave trade was ultimately deleted from the Declaration of Independence was due to the fact that the current slave trade devalued Virginia’s already-established slaves’ economic value to the slaveholder. By adding to their numbers as the African slave trade did, it had the potential effect of hurting Mr. Jefferson in the pocketbook. Jefferson would benefit from a stable negro population, and as a slave trader for life, he wanted to see the influx of new Africans halted.¹⁰

Whether Jefferson’s liberating words would be applied by the next generation of Americans was quickly answered with a resounding “yes!” Maier makes an important argument that by the 1790’s the Declaration of Independence’s meaning shifted from a document which declared independence from the Crown to one that embraced the universal rights of men.¹¹ This thought process corresponds to an early version of the egalitarian movement which witnessed more and more states, such as Pennsylvania and New Hampshire, dissolving property qualifications for voting and office holding. Apparently, more and more people were taking Mr. Jefferson up on his assertion that “all men are created equal.” This thought process would sweep through the United States in the early part of the nineteenth century, culminating in universal male suffrage by the 1820s; for white men twenty-one and over. By this time both Adams and Jefferson had taken turns at the helm of the presidency, fought a bitter feud, and made up. Their correspondence points to an increasing fondness toward the Revolutionary generation and their efforts at independency.¹²

Both men realized their contributions toward independence had been secured but it appeared as if John Adams was not comfortable with the limelight in which Jefferson appeared to bask openly. It was Jefferson who had commissioned artist John Trumbull to immortalize the soon-to-be-called Independence Hall in the pantheon of early American history; at least on canvas. Adams was jealous of Jefferson’s celebrity status when it came to crafting the Declaration of Independence, but he should have remembered that it was he who pushed the better writer into the job by recognizing Jefferson’s “felicity of expression.” John Adams might have done more behind the scenes work for independence, but Jefferson’s

¹⁰ Finkelman, quoted in Peter S. Onuf, *Jefferson Legacies* (Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia Press, 1993), 192-193.

¹¹ Maier, *American Scripture*, 171.

¹² *Ibid.*, 181. Jefferson to Adams regarding the desire of his grandson to learn of his generation: “he wishes to be able, in the winter nights of old age, to recount to those around him what he has heard and learnt of the Heroic age preceding his birth.”

document justifying what Adams had fought so hard to secure will always be better remembered product of the summer of 1776.¹³

History gives Abraham Lincoln partial credit for elevating the Declaration of Independence to a lofty standard preceding the Civil War and during his presidency. Lincoln was a Republican who stood against the extension of slavery into the territories. But he was also a politician who knew that any campaign rhetoric that included the abolition of slavery would be met with ferocious opposition in the South. The push for separation from Great Britain had been conducted by Northerner and Southerner alike in Congress, but on the eve of the Civil War, the issue of equality had differing meanings. To Lincoln and others, “it was impossible to separate the Declaration’s condemnation of monarchy from a condemnation of slavery.”¹⁴ So why had so many Southern delegates supported the Declaration of Independence and its “created equal” phrase? Maier suggests that Lincoln and other nineteenth century politicians believed that necessity dictated that the Founders accept practices contrary to their philosophical beliefs.¹⁵

President Abraham Lincoln held steadfastly that the Declaration of Independence was a shining torch in the struggle for human rights. Despite his previous assertions that suggested that if he could have avoided the Civil War without freeing a single slave he would have done so, Lincoln knew deep down inside that the magnitude of the struggle offered him the perfect chance to institute the human rights ideals of the declaration and issue the Emancipation Proclamation. Lincoln commented on the liberating effects of the Declaration of Independence in a speech in Springfield, Illinois in 1857. “But they did not intend to declare all men equal *in all respects*. They meant simply to declare the *right*, so that the *enforcement* of it might follow as fast as circumstances should permit.”¹⁶

Harry V. Jaffa wrote “Abraham Lincoln and the Universal Meaning of the Declaration of Independence.” In this interpretation of Lincoln, Jaffa also argues that Lincoln took the Jefferson’s Lockean political philosophy to a further degree by saying there was more to Locke’s assertion “if you do not wish to be a slave, then refrain from being a master.” Lincoln countered this argument, Jaffa states, with his own version “he who wills freedom for himself must simultaneously will freedom for others.”¹⁷

So much of the Declaration of Independence’s emphasis on freedom can be seen in the way Lincoln governed. Besides emancipation, Lincoln rescinded the Writ of Habeas Corpus and imprisoned dissenters for the duration of the conflict. On the one hand he was freeing the slaves in areas still in rebellion, and at the

¹³ Maier, *American Scripture*, 181-184.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 204.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 205.

¹⁶ Candidate Abraham Lincoln, quoted by Harry V. Jaffa in Scott D. Gerber, ed., *The Declaration of Independence: Origins and Impact* (Washington, D.C: CQ Press, 2002), 34.

¹⁷ Gerber, *Declaration of Independence*, 42.

same time he was denying basic Constitutional freedoms to Americans. While the Constitution does permit the president, during times of emergency, to do so, Lincoln defied Chief Justice Taney's demand for an issuance of the writ and insisted that the detainees be produced for due process. President Lincoln ignored the request; detained Marylanders were a threat to the more perfect Union he sought to preserve. Lincoln's new America would be one where the basic elements of the Declaration of Independence would be secured and where men would be free, equal, and independent.

The subsequent effects of the Declaration of Independence have been overrated, according to historian Carl Becker. He argues that the impact of the Declaration in the 19th century was anti-climactic as that century saw very little revolutionary activity. While Jefferson's document did spark the French Revolution of the previous century, the Reign of Terror left Europeans disillusioned with the prospect of revolution, and governments were not promoting the universal rights of man. Instead, they focused on the good that can be derived from the pursuit of setting up governments to recognize the masses, and indeed, placate them through democratic promises, while at the same time preserving the status quo in order to avoid the harmful effects of revolution.¹⁸

To historian Edmund S. Morgan, it was Jefferson's private nature that honed his quest for individual freedom and liberty. After stating that Jefferson was the most private of all Founding Fathers, Morgan believes this was a result of his cherishing of individual freedom. "The Revolution he fought was for the right of the individual to manage his own life with the minimum of interference from governments. For him the triumph of independence meant the triumph of the individual."¹⁹

Years after penning his masterpiece, Jefferson recognized it as an unfinished work. Clearly, the torch of liberty had not been passed to enough oppressed people around the world. Writing to his old friend in freedom, John Adams, Jefferson stated, "I shall not die without a hope that light and liberty are on a steady advance."²⁰

The Declaration of Independence was written to justify the inevitable events of 2 July 1776. It was not signed until late August, but its contents had been read from city to city and to General George Washington's troops. The message that summer was that Americans had been mistreated by their King and Parliament and that they were finally effecting the separation for which many had longed. The political philosophy of the second paragraph of Jefferson's masterpiece is what is most remembered today and has become the mantra for human rights all over the world. Little did Mr. Jefferson realize at the time of the writing that his statements

¹⁸ Carl L. Becker, *The Declaration of Independence: A Study in the History of Political Ideas* (New York: Vintage Books, 1922), 237-238.

¹⁹ Edmund S. Morgan, *The Meaning of Independence* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1978), 78.

²⁰ Jefferson to Adams, quoted in Maier, *American Scripture*, 188.

would spawn revolution throughout the world and speak for oppressed people everywhere.

Integration and Resistance in the Ethiopian Empire State: The Case of Qellem, 1886-1941

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Ethiopia is a pre-capitalist, multinational state created at the end of the nineteenth century through annexation of the independent peripheral people of the Oromo,¹ Sidama, Walayta, and many other nations/nationalities. This was accomplished by Emperor Menilek II (r.1889-1913) with the full support and assistance of imperialist powers. The Ethiopian state was created through the forced grouping of the aforementioned nations/nationalities without a common historical background or identity under one state presumed to represent a unitary nation, but which was in fact only dominated by one nation that subordinated all others. Thus, the end of the nineteenth century was a turning point in the history of the Horn of Africa. Qellem² has been a territory predominantly inhabited by the Macca Oromo. It is located in southwestern Wallagga. It was conquered by *Ras Gobana Daacee*, Menilek's general, in ca.1886. This article attempts to analyze Qellem-Addis Ababa relations in the period between 1886 and 1941 in the context of center-periphery theories. It seriously considers Qellem's attempt to maintain its local autonomy and Addis Ababa's attempt to erode it for the purpose of alleged integration. It endeavors to show this by making a brief comparison of the pre-Adwa days with its aftermath. The first section of the paper deals with an introductory remark that reviews the general nature of Qellem. The second presents the conquest of Qellem by the Shewan forces and its inclusion into the Ethiopian empire state. The third attempts to analyze Qellem-Addis Ababa relations between 1918 and 1941. The fourth section exclusively discusses Qellem's resistance that culminated into demand for secession.

¹ The Oromo are about forty percent of the population of Ethiopia. They constitute a single largest national group not only in Ethiopia but also in the Horn of Africa. Various scholars have given their views on the original homeland of the Oromo. The earliest view holds that the Oromo came to the continent of Africa from outside (See Tayye G. Mariam, 1914: 35; Atsme Giorgis Gebre Mesih, "Ya [Oromo] Tarik (History of [the Oromo])," n.d, vol. 1, Institute of Ethiopian Studies, 58-59. The second view, however, confines the origin and early settlement of the Oromo to a place located in the continent of Africa somewhere in the northern part of Somalia (See also J.S. Trimmingham, 1952:2; Enrico Cerulli, "The Folk Literature of the [Oromo] of Southern Abyssinia," *Harvard African Studies*, vol. 111, (Cambridge, Mass., 1922), 5; G.W.B. Huntingford, 1955:25). Another group of scholars located the Oromo original homeland to Baalee and Sidamo highlands of Ethiopia (See Eike Haberland, 1963: 772; H.S. Lewis, 1996: 27-46; Ulrich Braukamper, 1980: 25-30; Mohammed Hassen, 1994: 6). There is a consensus among scholars that the administrative region of Qellem was settled by the Macca Oromo. It is stated that when the Oromo settled in Qellem it was not an entirely empty land. The settlement process resulted in considerable displacements and assimilation of non-Oromo peoples from the mid sixteenth to the seventeenth centuries. Some writers have studied different aspects of Qellem with much emphasis on the Oromo.

² Qellem, the name now used as a sub region of Wallagga was originally the birth place of Jootee Tulluu in the Leeqaa region northwest of Gidaamii. The Ethiopian government later named the whole region once ruled by Jootee after the name of his birthplace. Qellem today includes the Leeqaa, Horroo, Jimma, Sayyoo, Amaara and Anfillo regions in southwestern Wallagga west of Gimbii and Najjoo, south of Begii, and north and northwest of Iluu Abbaa Booraa. Qellem has been a rich coffee producing territories of Ethiopia with considerable role in the country's national economy

Introduction

The close of the nineteenth century marked a great turning point in the history of Ethiopia, in general, and that of the Maccaa Oromoo, in particular. The process of building an Ethiopian empire was completed with the conquest and subjugation of the South. The empire was strengthened and consolidated under Menilek. The political center of gravity shifted from the North to South-central Ethiopia. The shift and the subsequent increasing centralization also changed the political landscape of the newly conquered territories with dramatic consequences. The administrative structures, the socio-cultural organizations and the economies of the conquered regions were gradually relegated to the needs and interests of the ruling class of the empire, their foreign allies and collaborators among the local elites.

The end of the nineteenth century, therefore, saw the conquest of the independent states and peoples in southern Ethiopia. Qellem was among the conquered states that were subjugated and annexed by Menilek of the Kingdom of Shawa, as he endeavored to build the Ethiopian empire state at the end of the nineteenth century.³ While many of the conquered states in the region firmly resisted Menilek's forces and lost their sovereignty, this entity of Wallagga attempted to defend its regional autonomy and ethnic identity against the expanding Shawan forces after its conquest.⁴ The contemporary leader, Jootee Tulluu (1855-1918), was busy consolidating his control over his local contenders. Jootee was left with the option of resistance and peaceful submission to Menilek whose forces were armed to their teeth with modern firearms. Menilek was the vassal of Emperor Yohannes IV (r.1872-1889). In 1881, Yohannes gave Taklahaimanot the title of “*Negus* of Gojjam and Kafa,” perhaps to check which one of the two vassals was more powerful since they were rivals. This unleashed a grand territorial competition for the rich western Oromoo lands to the south of Abbay between the two kings in which the Leeqaa leaders were confronted. Jootee had, however, attempted to use

³ The process of empire building in Ethiopia had dual character: (1) reunification of the northern Orthodox Christian core regions, (2) the conquest and subjugation of independent kingdoms, principalities and traditional kingdoms in the south. Many Ethiopianist scholars, perhaps out of sympathy or support for the predominance and perpetuation of the post Menilekian status quo, often ignore or overlook this fundamental distinction. For them the turbulent wars and campaigns for political centralization begun by Emperor Tewodros (r. 1855-1868), continued by Emperor Yohannes IV (r. 1872-1889) and culminated under Menilek II (r. 1889-1913) had but one justified and legitimate objective: the “reunification” or the “rebuilding” of the Christian empire. In this connection Getahun Dilebo is correct to have remarked, “[many of] the lands conquered and occupied by Menilek originally were not home land of [Orthodox] Christians . . . [Many of] the Oromo and Shankilla never had been under Habasha [Abyssinians] before Menilek. Hence, Menilek’s military policy against peoples was a flagrant imperial conquest and consolidation, not ‘unification’ let alone ‘reunification.’” See Tesema Ta’a, *The Political Economy of An African Society in Transformation: The Case of Maccaa Oromo (Ethiopia)* (Harrassowitz Verlag: Weisbaden, 2006); Getahun Dilebo, “Menileks Ethiopia: Unification or Amhara Communal Domination? (1865-1916)” (Ph.D. diss., Howard University, 1974).

⁴ Following its annexation to the Ethiopian Empire state (ca. 1886), Wallagga was divided into three provinces. Leeqaa-Naqamtee and its dependencies under *Dajjzmach* Kumsaa (alias *Dajjzmach* Gabra-Egzabiher) (1889-1923), Leeqaa-Qellem under *Dajjzmach* Jootee Tulluu (1855-1918), Arjoo, and Horro-Guduruu, administered by officials directly appointed by Menilek. The divisions were made simply for the convenience of the government in Addis Ababa and did not at all take into consideration the socio-economic and political needs of the people. For more detail, see Tesema Ta’a, *Political Economy*.

pragmatic alternative mechanisms to maintain his right to govern Qellem, organize his internal affairs and make his own decisions. He had also made relentless efforts to protect and preserve the identity of his society, not merely as a source of sense of pride and joy, but also of strength and confidence. This attempt was seriously damaged following the Battle of Adwa (1 March 1896). The military victory achieved by the Emperor added to his confidence in eroding the autonomy he agreed to give the Leeqaa state of Wallagga.

It seems necessary to underscore that the Battle of Adwa was an episode of sensible historical significance. Where it helped to establish Ethiopia as a sovereign state in Africa, it brought about erosion of local autonomy enjoyed by the Qellem. This state peacefully submitted to the Ethiopian Empire state, considering the politico-military problems awaiting his rivals and the promises entered with Ras Goobanaa Daacee, Menilek's general. However, the resultant negotiated internal autonomy did not give it a freehand to rule its domains, particularly after the Battle of Adwa (1 March 1896). The peaceful submission clearly spared the Qellem people from the devastating war during the conquest, avoided the unbridled *nafxanyaa* exploitation and the superimposition of an alien administration and the complete loss of cultural identity.

The Conquest of Qellem and the Subsequent Consequences (Ca.1886-1896)

In the second half of the nineteenth century the Sayyoo⁵ Oromo were ruled by "strong men" who fought each other for supremacy. These contenders for power were Tufaa Heddee (Abbaa Oofaa) of Haawwaa, succeeded by Buraayyuu Barii (Abbaa Gosaa), Bakakkoo Tufaa (Abbaa Dhaasaa) of Galaan, Gumaa Oshoo (Abbaa Dantaa) of Qooxa'oo-Sadii, succeeded by his son Hirphaa (Abbaa Daannoo). There was another powerful *abeetuu*,⁶ Qajeelaa Abbaa Gimbii, of the Busasse of Anfilloo. North of Sayyoo was Qellem, ruled by abeetuu Tulluu Guddaa, who stepped down in favor of his son, Jootee Tulluu.⁷ The focus of this article is

⁵ Sayyoo is the name of one of the Oromo groups in the Ethiopian empire. State that belong to the Macca (western Oromo). There are three main Sayyoo regions. One is the region immediately east of upper Gibe. The second is around the Jorgoo mountains east of the Birbir river. The third to which this article is referring comprises those Sayyoo who are settled around the Walal mountains. There is also a small clan which is known by the name Warra Sayyoo which is one of Hawuu clans of Sayyoo. It also has to be noted that the present-day town of Dambi-Doolloo was, in its early history, known as Sayyoo (Saio, Sayo) and was thus marked on some maps. In many works we also find the designations Leeqaa Sayyoo and Leeqaa Qellem. There is no such designation in this area. The Leeqaa region north and east of the Sayyoo region is known simply as Leeqaa, and the Sayyoo region in which the Sayyoo clans live is known as Sayyoo and not as Leeqaa Sayyoo. See Nagasso Gidada, *History of the Sayyoo Oromoo of South-western Wallaga, 1730-1886* (Addis Ababa: Mega Printing Enterprise, 2001), 11.

⁶ Abeetuu as a title was also used by the *mootii* (king) of Anfilloo. This title appears to have been used by the Oromo themselves when referring to or addressing the kings of Anfilloo; the Mao used the titles such as Bushaashoo and Tarofor their kings. According to Asfawessen Asrate (1980:66), the term abeetoo means "father of the house" similar to the *abbaakoo* or *abeetoo* meaning "my father." According to Asfawessen, the term abeetoo was already known in the time of Ahmed Ibn Ibrahim (Ahmed Grang). Ludolf (1682:237) who collected this information about the middle of the seventeenth century, claims that the title abeetoo was used by the Oromo. He states that they "used on other exclamation, but that of their abeetoo, abeetoo, abeetoo, or Lord, Lord, which appellation of honour is attributed not only to the king, to all those whom we call (k)[sic] mild and merciful Lords." See also Gidada, *History of the Sayyoo Oromoo*, 195, 220.

⁷ Gidada, *History of the Sayyoo Oromoo*, 245-329.

Qellem, which later on included all the territories of other rivals. However, sources are scanty on the history of Qellem before 1886. The only written source on the period is Juan Maria Schuver's travel accounts, recently translated as *An Africanist De Tocqueville at Jootee's Court: Juan Maria Schuver's Travels in Northeast Africa, 1880-1883*.

As soon as the news of the Gojjame advance of 1881 reached him, Menilek promptly sent his general, Ras Goobanaa, to march to Wallagga, pursue the Gojjame forces, and check their further successes.⁸ Goobanaa's advances into the heartlands of Wallagga were not free from resistance. He had encountered desperate resistance from the Leeqaa-Noonoo, but it was broken without much difficulty and the Shawan forces proceeded westward.⁹ The plan of Tuuchoo Daannoo of Leeqaa-Qumbaa, for a strong resistance against Goobanaa and his followers, was foiled by Morodaa's intrigue.¹⁰

Gojjam and Shawa soon entered into a direct military confrontation culminating in the Shawan victory at the Battle of Himbaabboo, on 6 June 1882, when Taklahaimanot himself was taken prisoner. The story of this conflict has already been told in a number of earlier accounts.¹¹ Here, it suffices to point out the role played by Menilek's local Oromo allies in his successes at Himbaabboo was decisive.

Morodaa Bakaree of Leeqaa Naqamtee congratulated himself on the victory of the Shawans at Himbaabboo and it was clear to him now that he had indeed made the right choice. Although he had clearly avoided making the Gojjame angry with him his role in the Shawan success was quite invaluable. He advised the local leaders to keep neutrality in the conflict. Morodaa's submission also served as a positive example for the other major Leeqaa power in the region, Qellem of Jootee Tulluu.¹² Jootee was given the title of Dajjazmach. Thus, Jootee was now left to administer his territory under the direct overlordship of Menilek, which was more or less similar to the system of an "Indirect Rule."¹³

⁸ Tesema Ta'a, "The Oromo of Wallagga: A Historical Survey to 1910" (master's thesis, Addis Ababa University, 1980), 33; Richard Caulk, "Territorial Competition and the battle of Embabo, 1882," *The Journal of Ethiopian Studies* 13 (1975): 78.

⁹ Cerulli, "Folk Literature," 74.

¹⁰ Ibid; Tesema Ta'a, *The Political Economy of An African Society in Transformation*, 81.

¹¹ Caulk, "Territorial Competition," 12-13.

¹² Tesema Ta'a, "The Oromo of Wallagga," 41.

¹³ Menilek and his generals claimed to have used this method according to the provisions of *Fetha Nagast* (Law of Kings) which states when you reach . . . a land to fight against its inhabitants, offer them terms of peace. If they accept you . . . the men who are there shall give you tribute . . . if they refuse the terms of peace and offer battle, go forward to assault and oppress them, since the Lord your God will make you master of them. See *Fetha Nagast*, 501; also quoted in John Markakis, *Ethiopia: Anatomy of Traditional Polity* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1974). The first text appeared in Ge'ez in the fifteenth century with adaptations from Egyptian Coptic text. It has been translated into Amharic and English. It contains various selections on property, canon, family, criminal law and kings.

Still, it is not clear whether the process of consolidation in Qellem was complete when Ras Goobanaa arrived or if his coming was decisive in consummating that process. Terefe Woldetsadik supports the former. Other sources are silent. Qellem tradition has it that when Jootee learned about Goobanaa's expedition towards his realm, he turned to his rivals, abeetuu Abbaa Gimbii of Anfilloo and *abetu* Abbaa Daannoo of Sadii, to persuade them to form an alliance against the Amhara forces coming against all of them. The three *abeetuus* agreed to present a united front against Goobanaa's forces and sealed their agreement with a solemn oath (*kakaa*). When Goobanaa arrived in the territory of Abbaa Daannoo at Sadii, however, there was no sign of confrontation between Jootee and Goobanaa. Jootee and Abbaa Daannoo met Goobanaa at Komboo (about 50kms from Dambi-Doolloo) and peacefully submitted to him as Morodaa Bakaree of Leeqaa Naqamtee did. Reportedly, Jootee offered gifts to Goobanaa as a symbol of his desire to submit peacefully to Menilek's suzerainty. In return, Goobanaa gave Jootee the title of Dajjasmach and declared him governor of the region west of Morodaa's territory, with the exception of Bella Shangul to the North. On his part, Jootee agreed to pay an annual tribute to Menilek, to be converted to Christianity and allow the evangelization of the people.

By 1885, the advance of the Shawan forces led by Ras Goobanaa to the west was underway. The seriousness of the danger for Qellem was first realized in Sadii when, in the same year, Amhara reconnaissance arrived at Tulluu Kuchoo, also known as Amaara Kuchoo (Amaara of Kuchoo) west of Aayira in the region then under the rule of Abbaa Daannoo.¹⁴ From Sadii, Ras Goobanaa first went to Gidaamii to visit the home and the center of Jootee. Both Goobanaa and Jootee marched south against Anfilloo and western Sayyoo through Horroo, Jimmaa and Amaara. Nagasso's informants of Galaan unanimously agree that the only resistance Goobanaa met was from Dhaa'ee clan and from the Anfilloo under the leadership of Abbaa Gimbii of Anfilloo.

Thus, Qellem was conquered by the Amhara of Shawa and was solely added into the Ethiopian empire state. The process of state formation in the region was thus interrupted. The process of state formation was discontinued, owing to complex historical factors and constellations. One important reason was the military support whereby European imperialist powers enabled Menilek II to conquer the Oromo. A second reason, as important as the first, was the internal rivalry between the ruling families and leading individuals of Qellem. The setting they established to compete with one another made the people of Qellem suffer under their rule and it enabled alien occupants to establish an even harsher administration.

In the late 1880's therefore a direct relationship had been created between the ruler of Qellem and Menilek's government in Addis Ababa. This was to exist for a

¹⁴ Gidada, *History of the Sayyoo Oromoo*, 237.

long time. According to an agreement between Menilek and Jootee, no *nafxanyaa*¹⁵ (armies or commanders) were to be settled in Jootee's lands but Jootee was to pay an annual tribute. He had also to render military support to Menilek.¹⁶ The Ethiopian Orthodox Church (EOC), at this critical time, was given an assignment of integrating the province by Christianizing inhabitants of the region. Since this church arrived in Qellem with forces of the conquest, it was soon understood as an alien institution. EOC was then seen by the Macca Oromo of Qellem only as an agent of oppression and exploitation. The Church also failed to contrast this understanding when it was observed using, for its service, the Ge'eze language, which could never be understood by a significant portion of the population in the northern half of the country, let alone by the Oromo, and the Church did not worry about proselytizing the population. Thus, EOC was soon won over by Protestantism, which had been able to use *Afaan Oromoo* (Oromo language) in its evangelization and was able to separate itself from the Amhara government.

A strong vassalage had been created by Menilek in Qellem. Menilek's rule was, however, only indirect and the internal affairs of Qellem were entirely in the hands of Jootee and his officials. Taxes and tributes were collected by the *balabats* of each district and were paid directly to Jootee, who paid an annual tribute to Menilek. The local land holding system was untouched at first. The annual tribute may not have been a burden in the eyes of the local rulers for gold and ivory were in abundance in those days it is said.¹⁷ The growth of Jootee's power in Qellem helped Menilek in his systematic annexation of almost all parts of Qellem, leading to the completion of Wallagga's conquest. At the same time, it also initially spared the people of Qellem from direct settlement and feudal exploitation by the Shawan *nafxanyaa*.

Integration and Resistance: Qellem-Addis Ababa Relations (1896-1918)

The most important and indisputably clear impact of the Ethiopian victory at the Battle of Adwa, on 1 March 1896 in Qellem, was the gradual erosion of regional autonomy and cultural identity it brought. Qellem tradition has it that the amount of annual taxation to be paid by Jootee after Adwa was doubled.

Soon after Adwa, Qellem was ordered to participate in the conquest of Bella-Shangul in 1897-98. Qellem seems to have been of great help to Menilek in

¹⁵ The term *nafxanyaa* used in this paper is representative of Oromoo sound for the Amharic *naftagna*. The term was derivative of Arabic word *nefi* which means firearm. *Nafxanyaa* was the Shawan-Amhara colonial settler who had a gun and used it to impose colonialism at gun point.

¹⁶ It is interesting to note that almost similar arrangements were made between Menilek and Sultan Abba Jifar II of Jimma. Menilek offered Abba Jifar terms which secured complete local control and immunity from Abyssinian interference in return for an annual tribute and assistance in the war against Kafa, imam's enemy. See Major C.W. Gwynn, "A Journey in Southern Abyssinia," *Geographical Journal* 38, no. 2 (1911) 118, 133; C.F.J.G. Vanderheyem, *Une Expedition Ovec le Negous Menelik* (Paris, 1896), 90-110; H. Marcus, "Motives, Methods and Some Results of the Unification of Ethiopia During the Reign of Menilek II," *Proceedings of the Third International Conference of Ethiopian Studies* (1969), 275-276.

¹⁷ Tesema Ta'a, "The Oromo of Wallagga," 82-83.

extending the border towards the Sudan. *Shiek* Khojele of Assosa had sought an alliance with the British against the Ethiopian empire state.¹⁸ A large Ethiopian army, made up of the three groups: Leeqaa-Naqamtee under Kumsaa, Qellem under Jootee and those under Ras Makonnen, arrived at Mandii ready to fight the Bella-Shangul leaders.¹⁹ On the arrival of Makonnen, Shiek Khojele is said to have sided with him against Tor Elguri, another leader in Bela-Shangul. Thus, Makonnen's troops did not enter Khojale's territory but returned to Harar after nine months of campaigning at Bela-Shangul. Later, Shiek Khojele was found to be intriguing with the British. The coalition forces captured Shiek Khojele and sent him to Menilek, who imprisoned him. Bella-Shangul was put under Ras Damissaw's lieutenant, *Fitawrari* Gulilat. His soldiers were not popular and as a result Damissaw's rule became more chaotic after five years. Therefore, Menilek put Bella-Shangul under Kumsaa from 1903-1908.²⁰

After Bella-Shangul had been conquered, a boundary agreement was made and a British explorer, Major Gwynn, who had accompanied Cornel Harrington to Addis Ababa to get Menilek's concurrence in the boundary, sent a letter to Menilek outlining the proposed boundary. Menilek read the letter with a map of the country in front of him. He found that the letter's description and the map were correct, so he accepted the settlement of the boundary set at Kurmuk. In return, concessions were given to the English to mine gold in Bella-Shangul. Menilek immediately wrote to Kumsaa, ordering him to send soldiers from Leeqaa Naqamtee to watch and make sure that neither the Sudanese nor the Ethiopians crossed the new line and settled. Informants agree that soldiers were sent in accordance with the orders of the king.²¹ Finally, in 1908-09 Gwynn was appointed as a British commissioner to carry out a permanent demarcation. Menilek agreed that he should show the frontier to the Ethiopian chiefs who represented both governments.²²

In Qellem, however, the Shawan presence was being felt more and more as the years went by, after the Battle of Adwa. This growing Shawan intervention resulted in strained relations and constant tug of war between Qellem and Addis Ababa. It is also worthwhile to note that *Dajjach* Jootee was extremely reluctant to cooperate with Menilek, particularly in executing land measurement. He emphatically

¹⁸ Atieb Ahmed Dafalla, "Shiek Khojele Al-Hassan and Bela-Shangul (1825-1938)" (B.A. thesis, Addis Ababa University, 1973), 50.

¹⁹ Tesema Ta'a, "The Oromo of Wallagga," 93.

²⁰ Atieb Ahmed Dafalla, "Shiek Khojele Al-Hassan and Bela-Shangul," 42. The Bela-Shangul expedition was undertaken against Sheik Khojele of Asossa (Agoldi) and other leaders of the region who sought alliance with the British against Ethiopia. Kumsaa of Naqamtee, Jootee of Qellem and Ras Mekonnen of Harar led a large army towards the Sudanese border and were successful in obtaining Sheik Khojele's submission after a nine-months campaign. For the detailed discussion of the expedition see Alessandro Triulzzi, "Salt, Gold and Legitimacy: Prelude to the History of No Man's Land, Belashangul, Wallagga, Ethiopia, (ca.1800-1889)" (Napoli, 1981), in addition to Atieb Ahmed Dafalla, op. cit., 42-50.

²¹ Alessandro Triulzzi and Tesema Ta'a, *Ya Wallagga Ya Tarik Sanadoch ka 1880wochu iska 1920wochu* [Documents for Wallagga History, 1880s to 1920s E.C.] (Addis Ababa, Ginbot 4, 1895 E.C.); Harold Marcus, "Ethio-British Negotiations Concerning the Western Border with Sudan, 1896-1902," *Journal of African History* 4 (1963): 96.

²² Ibid.

refused to introduce the *qalad* system, which was done by the Leeqaa-Naqamtee authorities. The Qellem local autonomy turned out to be more apparent than real as early as November 1908, when the region was directly entrusted to Fitawrari Sahla-Giorgis (brother of Ras Tasama Nadaw), though its complete erosion was in the early 1920s. In 1909 Jootee was imprisoned in Addis Ababa on the pretext of secret dealings with the British colonial government in the Sudan and misgovernment or maladministration. Under the leadership of Mardaasaa, Jootee's son, many people reacted sharply and expressed their discontent by taking up arms against the new governor and his supporters. Although the rebellion was temporarily suppressed, it was not completely quelled until Jootee was released and reinstated as a governor in 1912.²³ These and other related stories of Qellem have been discussed in detail elsewhere²⁴ and need not be repeated here. Menilek's interference gradually increased in the autonomous province of Qellem after he had consolidated his authority following Adwa. Menilek sent a number of Nagadras to Qellem to collect revenues at custom gates and markets.

The situation in Qellem had thus taken a turn for worse, following Adwa. Jootee was placed under the pressure of Ras Tasama Nadaw, appointed by Menilek, who acted as an overseer of Jootee. The settlement of northern soldiers in Qellem led to the displacement of the indigenous inhabitants who fled in masses to Begii. The people felt discomfited after their land and property had been given to the new settlers. This case disappointed Jootee, in whose domain the number of new settlers by far exceeded that of Naqamtee, numbering up to 9,000 Gondare soldiers with a political and economic upper hand over the local people.²⁵

Following his victory over Anfilloo, Jootee was accused of substantial intimidation on the people of Anfilloo, Bella-Shangul and his rivals like Buraayyuu Abbaa-Gosaa in Sayyoo. They appealed to Ras Tasama Nadaw, later to be nominated as guardian to the throne and tutor to the young prince Iyasu in 1909, with contempt since the Ras was his enemy.²⁶

In the years between 1909 and 1911 the Gondare were settled in Qellem under the leadership of Dajjach, later Ras, Birru W/Gabrel. The Gondare were given land and tenants in lieu of their services in the army of Menilek and/or Iyasu. Jootee had acrimoniously opposed their settlement and Ras Tasama used this as a pretext to imprison him. Jootee was condemned to a life imprisonment at Ankober, during which time his followers fled in mass to Begii because of the Gondare oppression.

²³ C.F.C.W. Guynn, "The Frontiers of Abyssinia, A Retrospect," *Journal of the Royal African Society* (1937): 150-155.

²⁴ Triulzi and Tesema, *Ya Wallagga Ya Tarik Sanadoch ka 1880wochu iska 1920wochu*, 143-146.

²⁵ Bahru Zewde, "A Biography of Dajjazmach Jote Tullu, 1855-1918" (B.A. thesis, Haile Sillassie I University, 1970): 40-55; Alessandro Triulzi, "Social Protest and Rebellion in Some Gebbar Songs from Qellem, Wallagaa," in Proceedings of the Fifth International Conference on Ethiopian Studies (Rotterdam, 1980), 178; *Ibid.*, "Salt," 166; Nagasso Gidada, "The Impact of Christianity in Qellem Awrajjja, 1886-1941" (B.A thesis, Haile Sillassie I University, 1970), 5-6; Alberto Sbachi, *Mussolini, Fascism and Colonial Experience* (London, 1985), 160.

²⁶ Terefe Woldetsadik, "The Unification of Ethiopia (1800-1935, Wallagga)," *The Journal of Ethiopian Studies* 6, no. 1 (1964): 84-85.

Desirous to ask the monarch of England to mediate between his father and Menilek, Mardaasaa, Jootee's son, proceeded to London through the Sudan. After three years sojourn in London, he obtained a letter from King George to the Emperor of Ethiopia. On his arrival at Addis Ababa, Mardaasaa, however, refused to hand the letter to Tasama. Lastly, Menilek summoned him to his court, received the letter and rebuked him for going to Britain. He persuaded the Emperor, by reasoning that he went to England only to ask for a mediator. Mardaasaa finally succeeded in getting his father released and reinstated to his territories and authority.

Yet, other sources remark that the main reason for Jootee's imprisonment was not only opposition to the new settlers and vengeance on his rivals, but also his refusal to obey Menilek in granting the land beyond Hora-gubaa²⁷ (hot spring) to the British.²⁸ Nevertheless, all sources agree that Jootee did not enjoy his authority and freedom for long because he died after he was released from prison in 1918.²⁹ Thus, it is possible to argue that Qellem's autonomy almost certainly ended with Jootee's death and the territory's fall under the Shawan generals.

The series of events that led to this inglorious end of Jootee's career are not fully investigated, but two factors have so far been known to scholars. These are the generally harsh nature of his administration³⁰ and his discordant relationship with his overlord in Iluu Abbaa Booraa,³¹ Ras Tasama. Jootee's violent and unpredictable behavior was presented as a cause for both circumstances by one writer in particular. Even though Jootee's harshness was evident, it was the Shawan Amhara who had exaggerated and capitalized on it to snatch the rich province from Jootee. Contributing Jootee's imprisonment and eventual removal to his harshness towards rivals and/or criminals only produces a fun, since Menilek had no room for defending the interests and security of peoples of the South, in general, and the Oromoo, in particular. Available written evidence testify that Menilek was an adversary to these peoples. Mass killing, enslavement, torture, amputation of hands and legs committed by Menilek in Arsii and Wolayita³² following the crush of their

²⁷ Hora Gubaa is found between Gidaamii and the Sudan border then claimed by the British.

²⁸ Alemu Shuie, "Wallagga During Italian Occupation, 1936-1941" (master's thesis, Addis Ababa University, 2002), 19.

²⁹ Terefe Woldetsadik, "Unification," 84-85; Alemu, "Wallagga During Italian Occupation," 19.

³⁰ Jootee's oppressive rule was highlighted in the violent and cruel suppression of the Anfilloo uprising at which time he hung seven of his brothers-in-law. Other rebels were said to have been yoked to the ground for some time. Qagnazmach Toobboo Misoo, the chief of Gidaamii, was confined in a well for seven years. A still more odious form of punishment, with which Jootee's name is readily associated, was tying a big stone on the back of dissidents and throwing them into the Qambarrii river.

³¹ Iluu Abbaa Booraa is located in the southwestern part of Ethiopia. It is another big territory largely inhabited by the Maccaa Oromoo. Formerly, the region was extended as far as the Ethio-Sudanese border in the west, Wallagga in the northeast and Kafa in the southwest. Currently, Iluu Abbaa Booraa is one of the zones in the Oromia regional state. It is bounded by Gambella in the west, eastern Wallagga and Jimma in the east, Kafa and Sheka zones of the Southern Nations Nationalities and Peoples in the south and Western Wallagga and Wallagga Qellem in the North. According to the 2007 population and housing census the total population of Iluu Abbaa Booraa is 1,278,183.

³² For the painful memories on Arsii see, Abbas Haji, "Arsi Oromo Political and Military Resistance Against the Shoan Colonial Conquest (1881-1886)," *The Journal of Oromo Studies* 2, nos. 1 & 2 (1995); and for the atrocities in Wolayta see Vanderheyem, C.F.J.G. *Une Expedition Ovec le Negous Menelik* (Paris, 1896).

resistance suffices to describe this. Jootee's acrimonious relations with Ras Tasama were already instigated by accusation from his deadly rivals, like Buraayyuu Abbaa Gosaa. Gambella also appears to have been a bone of contention between Jootee and Tasama. It was reported that Tasama was infuriated when Gambella was given to Jootee. To discredit Jootee, Tasama was then supposed to have forged a letter to the British in the name of Jootee and to have sent it to Menilek.³³ It is thus clear that Addis Ababa used these as excuses to gradually erode the nominal local autonomy of Qellem.³⁴

From the preceding discussion and pieces of evidence it is not difficult to understand that Qellem's local autonomy was increasingly threatened, particularly during the post Adwa period. Apparently, the survival of Qellem was in the personality of Jootee.

Qellem's Resistance: Exploitation, Oppression and the Question for Secession (1918-1941)

As soon as Qellem was conquered by the Ethiopian empire state its trusted leader's resistance to Addis Ababa's orders became clear. Jootee's resistance, to the orders of Addis Ababa, was soon manipulated by his enemies, which complicated his relations with Addis Ababa. Among other reasons used by Jootee's enemies to remove him from his power base was the alleged harshness he showed in punishing criminals and his local enemies.

Because of the allegation of Jootee's misrule, Qellem was put under hand-picked governors directly appointed from the central government. The governors came with their own soldiers, alien to the culture and society in the area. More than 9,000 Amhara (Gondare) were also settled in the polity. With this, cultural conflict had assumed its synthesis.³⁵ Thus, with the advent of the new administration, severe socio-economic and political problems were faced by a majority of the indigenous inhabitants. The people immediately felt it was an alien rule with no mercy. Opposition against the new administration had immediately surfaced, led

³³ Bahru, 1976: 48.

³⁴ Even though some writers seriously complain the harshness of Jootee, the atrocities committed by the Shewan military colonists on the people of Qellem after the death of the former was unprecedented and brutal. The atrocities included enslavement. It was with the arrival of Dajjach (later Ras) Birru Walde Gabriel, the newly appointed governor, and the *Malkaanyaa*, Qellem experienced the most oppressive rule ever witnessed. Human beings irrespective of social status and other values were counted, registered and distributed among the retinue of the alien governors. The already existing political and socio-cultural conflicts between the Amhara settlers and the indigenous Oromo were reinforced. With this also a new administrative machinery alien to the people was installed. For the detail see Raga Abdisa, "A Brief Survey of Land Tenure System in Qellem, Western Wallaga, c.1880-1944" (B.A. thesis, Addis Ababa University, 1984), 47; Kebede Kejela, "A Biography of Dejazmach Habte-Mariam Gebre-Egziaber" (B.A. thesis, Addis Ababa University, 1989), 31; Altaye Tadese, "A Historical Survey of Dembi Dollo (1880-1941)" (B.A. thesis, Addis Ababa University, 1984), 15; Nagasso Gidada, "Impact of Christianity"; *ibid.*, "Oromo Historical Poems and Songs: Conquest and Exploitation in Western Wallaga, 1886-1927," *Horn of Africa* 5, no.3 (1982): 2-19.

³⁵ Tesema Ta'a, *Political Economy*, 97.

by Mardaasaa. It was said that unparalleled crushing measures were taken by the governors.³⁶

Although Jootee was reinstated in 1912, he died in 1918. It was the death of Jootee which finally determined Qellem's loss of regional autonomy and put it under the direct control of the central government in Addis Ababa. With the arrival of Dajjach (later Ras) Birru Wolde Gebriel, the newly appointed governor, and the Malkaanyaa, Qellem experienced the most oppressive rule ever witnessed. Human beings, irrespective of social status and other values, were counted, registered and distributed among the retinue of the alien governors. The already existing political and socio-cultural conflicts between the Amhara settlers and the indigenous Oromo were reinforced. With this, a new administrative machinery, alien to the people, was installed.³⁷

Even though an independent study has never been made on the consequences of Qellem's autonomy, some features of the system have been outlined, among others, by Triulzi, Nagaso, and Kabada Kajela. The songs collected by Triulzi on Qellem peasant rebellions, appear interesting because they fully express the deep feelings of hatred, anger, and frustration of the Qellem Oromo *gabbars* under the *nafxanyaa* rule of the Amhara overlords directly. The songs, apart from depicting the severe set of rules and obligation of the *gabbar-nafxanyaa* relationship, show how people felt towards, and reacted to, administrative structure of oppression in Qellem history. These songs are also important for they give us the social background to one of the few recorded peasant revolts in Wallagga history, that of 1909-1912, which for a short span freed Qellem of the occupying Amhara forces, was the cause for the subsequent military occupation of the country, and eventually led to several thousand *gabbar* families to leave Qellem for the more hospitable highlands of Begii up north.

The oppression encountered by the Oromo of Qellem during the governorship of Dajjzmach Birru W/Gabriel (1918-1927) and his successor, could not be compared in any case with the harshness of Jootee. Both the periods of Jootee (1886-1909, 1912-1918) and the *Nafxanyaa* Amhara, headed by the aforementioned figures, had been miserable for the Oromo of Qellem. The latter, however, was unique in its degree of oppression. Various scholars agree that the period of Birru W/Gabriel was a time when the people of Qellem experienced slavery. Even under Hailamariam Chare, Dajjzmach Makonnen Wassane's *indarassee*, the introduction of slavery, Kebede argues that the Oromo of Qellem becoming mere slaves was beyond a shadow of doubt.

³⁶ Triulzi, 1977: 177-196.

³⁷ Raga Abdissa, "A Brief Survey," 47; Kebede Kejela, "Biography of Dejzmach Habte-Mariam Gebre-Egziaber," 31; Altaye Tadesse, "Historical Survey of Dembi Dollo," 15; *ibid.*, "Oromo Historical Poems and Songs: Conquest and Exploitation in Western Wallagga, 1886-1927," *Horn of Africa* 5, no. 3 (1982): 2-19.

In any case, Qellem was relieved from such a heavy-handed oppression when, with the order from the Emperor, the province was added to Habta Mariam's province in October 1931. It was Qellem's addition into Habta Mariam's province that had provided us with written evidence of atrocities encountered by the Oromo of Qellem under the Amhara. One of the most important letters in *Documents for Wallagga History* (1880s-1920s EC), written by Dajjazmach Habta-Mariam to Emperor Haile Sellasse I (r.1930-1974), on crimes committed by Fitawrari Haila-Mariam Chare, Dajjazmach Mekonnen Wassane's inderasse in Qellem³⁸ suffices to show the level of exploitation and suppression by the Amhara agents in Qellem. No sooner than Fitawrari Ashanafi Walda Mariam, a salaried official, was appointed over Qellem to relieve Habta Mariam of his responsibility there, than the country faced the Italian invasion.³⁹

The period of Italian occupation, 1935-1941, is important because it demonstrates the degree of integration of the conquered regions to the empire state of Ethiopia. In fact, the conquest and incorporation was imposed against the will of the people, which resulted in the loss of their traditional political independence. This was followed by the imposition of the gabbar system. Consequently, they were subjected to an intolerable economic exploitation, as well as political, social and cultural oppression.⁴⁰ The occupation clearly showed that the conquered regions were less integrated because of economic exploitation, cultural domination and political dictation, as in Qellem.

As already indicated, there had been widespread opposition to the Gondare settlers and the Abyssinian administration, which was primarily expressed by escaping to the regions where the Gondare dominance was not exercised, in Qellem even before the Italian invasion.

Nevertheless, as long as the coercive machinery of the Abyssinian administration existed, there could not be active resistance. Consequently, among most of the Oromo of Wallagga, the mobilization call of the Ethiopian government against the Italian invasion of 1935 was not accepted because of truly patriotic sentiment.⁴¹ Most of the balabats (hereditary chiefs) did not want to endanger their *sisso* (literally a third) right. In addition, those who might not participate in the campaign had to surrender their rifles to compensate for the shortage of firearms, which is certainly incompatible with the masculine tradition of any society.⁴² On the other

³⁸ Alessandro Triulzi and Tesema Ta'a, *Ya Wallagga Ya Tarik Sanadoch Ka 1880wochu iska 1920wochu*, 172-173. This volume is currently in Amharic. I am grateful to Prof. Tesema Ta'a, my PhD Thesis advisor, for allowing me to use his translation for the upcoming English version of the volume.

³⁹ Tesema Ta'a, "The Oromo of Wallagga," 85-86; Boshera Jarbo, "Land Tenure System in Limmu Warada, Northeastern Wallagga (c.1870-1936)" (B.A. thesis, Addis Ababa University, 1988), 43-44.

⁴⁰ Adrin Zervous, *L'Empire d'Ethiopia* (Alexandria, 1936), 401; Richard Pankhurst, "The Trade of Southern and Western Ethiopia and the Indian Ocean Ports in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries," *The Journal of Ethiopian Studies* 3 (1965): 520.

⁴¹ Foreign Office Archives, (hereafter FO). 371/20206, 1936:150-1510.

⁴² Alemu Shuie, "Wallagga During Italian Occupation," 30-31.

hand, the peasants, as usual, could either pay for their exemption or participate in the campaign to give labor services.

During the early months of Italian invasion, Goree became a new capital of the exiled government under *Bitwaded* Walda-Tsadiq as a Prime Minister and Ras Imiru as a viceroy respectively. Goree, in south-western Ethiopia, had an advantage of having a British consulate and a means of communication with the outside world, particularly with London. Economically, the South-west was already a British protectorate and from the Oromoo's elite point of view a British mandate would have been preferable to the Shawan or Italian rule. Just before Imiru's arrival in the south west, the Oromoo potentates had indeed formed a "Western [Oromo] Confederation," and were appealing to Anthony Eden for recognition and protection.⁴³

With the disintegration of the Ethiopian army, the provincial administration all over the country collapsed. The real attitude of the people of the conquered regions was exposed when the coercive machinery that had suppressed it was undermined.⁴⁴ In Wallagga, there seems to have been no decision as to what course of action to follow initially. Three options seem to have been open to the people soon after the disintegration of the Ethiopian administration. The first option was complete independence from both the Ethiopian administration and the Italians and joining the movement known as the "Western [Oromo] Confederation." The second and the third options were either to collaborate with the Italians or resist their rule for the restoration of the Ethiopian administration.⁴⁵

As regards the first option, in May 1936, the political movement for the creation of the "Western [Oromo] Confederation," under the leadership of the Dajjazmach Habtamariam Gabra-Egzabher, as already noted, was initiated in Wallagga.⁴⁶ The Confederation sought to include all Oromo of western and southwestern Ethiopia. The official letters exchanged with the British consul at Gambella state that the objective of the Confederation was complete secession from the Ethiopian empire state.⁴⁷ Evident is also the fact that the letters demanded, through the British diplomatic channels, the recognition of the League of Nations to the Confederation whose government would soon be reorganized and put under the British mandate

⁴³ Markakis, *Anatomy of Traditional Polity*, 293-297; Marcus, "Ethio-British Negotiations," 190-93; C.W. McClellan "Reaction to Ethiopian Expansionism: The Case of Darasa, 1895-1935" (Ph.D. diss., Michigan State University, 1978), 3-5; Sbacchi, *Mussolini*, 35; Tesema Ta'a, "The Bonayya Incident and the Italian Occupation of Nekemte, 1936-1941," in *XIIIth International Conference of Ethiopian Studies*, vol. 1 (Tokyo, Japan, 1997), 264.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 130.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 130-131.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.* See also FO 371/20206, June 11 1936: 219-220.

⁴⁷ Alemu, "Wallagga During Italian Occupation," 28-30; Oljira Tujuba, "Oromo-Amhara Relations in Horro-Guduru Awrajja (Northeastern Wallagga) ca.1840s-1941" (master's thesis, Addis Ababa University, 1994), 131.

of the British government. Nevertheless, the scheme of the “Western [Oromo] Confederation” was shattered and doomed to failure.⁴⁸

Finally, the failure of the “Western [Oromo] Confederation,” meant that Qellem and other parts of Wallagga left with the two options: fighting against the Italian rule or collaboration with them. The region initially welcomed the Italian invasion and the Italians favored the Oromo against the former agents of the Ethiopian government, until they consolidated their power. The Italians completed the occupation of Wallagga in 1937. Later on, however, guerrilla resistance became a widespread project among the Oromoo of Wallagga.⁴⁹

⁴⁸ The “Western [Oromo] Confederation” failed perhaps because of two basic reasons. First, the British seems to have no appreciation for the scheme that would have inevitably create misunderstandings with the Italian government. It is important to note that one official document vividly underlines the attitude of the British officials. It states that if the Oromoo petition was laid before the members of the League at Geneva nothing could convince the Italians that the whole scheme developed without the secret involvement of the British. Secondly, before any success could be registered, the Italians conquered and controlled the region, thereby forestalling the formation of the “Western [Oromo] Confederation.” For the detail see FO 371/20206, “Situation in Western Ethiopia,” A Report from Consul Erskine to Foreign Office (London), June 24, 1936; P. Gilkes, *The Dying Lion: Feudalism and Modernization in Ethiopia* (London, 1975), 213-214.

⁴⁹ Alemu Shuie, “Wallagga During Italian Occupation,” 100-130.

Did Slavery Really Matter in Grand Cayman, Cayman Islands?: Confronting Roy Bodden's Anti-Slavocratic Sentiments

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Introduction

The islands of Cayman Brac and Little Cayman were first sighted by Christopher Columbus on 10 May 1503¹ (we cannot be certain when Grand Cayman was first sighted, but in 1586 English Captain and Privateer Sir Francis Drake and his fleet found themselves in Grand Cayman on a two day layover).² Uninhabited, these islands remained relatively worthless Spanish New World properties until 1655, when the English seized Spanish Jamaica and in their efforts gained all three Cayman Islands which are located 180 miles to the northwest of Jamaica and have a combined land mass of roughly 100 square miles.³ From 1658 to 1670, the islands' reputation for turtle – a reputation in place since the previous century – led to Little Cayman's temporary settlement.⁴ Although it has been widely believed that Cayman Brac was also settled at this time, there is no conclusive evidence here. However, we can be certain that the village on Little Cayman was a coastal one consisting of at least twenty thatched dwellings, which had its own governor who was referred to as Captain Ary.⁵ Based on incomplete archeological evidence, Roger Smith has conjectured that these dwellings were not permanent ones but were used by fishermen who came to Little Cayman at certain times during the year to fish and catch turtle.⁶ The governor may have simply just been an overseer, especially at a time when Spanish-Anglo tensions were high and these fishermen would have needed added protection.

Nonetheless, in July 1670, just before Thomas Lynch was to replace Thomas Modyford as Jamaica's governor, the Jamaican Council issued a proclamation to the settlers on Little Cayman, pardoning the “divers, Soldiers, Planters . . . [and]

¹ See Ferdinand Columbus, *The Life of the Admiral Christopher Columbus by his son Ferdinand*, translated by Benjamin Keen (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1958), 64.

² Michael Craton, *He Hath Founded it Upon the Seas* (Kingston: Ian Randle Publishers, 2003), 17.

³ For detailed accounts of the circumstances surrounding the Cayman's Islands' cession to England in 1655, see Craton, *Founded*, chapter 2; See also Neville Williams, *A History of the Cayman Islands* (George Town: Cayman Islands Government, 1970), 1-17.

⁴ The nature of early, temporary settlement on Little Cayman is not sufficiently documented to be given comprehensive treatment. However, given that by 1669, HMS *Hopewell* and its captain Samuel Hutchinson was dispatched to Little Cayman to protect the interest of seamen there, together with the mention of a governor Ary as 'Governor' of Caymanas, it should be accepted that some form of settlement was in place on Little Cayman, Cayman Brac, or both islands at this time. See especially “Deposition of Captain Hutchinson,” 16 June 1669, Public Records Office (hereafter PRO), Colonial Office (hereafter CO) 1/25, f.151.

⁵ When Spanish Privateer Rivero Pardal conducted a successful raid on the tiny coastal village of Little Cayman in April of 1669, three months later in July, he penned, ‘I went on shoare at Caymanos, and fought with Captain Ary and burned twenty houses.’ See ‘River Pardal's Reprisal Commission’, 5 July 1670, PRO, CO 1/25, f.5; See also Roger Smith, *The Maritime Heritage of the Cayman Islands* (Gainesville, University Press of Florida, 2000) 89-95.

⁶ Smith, *The Maritime Heritage*, 93-94.

Privateers [of their] past irregular Actions.” if they returned to Jamaica within one year of its issue.⁷ In light of the proclamation, the commissioner to the Cayman Islands between 1907 and 1912, George Hirst, made the supposition that the class of settlers on Little Cayman was too dangerous to leave alone for prolonged periods of time, hinting at their piratical proclivities;⁸ similarly, Jamaican historian Edward Long asserted in 1774 that the “present race of inhabitants [on Grand Cayman] are said to be descendants of the British Bucaniers [sic].”⁹ Former Deputy Keeper of British Public Records Neville Williams offered another suggestion: Little Cayman’s total evacuation was necessary given the island’s isolation and thus vulnerability to Spanish attack.¹⁰ Indeed, on 14 April 1669, Spanish privateer Rivero Pardal conducted a successful raid on the village of Little Cayman, burning twenty of its dwellings to the ground and boasting of the incident in his challenge to Henry Morgan three months later.¹¹

In light of a fading piratical threat, the promise of a vibrant mahogany and fustic enterprise, and an abundance of turtles in surrounding waters, 1734 roughly marked the era of permanent settlement in Grand Cayman (Cayman Brac and Little Cayman were not permanently settled until 1833). Between 1734 and 1741 a total of five land patents were made; no more royal land patents were made during Grand Cayman’s slave century. Nonetheless, the introductory proprietor planter class totaled seven people: the first land patent was granted to Daniel and Mary Campbell and John Middleton in 1734; the remaining four land grants were made in 1741 – all four of them “authorized by [Jamaican] Governor Trelawny on the same day (August 20, 1741)”¹² – to Mary Bodden, Murray Crymble, William Foster, and Samuel Spofforth. With the exception of grantees Mary Bodden and William Foster, the other grantees had virtually disappeared from Cayman’s history by 1750 – perhaps because they had made their quick profit from Grand Cayman’s exhaustible timber supply.¹³ However, it should be noted that the grantees-cum-mahogany entrepreneurs were initially required to pay a yearly rent of 2 shillings, and were likely to have arrived with their slaves and white servants not long after the grants had been made; as with Jamaican law, one white man was needed for every ten slaves.¹⁴

⁷ See “Resolution of the Jamaican Council, Port Royal,” 12 June 1671, PRO, CO 140/1, ff. 223-5.

⁸ George S.S. Hirst, *Notes on the History of the Cayman Islands* (Grand Cayman: Cayman Islands Government, 1967 first published in 1910), 74.

⁹ Edward Long, *The History of Jamaica. Or, General survey of the ancient and modern state of that islands: With reflection, settlements, inhabitants, climate, products, commerce, laws, and government*, vol. 1 (London: T. Lowndes, 1774), 312.

¹⁰ Williams, *A History*, 11.

¹¹ See footnote 5.

¹² Craton, *Founded*, 39.

¹³ Facsimiles of the original land grants are to be found in Hirst, *Notes*, part 2, chapter 1.

¹⁴ Hirst, *Notes*, part 2. See also Orlando Patterson, *The Sociology of Slavery* (London: Associated University Presses, 1969), 56; Stanley Engerman et al., “The Demographic Structure of the Caribbean Slave Societies in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries,” in *General History of the Caribbean: The Slave Societies of the Caribbean*, vol. 3 ed. Franklin McKnight (London: UNESCO Publishing, 1997), 62-4.

There is no evidence for Grand Cayman's population by 1734, but in 1774 George Gauld, a visiting hydrologist, estimated that approximately 400 people lived in Grand Cayman: approximately 200 of these inhabitants were free and the remaining 200 constituted slaves. By 1802, 993 inhabitants resided in the island, 58 percent of them slaves.¹⁵ The censuses taken in 1821 and 1826 did not distinguish between whites and free people of color, but the free population inclusive of free people of color represented 42.5 percent and 43.7 percent, respectively;¹⁶ and by April 1834, free Caymanians represented roughly 46 percent of a total population of 1800;¹⁷ indeed, slaves comprised the numerical majority to emancipation.

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In the initial analysis, in his book *The Cayman Islands in Transition*, Caymanian historian Roy Bodden attempts to link Cayman's settled past with its present to explain the dynamics of a changing society. Acknowledging his agenda from the outset, Bodden characterizes historical Caymanian society as a pigmentocracy, while simultaneously stressing that this society never really (comparatively speaking) represented a true slave society (I give a definition of the slave society concept just below).¹⁸ A pigmentocracy essentially refers to a society whose hierarchy is determined by nurtured and repressed understandings of racial superiority.¹⁹ Whereas historian Michael Craton reiterates that, although not the most economically prosperous British New World colony, Cayman should really be seen as a true slave society up until the slaves' emancipation on August 1, 1834,²⁰ Bodden contends simply that "the entire [historical Caymanian] social order was characterized on the basis of skin colour . . . [and thus a pigmentocracy as opposed to a slave society]."²¹

Although Craton claims that many Caymanian "slaves were able to live like subsistence farmers" as their emancipation approached due to Grand Cayman's declining cotton trade by around 1808, as slaves they still would have been subjected to the strictures of the colonial regime either as field or domestic laborers – notice here that they remained slaves and did not make the transition to freedmen

¹⁵ See, respectively, Cayman Islands National Archives (hereafter CINA), *Transcript of George Gauld's Description of Grand Cayman, 1773* (George Town: CINA, 1993); *Our Islands' Past: Edward Corbet's Report and Census of 1802 on the Cayman Islands*, vol.1 (George Town: CINA and Cayman Free Press, 1992), 21.

¹⁶ See An Account of the Population of Grand Caymanas, 26 Oct. 1826, PRO, CO 137/179, f347; the census of Jan. 1821 is also included in this dispatch; see, accordingly, the copy letter from James Coe Esq., dated 28 May 1826.

¹⁷ See Grand Caymanas Slave Returns, 1 April 1834, PRO, T71/243, ff.133-4.

¹⁸ Bodden, *The Cayman Islands*, 9.

¹⁹ Bodden invokes American historian Frank Tannenbaum's use of the term pigmentocracy. Yet, and on the contrary, channeling Bodden's coinage of this term through Tannenbaum's own usage brings us back to the inescapable understanding that a pigmentocracy was a "stratified society." Therefore, any understanding of the pigmentocracy, for Bodden's muse (that is, Tannenbaum), is implicated in the fact "the Negro, much against his will, was to become a participant in the building of the New World." There is nothing less relatively tense about a pigmentocracy in this sense; see Frank Tannenbaum, *Slave and Citizen: The Negro in the Americas* (New York: Random House, 1946), 127 and 35, respectively.

²⁰ Craton, *Founded*, 63.

²¹ Bodden, *The Cayman Islands*, 7.

and women after 1808.²² This claim, as positive as it may seem, forwards the inescapable social actuality of human bondage, an actuality which indeed begins to conform to historian Elsa Goveia's understanding that a "slave society may refer to [a] whole community based on slavery, [inclusive of] masters and freedmen as well as slaves." In her classic attempt to assess the slavocratic essence of the Leeward Islands of the Caribbean, Goveia's arguments hinge on attempting to "identify the basic principles which held the white masters, coloured freedmen, and Negro slaves together as a community, and to trace the influence of these principles on the relations between the Negro slave and his white master, which largely determined the form and content of the society."²³ Goveia's definition indicates that a slave society was premised on a social hierarchy in which the color of one's skin determined his or her position in that hierarchy. This triangular hierarchy consisted of the numerically minor European and creolized – or local born – whites at the top, followed by the numerically larger indigenous, largely miscegenated free people of color,²⁴ and finally, there were the preponderant blacks who would have either been Africans or else creole. In light of this social ordering, historian Gad Heuman was able to assert, using Jamaica as an enduring example, that slave societies were "dominated numerically by blacks and economically by whites," an assertion which becomes applicable to Cayman society up until 1834.²⁵ In this sense, Bodden's use of pigmentocracy to counter understandings associated with slave societies becomes negligible in the context of the slave society. This is not to say that slavocratic Cayman was not predicated on the social ordering of a pigmentocracy, for it was; rather, the term pigmentocracy is much too limited a nomenclature to describe a society where slavery existed and indeed proved institutionally important in the sense that it was a social, economic, and legal custom.

Like Bodden, sociologists Vered Amit and Ulf Hannerz are not inclined to assess historical Cayman's hierarchy in strict slavocratic terms. Amit, for instance, makes the historically bound presumption that because Grand Cayman lacked an absentee class and the "socioeconomic extremes and racial polarization associated with Caribbean plantation societ[ies] [in general]," it cannot be viewed as an authentic plantation society. In the Caribbean setting, a plantation society referred to a social structure that was premised on the economics of monoculture which, after 1510 especially, relied on African enslaved labor.²⁶ "[U]nlike most of the

²² Craton, *Founded*, 77-79.

²³ Elsa Goveia, *Slave Societies in the British Leeward Islands* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965), vii.

²⁴ It is important to stress here that in the early years of colonialism, whites outnumbered free people of colour, although by the emancipation of British West Indian slaves, free people of colour had become more numerous than whites. For the relevant statistics, see for instance, Orlando Patterson, *Slavery and Social Death: A Comparative Study* (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1985), 477-480.

²⁵ Gad Heuman, *Between Black and White: Race, Politics, and the Freed Coloreds in Jamaica, 1792-1865* (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1981), 3.

²⁶ See Franklin Knight, "Introduction," in *The Slave Societies of the Caribbean* vol. III of *A General History of the Caribbean*, ed. Franklin Knight (London: UNESCO Publishing, 1999), 1-8.

other Caribbean islands,” Amit continues, “the Caymanian dependence on the colonial metropolises was historically vested in a seafaring rather than a plantation economy.”²⁷ Amit continues to defend her argument of a non-plantocratic Grand Cayman by pointing to the absence of “institutions such as ‘family land,’ which appeared throughout the Caribbean region.”²⁸ In the colonial British West Indies especially, family land developed out of the condition of slavery, a development based “on [the] customary [and/or legal] rights [of black people] to land.” “Within the constraints of the plantation system,” such rights often referred to the slaves’ permitted access to land like provision grounds and kitchen gardens where they were allowed by their masters to cultivate their own produce, often producing surpluses which could be sold at public markets.²⁹ Yet, rights to land were also won by maroons – successful runaway slaves – said lands later developed into “sacred landscapes” of subsistence and habitation which would come to signify complete black autonomy.³⁰ Thus Amit’s superficial use of family land does not take into account Caribbean anthropologist Jean Besson’s compelling research on the origins of family land in the Caribbean and especially the ways in which access to land during slavery not only created a protopeasantry in the Caribbean – premised on Sidney Mintz’s idea that slaves especially should be seen as protopeasants given that they worked provision grounds for much of their own subsistence³¹ – but that this very access differed throughout the Caribbean. Indeed, Amit does not consider that the presence of provision grounds in Grand Cayman – in the face of the evidentiary absence of marronage there – should at the very least prompt preliminary ideas about the origins of family land – as defined above – in that colony as such ideas also work to forward the well-researched position of Mintz and Besson that although customary and legal rights to land among blacks varied with topography, any ostensible absence of such rights should not serve to impugn the slavocratic and/or plantocratic worth of the colony in question.³²

Amit’s understandings of historical Cayman prove to be somewhat compatible with Hannerz’s, who begins to explain his position on the matter: “For some time, cotton was exported to Jamaica,” he begins, “[and inchoate Caymanians] also kept horses, cattle, goats, pigs and poultry. Like their Jamaican counterparts, these settlers were slave owners, and the Cayman Islands thus began as a slave

²⁷ Amit, “A Clash of Vulnerabilities,” 579-580.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 580.

²⁹ Jean Besson, *Martha Brae’s Two Histories; European Expansion and Caribbean Culture Building in the Caribbean* (Kingston: Ian Randle Publishers, 2002), p. 86; see also Besson, “Family Land and Caribbean Society: Toward an Ethnography of Afro-Caribbean Peasantries,” in *Perspectives on Caribbean Regional Identity*, ed. Elizabeth M. Thomas-Hope (Liverpool: Centre for Latin American Studies, University of Liverpool Monograph Series no. 11, 1984), 57-83.

³⁰ Besson, *Martha Brae’s Two Histories*, 85-87.

³¹ See Sidney Mintz, *Caribbean Transformations* (New York: Columbia University, 1989).

³² *Ibid.*; see also Besson, “Land, Kinship and Community in the Post-Emancipation Caribbean: A Regional View of the Leewards,” in *Small Islands, Large Questions: Society, Culture and Resistance in the Post-Emancipation Caribbean*, ed. Karen Fog Olwig (London: Frank Cass, 1995), 73-99.

society.”³³ However, by constantly offsetting any Cayman-based system of slavery before emancipation with the “indispensable” occupations of wrecking and turtle-fishing, Hannerz imposes upon historical Cayman society a substantively non-slavocratic essence: Cayman slavery, then, according to him, cannot be “negatively” associated with the harsh enslaved regime of plantation societies because of “the absence of large plantations” in Grand Cayman; instead, Cayman’s colonial history becomes a more positive one “in terms of [the island’s] orientation to the sea,” and thus the importance of cotton cultivation to Cayman’s colonial economy is underestimated.³⁴ Hannerz’s somewhat short-sighted position begins to underpin economic historian Barry Higman’s terse, uncorroborated comment that Cayman’s economy to 1834 was solely invested in turtle, an assertion which automatically denies the numerically preponderant Caymanian slave any indispensable ideological, occupational, social, and cultural role in the forging of a Caymanian identity from the preceding decades.³⁵

The foregoing positions of Bodden, Amit and Hannerz seem contradictory: on the one hand they fleetingly acknowledge the very un-ideal, real fact of slavery in Cayman and by association its institutional corollary, but on the other they are quicker to confirm the diminished importance of slavery by subordinating the damned nature of the slightly numerically preponderant slave to the otherwise uncorroborated “bigheartedness” of their masters. Can one truly assume that slavery was not very harsh in the Cayman Islands, when compelling evidence exists that slaves there were publicly and brutally punished, treated no better than chattel, and subjected to long hours of back-breaking labor in the cotton fields? I am indeed aware that there is a methodological way with which to fuse the primary constituent arguments in the foregoing contradiction towards understanding historical Cayman as a true, if marginal, slave society, and I set out to do this below.

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Towards the refutation of Caymanian historian Roy Bodden’s claim that slavery never achieved institutional status in Grand Cayman,³⁶ and the confirmation that historical Grand Cayman was a slave society of seafaring origins, I juxtapose two historiographic statements; essentially economic in their descriptions, these statements launch a conceptual frame both for those ethnicities that “shared” Cayman soil and the extent of their interdependency.

The first statement implicates the white element of Cayman society, intimating that by 1800 “the first economic system in the islands was a basic one derived from

³³ Hannerz, *Caymanian Politics*, 24.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 30.

³⁵ See Barry Higman, *Slave Populations of the British Caribbean, 1807-1834* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University, 1984), 43.

³⁶ J.A. Roy Bodden, *The Cayman Islands in Transition: The Politics, History, and Sociology of a Changing Society* (Kingston, 2007), chapter 1.

the sea, but dispersed externally.”³⁷ Estimated at about one shilling per head by the late eighteenth century,³⁸ the green turtle especially was a very valuable New World commodity; when salted, turtle meat lasted longer than beef or pork and was an effective remedy against scurvy.³⁹ Although we are not given any precise annual figure of the amount of turtle caught, after speaking with the inhabitants on Grand Cayman in 1787, Captain Hull of HMS *Camilla* made the estimate that between 1,200 and 1,400 turtles were being sold at seaports in Jamaica per annum.⁴⁰ Furthermore, thirteen years earlier, in 1774, historian Edward Long was also able to say of the inhabitants on Grand Cayman: “Their principal occupation is the turtle-fishery[,] in which article they carry on a traffic with Port Royal [Jamaica], and supply some of such of the homeward-bound merchant ships as touch here in their way to the Gulph [i.e. the Gulf of Florida or the Gulf of Mexico.]”⁴¹

By 1802, Caymanian turtle-fishers caught the majority of their turtle in locally made sloops “[along] the Keys & Shoals on the South side of Cuba in groups of eight to nine per 20 to 50 sloop tonnage;” the sister islands’ earlier vast turtle supply had been virtually depleted, and together with their dangerous outlying reefs, those islands were frequented for turtle only in the quiet summer months of the turtle season.⁴² Indeed, Caymanian turtle-fishers were welcome in Cuban waters until the beginning of the Ten Years’ War (also known as the Cuban War of Independence) in 1868. During this period, non-Spanish ships were often seized in Cuban waters and held in detention; this proved the case, for instance, with Caymanian-manned and built schooners *Star* and *Lark*, seized in 1871 and 1872, respectively, which were released only after a fine was paid.⁴³ In spite of such an exceptional setback, and in addition to the fact of a depleted turtle yield in Cayman waters by this time, Caymanian seamen were also plying their turtle-fishing livelihood off the coasts of Honduras and Nicaragua by the 1840s, becoming well known for their maritime proficiency in this region by the onset of contemporary globalisation in Grand Cayman in the early 1970s.⁴⁴

³⁷ Smith, *The Maritime Heritage*, 67.

³⁸ In the absence of precise historical documentation, we cannot be sure of the exact cost of turtle by this time. Nonetheless, Hirst has speculated that turtle of the late eighteenth century might have secured this cost given that by the early 1830s they “were sold to Jamaica at three and four shillings each.” See Hirst, *Notes*, 27.

³⁹ Biologist Archie Carr has provided a compelling narrative on the importance of turtle in the historical New World: “while there were other sources from which to replace exhausted ship’s stores,” he begins, “none was as good, abundant, and sure as turtle; and no other edible creature could be carried away and kept so long alive . . . It was only the . . . turtle that could take the place of spoiled kegs of beef and send a ship on for a second year of wandering. All early activity in the New World tropics – exploration, colonization, buccaneering, and even the maneuvering of naval squadrons – was in some way or degree dependent on turtle. It was quick rescue when scurvy struck, and shipwrecked people lived on it for months or even years. Salted or dried, it everywhere fed the seaboard poor. It was at once a staple and a luxury.” See *The Windward Road: Adventures of a Naturalist on Remote Caribbean Shores* (London: Robert Hale Limited, 1980), 203-4.

⁴⁰ Quoted in Craton, *Founded*, 52.

⁴¹ Edward Long, *The History of Jamaica*, vol. 1, 310.

⁴² CINA, *Our Islands’ Past*, vol. 1, 8.

⁴³ For the incident involving the *Star*, see Grant to Kimberley, 10 March 1872, IB/5/18, vol. 33, no. 49; and for the *Lark*, see Grant to Kimberley, 8 Nov. 1873, IB/4/18, vol. 34, no. 188.

⁴⁴ See Archie Carr, *Windward Road*, chapter 9.

Still implicating the first historiographic statement, the opportunistic act of wrecking was also an economic mainstay of Grand Cayman in the first century of permanent settlement; Long was quick to remark of Caymanian seamen that “their crews were attentive to two points, turtling and plundering of wrecks.”⁴⁵ Indeed, opportunism may have been an ideal, necessary trait to possess in the maritime-driven New World, but that the trait was understood to be influenced by the somewhat amoral, thieving stance of piracy, rendered settling seamen especially suspect. Throughout New World history, merchant ships often ran aground due to inclement weather, darkness, or navigational folly, and if the receiver of wrecks was so authorized by the captain of the wreck in question to salvage any undamaged cargo, wrecking was not considered illegal. The wrecker and the ship’s captain, then, would have had to agree on the wrecker’s salvage fee, usually 50 percent of the ship’s proceeds, and the salvage would proceed on that principle.⁴⁶ However, that one colonial official understood “wrecking as the first cousin to piracy” reveals the occupation’s underbelly as, in addition to possibly precipitating wrecks, the potential wrecker often exposed his “pirate’s” side.⁴⁷ It is true that complications between wrecker and ship captain were likely to emerge, and Caymanian wreckers were known to abuse captains and crews, illegally making off with precious cargo and other valuables with the intention of either selling these items at a profit or keeping certain articles for themselves. In this sense, wrecking was considered as nothing more than a piratical-masquerading occupation, something which Spanish Captain Tirri had perhaps experienced firsthand given his vivid description of Caymanian seamen in 1797:

The islet [of Grand Cayman] is inhabited by a handful of lawless men who bear the name and accidentally carry on the trade of fisher-folk but who are in reality nothing more than sea-robbers. The island constitutes their lair and it is the place where they hide their ill-gotten gains.

As turtle fishers, they have explored the south coast of Cuba and those of the [I]sle of Pines, and have thus become familiar with the big and dangerous reefs around them. Thus they often witness, or very soon hear of the frequent shipwrecks of the mariners driven onto these reefs. Instead of giving them the assistance and help that humanity demands, they hasten thither only to rob them and to take away to their caves even mere fragments of broken vessels. They make no exception even for English boats sailing from Jamaica, many of which fall into their clutches.⁴⁸

⁴⁵ Long, *The History of Jamaica*, vol.1, 313.

⁴⁶ See Craton, *Founded*, 215-7.

⁴⁷ See J.A. Roy Bodden, *The Cayman Islands in Transition: The Politics, History, and Sociology of a Changing Society* (Kingston, 2007), p. 5. For a fuller understanding of this colonial official’s view of wrecking and early Caymanianness, see especially George Hirst, *Notes*, 32-34.

⁴⁸ Quoted in Ulf Hannerz, *Caymanian Politics: Structure and Style in a Changing Society* (Stockholm: Stockholm Studies in Social Anthropology, 1974), 25.

It is impossible to estimate the number of vessels wrecked in Cayman waters. However, if settled wreckers in the historical Cayman Islands made their living this way, then the act of wrecking, by Tirri's account especially, automatically tainted any legal Caymanian maritime activity.

Two other wrecking incidents immediately come to mind here: the wreck of the *Iphigenia* in 1874 and the wreck of the *Juga* in 1888. The former occurred on the coral reefs off Bodden Town, Grand Cayman's first capital city. Bodden Town Magistrates quickly made their way to the wrecked ship "and told the captain that its condition was hopeless," despite the fact that the ship's hull had not been compromised. Bedlam thereafter ensued, the Magistrates offering "only token remonstrations as unauthorized wreckers cut down and carried off all the rigging and sails, purloined the loose ship's stores and threatened to invade the officers' quarters and below decks."⁴⁹ The wreck of the Norwegian merchant ship the *Juga* occurred off Grand Cayman's west coast. As with the *Iphigenia*, the crew members of the *Juga* experienced strong-arm tactics by Caymanian wreckers, who, at the backing of their Magistrates, were keen to secure their proceeds, although according to the ship's captain, he did not acknowledge a receiver of wrecks. When the latter incident was later investigated by British Captain E. Rolfe of HMS *Pylades*, the Caymanian wreckers were placed clearly in the wrong if simply on the omissive fact that Rolfe's report did not mention an official receiver of wrecks;⁵⁰ theoretically, this meant that the Caymanians had committed an act of piracy according to the following nineteenth century statute:

Now piracy is only a term for sea-robbery...If any man shall be assaulted within that jurisdiction and his ship or goods violently taken away without legal authority, this is robbery and piracy. [If the inhabitants of a nearby island] shall...dispossess the master, and afterwards carry away the ship itself or any of the goods, or tackle, apparel or furniture, in any place where the Lord Admiral hath, or pretends to have jurisdiction, this is also robbery and piracy.⁵¹

Nonetheless, Captain Rolfe's concluding words on the matter begin to situate the occupational and cultural importance of wrecking for Caymanians, and the British proclivity to overlook any potentially illegal Caymanian wrecking despite the passing of the Wrecking and Salvage Law thirteen years earlier, which was created not only to protect shipowners and their insurers, but also gave them legal redress to unsolicited wrecking:⁵² "wrecking is one of the principal industries of

⁴⁹ Craton, *Founded*, 215-216. See also PRO, CO 137/478, ff. 20-77.

⁵⁰ See Craton, *Founded*, 217; see also PRO, CO 137/538, ff. 32-42.

⁵¹ Quoted in Edward Lucie-Smith, *Outcasts of the Sea* (Hampshire: Paddington Press, 1978), 8.

⁵² Craton, *Founded*, 216.

the Cayman Islands,” Rolfe began, “and one which they thoroughly appear to understand and conduct in a straightforward and equitable manner.”⁵³

Despite any negative reputation associated with wrecking, in February 1794 settlers on Grand Cayman witnessed a convoy of British merchant ships running aground on the reefs of Grand Cayman’s East End coast. “[T]he people of East End . . . [were] reported to have shown great heroism in ensuring that no lives were lost,” also salvaging as much property as they could.⁵⁴ This historic incident has lived on in the Caymanian imagination to the present day, and has assumed nothing less than an epic tale of the seafaring greatness of the Caymanian ancestor, if contrasted with the more seemingly commonplace and negatively perceived wrecking activities of inchoate Caymanians.

It was George Hirst who first attempted to provide an argument for the piratical influence of wrecking relative to the historical Cayman Islands. According to him, the isolated island of Grand Cayman especially would have been an ideal place “for [buccaneers] to settle down to a quieter and more peaceful life finding the business of pirating was getting more serious and risky every year and confining themselves to . . . operations from the shore.”⁵⁵ Indeed, by 1720 pirates in the Caribbean had begun to come under extensive naval threat from Britain especially, many of them making their way to the North American region to continue life as freebooters.⁵⁶ Although one could attempt to link settling pirates in Grand Cayman with the intention to cover their past actions on an isolated island, the historical evidence with which to confirm a direct piratical effect upon wreckers in the Cayman Islands is lacking. Despite any such lack, there is documented evidence that between 1670 and 1730 English buccaneers, from Blackbeard in 1717 to Neil Walker in 1730, often visited the shores of the Cayman Islands either for turtle, to careen their ships and sign treaties amongst themselves, or else to return for stolen hidden treasure.⁵⁷ Nonetheless, Hirst’s argument that wrecking was symptomatic of an earlier piratical way cannot be rigorously substantiated in the case of historical Cayman. In future studies I will make the attempt to assess various modern-day Caymanian cultural interpretations with regard to historical maritime piracy and the islands’ contemporary national Pirates Week festival.

⁵³ Quoted in Craton, *Founded*, 217.

⁵⁴ See Margaret Leshikar-Denton, “The 1794 Wreck of the Ten Sail, Cayman Islands, British West Indies: A Historical Study and Archaeological Survey” (master’s thesis, Texas A&M University, 1993), 15; see also CINA, *Our Islands’ Past: The Wreck of the Ten Sails*, vol. 2 (George Town: CINA and Cayman Free Press, 1994).

⁵⁵ Hirst, *Notes*, 33.

⁵⁶ See, for instance, Peter Leeson, *The Invisible Hook: The Hidden Economics of Pirates* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2009), chapters 6 and 8; see also Arne Bialuschewski, “Black People Under the Black Flag: Piracy and the Slave Trade on the West Coast of Africa, 1718-1723,” *Slavery & Abolition* 29, no. 4 (2008): 461-475.

⁵⁷ For a detailed account of buccaneers/pirates in the Cayman Islands by this time, see Charles Johnson (Captain), *A General History of the Robberies and Murders of the Most Notorious Pirates* (New York: The Lyons Press, 1998, first published in 1724), chapters 3, 12, 14, and 15. In 1730, Pirate Neil Walker plundered the Genouesa wrecked on the reefs of the sister islands, but was never caught by the British authorities; for the account, see “State Calendar of Papers,” 19 June 1733, PRO, CO 137/54.

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Having briefly assessed the first historiographic statement, thereby confirming an important seafaring constituent of a developing Caymanian historical identity from the outset, the second historiographic statement offers a more expansive understanding of any such development in its stress that “[f]or about a century, from the 1730s to the early 1830s, slaves were important to the Caymanian economy, especially for logging and cotton plantations.”⁵⁸ In the first instance, the importance of slavery on Grand Cayman was visible from the first decade of permanent settlement there when slaves worked as timber extractors. From as early as 1734, inhabitant John Bodden oversaw a number of John Middleton’s timber slaves, in addition to William Foster’s eight timber slaves, which had by 1736 become twenty slaves;⁵⁹ although this account is almost certainly incomplete, perhaps these were the only slaves in Grand Cayman at that time before more slaves were brought in by the remaining four land grantees in 1741 or later. Nonetheless, and suggesting that mahogany and fustic had become the major feature of the island’s economy by the 1740s, we can be certain that although abandoning his granted land within a short time of taking it up, grantee Samuel Spofforth’s twenty-five-ton *Experiment* returned to Jamaica from Grand Cayman in early 1745 with 81 “pieces” of mahogany. Also, in 1764 merchant ships the *Success* and *Eagle* together carried eighty tons of timber from Grand Cayman to Jamaica, while its protection vessel carried “another thirty tons of mahogany.”⁶⁰ Although the shipping records between 1745 and 1765 are also likely to be incomplete, fustic and mahogany remained Grand Cayman’s primary export resources as confirmed by Robert Christian of the ship *Active* when he visited Grand Cayman sometime in the latter year: “Most of their Employment is cutting Mahogany, Fustick & c. which they send to Jamaica.”⁶¹

Unlike the intense slave labor and large numbers of slaves required for the more “efficient” operation of sugar plantations, the earlier timber industry on Grand Cayman required fewer slaves that would have worked in smaller labor gangs.⁶² Like British Honduras – now known as Belize – there might have been a relatively vast market of untapped mahogany and fustic in Grand Cayman from the early years of settlement – Captain Christian describing Grand Cayman as possessing “Wood in great plenty” – but unlike British Honduras, by 1773 timber extraction is no longer mentioned as a mainstay of Grand Cayman’s economy due most likely

⁵⁸ Craton, *Founded*, 63.

⁵⁹ Craton, *Founded*, 42-44.

⁶⁰ This information was taken from Craton, *Founded*, 50, 51. See also, Jamaican Shipping Returns, 1680-1818, PRO, CO 142/18, ff. 91-92, 95-96, 96-97.

⁶¹ Quoted in Craton, *Founded*, 51.

⁶² Gad Heuman, *The Caribbean: Brief Histories* (London: Hodder Headline Group, 2006), 28.

to the tiny island's obvious exhaustible timber supply.⁶³ History is also silent on how Cayman slaves were treated as timber extractors, but we may here look to Gad Heuman's assessment of the treatment of timber slaves in British Honduras: "Although work was often difficult and dangerous," Heuman begins, "life for the timber-cutting slave was less regimented and generally subject to less arbitrary punishment than that of their counterparts on sugar plantations."⁶⁴ Heuman's researched description of a slavery system based on timber extraction begins to denote a Panglossian-type slave society as Michael Craton utilizes the term: "Where slave conditions – though nowhere quite "Panglossian" [or ideal for the slave] – were relatively benign, this could largely be attributed to the fact that slavery, once it had been instituted for the most intensely cultivated and profitable areas, spilled over into those colonies that probably could not have justified the Atlantic slave trade on their behalf alone."⁶⁵ Indeed, no colony which depended on the minor staples of mahogany and then cotton would have proved the primary beneficiary of slavery in the first place, given that between 1770 and 1850 such crops only accounted for a mere fifth of exports from the British West Indies.⁶⁶

Where the period following the introduction of cotton cultivation around the 1770s is concerned, Craton suggests that "[c]otton production was less arduous than the year-round gang labour required for producing sugar, the latter never becoming the chief cash crop in the colonial Cayman Islands."⁶⁷ It should, however, not be overlooked that Grand Cayman's field slaves – who represented 65 percent of the entire slave population on that island throughout the early nineteenth century towards emancipation – would have indeed been subjected to hard labor under the watchful eye of an overseer. While there is no evidence about the seasonal routine of cotton cultivation in Grand Cayman, it would probably not have been much different from that in the Bahamas or Anguilla, for instance. Before cultivation could occur, then, land would have had to be cleared of any trees and vegetation, a process which was in itself strenuous but not cyclical. Thereafter, and usually between the months of January and June, cotton seeds were planted in extensively hoed ground. The seeds normally took two months to flower and bloom, by which time the slave would be required to harvest and finally clean the cotton balls

⁶³ The accounts of George Gauld and Census taker Edward Corbet made in 1773 and 1802 do not include timber exports in Grand Cayman's trade. See, respectively, CINA, Transcript of George Gauld's Description of Grand Cayman, 1773; *Our Island's Past*, vol.1. Edward Long does mention that the inhabitants on Grand Cayman exported small amounts of timber, but given that his lengthy work was published in 1774, he may perhaps have been speaking of an earlier time.

⁶⁴ Heuman, *The Caribbean*, 28.

⁶⁵ Dr. Pangloss was a major character in Voltaire's eighteenth century work *Candide*, and Craton has adjectived his name in the above instance, given his proclivity to see life in degrees of optimism. See Voltaire, *Candide* (Createspace Publishing, Amazon.com, 2010 reprint); see also, Michael Craton, "Hobbesian or Panglossian? The two extremes of Slave Conditions in the British West Indies," in Michael Craton, *Empire, Enslavement and Freedom in the Caribbean* (Kingston: Ian Randle Publishers, 1997), 231.

⁶⁶ See David Eltis, "The Slave Economies of the Caribbean: Structure, Performance, Evolution and Significance," in *General History of the Caribbean*, 105-137.

⁶⁷ Craton, *Founded*, 68.

for export. Due to a substantial lack of information on Grand Cayman's cotton enterprise, we cannot be certain if the cotton gin, the machine which separated the cotton from the seed, was used there as it would have been in the Bahamas towards emancipation in 1834.⁶⁸ If this piece of machinery was indeed used on Grand Cayman, it would have quickened the cleaning process of the cotton, thereby lessening the tedious intensity of the slave's labor.

As the industrial revolution developed in the final two decades of the eighteenth century, Caribbean cotton (especially in the Bahamas) surged in value after 1770 as new technologies in Britain by then made it easier – and more profitable – to process more of the staple at less of a production cost.⁶⁹ It was against this background that sea cotton cultivation took hold of Grand Cayman's economy from at least the early 1770s, if we accept Gauld's assertion in 1773 that “[t]he island produces a great quantity of cotton, which is their principle article of export.”⁷⁰ With its limestone landscape, tropical climate and moderate seasonal rainfall, Grand Cayman was particularly suited to cotton cultivation, even if this cash crop was both vulnerable to insects and depleted soil fertility.⁷¹ Nonetheless, word of the tiny colony's plantocratic potential spread throughout the Miskito Coast – situated along the Nicaraguan and Honduran coastline, a British Protectorate since 1655.⁷² In 1787 British settlers residing along the Miskito Coast had to evacuate this region “under the terms of the Convention of London signed a year before as an extension to the Treaty of Versailles,”⁷³ terms which placed much of the control of the coast under Spanish-Nicaraguan control. Thus some of these settlers-turned planters began migrating to Grand Cayman so that by 1787 the island's population stood at well over 700 inhabitants. According to British Captain John Hull's admiralty report, of the incoming 300 inhabitants from the Miskito Coast to 1787, 50 were white and 250 were slaves;⁷⁴ an increase of this nature indicated the expansion of Grand Cayman's cotton cultivation enterprise, given that the incoming settlers, according to Hull, were in Grand Cayman “making large [p]lantations for [c]otton.”⁷⁵ However, Hull's use of the adjective *large* is questionable, in view of the lack of other evidence and the small size of the island (Grand Cayman is twenty-two miles long by five miles wide at its widest point).

⁶⁸ See Michael Craton et al., *Islanders' in the Stream: A History of the Bahamian People*, vol. 1 (Atlanta: University of Georgia Press, 2000); see also Craton, *A History of the Bahamas* (London: Collins, 1962).

⁶⁹ For a more in-depth understanding of the technological advancements of Britain's Industrial Revolution see, for instance J. T. Ashton, *The Industrial Revolution, 1760 -1830* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998); Robert C. Allen, *The British Industrial Revolution in a Global Perspective* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).

⁷⁰ CINA, Transcript of George Gauld's Remarks.

⁷¹ Craton, *Founded*, 66.

⁷² See F.G. Davenport et al., *European Treaties Bearing on the History of the United States and its Dependencies*, vol. 4 (Washington: Thonssen Press, 2008), 62.

⁷³ See Roy Murray, “Notes on the History of Grand Caymanas,” unpublished manuscript (George Town: CINA, 2003), 8.

⁷⁴ See Craton, *Founded*, 52, 65-66.

⁷⁵ Quoted in Craton, *Founded*, 52.

Based on available shipping records, Grand Cayman's cotton boom reached its peak between January 1802 and July 1804. In this 30-month period, according to Craton, some 200,000 pounds, or nearly 100 tons, of cotton was shipped to Jamaican ports, dispersed between eighteen vessels making a total of thirty voyages.⁷⁶ More than half of the merchant ships into Grand Cayman throughout this period were "owned, captained and crewed by Jamaicans."⁷⁷ These figures indicate the Jamaican investment in Cayman cotton at this time. Notwithstanding this, if we are to abide by the inhabitants' estimate – as relayed to census taker Edward Corbet in 1802 – that before 1802 an estimated 30 tons of cotton per annum was being exported, then the near 100 tons exported in this thirty-month period would have indicated increased export by at least 10 tons per annum.⁷⁸ Nonetheless, after 1808 and towards 1818, we notice a substantial decrease of trade between Jamaica and Grand Cayman. Where many Jamaican-built schooners were arriving in Grand Cayman's port in 1804 – most of them involved in cotton export – by 1818 only Caymanian seamen were "regularly involved in the trade between Grand Cayman and Kingston or Montego Bay, and their trade [had become] less frequent."⁷⁹ Indeed, Caymanian cargo had become typically more mixed and smaller after 1808, as represented in, for instance, William Bodden's exported goods in 1811, which consisted of: 19 bags of cotton, 6 baskets of corn, 1 mahogany log, 2 barrels of tortoiseshells, a 600 weight of corned fish and wrecked goods to the amount of 18 puncheons of rum and a 1200 weight of old copper. These goods were exchanged for 2 barrels of sugar, 5 tubs of crockeryware, 1 barrel of butter, flour, a small box of tobacco, bottles of alcohol, 3 barrels of beef and pork, and 6 barrels of bread.⁸⁰ The absence of slave imports to Grand Cayman after 1804 and a noticeably smaller scale, more varied trade between Grand Cayman and Jamaica by 1808, suggests that Grand Cayman's cotton boom had peaked by 1804, thereafter declining to and after 1808.⁸¹

It is for the reason of crop profitability, then, that Craton's classification of Hobbesian slave societies is usually associated with those colonies where the more profitable sugar cane was cultivated (by 1773 sugar had gained preeminence across the British West Indies, rendering the earlier smaller cash crops of cotton, tobacco and indigo largely insignificant).⁸² Upon completion of his introductory comparative work between slaves on Jamaica's Worthy Park estate and the

⁷⁶ This information was taken from Craton, *Founded*, 66-67; see also A List of Ships and Vessels that have entered at the Port of Kingston, 1802-1818, PRO, CO 142/21, ff. 122-123; 142/22, f. 101.

⁷⁷ Craton, *Founded*, 66.

⁷⁸ This estimation is based on what was intimated to Corbet in the 1802 census; see CINA, *Our Islands' Past*, vol. 1, 5.

⁷⁹ Craton, *Founded*, 70.

⁸⁰ Information quoted from Craton, *Founded*, 70.

⁸¹ This thought is based on the available shipping records between Grand Cayman and Kingston between 1802-1810 (see footnote 55).

⁸² Bernard Marshall, *Slavery, Law and Society in the British Windward Islands, 1763-1823* (Kingston: Arawak Publications, 2007), 94.

Stevensone cotton estate on the island of Great Exuma in the Bahamas, Craton summarized that: “where slave lives were “Hobbesian” in the sense of “nasty, brutish and short,” this could largely be attributed to the evils of a system that sanctioned slavery wherever the most profitable type of agriculture was extremely labor-intensive and situated in unhealthy areas.”⁸³

Craton’s comparative analysis places slaves on the Stevensone estate “at the benign end of a scale of demographic health, on which sugar plantation slaves such as those at Worthy Park, Jamaica, occupied a far lower position.”⁸⁴ This Craton argues around a number of facts: for instance, slaves on Stevensone experienced a positive rate of natural increase between 1822-1834, “from 254 [slaves] to 376,” while Worthy Park slaves between 1783 and 1834 “rarely came close to sustaining its population by natural increase;”⁸⁵ where slaves on Stevensone were experiencing a crude annual birth rate averaging 42.5 per thousand slaves, Worthy Park’s crude annual birth rate rapidly fell from 21.7 per thousand slaves in the slave registration period (from 1816 onwards) to 15.6 per thousand slaves towards 1830. Similarly, the crude death rate among Stevensone’s slaves averaged 8 per thousand between 1822 and 1834, at “one-sixth the rate at Worthy Park.”⁸⁶ Craton then attempts to assess these discrepancies by looking at a number of potential causal factors. For instance, relying on Philip Curtin’s argument that African slaves were more prone to a “notoriously low birth rate” than creole slaves,⁸⁷ Craton links Worthy Park’s escalating slave death rate and its dependence on an imported slave population between the ages of 12 and 25 with statistically diminishing fertility and health rates.⁸⁸ On the other hand, and based on the above estimated age range of incoming African slaves, that African slaves were no longer imported to Stevensone after 1784, signaled a healthy natural increase among the more settled and climatically adapted creole slave against a decreasing, aging African population.⁸⁹

In a similar way, and unlike many of their Jamaican counterparts between 1821 and emancipation, slaves in Grand Cayman were experiencing some semblance of natural increase similar to the colonies of Barbuda and the Bahamas throughout roughly the same period. There is no evidence of slaves being shipped to Grand Cayman after 1804, so it is very likely that any increasing slave numbers, as with Stevensone slaves, largely represented an internal effort.⁹⁰ However, Barbuda

⁸³ In his utilization of the Hobbesian label, Craton is implicating the seventeenth-century English philosopher Thomas Hobbes’ work *Leviathan*, which, as a political and social treatise, largely views the state of nature as chaotic, bellicose and short. See Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008 reprint); see also, Craton, “Hobbesian or Panglossian,” 202.

⁸⁴ Craton, 1997: 204.

⁸⁵ 206.

⁸⁶ 207.

⁸⁷ See Philip Curtin, *The Atlantic Slave Trade: A Census* (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1969), chapters 7, 8, and 10.

⁸⁸ 206-207.

⁸⁹ 207-233.

⁹⁰ This conclusion is based on my own assessment of the available shipping registers between 1802 and 1818; also see footnote 58.

stands out here in terms of rapidly increasing slave numbers by natural means. A largely subsistence colony, Barbudan slaves either produced crops for the sustenance of the colony, or else were used to replenish dwindling supplies in nearby Antigua, and between 1821-28 had experienced, on annual average, a natural increase of roughly 28.4 per thousand slaves, representing the largest naturally increasing slave population in the British West Indies throughout this time.⁹¹ The cotton-producing Bahamas, in its totality, also witnessed a high rate of positive increase from the late 1820s towards emancipation with an annual average of roughly 14.4 slaves per thousand.⁹² Similarly, between January 1821 and April 1826, Cayman slaves had experienced positive rates of natural increase; out of an entire slave population of 889 slaves by April 1826 a total of 133 slaves had been born and 56 had died. Per capita, this indicated that Grand Cayman's rate of natural increase by 1826 stood at roughly 17 slaves per thousand.⁹³

Notably, any correlation between slave treatment and their demographic and situational circumstance in the colony in question represents only a plausible analytical scheme and not precisely measurable factors of causation.⁹⁴ For instance, Orlando Patterson's comprehensive work *The Sociology of Slavery* argues that the high mortality mainly among incoming African slaves to Jamaica towards emancipation was related to combined factors which included disease, a humid climate, and malnutrition. Such factors, according to Patterson, would have been exacerbated by intense field labor towards the planters' desire for maximum yield and profit of the valuable sugar cash crop.⁹⁵ Similarly, Philip Curtin's *The Atlantic Slave Trade* contends that slave existence on sugar plantations begins to illuminate the connection between plantation type, slave treatment, slave fertility, and mortality, and the ways in which African-born slaves and creole slaves, in numerical terms, were bound to influence these factors. African-born slaves dominated in English sugar colonies to at least 1810 because of the rapid rate of decrease in these colonies – with the probable exception of Barbados⁹⁶ – among the existing slave population.⁹⁷ This is why, for instance, in his study Craton cautions that “[i]t seems plausible . . . although not directly provable, that a balanced sex ratio and a “pyramidal” age profile, as exhibited by the [Stevensone] slaves, would be generally conducive to viable fertility as well as mortality levels;”⁹⁸ or, “[a]

⁹¹ Barry Higman, *Slave Populations of the British Caribbean, 1807-1834* (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1984), 310.

⁹² Ibid.

⁹³ Calculations based on PRO, CO 137/170, f.403; Craton has also calculated this rate based on the same documentation; see *Founded*, 71.

⁹⁴ For further elaboration here, see, for instance, Barry Higman, “The Slave Populations of the British Caribbean: Some Nineteenth Century Variations” (first published in 1976), in *Caribbean Slave Society and Economy*, 221-27.

⁹⁵ Patterson, *The Sociology of Slavery*, 100.

⁹⁶ See especially Higman, *Slave Populations*, 75; see also Hilary Beckles, *A History of Barbados: From Amerindian Settlement to Caribbean Single Market* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007, 2nd edition), chapter 5.

⁹⁷ Philip Curtin, *The Atlantic Slave Trade: A Census* (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1972).

⁹⁸ Craton, “Hobbesian or Panglossian?,” 212.

lthough it is impossible . . . to order the variables in [assessing the treatability of slaves], the discovery of data on a slave population for which virtually all causal factors were favourable permits comparisons with the data from less favourable slave regimes on which demographic research has so far concentrated.”⁹⁹

Craton’s effort represents a thoughtful assessment of slave treatment through a statistical analytical gaze. Nonetheless, with reference to Caymanian history, his analysis begins to establish that although slaves were not treated equally throughout the British West Indies, the relatively less harsh treatment of slaves in certain colonies would not have diminished the importance of slavery itself. Indeed, Bodden makes a sentimental mistake here when he infers that the differences between a “Hobbesian” Jamaica and a “Panglossian” Grand Cayman must conclude in the latter’s non-slavocratic actuality.¹⁰⁰ Therefore, the understanding that colonies like the Bahamas and Bermuda were still slave societies even if their demand for slaves could not, on its own, justify the Atlantic Slave Trade becomes laden with meaning when transposed to Grand Cayman’s colonial context.¹⁰¹

Grand Cayman was also a viable slave society on the basis of the slave-to-master ratio. Slaves there consistently outnumbered their masters to emancipation. By 1802, there were 545 slaves out of a total population of 933 inhabitants; they represented the slight numerical majority, standing at just over 58 percent of the entire population.¹⁰² Just before emancipation, slave numbers had increased to 985, slaves by then representing just below 55 percent of a total population of around 1800.¹⁰³ Like Bermuda whose slave-to-white numbers by 1833 stood at 4297 whites to 4277 slaves, Grand Cayman’s slave-to-master ratio stands out among the colonial British West Indies. In Jamaica, for instance, between 1800 and 1830, slaves constituted 82 to 86 percent of that colony’s population; similarly, Barbadian slaves made up 80 percent of the entire population within the same timeline. The Eastern Caribbean colonies followed a similar demographic trend, from Antigua whose slaves comprised just below 83 percent of the population by 1834, to Dominica whose slaves represented 80 percent of that colony’s population within two years of emancipation.¹⁰⁴

⁹⁹ Craton, “Hobbesian or Panglossian?,” 204.

¹⁰⁰ Bodden, *The Cayman Islands in Transition*, chapter 1.

¹⁰¹ This understanding is especially borne out in Craton, *Founded*, chapter 4; Elsa Goveia also gives a simple yet illuminating definition of a slave society independently of that society’s economic importance: a slave society thus represents a “community based on slavery, [inclusive of] masters and freedmen as well as slaves;” see *Slave Society in the British Leeward Islands at the End of the Eighteenth Century* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965), viii. For an especially illuminating explication of Goveia’s afore-mentioned definition in the substantially non-sugar Dutch West Indian colonies, see Edward Donoghue, *Negro Slavery: Slave Society and Slave Life in the Danish West Indies* (Bloomington, Indiana: Author House Press, 2007), section 5.

¹⁰² CINA, *Our Islands’ Past*, vol. 1, 21.

¹⁰³ See *Slave Returns*, 1834, ff. 133, 134.

¹⁰⁴ See Patterson, *Slavery and Social Death: A Comparative Study* (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1982), 477-480; see also W.S. Zúill, *The Story of Bermuda and Her People* (London: Macmillan Caribbean, 1983, 3rd edition), chapter 10.

Yet, although the concession must be made that Grand Cayman's slave-to-master ratio was comparably more even than much of the British West Indies, we should ultimately strive to understand Grand Cayman's slavocratic worth not so much in numerical terms – although this understanding is an important indicator of the extent of the dependence on slavery in Grand Cayman – but in institutional and ideological ones. David Francione begins to capture the importance of institutionalized slavery where this term denotes not only the entrenched socio-occupational practice of any kind of slavery, but the resultant hierarchical scheme that determine master-slave relations: “the system of institutionalized slavery permits pain, suffering and death whenever it is in the interests of [the] property owners.”¹⁰⁵

Indeed, by 1700 – as many white indentured servants migrated elsewhere in the New World, and Sub-Saharan Africans became the major source of involuntary labor throughout the British West Indies and indeed the wider Caribbean¹⁰⁶ - the interest of the slaveholder throughout the Caribbean had long been a decidedly economic one.¹⁰⁷ In light of the socio-economic situation of institutionalized slavery in the Caribbean, the slaves' pain, suffering, and death can ultimately be understood as subordinate to this economic interest. Such an interest represented the ideological underpinning of slave labor, and the default subordinate relationship that existed between slave and master. Although Panglossian slaves were not typically prone to the harsh treatment of their Hobbesian counterparts, the same theme of subordination applied to them, for their very status as slaves was indispensably linked not only to their perceived inferiority, combustibility, and workability, but also to their ownership by men and women with economic motives. Two points are worth raising at this juncture: first, although better treated slaves were typically prone to naturally increasing numbers, this did not diminish their inferiority in a society/economy that used them institutionally; and second, a Panglossian-style slave society did not furnish an automatic understanding that its slaves were without an anti-slavery ideology.

Briefly implicating the second of these slavocratic factors towards confirming that the above ideology existed in Grand Cayman to 1834, there is evidence of resistance among Caymanian slaves. For instance, in 1816 and 1821 slaves Primus

¹⁰⁵ Although David Francione concerns himself with the ways in which animal welfare is being sacrificed for their human masters' benefit, his ideas can indeed be made relatable to the master-slave relationship/experience in the New World given the accepted view that slaves there were, like cattle, considered to be chattel – personal property – and were therefore subjected to harsh treatment towards their masters' economic benefit. See *Rain without Thunder: The Ideology of the Animal Rights Movement* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1996), 222.

¹⁰⁶ For more on the migratory patterns of white indentures from the mid- to late- seventeenth century onward, see, for instance, Hilary Beckles, *A History of Barbados: From Amerindian Settlement to Nation State* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Neville Connell, *A Short History of Barbados* (Bridgetown: The Barbados Museum and Historical Society, 1959).

¹⁰⁷ For an introductory yet thorough understanding of the economic importance of slavery in the Caribbean, see David Eltis, “The Slave Economies of the Caribbean,” 105-137.

and Hanibal, respectively, were convicted of the practice of obeah by a jury of twelve free Caymanian men. Obeah was (and indeed is) an Afro-Caribbean religion, which by 1800 was not tolerated throughout the British West Indies for its ability to bring slaves together in revolt.¹⁰⁸ Thus having, it was alleged, buried an egg in the kitchen room of freeman James Coe Senior, Primus's sentence was permanent exile from Grand Cayman; the specifics of Hanibal's actions were not made known, but he too was convicted of obeah and was also permanently exiled from Grand Cayman. In another instance of potential slave subversion, in 1816 a female slave by the name of Long Celia was so convinced that freedom was being withheld from Cayman slaves that she urged a number of male slaves to arm themselves with machetes and free themselves from illegal slavery. Long Celia was ultimately betrayed by a domestic slave who brought the plan to the attention of Caymanian planters, and her punishment was a public flogging.¹⁰⁹

Based on these recorded instances of actual and potential slave rebellion, we begin to realize that some Caymanian slaves were more resistant to their freed colored and white owners, while others would have been more inclined to ingratiate themselves to them (I analyze the free people of color in Cayman slave society later on). Indeed, all types of slave societies manifested the automatic degree to which some slaves accepted their plight, thereby accommodating to their masters, while others resisted them.¹¹⁰ Furthermore, the presence of a slave court on Grand Cayman confirmed that island's legal contiguity with other colonies in the British West Indies throughout the eighteenth century towards emancipation. The very fact that slaves were to be found in Grand Cayman together with a slave court signaled that "slave laws were essential for the continued existence of slavery as an institution" there. This spoke to an accepted legal structure fashioned from English law and its dedication to "the respect for [the] liberty of the subject."¹¹¹ Therefore, this legal dedication worked not only to secure the slaves' status as properties of British subjects, but also stressed that the former be subjected to a rule of law whose practitioners reserved the right to enforce and maintain law and order, an enforcement which "lay at the very heart of the slave system," a system which, the Caribbean context, was specifically created with economic interests in mind.¹¹²

¹⁰⁸ For more information on the consideration of obeah as subversive and demonic throughout the British West Indies, see Dale Bisnauth, *History of Religions in the Caribbean* (Trenton, New Jersey, African World Press, Inc., 1996), 83-84; Richard Hart, *Slaves Who Abolished Slavery: Blacks in Rebellion* (Kingston: University of West Indies Press, 2002), chapter 6; Eugene Genovese, *Roll Jordan, Roll: The World the Slaves Made* (New York: Vintage Books, 1976), section 4.

¹⁰⁹ These accounts can be found in Hirst, *Notes*, 200-210.

¹¹⁰ For a more detailed understanding of the ways in which slaves betrayed themes of resistance and accommodation within the slave society, see Franklin Knight, *The Genesis of a Fragmented Nationalism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990); Thomas Durant, Jr. and David Knottnerus, *Plantation Society and Race Relations* (Westport, Connecticut, Praeger, 1999); Knight, "Slavery in a Plantation Society," in *Caribbean Slavery in the Atlantic World: A Student Reader*, ed. Verene Shepherd and Hilary Beckles (Kingston: Ian Randle Publishers, 1999), 398-412.

¹¹¹ Elsa Goveia, "The West Indian Laws of the Eighteenth Century," in *Caribbean Slave Society and Economy*, ed. Hilary Beckles et al. (New York: New Press, 1991), 350 (originally published in 1960).

¹¹² Goveia, "The West Indian Laws," 350.

The sweeping intent of this legal dedication, then, signaled a default suspicion of the predominating slaves as potentially subversive properties; in comparative terms, as with a decidedly white perception of slaves during, for instance, the Haitian Revolution which occurred from 1791 to 1804, or the Tacky Rebellion in Jamaica in 1760, there was a similar perception in Grand Cayman that the spirit of resistance present in certain slaves there had to be broken if law and order, in addition to economic yield, was to be maintained, despite that island's relatively impoverished and isolated state throughout its slave century.¹¹³ Thus we return to the idea of institutional slavery, which in its most essential form is not so much predicated on a slave-to-master ratio, but on the necessity that the default "lawless and rebellious" slave be kept broken and under the master's control.

Additionally, like the other slave societies in the British West Indies, Grand Cayman's social structure from 1734 to 1834 functioned on behalf of whites, free people of color, and slaves. These structural-functional manifestations also confirm institutionalized slavery, although Bodden classifies historical Cayman, in socio-cultural terms, as fundamentally different in terms of its social interrelationship scheme. "What made the relationships different in Cayman vis-à-vis the wider Caribbean," he begins, "was that the physical and environmental characteristics of the Cayman Islands dictated that symbiosis, rather than adversarial relationships, was the norm."¹¹⁴ Bodden seems to be relating this idea of symbiosis among Grand Cayman's settlement to the white strata, arguing, like Ulf Hannerz¹¹⁵ and Vered Amit¹¹⁶ that because of the absence of an influential planter/absentee class and hyper-profitable natural resources, whites in Grand Cayman automatically worked together in their desire to adapt and survive in relatively bare environmental conditions. However, this understanding of total social and cultural symbiosis can be misleading: by focusing on whites only, there rests the implication that slaves and free people of color were not legitimate social entities and that whites in historical Cayman society were able to reduce or eliminate the racial tensions typical of elsewhere in the Caribbean. Yet in light of the preceding analyses which demonstrated that slaves were subjected to a superseding "superior" exploitative will of the master in Grand Cayman, the realization should be made that until 1834 there was a noticeable relational social scheme that betrayed the racial divisions which constitute the social hierarchy of slave societies. Accordingly, I further question Bodden's idea of complete socio-cultural symbiosis on Grand Cayman within the concept of the slave society and its structural-functional manifestations

¹¹³ For thorough introductions to the Haitian Revolution and the Tacky Rebellion, see Heuman, *The Caribbean*, chapters 6 and 7, respectively.

¹¹⁴ Bodden, *The Cayman Islands*, 4.

¹¹⁵ See Ulf Hannerz, *Caymanian Politics: Structure and Style in a Changing Island Society* (Stockholm: Department of Social Anthropology, University of Stockholm, 1974), 21-32.

¹¹⁶ Vered Amit, "A Clash of Vulnerabilities: Citizenship Labor, and Expatriacy in the Cayman Islands," *American Ethnologist* 28, no.3 (2001): 574-594.

in my assessment of the social role of free people of color in that island's racial hierarchy.

The origins of Grand Cayman's free people of color are shrouded in uncertainty. In 1773, Gauld offered a summary of the island's population as 200 whites and "above [the] same number of Negroes and Mulattos,"¹¹⁷ unfortunately, of the latter groups, Gauld did not distinguish the free from the enslaved of an already vague number. In keeping with the histories of other free people of color throughout the British West Indies, however, it is likely that in the earlier years of settlement in Grand Cayman many of the free people of color were the "miscegenated offspring of...whites who had arranged for their freedom, [subsequently conform[ing]] to the Euro-creole pattern of the dominant group."¹¹⁸ I am inclined here to view free Negroes as part of the free colored designation although they were more likely to have gained their freedom through manumission.¹¹⁹ Nonetheless, we can be certain that by 1802, the free colored designation did indeed exist on Grand Cayman, with free people of color positioned between the slave on the lowest social rungs and whites who controlled the society in legal and economic terms. The nature of such a positioning is of a colonial making, and in many ways the deductions to be made about any established free colored population, serve also to express that population's complicit role in colonialism and its supporting logic.¹²⁰

The major indicator of such a social position, as its members strive to perpetuate a dominating ethnocentric logic, is initially revealed in the dedication of Grand Cayman's free people of color to slavery: their conformity to a dominant Euro-creole pattern is initially revealed in the fact that 63 percent of Grand Cayman's free people of color owned slaves by 1802. Dispersed into 22 families unevenly distributed throughout Grand Cayman, they owned 9 percent of the island's entire slave-holdings, or 49 slaves out of a total of 545.¹²¹ Although we cannot be certain how many among Grand Cayman's free people of color were planters by 1802, or the occupations of their slaves, by virtue of the fact of the formers' status as slaveholders, they were, in the crudest analysis, demonstrating a consciousness that depended on putative Euro-colonial understandings of the slave: in the colonial New World setting, slaves were indeed slaves because of the completeness of their subjugation, which was superlatively defined in terms of their forced labor. The foregoing numerical picture, together with the logic I have provided it, begins to

¹¹⁷ CINA (compiler), Transcript of George Gauld's Remarks.

¹¹⁸ Arnold Sio, "Marginality and Free Coloured Identity in Caribbean Slave Society," in *Caribbean Slave Society and Economy*, 152 (first published in 1987).

¹¹⁹ Heuman writes that "the freedmen caste was internally highly differentiated," something which confirmed that free Negroes by virtue of their colour and single biological heritage were bound to be understood as inferior to free coloured men and women who had white blood and were in a more advantageous social position in relation to whites and whiteness. See Heuman, "The Social Structure of the Slave Societies in the Caribbean," in *General History of the Caribbean*, 145.

¹²⁰ See Partha Chatterjee, *The Nation and Its Fragments* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), chapters 1 through 4.

¹²¹ CINA, *Our Islands' Past*, vol.1, 18-21.

corroborate Jerome Handler's claim that "[coloured] freedmen and whites owned slaves for similar reasons."¹²²

By 1833, Grand Cayman's free people of color continued to exhibit an ethnocentric consciousness hinged on their social position, although, unlike their more privileged Jamaican counterparts, as we shall see, they did not seem to function in an essentially different racial identification in relation to whites and whiteness. Where towards emancipation Jamaica's privileged free people of color were sending their own petitions to the Crown, ostensibly "concerned with their own narrow interests, and pointedly avoiding any alliance with either [black or white] group,"¹²³ certain members among Cayman's free people of color were completely associating themselves with their white counterparts, yet with a greater deal of symbiosis and intimacy than those less privileged counterparts across the Caribbean, who aspired to whiteness at the continued derogation of their black ancestry, only to be constantly and miserably rejected by that which they aspired to.¹²⁴ Indeed, there is some evidence of colored slaveholders among the Caymanian petitioners who displayed their ultimate stance both on the societal importance of slavery and the slave as morally bankrupt and without social grace. Caymanian surnames like Ebanks, Tatum, and Parsons stand out here.¹²⁵

Thus expressing themselves through the understanding that emancipation was but a foregone conclusion, the colored Caymanian petitioners pushed not for the "continuance of slavery in their Island, but [that] the same measure of compensation meted to the slave owners in Jamaica be not withheld from them."¹²⁶ They clearly realized the economic disruption that would ensue, and were seeking to ensure their compensation. Yet if the freedmen, both white and colored alike, really had their way, slavery would have continued indefinitely. Indeed, there was the general opinion among the slaveholders that slaves must remain slaves, or else the wives and children of the former "[would] be at the mercy of men who [were] suddenly to receive a boon of so extraordinary a nature, that their capability of fully appreciating it is a matter of considerable doubt."¹²⁷ Although they admitted that the slaves on Grand Cayman were generally "peaceable . . . the proposed change in their condition [was] fraught with danger, and it [behoved] everyone to prepare for any evil consequence that may ensue."¹²⁸ The slaveholders' assertion meant that a pro-slavery ideology remained vibrantly alive toward emancipation. In the words of Gordon Lewis, such an ideology "was at once an economic institution and a

¹²² Jerome Handler, *The Unappropriated People: Freedmen in the Slave Society of Barbados* (Kingston: University of the West Indies Press, 2009), 149.

¹²³ Gordon Lewis, *Main Currents in Caribbean Thought: The Historical Evolution of Caribbean Society in Its Ideological Aspects, 1492-1900* (Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 2004), 218.

¹²⁴ For more on the beliefs and actions of this larger group of coloured freedmen, see especially Heuman, "The Social Structure of Slave Societies," 138-168.

¹²⁵ See Memorialists to the Earl of Mulgrave (Jamaican Governor), 13 Dec. 1833, PRO, CO 137/189, f. 40.

¹²⁶ Memorialists to the Earl of Mulgrave.

¹²⁷ Memorialists to the Earl of Mulgrave.

¹²⁸ Memorialists to the Earl of Mulgrave.

political system; and it left its indelible mark, in varying degrees, on the collective social psychology of the . . . Caribbean [people in question.]”¹²⁹ In other words, given their investment in slavery and the slave, free people of color, like whites, had internalized the normalcy and necessity of slavery.

This is not to say, however, that free coloreds on Grand Cayman functioned independently of the racializing edicts of whites in the period up to 1834. For instance, with regard to an act for levying a tax, taxes were raised on “Dwelling Houses occupied by Whites, free Coloureds and free Blacks, [and] assessed according to [the] value of the house valued by Magistrates and Representatives.” So too did racial classifications extend to “vessels according to tonnage,” and “canoes over 16 feet in length.”¹³⁰ Color and race still informed day-to-day issues on Grand Cayman, confirming a racist society. Yet this distinction did not seem to damn the free people of color to an inferior social position, given both the absence of any debilitating legislation against them, and the fact that by 1834 the slaveholders among them were expressing their unity with whites regarding their abhorrence of the soon-to-be-freed slave.

In contrast, where life had changed for Jamaican free coloreds, and drastically for the worst by 1800 (only to improve in the years leading up to emancipation), Cayman’s equivalents were in a far more elevated social position by 1802, even if Grand Cayman was not a great and prosperous slave society. Where the elite among Jamaica’s free people of color were, in their own selfish way, securing their social freedoms by countenancing the continuation of a superior/inferior racist binary, Grand Cayman’s slaveholding equivalent, in its apparent entirety, did not seem to develop a discrete sense of identity in relation to whiteness.¹³¹ In the long run, it was constitutional equality that privileged Jamaican free people of color craved, yet it was not simply a matter of wanting to be white, as it was finding themselves in a “third party in a system built for two,” thereby striving to secure their equality in a society premised upon ethnocentrism, racism, and racialism.¹³² Conversely, and based on the available, if limited, evidence which has been outlined above, free people of color on Grand Cayman to 1834 were, to a significant extent, accepted contributors to Grand Cayman’s slave society and the logic needed to sustain it.

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In conclusion, Bodden’s idea that Grand Cayman was a “society with slaves as opposed to a slave society” conflicts with the idea that the consistently greater

¹²⁹ Lewis, *Main Currents*, 218.

¹³⁰ Local Laws of Grand Cayman (1831-1834), PRO, CO 137/194, ff. 42-43.

¹³¹ See especially, in its entirety, Gad Heuman, *Between Black and White: Race, Politics, and the Free Coloreds in Jamaica, 1792-1865* (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1981); see also Franklin Knight, *The Caribbean: The Genesis of a Fragmented Nationalism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), chapter 5; Mervyn Alleyne, *Construction of Representation of Race and Ethnicity in the Caribbean and the World* (Kingston: University of West Indies Press, 2002), chapters 5 and 8.

¹³² See Arnold Sio, “Marginality and Free Coloured Identity,” 150.

number of slaves proved social and economic mainstays of developing Caymanian society, in spite of claims that because historical Cayman society was based on a seafaring economy, it could not have really been a true slave society.¹³³ Seafarers though many of them were, Caymanian whites and free people of color did own slaves who were subjugated as inferior seamen and other skilled laborers, domestics or field hands, thereby imposing upon this society notions of inferiority and superiority defined in racist and racialist terms. Regardless of the effective end of Grand Cayman's cotton boom by 1808, that Grand Cayman's slaveowners remained faithful to the institution of slavery also reflected their tenacious slavocratic will. Indeed, in slavocratic terms, the social position of the enslaved in relation to freemen in historical Cayman society should assume preeminence and not any noticeable atypical numerical actuality of that position as affected by a so-called harsh, isolated existence; noticeable though these social actualities might have been, the fact remains that slaves still outnumbered their masters to emancipation, a numerical actuality that strengthens the idea that slavery was an entrenched social institution in Grand Cayman. If we choose to identify the dynamics of a slave society with the analyses I have offered throughout this paper, then Bodden's assertion that "slave societies were those societies where free whites were significantly outnumbered by their black slaves"¹³⁴ is effectively challenged, and perhaps even cancelled out, and Elsa Goveia's definitive understanding of a slave society becomes a highly applicable one in the context of Grand Cayman towards the emancipation of slaves in the British West Indies.¹³⁵

¹³³ See Amit, "A Clash," 579-82.

¹³⁴ Personal Interview with Roy Bodden, 4-6.

¹³⁵ Goveia, *Slave Societies in the British Leeward Islands* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965), vii.

Hitler Versus Christ: The Ambivalent Co-Existence of Nazism with Christianity, 1919-1945

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Christianity and Nazism were neither intimate partners nor deadly enemies. During the 1920s and 1930s, Hitler and other Nazi leaders often invoked Christian history and symbols and minimized conflict with the Christian hierarchy, striving to ease the Nazis' rise to power and unite Germany behind them. This cautious approach enabled the Roman Catholic and Protestant churches in Germany to fall into an uneasy but more or less harmonious co-existence with the Nazi system. By the mid-1930s, however, leaders on both sides had come to realize that Nazism and Christianity had little in common, while Nazi efforts to "Aryanize" Christianity only exposed the fault lines within German society. Hitler's regime eventually began to persecute and imprison Christian dissenters; only Germany's defeat in World War II averted a more systematic persecution. Thus, even though the Nazi hierarchy initially embraced Christian rhetoric and sought to co-opt the churches' theology and institutions, Nazi and Christian leaders gradually became estranged from one another as their doctrines' mutual incompatibility became apparent.

I. Invocation: Nazism's Embrace of Christian Antisemitism, 1919-1933

Nazism initially accommodated Christianity because theological anti-semitism — "the stigmatization of Jews on the basis of Christian doctrines and world views" — had long shaped European attitudes toward Jews.¹ For centuries, popes and Protestants alike had accused Jews of crucifying Christ, baking Passover loaves with the blood of Christian children (the notorious blood libel), desecrating the Host, issuing usurious loans, and so on. Christians also accused Jews of believing that Christianity was not superior to Judaism — probably the only charge to which Jews could not plead innocent.² Exploited by nobles and scapegoated by commoners, Jews had long suffered pogroms, expulsions, ghettoization, and exclusion from citizenship and property rights. "Long before the Nazis," explains Holocaust historian Robert Wistrich, "the Jews were the most potent and hated collective 'other' against which Christian Europe could define itself."³

Antisemitism persisted among devout Christians well into the twentieth century. One of Hitler's earliest inspirations was Karl Lueger, a vocal Catholic antisemite and mayor of Vienna (1897-1910) whose picture adorned Pope Leo XIII's desk at

¹ Jacob Katz, "Antisemitism through the Ages," in *The Holocaust: Problems and Perspectives of Interpretation*, ed. Donald L. Niewyk (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2002), 14. Jews are, of course, an ethnic or religious group, not a race; hence, I will spell "antisemitism" without a capital S because to use "anti-Semitism" seems to imply that there really is a fundamental "Semitic" character to oppose, and hence to buy unconsciously into a racial world-view.

² Katz, 5, 16, 22.

³ Robert Wistrich, *Hitler and the Holocaust* (New York: Modern Library, 2001), 13.

the Vatican.⁴ Dietrich Eckart, to whom Hitler dedicated *Mein Kampf*, participated in the 1923 Beer Hall Putsch and helped launch the National Socialist German Workers' Party (*Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei*, or NSDAP), yet this die-hard Nazi admired Jesus Christ as a role model, "the embodiment of all manliness."⁵ Neither were Protestants innocent of Judenhass (hatred of Jews); indeed, it was a Lutheran priest, Adolf Stöcker, who founded Germany's first single-issue antisemitic party in 1878, while theologians like Paul Althaus and Emanuel Hirsch hailed Hitler's rise to power as a "miracle of God."⁶ The prevalence of antisemitism among Christians would give Nazism both a sense of moral legitimacy and a ready-made audience for their vilification of Jews.

But from the 1870s onward, European Jews became the targets of a new and especially virulent strain of Judeophobia that incorporated nationalism, racism, and Social Darwinism into the antisemitic polemics bequeathed it by Christianity.⁷ Secular German nationalists and Christian traditionalists alike pictured Jews as depraved and avaricious outsiders who deserved to be excluded from public office, key professions, and academia. However, Hitler and other believers in the *Völkische* ideology of "blood and soil" went further, envisioning a "racially pure" Aryan society purged of supposedly enervating and materialistic Jewish influences and thence reflecting the true German world-view (*Weltanschauung*). The Nazis imagined their ideal to be achievable only through an inter-racial struggle (*kampf*) for the "survival of the fittest" — a struggle from which Providence (*Vorsehung*) had destined the Aryan people (*Volk*) to emerge victorious.⁸ From this blend of Romantic nationalism with pseudoscientific racism emerged fanatics who saw Christianity as too tainted by "Semitic" influences to belong to a truly "Aryan" society.⁹ Coined by irascible German journalist Wilhelm Marr in 1879, the term "antisemitism" was meant to give anti-Jewish prejudice a scientific veneer — suggesting a distinctly "Semitic" racial character — distinct from religious objections to Judaism. Leading pre-Nazi antisemites like Eugen Dühring and Theodor Fritsch spurned Christianity altogether; others, such as Paul de Lagarde, advocated a "virile Germanic and de-Judaized" travesty of Christianity. However, all such zealots demanded that Germany "throw off the yoke of a 'Semitic' Judeo-Christianity."¹⁰

⁴ Klaus P. Fischer, *Nazi Germany: A New History* (New York: Continuum, 1995), 37; Robert Michael, *A History of Catholic Antisemitism: The Dark Side of the Church* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 107.

⁵ Richard Steigmann-Gall, *The Holy Reich: Nazi Conceptions of Christianity, 1919-1945* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 14. Eckart exerted such a formative influence over the young Hitler that one eminent Holocaust historian refers to him as the "ideological godfather" of National Socialism. Wistrich, 25.

⁶ Robert P. Ericksen and Susannah Heschel, eds., *Betrayal: German Churches and the Holocaust* (Minneapolis, MN: Augsburg Fortress Press, 1999), 23; Fischer, 34.

⁷ Katz, 14.

⁸ Fischer, 37, 166-68.

⁹ Wistrich, 16.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 16-18.

Although Hitler's movement was indebted to these radicals, his own rhetoric did not quite reflect their anti-Christian stance — indeed, on the Christian question he was what passed for a moderate. Hitler never formally quit the Catholic Church, continued to speak of a “Divine Providence,” and reined in subordinates whose zeal threatened to antagonize the faithful. The future Führer nevertheless nursed a fundamental antagonism to what he termed the “satanic superstition” of “hypocritical priests” extracting money from parishioners.¹¹ “One day,” Hitler snarled, “we want to be in a position where only complete idiots stand on the pulpit and preach to old women.”¹² Despite these objections, he assiduously avoided any conflict with Christianity in the 1920s, fearing to alienate Catholic Bavarians. In 1928, he even expelled the Nazi organizer for Thuringia, Artur Dinter, from the Party for espousing the “de-Judaization” of Christianity.¹³ Years earlier, in 1922, Hitler had denounced ally and old war hero Erich von Ludendorff, calling the former general's paganist anti-Catholicism a “disastrous diversion from the Jewish peril.”¹⁴ “I need Bavarian Catholics as well as Prussian Protestants,” Hitler pronounced, dismissing sectarianism as counter-productive. “The rest,” he added ominously, “can come later.”¹⁵

To win over Christians, Hitler “draped himself in the colors of a fundamentalist anti-Semitic Christianity.” Throughout the 1920s, he claimed to be following Christ's example in the struggle against Jewish materialism, seizing on the biblical passage in which Jesus flogs the moneylenders out of the temple as evidence of Jesus' militant antisemitism. “In Hitler's imaginary self-projection,” writes Robert Wistrich, “Christ seemed more like Siegfried, a Germanic warrior-hero who had created a great world movement by preaching a popular anti-Jewish faith fused with intense patriotic idealism.” Hitler saw himself as a redeemer of Germany, positing a millenarian struggle for “Aryan” salvation from “Semitic” corruption.¹⁶ Finally, citing the continuity between Christian and Nazi antisemitism, Hitler assured Bishop Berning of Osnabrück in 1933, “as for the Jews, I am just carrying on with the same policy which the Catholic Church has adopted for fifteen hundred years.”¹⁷ “By defending myself against the Jews,” he concluded in *Mein Kampf*, “I am fighting for the work of the Lord.”¹⁸

¹¹ Quoted in John S. Conway, *The Nazi Persecution of the Churches* (New York: Basic Books, 1968), 3.

¹² Quoted in Fischer, 359.

¹³ Conway, 13; Steigmann-Gall, 58.

¹⁴ Wistrich, 124.

¹⁵ Quoted in Conway, 5, and Steigmann-Gall, 59. Like most German nationalists, the Nazis generally favored Germany-based Protestant confessions over international Catholicism. Seeking to promote sectarian homogeneity in Germany, Otto von Bismarck had waged a bitter *Kulturkampf* (“culture struggle”) against Catholic influence in Prussia in the 1870s, a campaign blunted by intense Catholic opposition. From the start, Hitler promised himself not to repeat Bismarck's mistake of favoring one church over another. Fischer, 358; Steigmann-Gall, 82.

¹⁶ Wistrich, 121-23.

¹⁷ Conway, 26.

¹⁸ Adolf Hitler, *Mein Kampf*, trans. Ralph Manheim (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1943), 65.

Despite Hitler's invocation of the Christian past, leading churchmen remained suspicious of Nazism throughout the 1920s, embracing the NSDAP only once Hitler had come to power. The authoritarian conservatives and traditionalists who dominated the Christian hierarchy mostly rejected the Nazi notion of "positive Christianity" (a national creed based on racial exclusion) as incompatible with Christian doctrine.¹⁹ Bishops of major dioceses like Mainz and Breslau forbade Catholics from becoming Party members and, if any of the faithful disobeyed, from taking the sacraments.²⁰ Still, the Nazis' emphasis on stamping out Communism, confining women to domestic roles, and suppressing homosexual behavior pleased the clergy and enabled Catholic laymen like Franz von Papen to justify rallying to Hitler's side. The Vatican cemented its amity with Nazism in July 1933, when it signed a Concordat recognizing the Nazi regime in exchange for religious freedom and legal status for Germany's large Catholic minority.²¹ That Christmas, Cardinal Michael von Faulhaber preached against racism and ultranationalism to huge crowds in Munich — the city that gave birth to Nazism — but denied rebuking the regime.²² Faulhaber's ambivalence reflects the emergence of a "loyal opposition" within the churches that resisted attempts to "Aryanize" Christianity while remaining loyal to the Third Reich.

II. Aryanization: The Rise of the German Christians, 1932-1934

In contrast to Catholics' reluctance, many Protestants embraced Nazism early on, albeit in a piecemeal way that reflected the Evangelical churches' lack of central authority. The 1920 Party platform had affirmed a "positive Christianity" (*Positives Christentum*) that would not "endanger" state authority or "conflict with the customs and moral sentiments of the Germanic race."²³ From the 1920s onward, vocal elements within the Protestant clergy had pushed to implement this positive Christianity, demanding the "de-Judaization" of Christian theology and the "coordination" (*Gleichschaltung*) of the 28 regional churches (*Landeskirchen*) into a single national church (*Reichskirche*) that would exclude "non-Aryans" from membership.²⁴ Hailing Hitler as a "redeemer" from the "gangrene" of Communist atheism, pluralism, and democracy, the Faith Movement of German Christians (*Glaubensbewegung Deutsche Christen*), or German Christians for short, won partially rigged church elections in September 1933, taking over seminaries, bishoprics, and local church councils across the country. German Christians then

¹⁹ Conway, 6.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 24. This blanket prohibition on Catholics' joining the NSDAP remained in effect until 28 March 1933.

²¹ Ericksen and Heschel, 11; Wistrich, 127-28.

²² Ethel Mary Tinnemann, "Attitudes of the German Catholic Hierarchy toward the Nazi Regime: A Study in German Psycho-Political Culture," *Western Political Quarterly* 22, no. 2 (June 1969), 344; Wistrich, 128.

²³ Steigmann-Gall, 14.

²⁴ Fischer, 360.

appointed Ludwig Müller, Hitler's advisor on Protestant affairs, as the new Reich Bishop (Reichsbischof), giving the Nazis control over the Protestant hierarchy.²⁵

Aryanization of Christian theology followed hard upon the heels of the Nazification of Protestant institutions.²⁶ Striving to purge supposed Jewish influences from Christianity and reconcile it with Nazism, German Christian radicals like Reinhold Krause denounced the Old Testament's "cheap Jewish morality" and its "stories of cattle traders and pimps."²⁷ Alongside this rejection of the Old Testament as "too Jewish" was the claim that Jesus was really an Aryan Amorite dedicated to destroying Judaism and was not a Jew at all.²⁸ German Christians distorted the New Testament's message to make it seem antisemitic, citing random passages in which Jesus accuses a few Jews of belonging to "your father, the devil" (John 8:44) or drives Hebrew merchants from the Temple of Solomon (Matthew 21:12). By December 1941, at least seven regional churches dominated by German Christians had expelled Jewish converts to Christianity from their clergy and congregations. They justified this betrayal by claiming that baptism changed "nothing about the racial essence of Jews;" therefore, "racially Jewish Christians have no room and no rights" in a German church. German Christians ended up sanctifying Nazism.²⁹

So eagerly did the German Christians cultivate this ill-fated alliance with the Nazi regime that they triggered a backlash from mainstream clergy, ranging from conservatives like Otto Dibelius, church superintendant of Berlin-Brandenburg, to progressive theologians like Dietrich Bonhoeffer. The huge rally at the Berlin Sportpalast on 13 November 1933, at which speakers called for the expurgation of the Old Testament and the expulsion of "non-Aryan" parishioners and pastors from the Reich Church, drove an outright schism between German Christians and the Pastors' Emergency League (*Pfarrernotbund*), formed to defend orthodoxy.³⁰ The resultant church struggle (*kirchenkampf*) exasperated leaders of the Nazi state, who concluded that attempts to Aryanize Christianity had backfired, endangering the national unity they craved.³¹

Nazi leaders therefore disassociated themselves from the *Deutsche Christen* and discouraged further overt interference in religious matters. German Christians did continue to receive most ecclesiastical appointments given that the alternative was ideologically unreliable clergy who either belonged to the Confessing Church or professed neutrality; still, compared to 1933, pro-Nazi Christians found themselves

²⁵ Barnett, 34; Doris L. Bergen, "The Ecclesiastical Final Solution: The German Christian Movement and the Anti-Jewish Church," in *The Holocaust and History: The Known, the Unknown, the Disputed, and the Reexamined*, ed. Michael Berenbaum and Abraham J. Peck (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998), 567.

²⁶ I prefer to use the term "Aryanization" rather than "Nazification" to emphasize the fact that far-right antisemites and theologians had advocated the de-Judaization of Christianity for decades preceding the emergence of Nazism.

²⁷ Bergen, 569.

²⁸ Ericksen and Heschel, 69, 77-78. Many Nazis idolized Jesus as history's first and most heroic anti-Jewish fighter.

²⁹ Quoted in Bergen, 576.

³⁰ Victoria Barnett, *For the Soul of the People: Protestant Protest Against Hitler* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 34-36; Fischer, 360-61.

³¹ Conway, 51-54.

in the cold. The Hitler Youth absorbed all 700,000 members of Protestant youth groups in late 1933; two years later, the regime banned churchmen from addressing secular gatherings and forbade Party members from wearing their uniforms at religious services.³² In 1938, SS chief Heinrich Himmler went so far as to forbid the display of the German Christians' conjoined cross and swastika, warning that "the Party lays the greatest stress on remaining independent towards all Church groups."³³ Seeing that Gleichschaltung had done little other than to provoke dissent, Nazi leaders elected to disregard the Christian question in the hope that Christianity would "disappear of its own accord."³⁴ On the whole, unexpectedly vigorous opposition had frustrated the regime's campaign to co-opt Christianity.

III. Radicalization: The Clash of Convictions, 1934-1937

The Nazi leadership's decision to abandon its Aryanization project arose not only from clerical opposition but also from its own hostile or ambivalent attitudes toward Christianity. In late 1936, Nazi hardliners began "leaving the church" (*Kirchenaustritt*) to become unaffiliated "believers in God" (*Gottgläubige*), whose ill-defined religious ideas can best be described as pseudoscientific brand of deism: a belief in a "Divine Providence" that did not intervene in Creation and therefore rendered prayers and scriptures moot.³⁵ Nazi paganist theoretician Alfred Rosenberg had quit his faith in November 1933, while internal security chief Heinrich Himmler and his enforcer, Reinhold Heydrich, followed suit in 1936. Party Chancellor Martin Bormann was a bona fide nonbeliever (*Ungläubige*) who hated Christianity root and branch, comparing pastors to astrologers and other "quacks."³⁶ By 1939, a census had counted 3,481,000 God Believers, representing just 4 percent of the German population but a sizable share of the Party.³⁷

Such anti-Christian radicals clashed with more moderate Nazis who rejected traditional or institutional Christianity but not Christianity *en toto*, an attitude they deemed either rashly neo-pagan or too reminiscent of Bolshevik atheism. Adolf Hitler, Propaganda Minister Joseph Goebbels, and *Der Stürmer* editor Julius Streicher fell into this category, for despite their reputations as "vituperative anticlericals," they admired the Aryan Jesus, never bothered to quit the Catholic Church, and publicly insisted that Nazism was not a repudiation of Christianity.³⁸ Air force chief Hermann Göring was the only Nazi leader who consistently attended church services. Like most Nazis, though, Göring was suspicious of "papist" internationalism and was violently anti-clerical. "Neither the red rats nor the black

³² Barnett, 36-37.

³³ Quoted in Conway, 59.

³⁴ Quoted in Jeremy Noakes and Geoffrey Pridham, eds., *Documents on Nazism, 1919-1945* (New York: Viking Press, 1974), 373.

³⁵ Barnett, 32; Fischer, 359; Noakes and Pridham, 373; Steigmann-Gall, 219-22.

³⁶ Noakes and Pridham, 374; Steigmann-Gall, 126.

³⁷ Fischer, 359.

³⁸ Steigmann-Gall, 124-26.

moles,” he bellowed in November 1933, “shall ever rule over Germany.”³⁹ Caught in this broad and shifting but fundamentally antipathetical spectrum of attitudes, Christianity’s future seemed tenuous at best.

The most prominent anti-Christian Nazi during the 1930s was Alfred Rosenberg, Nazism’s foremost theorist and paganist — and also the first NSDAP leader to leave his church. Rosenberg’s notorious *Myth of the Twentieth Century* (1930) repudiated doctrines traditionally central to Christianity, including the Resurrection and the Trinity, and urged a “Nordic-western soul-faith” that would replace “Roman dogmatism” and the feeble Christian “brotherhood of man.” Abstruse and, at 700 pages, interminable, this paganist exaltation of “blood and soil” (*Blut und Boden*) had sold more than a million copies by 1945. Its popularity, coupled with its author’s prominence in the Nazi movement, made orthodox clergy assume that the book stated the official Party line. But its influence within the NSDAP was negligible: Hitler dismissed it as “stuff nobody can understand,” while Goebbels ridiculed it as an “ideological belch.” Of all the other top Nazis, only Himmler shared Rosenberg’s *ersatz* faith. Yet however discounted by his associates, Rosenberg’s anti-Christian paganism foreshadowed a broader shift not necessarily toward paganism but against any traditional mode of Christianity, which the regime increasingly saw as offering a rival world-view that could never truly be incorporated into Nazi ideology.⁴⁰

The issue of converts particularly divided Nazis and Christians.⁴¹ Whereas Christians had targeted Jews on the basis of their religion and alleged misconduct, the Nazis hated and persecuted Jews “not for what they had done but for the simple fact of their existence.”⁴² In other words, Nazi ideology defined Jewishness in racial terms, whereas Protestant dissenters and Catholics believed that Christianity transcends ethnicity: baptism over blood, in other words.⁴³ Baptism tendered the prospect of salvation even to people of Jewish ancestry or former Judaic faith — a universalism that was anathema to Nazi ultranationalists and racists, who demanded at least two generations of German forbearers before admitting anyone to the Aryan elect.⁴⁴ In contrast, Christians traditionally welcomed so-called non-Aryans who converted to Christianity. To quote one Jewish Christian, Dietrich Goldschmidt, “Whoever was baptized, belonged.”⁴⁵

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 119-120.

⁴⁰ Steigmann-Gall, 92-101.

⁴¹ Christians also objected, albeit feebly, to Nazi ruthlessness. Otto Dibelius applauded the oppression of German Jews but hoped they would not be unduly brutalized in the process. Shelley Baranowski, “Consent and Dissent: The Confessing Church and Conservative Opposition to Nazism,” *Journal of Modern History* 59, no. 1 (March 1987), 61.

⁴² Wistrich, xi.

⁴³ Baranowski, 69; Barnett, 130. Unlike the Nazis, the Catholic fascist movements that ruled Croatia and Slovakia during World War II allowed Jews the escape route of baptism and made no effort to Aryanize Christianity.

⁴⁴ Barnett, 127.

⁴⁵ Quoted in Barnett, 133; Katz, 22.

Christian dissenters made some effort to protect converted Jews, who by the Nazis' count numbered some 300,000 as of 1933.⁴⁶ Dietrich Bonhoeffer assailed the *Aryan Paragraph*, while Martin Niemöller founded the Pastors' Emergency League in part to protect scores of non-Aryan pastors from suffering expulsion from their parishes. Berlin pastor Heinrich Grüber, meanwhile, worked with progressive theologian Karl Barth in Switzerland to assist as many as 2000 Jewish Christians to flee abroad between September 1938 and December 1940, when the Gestapo finally shut down his operation and sent him to the Sachsenhausen concentration camp. Only twelve of the 35 staff in his office would survive the Holocaust.⁴⁷ To a regime striving for total control over society, even such minor challenges, coming as they did from institutions to which 95 percent of Germans nominally belonged, could not be countenanced.⁴⁸

Opinion on both sides radicalized between 1934 and 1937. A former U-boat captain who festooned his church with swastikas, Martin Niemöller rallied over 6000 clergymen — 33 percent of all German pastors — to defend Jewish Christians.⁴⁹ In April 1934, the nascent Confessing Church published the Barmen Declaration, in which it rejected state control of the churches and affirmed the traditional Christian faith in baptism and the Bible against the heretical and “destructive errors of the German Christians.”⁵⁰ In May 1936, the church went so far as to send Hitler a letter — albeit a secret one — protesting anti-Jewish persecution and prejudice.⁵¹ Catholic protest, meanwhile, crystallized on Palm Sunday in April 1937, when parish priests all over Germany mounted their pulpits and proclaimed Pope Pius XI's encyclical *Mit brennender Sorge* (“With Burning Anxiety”), in which the Vatican denounced the paganist idolization of race and blood and efforts to establish a national religion — and, implicitly, condemned Nazism too.⁵²

IV. Conflict: The Intensification of Persecution, 1937-1945

From 1937 to 1945, the long-standing doctrinal differences between National Socialism and traditional Christianity developed into an increasingly systematic persecution of Christian dissenters. On Hitler's orders, the Gestapo seized all copies of the papal encyclical of 1937 and shut down Catholic printing presses, while Goebbels “orchestrated a smear campaign” that sent hundreds of priests and monastics to concentration camps after sensational trials convicting them of

46 Baranowski, 68; Barnett, 128.

47 Barnett, 128-134, 144-146.

48 Martyn Housden, *Resistance and Conformity in the Third Reich* (New York: Routledge, 1997), 56. The statistic applies to 1939 and reveals the institutional challenge that the churches might conceivably pose to the Nazi state.

49 Conway, 85.

50 Quoted in Housden, 48. Swiss Reformed theologian Karl Barth wrote the Barmen Declaration. Baranowski, 64.

51 Barnett, 83; Wistrich, 127.

52 Conway, 165-66; Wistrich, 129, 135.

trumped-up charges ranging from “financial malfeasance” to “sexual aberrations.”⁵³ Having dissolved Christian youth and other lay organizations and seized their assets, the regime proceeded to shut down all church-run schools in Germany by mid-1939 and purged religious instruction from school curriculums the following year.⁵⁴ This campaign to reduce Christian influence on society escalated further when Hanns Kerrl, Minister of Church Affairs, expelled the outspoken bishop of Rottenburg, Johannes Sproll, from his diocese in 1938.⁵⁵

In its campaign to muzzle clerical opposition, Nazi Germany also cracked down hard on Protestant dissenters. In July 1937, Hitler personally ordered the arrest of Martin Niemöller, who would spend the next eight years either in police prisons or in the concentration camps of Sachsenhausen and Dachau, where the regime confined hundreds of clergymen and other political prisoners. By year’s end, the Gestapo had rounded up more than 700 Protestant pastors, including Paul Schneider, who was murdered at Buchenwald after daring to excommunicate his Nazi parishioners.⁵⁶ Renowned seminarian Dietrich Bonhoeffer, implicated in a 1943 plot to assassinate Hitler, was imprisoned and eventually hanged in April 1945.⁵⁷

The incompatibility of Nazism and Christianity became plain in the summer of 1941. In June of that year, Martin Bormann, the powerful Party Chancellor and Hitler’s confidant, told regional Party leaders point-blank that “National Socialism and Christianity are irreconcilable.”⁵⁸ Archbishop Clement von Galen of Münster soon proved Bormann right. On 3 August 1941, this aristocratic prelate publicly denounced Operation T-4, the regime’s program to “euthanize” mentally and physically handicapped Germans (at least 70,000 victims by 1941). Backed by fellow Catholic clerics as well as by the Confessing Church, Galen reviled the euthanasia policy as “plain murder” and suggested the culprits be executed. Lest the publicity undercut German wartime unity, Hitler formally halted the euthanasia program (it continued in secret).⁵⁹ Hitler flew into his usual rage at Galen’s defiance, but Goebbels warned that “if anything were done against the Bishop,” the whole province of Westphalia “could be regarded as lost to the war effort In politics,” he added, “one should know how to wait.”⁶⁰ Hitler therefore deferred the day of reckoning, but the confrontation revealed the incompatibility of Nazi and Christian values and the reason Bormann insisted the churches be “broken finally and completely.”⁶¹

⁵³ Conway, 166; Fischer, 363.

⁵⁴ Conway, 182-84, 210. The ban on crucifixes in schools in particular aroused discontent among the populace. Villagers in the Saarland, for example, broke into one school and hung the crucifix back on the wall. Housden, 51.

⁵⁵ Conway, 224.

⁵⁶ Barnett, 181; Conway, 209.

⁵⁷ Barnett, 4.

⁵⁸ Quoted in Noakes and Pridham, 373-74.

⁵⁹ Conway, 281-83; Housden, 63; Wistrich, 131.

⁶⁰ Quoted in Steigmann-Gall, 249.

⁶¹ Conway, 283; quoted in Noakes and Pridham, 374.

In the event, no “ecclesiastical final solution” ever took place — not just because Germany lost the Second World War but because Christian objections to National Socialism never posed an existential threat to the regime.⁶² In fact, bishops and pastors tended to couple their critique of Nazi ideology with patriotism and an unfortunate loyalty to the Nazi state. Bishop Galen, for example, publicly congratulated the German armed forces on defending the Fatherland against “godless Bolshevism.”⁶³ As for the Confessing Church, to quote historian Joseph Conway, it sought chiefly to “maintain the integrity of the Gospel against the distortions and misuse of the ‘German Christians.’”⁶⁴ Catholics objected to Nazi infringements on the autonomy guaranteed them under the Concordat of 1933, but Pius and other critics never rebuked Hitler or the regime directly, condemning racism and nationalism only in general terms. And while it took courage for Clement von Galen to denounce the “euthanasia” of 70,000 handicapped Germans, he said nothing against the annihilation of over a hundred times as many Jews and Poles.⁶⁵ Christians tended to object only when Nazism threatened the churches’ theological or institutional sovereignty. That said, their loyalty was not necessarily enough to ensure their safety.

Conclusion

In short, Nazism’s dialectical relationship with Christianity emerges as a tortuous story of complicity and growing estrangement. During the first phase of this relationship (1919-1933), Hitler and his followers regularly invoked Jesus and Christianity’s history of Judeophobia to justify Nazi antisemitism. The next phase (1933-1934) saw the Nazis struggle to “Aryanize” Christianity by expurgating the Bible of “Semitic” influences and establishing a pro-Nazi national church that excluded “non-Aryan” converts. The third phase (1934-1937) saw the radicalization of Nazi attitudes toward Christianity as Catholic and Confessing clergy became increasingly critical of the regime, to which they nonetheless remained loyal. In the final phase (1937-1945), Nazism’s ideological incompatibility with Christianity became clear as the regime began to suppress Christian institutions and systematically persecute thousands of dissenters. Most importantly, the Nazis violated Christianity’s spirit and letter alike when they discarded every vestige of compassion, universalism, and biblical authenticity. Even though church leaders remained silent about the Holocaust and to a considerable degree acquiesced in the Nazi regime, the relationship of Nazism with Christianity was ultimately — and perhaps inevitably — adversarial. Martin Bormann was right: Hitler’s Reich had no place for Christ.

⁶² Bergen, 566.

⁶³ Ericksen and Heschel, 11; Housden, 61.

⁶⁴ Conway, 84.

⁶⁵ Wistrich, 131-32. Once Poland fell in 1939, the Nazis systematically imprisoned and massacred thousands of Polish priests, who they feared might form the nucleus of an armed resistance movement. Nationalistic German Catholics maintained a deeply disturbing silence about this genocide of their Catholic brethren. Conway, 295-99.

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April 14 -16
Florida Conference of Historians
Fort Lauderdale, Florida
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**A Note to Those Chairing Sessions: Your basic obligations as chair of
a session are few but nonetheless important. You should gather basic
biographical information about the presenters prior to the session so as to
introduce them appropriately. You should inform those present that it is
customary to defer questions to the end of the session. It is crucial to manage
your scheduled time appropriately. In most sessions, presenters are allotted
about twenty minutes and it is the chair's duty to cue them when their time
elapses, perhaps providing a "five minute warning." For the purposes of this
conference, there will be no appointed discussants unless specifically noted.
As chair, you are also charged with managing the question-answer period
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Finally, you should bring your session to a timely close by thanking all of
those who participated.**

**2011 Meeting
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**Thursday – April 14
Registration and Reception
Bahia Mar Beach Resort, Harbor Lights Room
600 – 800 pm**

**Friday, April 15
800 – 1000am: Registration in Harbor Lights Room,
2nd Floor**

**Friday's Food and Beverages Courtesy of Pearson Education Group
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**Note: Presenters who did not appear have been removed
from the program.**

800 am-1230 pm: Concurrent Sessions

**800 – 915 am Session I: Topics in World Religion
Seafarer Room, 3rd Floor**

Chair: David Proctor, Tallahassee Community College

“Holy Obedience beyond the Covenant: The Autobiography of Cecelia Ferrazzi, Venice, 1665” – Ashley Lynn Buchanan, University of South Florida

“The Business of Faith: Lascasian Missionary Practices of the Dominican Mission Frontier” – Scott Cave, University of North Florida

800 – 915 am

**Session II: African Americans in the Modern Era
Mariner Room, 3rd Floor**

Chair: Julian Chambliss, Rollins College

“Depicting the Black Other on Page and Stage: Historical Interpretations Of Nineteenth Century Popular Culture and the Scholarship of Blackface Minstrelsy” – Chris Tucker, Clark University

“‘Stony the Road:’ African – Americans in Transition from Jacksonville to St. Augustine, 1892 – 1918” – Rose C. Thevenin, Florida Memorial University

930 – 1045 am

**Session I: Topics in Florida History
Seafarer Room, 3rd Floor**

Chair: Seth A. Weitz, Dalton State College

“Massive Resistance to Civil Rights in Florida, 1945 – 1970”
Kisha King, Broward College

“‘You Can’t Hug a Newspaper:’ Janet Chusmir, the Miami Herald
and Newspaper Management” - Kimberly Voss, University of
Central Florida

“The Florida East Coast Railway: For More than 110 Years America’s
Speedway to Sunshine” – Seth H. Bramson, Barry University /
Florida International University

**Session II: India: Empire and Nationhood
Mariner Room, 3rd Floor**

Chair: Evan Lampe, St. Thomas University

“Hunting and Imperialism: British Female Hunters in Colonial India,
1860 – 1947” – Fiona Mani, West Virginia University

“Non-Alignment: Nehru’s Wisdom” – Pankaj Kumar, Vidant Hindu
College, Lucknow, India

1100 – 1230 am

**Session I: Latin America from Colonial to Contemporary Times
Seafarer Room, 3rd Floor**

Chair: Sean McMahon, Florida Gateway College

“Witchcraft and the Inquisition in Colonial Latin American: The Case
of Diego Lopez” – Michael Cole, Florida Gulf Coast University

“Bill Delahunt and the Origins of Plan Colombia, 1990 – 2005” –
Landon Hinson, Jacksonville University

**Session II: War and Ideology, Ancient and Modern
Mariner Room, 3rd Floor**

Chair: Blaine T. Browne, Broward College

“Naval warfare during the Siege of Syracuse and Tyre,”
- Greg Miller, Hillsborough Community College

“From Nazi Youth to Child Soldiers of Today: How and Why Do
Children Get Involved in War?” – Jennifer Kohnke, Aurora University

“Rosie the Riveter Didn’t Live in Puerto Rico:’ the Home Front in a Caribbean Island during World War II” – Mirta L. Nieves Meijas, University of Puerto Rico

“Genocide and Forced Collectivization in Stalinist Russia,”
- Frank Piccirillo, Florida Gulf Coast University

1230 – 130: Lunch on Your Own – FCH Business Meeting

130 – 545 pm: Concurrent Sessions

130- 245 pm

Session I: War, Nationalism, Revolution and Counter – Revolution in Germany Seafarer Room, 3rd Floor

Chair: Michael Rodriguez, Florida Gulf Coast University
Discussant: Frank Piccirillo, Florida Gulf Coast University

“Manfred von Richtofen and the Making of a Greater Great War”
- Janet Schalk, Florida Gulf Coast University

“Strange Bedfellows: The SPD, the Freikorps and the Suppression of the Far Left in the German Revolution” – William Murphy

“The Night of the Long Knives: The Defeat of the SA and the Rise of the SS” – Sara Gottwalles, Florida Gulf Coast University

Session II: Politics & Social Change in Europe and the United States, 1900 – 1939 Mariner Room, 3rd Floor

Chair: Nicholas J. Steneck, Florida Southern College
Discussants: Mike Denham and Nicholas J. Steneck, Florida Southern College

“Post-First World War Automobile Advertisements: Defining Social Roles and Ideals” – Holly Bennett, Florida Southern College

“‘Within Our Moral and Legal Rights’”: The Racially Discriminatory Policies of Progressive Governors Hiram Johnson and Hoke Smith”
- Richard Soash, Florida Southern College

“Fashion and Feminism in Interwar Britain,” Mary Yurso, Florida Southern College

300 – 430 pm

**Session I: Topics in Modern U.S. History
Seafarer Room, 3rd Floor**

Chair: Michael Epple, Florida Gulf Coast University

“Starving the Mill of Soviet Propagandists: Understanding President Eisenhower’s Response to the Little Rock Desegregation Crisis”
- Roland Brucken, Norwich University

“‘A Vast Wilderness:’ Fulton Sheen Refuses to Follow the Pro-Soviet Rhetoric during World War II” – Michael Epple, Florida Gulf Coast University

“African Americans and the Civilian Conservation Corps” –
Michael Sanchez, Florida Gulf Coast University

**Session II: The United States: From Republic to Empire
Mariner Room, 3rd Floor**

Chair: Daniel Vogel, Texas Christian University

“The Historical Context of the Declaration of Independence”
- Stuart Smith III, Germana Community College

“The Benevolent Empire: The Origins of the U.S. Empire”
- Andrew Cain, Florida Gulf Coast University

“McKinley and the Modern Presidency: How the Spanish-American War Changed the Power of the Presidency” – Heather Kizkiel,
Florida Gulf Coast University

430 – 545 pm

**Session I: Africa and Asia
Seafarer Room, 3rd Floor**

Chair: Kisha King, Broward College

“Integration and Resistance in the Ethiopian Empire State:
The Case of Qellem, 1886-1941” – Etana Habte Dinka,
Addis Ababa University, Ethiopia

Session II: Ireland, Scotland and the Empire
Mariner Room, 3rd Floor
Chair: Blaine T. Browne, Broward College

“The Earliest Form of Irish Surety” – William Mattingly,
Florida Gulf Coast University

“For Freedom Alone: The Birth of Scottish Nationalism in the Scottish War of Independence” – Keith A. Kelso, Southeastern University

“‘Hmph, Slavery was never an institution here!’: Did Slavery Really Matter in the Cayman Islands?” – Christopher Williams, University College of the Cayman Islands

Notes:

Fun Florida Facts!

David Levy (Yulee)

David Levy Yulee (1810 – 1886), who served as U.S. senator from Florida from the 1840s through 1861, was the first Jewish member of that chamber. Born in St. Thomas, Virgin Islands, David accompanied his father Moses Levy to Florida, where the latter purchased some 50,000 acres of land near present-day Jacksonville with hopes of establishing a “New Jerusalem” for Jewish immigrants. The younger Levy studied law before winning election to the U.S. senate when Florida gained statehood in 1845. The following year he adopted the ancestral Sephardic surname Yulee then married Nannie Wickcliffe, with whom he raised two children. Levy bought a 5,000 acre plantation on the Homosassa River, the remains of which are to be found at the Yulee Sugar Mills State Historic Site. During the 1850s, he began construction of the Florida Railroad, which reached Cedar Key just as the Civil War broke out. In 1861, Levy left the U.S. Senate when he sided with the Confederacy, a decision that cost him a stint as a prisoner in Ft. Pulaski after the war ended. Freed, he rebuilt what became the Yulee Railroad. He later moved to Washington, D.C before dying in New York City in 1886. Both the town of Yulee, Florida and Levy County are named for him. In 2000, he was designated a “Great Floridian” by the Florida Department of State.

**630 – 830: Banquet, Installation of New Officers and Keynote Address
Harbor Lights Room, 2nd Floor
(attendees desiring an alcoholic beverage may purchase one in the hotel bar)**

**Welcoming Remarks: Dr. David Proctor,
Tallahassee Community College
President, Florida Conference of Historians, 2009-2010**

**Introduction of Guest Speaker: Dr. Blaine T. Browne
Broward College**

**This Year’s Speaker:
David W. Levy, David Ross Boyd Professor of American History, Emeritus
University of Oklahoma**

David W. Levy attended the University of Illinois and the University of Chicago before earning a doctorate in history from the University of Wisconsin in 1967. That same year, he began a lengthy and productive tenure at the University of Oklahoma, where he taught American intellectual history. Having only recently retired, Dr. Levy authored numerous articles and reviews in addition to co-editing the Louis Brandeis letters and Franklin Roosevelt's Fireside Chats. His other major publications include *Herbert Croly of the New Republic* (1985), *The Debate Over Vietnam* (1991), a three volume history of the University of Oklahoma (in progress) and most recently *Mark Twain: The Divided Mind of America's Best-Loved Writer* (2010). Dr. Levy's ambitious scholarship is matched by his teaching skills, which were regularly recognized in the numerous teaching awards he received during his years at the University of Oklahoma. He now resides in Norman, Oklahoma with his wife Lynne and remains actively engaged in research and writing. **Dr. Levy's address tonight is: "Yossarian and McMurphy: Or Why the Sixties Floundered."**

Saturday, April 16, 2011

800-900 am: Registration, Harbor Lights Room, 2nd Floor

Food and Beverages Provided by W.W. Norton

800 am – 1230 pm: Concurrent Sessions

800-915

Session I: Cowboys and Indians: Iconography and Representation in the Americas

Seafarer Room, 3rd Floor

Chair: Jesse Hingson

"Ernest Bellocq's Storyville Photographs in the Public Memory since 1970" – Kylie Romero, Jacksonville University

"Commercialization and Nostalgia of the Native American Past: The Chickasaw Cultural Center, 1977 – Present" – Jennifer L. Johnson, Jacksonville University

"A Comparative Study of the Cowboy as Cultural Icon in the Americas" – Christine DePasquale, Jacksonville University

Session II: Florida in the Twentieth Century

Mariner Room, 3rd Floor

Chair: Sean McMahon, Florida Gateway College

"The Politics of Control: Florida and the British West Indian Labor Program" – Erin Conlin, University of Florida

“Flying in the Sun: World War I pilot Training at Carlstrom Field, Florida, 1917-1918” – Erik D. Carlson, Florida Gulf Coast University

“Strom Thurmond and the Failed Dixiecrat Revolt of 1948 in Florida”
- Seth A. Weitz, Dalton State College

930 – 1045 am

**Session I: Florida, From Piracy to Nuclear Power
Seafarer Room, 3rd Floor**

Chair: Sheila Jones, Broward College

“Plundering the Peninsula: Piracy, Privateering and Smuggling in Florida Waters” Daniel Vogel, Texas Christian University

“Floating the Idea: The Failure of Nuclear Power in Jacksonville, 1970-1985” – Michael Bunch, Jacksonville University

**Session II: Explorations in US Immigration Policy
Mariner Room, 3rd Floor**

Chair: Cassidy Henry, Florida Atlantic University

“The Molly Maguires: Creating History, Destroying Fact”
- Ashley Irizarry, Florida Atlantic University

“In the Void: State Policy Making in the Absence of Federal Enforcement of Immigration” – Robert Bruton, Florida Atlantic University

“Immigration, Population and the Environment” – Megan Allore, Florida Atlantic University

1100 am – 1230 pm

**Session I: New Directions in Historical Studies
Seafarer Room, 3rd Floor**

Chair: Rowena Hernandez-Muzquiz, Broward College

“Slowly, Yesterday Went: An Overview of Economic Aspects of the First Decades of the United States Space Industry” – Ian Morris, Florida Gulf Coast University

“Africa and African-Americans in the Digital Age: Project Mosaic And Zora Neale Hurston” – Julian C. Chambliss, Rollins College

1100 am-1230 pm

**Session II: Issues in Contemporary European History
Mariner Room, 3rd Floor**

Chair: Jack McTague, St. Leo University

Discussant: Will Murphy, Florida Gulf Coast University

“Hitler versus Christ: Nazism’s Shifting Attitudes toward Christianity”
- Michael Rodriguez, Florida Gulf Coast University

“What’s in a Name?: EU Foreign Policy Evaluated through the FYRM”
- Cassidy Henry, Florida Atlantic University

“The Revolution May Be Televised: The Legacy of the Situationist
International” – Leslie Williams, Florida Atlantic University

“NATO from Cold War Plans to Post-Cold War Out-of-Area
Peacekeeping” – Marco Rimanelli, St. Leo University

1230 pm: Conclusion of Conference Activities

**– See You Next Year in Lake City, February 23- 25, 2012 when
FCH meets under the sponsorship of Florida Gateway College and
President-elect Sean McMahon.**