

Selected
Annual Proceedings
of the



Florida Conference of Historians

Annual Meeting

May 5-6, 2006
Miami Beach, Florida

Volume 14
March, 2007

**Selected
Annual Proceedings
of the**

**Florida
Conference
of
Historians**

Editors of:

*Selected Annual Proceedings
of the
Florida Conference of Historians*

Anthony Atwood and Joseph F. Patrouch, Co-Editors
Annette Papizzo and Richard Smith, Associate Editors
Florida International University

PRINTING OF THE VOLUME COURTESY OF
FLORIDA CONFERENCE OF HISTORIANS

ISSN 1076-4585

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Letter from the Editors

This year's volume marks my third and final contribution to the series. I have learned a lot about the responsibilities of editors and thank the officers of the FCH for allowing me this privilege. I also thank this year's volunteer FIU History graduate student editors Anthony Atwood, Annette Papizzo, and Richard Smith for their assistance. Annette and Richard have contributed their efforts for the second consecutive year, and Anthony has been involved first as an Associate Editor for Volumes 12 and 13 and now as Co-Editor.

This year's volume reflects the contributions of many at FIU History whose work led to the success of the FCH annual meeting. It was held at the Wolfsonian-FIU, a unique research museum in Miami Beach which hosted the conference. Regina Bailey helped coordinate efforts there, as did librarians Frank Lucca and Nicolae Harsanyi. In addition to Anthony Atwood, Annette Papizzo, and Richard Smith, the efforts of Silvia Mitchell, a FIU History MA student and two-time *Selected Annual Proceedings* Associate Editor, must also be recognized.

This year's volume, in addition to revealing the continued interest of FCH historians in the histories of 20th-century Florida and the US, shows the relevance of the pre-modern histories of the Florida peninsula and of the cultures which influenced its development. Thanks go to State Archeologist Ryan J. Wheeler for his important contributions to making the earlier histories of the peninsula's peoples better known and incorporated into the general history of the state. It is clear that the histories of what is now Florida are undergoing serious revision as new evidence comes to light or is reinterpreted concerning the lives of the women and men who lived there in the centuries before US acquisition of the area.

Mr. Atwood requests that his thanks to all involved also be conveyed. He will assume the full responsibilities of editing Volume 15, which will include papers from the 2007 conference to be held in Orlando.

Joseph F. Patrouch
Princeton, New Jersey
February, 2007

Thomas M. Campbell Award

Beginning with Volumes 6/7 in 1999, the Florida Conference of Historians has presented the Thomas M. Campbell Award for the best paper published in the Annual Proceedings of that year.

Thomas M. (Tom) Campbell was the driving force behind the creation of the Florida Conference of Historians, at that time called The Florida College Teachers of History, 45 years ago. It was his personality and hard work that kept the conference moving forward. Simply put, in the early years he *was* the conference.

Tom was a professor of US Diplomatic History at Florida State University. The Thomas M. Campbell Award is in his name so that we may recognize and remember his efforts on behalf of the Florida Conference of Historians.

Recipients

Volumes 6/7: J. Calvitt Clarke, III, Jacksonville University

Volumes 8/9: J. Calvitt Clarke, III, Jacksonville University

Volumes 10/11: Robert L. Shearer, Florida Institute of Technology

Volume 12: David Michel, Chicago Theological Seminary

Volume 13: Dennis P. Halpin and Jared G. Toney, University of South Florida

Volume 14: Steve MacIsaac, Jacksonville University

**Florida Conference of Historians
2006 Annual Program**

**Hosted by
Joseph F. Patrouch
Florida International University
Miami, Florida**

Thursday, May 4

6:00-8:00 P.M.
Registration and Cash-Bar Reception
Blue Moon Hotel

Friday, May 5

8:30: Registration

9:00-10:15: Morning Panels I

Session I-A: Are We There Yet? Temporality, Identity and Tourism in Florida Classroom

“The Once and Future Past: Constructions of History at Silver Springs”
Wendy Adams King, USF, Chair and Presenter

“Touring NASA: Communicating Triumph and Tragedy”
Linda Levitt, USF

“Independence and Dependence: Diving in Key Largo, Florida”
Cara Mackie, USF

Session I-B: Themes and Sources Concerning the Histories of Miami and Miami Beach

Sponsored by the Miami Beach Historical Association
Conference Room

“Miami Beach in 1930: A View from the Census”
Abraham Lavender, FIU, Chair and Presenter

"On the Care and Feeding of a Miami Memorabilia Collection"

Seth Bramson, FIU

"Camp Miami Beach WW2"

Judith Berson-Levinson, Independent Scholar

"The City of Miami Beach Historical Records Archives Project"

Liliam Hatfield, City of Miami Beach

**Session I-C: The World of Dreams and Fairs
Library**

Rebecca Friedman, FIU, Chair and Commentator

"Romania at pre-World War II World Fairs"

Nicolae Harsanyi, Wolfsonian-FIU

"The Dream Merchants' Florida Dreams: Irony and the Circus Come to Florida"

Allen S. Miller, USF

10:30: Coffee Break

10:45-12:00: Morning Panels II

**Session II-A: Conflict and Consensus in Modern Florida
Conference Room**

Sherry Johnson, FIU, Chair

Sean MacMahon, Lake City Community College, Commentator

"Before Walt Arrived: Florida's Ill-Fated Attempt to Build INTERAMA Theme Park"

Michael Hoover, Seminole Community College

"'Catastrophe' seen if sewer suit wins": Dade County's Regional Sewage Solution v. Municipal Resistance, 1971-1974"

Marlin Kann, FIU

"Camp Biscayne, 1914-1924: The Sporting Set Sets Sail"

Susannah Worth, Barnacle Historic State Park

Session II-B: In Pursuit of Pleasure: Schultze & Weaver and the American Hotel
Sponsored by the Wolfsonian-FIU (includes a tour of the exhibition)
Gallery

Jon Mogul Wolfsonian-FIU; **Marianne Lamonaca**, Wolfsonian-FIU; **Robin Bachin**, University of Miami; **Kenneth Lipartito**, FIU; **Keith Revell**, FIU

12:15: Lunch on your own. FCH annual business meeting in the Dynamo Café, Wolfsonian-FIU.

1:30-2:45: Afternoon Panels III

Session III-A: Community Planning and Progress in the (Post) Modern US Classroom

Michael Epple, FGCU, Chair and Commentator

“The Contention between Community and Society: Reflected in New York City, Miami, and Historic Preservation”

Anthony Atwood, FIU

“Progressive Ideas and City Planning Realities: J. Horace McFarland, the American Civic Association, and the Pursuit of Beautification”

Julian C. Chambliss, Rollins College

Session III-B: Performance and Rule in the Early Modern World Auditorium

Joseph F. Patrouch, FIU, Chair and Commentator

“Maria de’ Medici: a Muse or a Strategist? How Opera, Painting, and Chronicle Investigate the Theme of Agency”

Antonietta DiPietro, FIU

“A Fallen Favorite in the Court of Phillip III of Spain (1598-1621): The Role of *Fortuna* in the Textual Representation of Rodrigo Calderón’s *privanza* and Death”

Silvia Mitchell, FIU

“Diverse Affiliations in the City of Angeles: Promoting Urban Identity in Eighteenth - Century Puebla, Mexico”

Frances L. Ramos, Western Michigan University

3:00: Coffee Break

3:15-4:30: Afternoon Panels IV

**Session IV-A: The Middle East, Then & Now
Auditorium**

Blaine Browne, Broward Community College, Chair and Commentator

"Hamas 2006 and Likud 1977: Terrorists Win at the Polls"

John J. McTague, Saint Leo University

"Geo-Strategic Lessons Learned After the II Gulf War against Iraq: US & International Interests in the Middle East/Gulf"

Marco Rimaneli, Saint Leo University

Session IV-B: Pre-Modern Archeology and FIU History

Sponsored by the Working Group for Pre-Modern Histories and Cultures, FIU
Classroom

"Yotvata: a Roman *Beau Geste*?"

Gwyn Davies, FIU, Chair and Presenter

"Handmaidens': History and Historical Archaeology in the Colonial Chesapeake"

John Coombs, FIU

"The Making of Oyo Empire during the Atlantic Age: Archaeological Perspectives from West Africa"

Akin Ogundiran, FIU

5:45: Reception

Sponsored by the Working Group for Pre-Modern Histories and Cultures, FIU

2nd Floor Reception Hall

Welcoming Remarks: **Luis R. Garcia, Jr.**, City Commissioner, City of Miami Beach; **Joyce Shaw Peterson**, Associate Dean, FIU College of Arts and Sciences; **Victor Uribe**, Chair, Department of History, FIU; **Gwyn Davies**, Coordinator, Working Group for Pre-Modern Histories and Cultures, FIU

6:30: Banquet

2nd Floor Reception Hall

7:30: Campbell Award Announcement and Presentation of *Selected Annual Proceedings of the Florida Conference of Historians*, Volume 13.

Joseph F. Patrouch, Chair, Campbell Award Committee and Editor, *Selected Annual Proceedings*

Comments and recognition of new FCH president: **Sean McMahon**, Immediate Past President, FCH

Keynote Address:

Ryan J. Wheeler, Florida Bureau of Archaeological Research,

"The People Who Met Ponce de Leon--the Tequesta in Florida History"

Saturday, May 6

9:00-10:15: Morning Panels V

Session V-A: Conceptualizing Otherness
Auditorium

Aurora Morcillo, FIU, Chair and Commentator

"Forging an Alliance of the "Colored Peoples" of the World: Ethiopia's Foreign Minister Heruy's Mission to Japan, 1931"

J. Calvitt Clarke, III, Jacksonville University

"An African Tree Produces White Flowers: Black Consciousness in the Argentine Community, 19th and 20th centuries"

Erika D. Edwards, FIU

"Elizabeth Cady Stanton's and Susan B. Anthony's Dual Strategy of 'Other' and 'Privilege' in *The Revolution*"

Patrica Farless, UCF/UF

"Raising Our Own Voice: Documenting Latino/a Church History in the USA"

Raúl Fernández-Calienes, St. Thomas University

Session V-B: American Foreign Policy and the Cold War
Classroom

David Proctor, Tallahassee Community College, Chair and Commentator

"The American Nation and the Eisenhower Doctrine, 1957-1958"

Bernard Lemelin, Laval University

"Reversing the Course: The Philippine-American Trade Agreement of 1946"

Steven D. Macisaac, Jacksonville University

"Cobalt, Southern Africa, and the United States: American - Soviet Clash for Raw Materials in Zaire and Angola, 1945-1988"

Omer Subhani, FIU

10:30: Coffee Break

10:45: Morning Panels VI

**Session VI-A: 20th-Century US: Best and Worst
Auditorium**

Alex Lichtenstein, Rice University, Chair and Commentator

"McCarthyist Conservatism: The Johns Committee Probe into the NAACP"
Chris Day, FSU

"Bishop Fulton J. Sheen and the Great Depression in America"
Michael Epple, FGCU

"The Dilemma of a Southern Liberal: Claude D. Pepper and Civil Rights"
Ric A. Kabat, Gainesville State College

"Crusade in the Sunshine: Political Immorality in Florida, 1956-1960"
Seth A. Weitz, FSU

**Session VI-B: Threatening Nature: Military Life in Florida
Classroom**

Howard Rock, FIU, Chair and Commentator

"Gators, Sand Fleas, Mosquitos and Tallahassee: Life in Camp Gordon Johnston, 1942-1946."

Jon Mikolashek, FSU

12:15: Conference is Adjourned

Forging an Alliance of the "Colored Peoples" of the World: Ethiopia's Foreign Minister Heruy's Mission to Japan, 1931

J. Calvitt Clarke III
Jacksonville University

Heruy and Ethiopia's Japanizers

To the exaggerated horror of many western powers and ultimately a justification for Italy's declaration of war against Ethiopia, in the 1920s a series of Japanese visitors sought to expand trade between Japan and Ethiopia. Japanese representatives attended Haile Sellase's coronation as emperor in 1930, and soon after signed a treaty of friendship and commerce with Ethiopia. The next year, the Ethiopians promulgated a constitution closely modeled on Japan's Meiji Constitution of 1889. This rapprochement encouraged Ethiopia's "Japanizers," a group of young educated Ethiopians who sought modernization for their country by modeling Japanese successes. Seemingly fulfilling their dreams, Foreign Minister Heruy Welde Sellase, one of Ethiopia's most influential Japanizers, visited Japan in late 1931.¹

An accomplished and progressive thinker, Heruy wrote some twenty-eight works in Amharic, including stories, histories, and social philosophy. A linguist and, after 1930, foreign minister, he also had served in several diplomatic missions. Additionally, Heruy had edited Ethiopia's civil and ecclesiastical codes. Both he and Emperor Haile Sellase sought the Japanese developmental model, and both understood that Europeans acting as Japan's educators had prodded Japan's rapid evolution. Speaking with the French chargé d'affaires in Ethiopia, Heruy praised Japan's transformation and asserted, "You will see even more extraordinary things here than in Japan."²

Approaches to Japan held practical diplomatic advantages. By the early 1930s, Ethiopia's policy was to confide important business concessions to those countries not having immediate interests in Ethiopia, for example, the US, Germany, a few small European countries, and Japan. In the international political game, Heruy understood that Japan's geographical position meant the Japanese could not threaten Ethiopia's

¹J. Calvitt Clarke III, "Mutual Interests: Japan and Ethiopia Before the Italo-Ethiopian War, 1935-36," *Selected Annual Proceedings of the Florida Conference of Historians* 9 (2002), 83-97; J. Calvitt Clarke III, "Seeking a Model for Modernization: Ethiopia's Japanizers," *Selected Annual Proceedings of the Florida Conference of Historians* 10 (2004), 7-22; Richard Bradshaw, "Japan and European Colonialism in Africa 1800-1937," Dissertation, Ohio University, 1992, 300; Aoki Sumio and Kurimoto Eisei, "Japanese Interest in Ethiopia (1868-1940): Chronology and Bibliography," in *Ethiopia in Broader Perspective: Papers of the XIIIth International Conference of Ethiopian Studies*, K. E. Fukui and M. Shigeta, eds., 3 vols. (Kyoto: Shokado Book Sellers, 1997), 1: 713-28; Adrien Zervos, *L'Empire d'Ethiopie: Le Miroir de L'Ethiopie Moderne 1906-1935* (Alexandria, Egypt: Impr. de l'Ecole professionnelle des freres, 1936), 481-85. In National Archives (College Park, MD), Record Group 59, Decimal File [hereafter cited as NARA], see Park, 2 April, 1930: 701.9484/1; Park, 2 April, 1930: 784.942/2; Southard, 9 March, 1931: 701.9484/1; Neville, 4 June, 1931: 701.9484/2; Grew, 14 September, 1932: 784.9411/no no.; Grew, 14 September, 1932: 784.942/4; Southard, 5 October, 1932: 033.8411/81; Southard, 5 October, 1932: 784.942/3; Southard, 17 December, 1932: 784.9411/1; Southard, 17 December, 1932: 784.942/5; and Grene, 17 January, 1934: 784.942/6.

²Hidéko Faërber-Ishihara, "Heruy, le Japon et les "japonisants," in Alain Rouaud, ed., *Les orientalistes sont des aventuriers. Guirlande offerte à Joseph Tubiana par ses élèves et ses amis*. (Paris: Sépia, 1999), 145; Chris Prouty and Eugene Rosenfeld, eds., *Historical Dictionary of Ethiopia* (Metuchen, NJ: Scarecrow Press, 1981), 91-93, 94.

sovereignty. Further, Japan's economic interests in Ethiopia might induce Tokyo to back Ethiopia if a European power should threaten. Finally, a Japanese presence, including immigration, in Ethiopia could weaken the rights of England, France, and Italy, which held neighboring colonies.³

French diplomats had thought well of Heruy, at least early in his career. In 1919, when he went to Europe, they saw him as leading Ethiopia's intellectual party. When named in 1922 as president of the Special Court in Addis Ababa, a court designed to deal with non-natives, foreign diplomats expressed satisfaction. The French minister in Ethiopia from 1917 to 1923 reported that Heruy was honest, intelligent, and educated, and that all Europeans in Ethiopia were counting on him to guarantee the Special Court's smooth functioning. In 1924, Heruy joined Teferi Mekonnen—the future emperor Haile Sellase—on another trip to Europe. On that occasion, another French minister declared him to be “a man of great worth, completely devoted to *Ras* Teferi ... Full of common sense and open-minded. Understands well modern ideas and understands the necessity that his country come to know them. One of the government's best heads”⁴

Little-by-little, however, this positive opinion changed. In a 1931 letter to his foreign minister, the French chargé d'affaires wrote that Heruy lacked intelligence and took only superficial care of his job. The government in Addis Ababa, nonetheless, took no decision without consulting him. His influence on the sovereign remained so important that one French representative called him Ethiopia's “Rasputin,” and another editorialized, “Heruy was consecrated emperor under the name of Haile Sellase.” One wag disparaged him as “the wizard.”⁵

Why had Heruy's reputation among French diplomats slipped so badly? Not a Francophile, he did not trust Europeans in general, although he did want to draw closer to the English and the Swedes. The French also criticized Heruy's aggressive policies that had isolated Ethiopia, and they blamed Heruy for Japan's advances in Ethiopia.⁶

Heruy's Visit

The idea for Heruy's visit began in November, 1930 when Tokyo sent its ambassador in Turkey to attend Haile Sellase's coronation. While there, Ambassador Yoshida Isaburo also negotiated and signed a new treaty of friendship and commerce, which the two states ratified two years later. Eager to see if Ethiopia could model its modernization along Japanese lines, Heruy asked Yoshida about sending an Ethiopian mission to Japan to improve relations. Receiving a favorable reply, Ethiopia's emperor then officially requested that Japan accept an ambassador extraordinary to Japan, and the Gaimusho [foreign ministry] directed Yoshida to discuss details.⁷ Heruy had originally intended to go in May.⁸

³Faërber-Ishihara, “Heruy,” 145.

⁴*Ibid.*, 147-48.

⁵*Ibid.*, 148.

⁶*Ibid.*

⁷Taura Masanori, “Nihon-Echiopia kankei ni miru 1930 nen tsusho gaiko no iso,” *Seifu to Minkan, Nenpo Kindai Nihon Kenkyu* 17 (1995): 148-49; Hidéko Faërber-Ishihara, *Les premiers contacts entre l'Éthiopie et le Japon* (Paris: ARESAE, 1998), 12; Bahru Zewde, “The Concept of Japanization in the Intellectual History of Modern Ethiopia,” in Bahru Zewde, et al., eds., *Proceedings of Fifth Seminar of the Department of History* (Addis Ababa: Addis Ababa University, 1990), 3; Furukawa Tetsushi, “Japanese-Ethiopian Relations in the 1920-30s: The Rise and Fall of ‘Sentimental’ Relations,” unpublished paper presented at the 34th Annual Meeting of the African Studies Association, St. Louis, MO, November, 1991; Furukawa Tetsushi, “Japan's

Having told Rome of his plans, Heruy, special envoy of the Ethiopian emperor, left Addis Ababa on 30 September, 1931. Traveling with him were Teferi Gebre Mariam (Ethiopia's consul in Djibouti), Araya Abeba, and Daba Birrou. They sailed on 5 October from Djibouti in French Somaliland, bound for Japan.⁹

On the same day that Heruy left Djibouti, the US representative in Addis Ababa, Addison Southard, sent a long message to Washington. He reported that Heruy had said he was going to Japan mainly to return the recent official Japanese visits, which had dealt with opening a legation, negotiating a treaty of commerce and friendship, and attending the coronation. Southard believed the Japanese had proposed an arrangement that would give them a near monopoly of the local cotton piece goods market, which they already competitively dominated. One Japanese firm, which he understood to have "dickered" for this concession, was the Nisshin Joint Stock Textile Company of Tokyo. The emperor also wanted to manufacture in Ethiopia the coarser kinds of cotton piece goods, and Southard thought that Heruy would propose that the Japanese set up such an enterprise in Ethiopia.¹⁰

From his conversations over many years, Southard added, he knew the emperor admired Japan and believed the Japanese had achieved their influential world position by using foreign advisers. Hayle Sellase further thought that Ethiopia might reasonably expect to accomplish similarly marvelous results through his own foreign advisers. Southard skeptically added that the emperor was "unaware, of course, of the vast differences between the two countries and peoples, and their qualifications and resources which place Japan far ahead of what Ethiopia is or ever could hope to be." Southard had spent many years in the Far East before entering the Foreign Service, and he knew Japan well. But Southard never thought it "discreet to try the probably impossible, and genuinely delicate, task of convincing His Imperial Majesty of the great difference between the two countries and their peoples." Southard did "informally and tactfully" suggest to Heruy how he could make practical comparisons during his visit to Japan.¹¹

At 9:00 a.m. on 5 November, Heruy's delegation arrived at Kobe in western Japan aboard the liner *Andre Lebon*. High Japanese government officials, a prefectural governor, the mayor, and two to three thousand citizens, including members of a young men's association, boy scouts, and schoolchildren welcomed him. The envoy told the throng of his hopes for mutual prosperity, closer friendship, economic development, and commercial intercourse.¹² Heruy later exalted in the reception he received. People waved Ethiopian and Japanese flags and joyfully shouted as they lined the route to the hotel. He added that everywhere he went in Japan, his reception was the same.¹³ Given their recent withdrawal from the League of Nations, the Japanese were especially happy to welcome Heruy's

Political Relations with Ethiopia, 1920s-1960s: A Historical Overview," unpublished paper presented to the 35th Annual Meeting of the African Studies Association, Seattle, WA, 20-23 November, 1992.

⁸Southard, 10/5/1931; NARA 033.8411/81.

⁹Heruy Welde Sellase, *Dai Nihon*, trans. Oreste Vaccari, Foreword by Baron Shidechara Kijuro (Tokyo, Eibunpo-Tsuron Shoji, 1933), Preface; Faërber-Ishihara, *Les premiers contacts*, 12; J. Calvitt Clarke III, "Marriage Alliance: The Union of Two Imperiums: Japan and Ethiopia?" *Selected Annual Proceedings of the Florida Conference of Historians* 7 (1999): 105-16; J. Calvitt Clarke III, "Dashed Hopes for Support: Daba Birrou's and Shoji Yunosuke's Trip to Japan, 1935," *Selected Annual Proceedings of the Florida Conference of Historians* 11 (2004): 135-51.

¹⁰Southard, 5 October, 1931; NARA 033.8411/81.

¹¹*Ibid.*

¹²*Osaka Maimichi & Tokyo Nichi Nichi* [cited as *OM&TNN*], 6 November, 1931.

¹³Heruy, *Dai Nihon*, 16-17; Faërber-Ishihara, *Les premiers contacts*, 12.

mission of friendship from Africa. After lunch, the party drove to Mount Rokko and Takarazuka, and attended a tea party held at the Zuihoji temple.¹⁴

At 9:00 p.m., Heruy's group boarded a special train bound for Tokyo. Arriving the next morning, the Minister of the Imperial Household, Ichiki Kitokuro, Foreign Minister Shidehara Kijuro, and other high officials and journalists welcomed them. While the Toyama Military Band played, the Ethiopian envoy and his party entered the Distinguished Guests' Room at the station for a short rest.¹⁵

Escorted by Imperial Honor Guards and attended by Master of Ceremony Watanabe, the envoy and his suite then went to the Imperial Hotel. Again escorted by Imperial bodyguards and motorcycles, they left the hotel at 10:20 a.m. for the Imperial Palace in the carriage sent by the court. Received in audience at the Phoenix Hall, Heruy saluted Emperor Hirohito in Amharic and gave him a royal letter and the Grand Cordon of Solomon with Paulownia Flowers, the highest order of the Ethiopian Empire. In turn, he received the First Order of Merit and the Grand Cordon of the Rising Sun from the Japanese emperor. Heruy confirmed Ethiopia's choice of Japan as the model for modernization. "Our Ethiopian Emperor is deeply impressed with Japanese Empire's remarkable and great progress of the last sixty years. He is astonished that the Japanese Empire performed such a great deed in such a short time, and he is determined to push the Great Japanese Empire as the best model for Ethiopia." Heruy then thanked the emperor for the imperial representation at Hayle Sellase's coronation the previous spring and for the honor given him as a guest of state.¹⁶

The emperor, in turn, expressed gratitude for the decoration and for the visit from such a far-off land. Received in audience by the empress, Heruy presented her with the Medal of Sheba. Leaving the Imperial Palace shortly after 11:00 a.m., the envoy and his party returned to the Imperial Hotel. With the members of his suite, Heruy presented himself at the Imperial Palace again and attended the imperial luncheon given in the visitors' honor at the Homeiden Hall. The emperor and empress, the prince and princess, and more than thirty dignitaries attended. The visitors left the palace shortly before 2:00 p.m. and again returned to the Imperial Hotel. The emperor then sent Grand Master of Ceremonies Hayashi to return the call.¹⁷

Heruy visited the Gaimusho on 7 November at 10:00 a.m. to offer formal greetings to Shidehara, who offered a toast in English:

The Ethiopian emperor invited Japanese representatives for the coronation last year. We enthusiastically sent Minister Yoshida for this honorable mission. Now it is our great pleasure to meet Your Excellency who has been

¹⁴*OM&TNN*, 1 November, 1931; Taura, "Nihon-Echiopia kankei," 149; Heruy, *Dai Nihon*, 1-15; Bradshaw, "Japan," 308.

¹⁵*OM&TNN*, 7 November, 1931.

¹⁶*Ibid.*; Shoji Yuosuke, *Echiopia Kekkon Mondai wa Donaru, Kaisho ka? Ina!!!: Kekkon Mondai o Shudai to shite Echiopia no Shinso o Katari Kokumin no Saikakunin o Yobo su* (Tokyo: Seikyo Sha, 1934), 3; Majoni, 9 November, 1931; Italy, Ministero degli Affari Esteri, Direzione Generale degli Affari Politici, Etiopia (Rome) [hereafter cited as AP Etiopia], b(usta) 8 f(oglio) 1.

¹⁷Heruy, *Dai Nihon*, 26-30; *OM&TNN*, Nov. 7, 1931; Bradshaw, "Japan," 308; Faërber-Ishihara, *Les premiers contacts*, 12-13.

sent to the Japanese emperor by your head of state. I wish to toast the prosperity of the Ethiopian Empire. Forever for the friendship of both countries! Ethiopian emperor, Banzai!¹⁸

Heruy kept an active schedule. After his meeting with Shidehara, he paid homage at the Meiji Shrine. In the afternoon, the envoy visited the Ueno Zoo and the "Teiten" Art Exhibition at the Tokyo Prefectural Art Museum. In the evening, Japanese entertained him at the Kabukiza Theater. Heruy arrived at Nikko on the morning of 9 November and stayed overnight at the Kanaya Hotel. He left the next day after paying a visit to the Toshogu Shrine. The Imperial Household Office held a wild duck hunting party for Heruy at the Hama Detached Palace on 11 November.¹⁹

At Heruy's request, the War Office arranged for him to observe a mock battle between the Imperial Bodyguard Division and the Utsunomiya 14th Division held in Tochigi Prefecture. This was part of the three-day, interdivisional maneuvers. Bound for the war games, Heruy's party left Tokyo on Saturday morning, 14 November and visited a railway plant at Omlya and the Katakuru Reeling Company during the morning. The mock battle began at 2:00 p.m. and took place across the Omoi River. The group stayed that night at Sano. On 15 November, Heruy and his party watched the battle that started at 5:00 a.m. around Tochigi.²⁰

Heruy and his party, after staying in Nagoya, left their hotel on 18 November to visit the Hattori Poultry Farm, the Japan Rolling Stock Manufacturing Company, and the Mitsubishi Aircraft Manufacturing Plant. The Ethiopians attended a luncheon given by Mayor Oiwa at the Buntenkaku Restaurant in Tsurumai Park. Later the guests saw the main tower of the Nagoya Castle. In the evening, they were the guests of honor at the dinner party given jointly by Aichi Prefecture, Nagoya city, and the Nagoya Chamber of Commerce and Industry.²¹ Seen off by the governor of Aichi Prefecture, the mayor of Nagoya, and others, Heruy and his party left Nagoya Station at 9:52 a.m. on the 19th for Kyoto.²²

With his suite, Heruy arrived in Osaka from Nara on the afternoon of 24 November. By this time, Kuroki Tokijiro, the former Vice-Consul at Port Said and now Consul at Saigon had joined Heruy's party. Kuroki had been central to Japan's early approaches after 1924 to Ethiopia. Alighting, Heruy said, "By the present tour in Japan I realized more and more that Japan is a nation of the most hospitality. Everywhere I went I was given a hearty welcome and cordial reception, which I shall never forget. I was particularly surprised to find Japan so much developed."²³ Many prefectural and local officials as well as business and commercial figures welcomed Heruy. As the envoy left the station, hundreds of schoolchildren and students of girls' high schools who lined the open space in front of the station raised cheers of banzai and waved small paper flags.

Then the suite drove to the *Osaka Asahi*, after which the party toured the *Osaka Mainichi*, where they met the newspaper's president and editors. Heruy found the paper's

¹⁸ Okakura Takashi and Kitagawa Katsuhiko, *Nihon-Afurika Koryu-shi: Meiji-ki kara Dainiji Sekai Taisen-ki made* (Tokyo: Dobun-kan, 1993), 32-33, quote on 33; Faerber-Ishihara, "Heruy," 144.

¹⁹ *OM&TNN*, 8, 10, 12 November, 1931.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 11, 15 November, 1931; Bradshaw, "Japan," 308-09.

²¹ *OM&TNN*, 19 November, 1931; Bradshaw, "Japan," 309.

²² *OM&TNN*, 20 November, 20, 1931.

²³ *Ibid.*, 25 November 25, 1931.

Braille edition especially interesting. The party then registered at the Osaka Hotel.²⁴

Leaving the hotel Wednesday morning, they visited the Osaka Castle, the Osaka Prefectural Office, the Osaka Municipal Office, and the Osaka Chamber of Commerce and Industry. From noon to 2:00 p.m., the Japanese held a reception in honor of Heruy and his group at the Osaka Club under the joint auspices of Osaka Prefecture, Osaka City, and the Osaka Chamber of Commerce and Industry. After this, he visited the Osaka Arsenal. In the later afternoon, Heruy saw the puppet show at Bunrakuzza Theater.²⁵ The Cotton Cloth Exporters' Association in Osaka hosted Heruy at a dinner.

On 26 November, the visitors went to the Kanegafuchi Spinning Company in Kanebo and the Toyo Spinning Company, where they lunched. Afterward, they toured the Sumitomo Copper Works and the Azumi Insect Powder Factory. That night, the Association of Exporters of Goods to Africa hosted them at a dinner and then entertained them at a geisha house.²⁶

Kobe extended a hearty welcome to the Ethiopian envoys, who arrived by motorcar from Osaka at 3:00 p.m. on 27 November. The local governor called their visit an epoch-making event in developing trade between the two countries. The governor's secretary accompanied the party to the Naigai Rubber Factory in Hyogo, which Heruy spent more than an hour inspecting. Later, they attended a reception at the Chamber of Commerce and Industry building with more than fifty leading business and town officials. In the evening, they were guests of honor at a dinner held at the Nishitokiwa, jointly hosted by the governor, the mayor, and president of the chamber.²⁷

Admiring Japan's well-disciplined soldiers, Heruy decided to "Japanize" Ethiopia's troops by adopting Japanese-style military uniforms. After studying samples from the Osaka branch of the Army Clothing Depot and elsewhere, he informally contracted the Toyo and Kanegafuchi spinning companies for supplying cloth for uniforms. To make the uniforms in Ethiopia, Heruy wanted to bring home some experienced Japanese tailors. Heruy approached Kuroki, but as a government official he could not help in selecting tailors. Heruy then began talking with the president of the Osaka Chamber of Commerce and Industry. The president of the Toyo Spinning Company thought the Ethiopians would place orders after Heruy returned home. Kuroki was also optimistic.²⁸

With Heruy's arrival, Japanese merchants, especially those in Osaka, saw Ethiopia as a bright prospect for developing markets. The National Cotton Cloth Exporters' Association with its office in Osaka was encouraging exports of cotton cloth to Ethiopia to drive away foreign goods, although already more than 80 percent of the cotton cloth consumed there was Japanese. The Japanese also foresaw an increase in the export of celluloid goods, mosquito sticks and insect powder, rubber boots, enameled wares, knitted goods, aluminum manufactures, caps, and hats. Soap, towels, woolen blankets, glass manufactures, and other goods not previously exported to Ethiopia, they hoped, would find new markets there. During his three days in Osaka, Heruy inspected various manufacturers including the Shimada Glassware Manufacturing Plant. Pleased with price and quality, he bought 1,500 Yen worth of cut glass, soap, and other goods as samples. An official of the

²⁴*Ibid.*

²⁵*Ibid.*, 24 November, 1931.

²⁶*Ibid.*, 25, 27 November, 1931; Bradshaw, "Japan," 309-10.

²⁷*OM&TNN*, 28 November, 1931.

²⁸*Ibid.*, 29 November, 1 December, 1931.

Osaka Association of Exporters of Goods to Africa complained that Ethiopians did not appreciate the quality of Japanese goods and had been relying on costly foreign manufactures. He optimistically added, "The visiting Envoy seems to have understood the quality of Japanese goods and the negotiations for commercial transactions in various lines have become brisk between the Japanese manufacturers and the representative from Ethiopia."²⁹

Heruy, who had been sojourning in Takahama, arrived at Kobe on 3 December by ferry. He and his group immediately boarded motorcars and drove to Osaka.³⁰

When Inukai Tsuyoshi became the new prime minister on 12 December, 1931, Heruy asked to meet with him, which he did three days later. This was his last important meeting. Heruy's mission left Japan aboard the *Sphinx* on 28 December, 1931. He had spent about forty days in Japan.³¹

Consequences of Heruy's Visit

The trip clearly affected Heruy and those traveling with him. The month-long sea voyage to Japan included stops in India, Singapore, Indo-China, and Shanghai. Everywhere along the way, they saw Asians under white, colonial rule. In contrast, Japan was friendly, modern, vibrant, strong—and independent. Especially impressive to the Ethiopians had been the opportunity to be "wined and dined" with Japan's emperor—at a time when he lived in god-like seclusion with few having the opportunity to meet with him. Every day he had dictated his impressions to Araya. Using these notes in 1932 he published a book in Amharic with the title *The Source of Light: The Country of Japan*. This was likely the first book by an African to try seriously to introduce Japan to Africans. Former foreign minister Shidehara Kijuro wrote the foreword to the Japanese translation, *Dai Nihon [Great Japan]*, published in Tokyo in 1934. Japanese readers eagerly read the account. The trip and subsequent book played into western fears that Ethiopia would take Japan for its model for modernization.³²

Heruy's mission returned to Ethiopia with two Japanese. The first, a tailor, stayed only three months with Heruy. The second, Dr. Yamauchi Masao, proved more important. He went as a representative of the Ministry of Emigration and later became a special correspondent of the *Osaka Mainichi*. Losing no time in picking up some knowledge of Amharic, in both positions he actively promoted closer ties between Japan and Ethiopia. He spearheaded Japan's commercial thrust into Ethiopia that provoked so much alarm among Europeans. Yamauchi's drive impressed the British minister who admired his "skill and thoroughness." The minister lamented that European merchants, "who complain so bitterly of Japanese competition" were not nearly as energetic or effective.³³

Japan's approaches especially exercised the Italians. Rome claimed that the Anglo-French-Italian agreement 1906 and the Italo-Ethiopian treaty of 1928 sanctified Italy's

²⁹*Ibid.*, 1 December, 1931; Consul in Yokohama, 30 November, 1931: Ethiopia b8 fl; Bradshaw, "Japan," 310-11.

³⁰*OM&TNN*, 4 December, 1931.

³¹Heruy, *Dai Nihon*, 85-86, 146-47; Furukawa, "Japan's Political Relations;" Furukawa, "Japanese-Ethiopian Relations."

³²Interview with Amde Araya (son of Araya Abeba) and Araya Abeba, Fairfax Lakes Park, VA, and apartment of Araya Abeba, Alexandria, VA, 7 July, 2001, 1:45-6:30 p.m.; Faerber-Ishihara, "Heruy," 144; Faerber-Ishihara, *Les premiers contacts*, 13.

³³Bahru, "Concept of Japanization," 3.

position in Ethiopia. Yet, inroads by anyone, especially the Americans and Japanese, petrified Rome.³⁴ Naturally, then, Italy's representatives in Tokyo closely followed Heruy's progress through Japan, though more calmly than did those in Rome who read the reports.³⁵ Similarly more sanguine than were their superiors in Rome, Italy's representatives in Ethiopia often downplayed Japanese successes. In the face of fears that Heruy's visit provided the key to opening the door to massive Japanese immigration, the local representatives noted in early 1932 that the Ethiopian court had employed only two Japanese. A husband and wife, one was a cook and the other a maid.³⁶

For Japan, Heruy's visit visibly raised Japanese-Ethiopian relations to their zenith and encouraged widespread public support for Ethiopia before and during the Italo-Ethiopian War a few years later. Heruy's journey to Japan also marked his future career, and his admiration for the Japanese developmental model alarmed the western powers, which had no wish for a second Japan—this one in Africa.³⁷

A couple of years after Heruy's trip, the peripatetic journalist, Ladislav Farago, asked Heruy about his visit and its implications: "Your Excellency was speaking of your journey to Japan. It roused a great commotion at the time, and started many rumours. Why did you go to Japan?" Heruy replied:

[I]t is not difficult for me to be quite undiplomatic and tell you the simple truth. We had no ulterior motive, and what we wanted was no mystery. Japan has been growing into one of the most influential great powers, and while all the other important nations had their representatives in Addis Ababa, Japan was not represented at His Majesty's court by so much as an Honorary Consul. It meant a great deal to us to open up diplomatic connections with Japan. . . .

The second reason was purely economic. Our people are poor, and our export trade has shrunk during the last few years owing to the depression. We had to find a source for cheap everyday goods, and Japan is famous the world over as the country that sells the cheapest goods, especially cotton. . . . The hackneyed term "Japanese invasion" has a real meaning in this country, for half of our imports is comprised of cotton.³⁸

³⁴As a small example of Italian fear of its interests being displaced in Ethiopia, see Italy, Ministero degli Affari Esteri, Commissione per la Pubblicazione dei Documenti Diplomatici, *I documenti diplomatici italiani*, 7th Series: 1922-1935 (Rome: La Libreria dello Stato, 1952), vol. 11: nos. 42, 148, 177, and 204.

³⁵Colonial Minister, 11 September, 1931; Circular, 24 September, 1931; Majoni, 9 November, 1931; Majoni, 22 December, 1931; Circular, 12 January, 1932; Tokyo, 19 April, 1932: AP Ethiopia b8 fl.

³⁶Tokyo, 5 February, 1932; London, 1 March, 1932; Manzoni, 22 April, 1932: AP Ethiopia b8 fl.

³⁷Also see Tokyo, 14 September, 1931; Paternò, 5 October, 1931; Gabelli, 8 October, 1931; Paternò, 19 October, 1931; Scammacca, 30 January, 1932; Tokyo, 14 September, 1932: Etiopia b8 fl; Addis Ababa, 17 February, 1932: AP Etiopia b14 f9; *Japan Times*, 23 November, 1934; Taura, "Nihon-Echiopia kankei," 150-51; Marcus, *Haile Sellassie I*, 114. See also 109-113; Okakura and Kitagawa, *Nihon-Afurika Koryu-shi*, 32-37; Asfa Yilma, *Haile Selassie, Emperor of Ethiopia: With a Brief Account of the History of Ethiopia with a Brief Account of the History of Ethiopia, Including the Origins of the Present Struggle, and a Description of the Country and Its Peoples* (London: Sampson, Low, Marston & Co. 1936), 208-33; Anthony Mockler, *Haile Selassie's War: The Italian-Ethiopian Campaign, 1935-1941* (NY: Random House, 1984), 16.

³⁸Ladislav Farago, *Abyssinia on the Eve* (NY: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1935), 127-28.

Heruy was more “diplomatic” than he allowed. He had also requested arms and munitions. Tokyo, however, was aggressively moving in Manchuria and had worries other than those of supplying arms and munitions to Ethiopia.³⁹

Over the next several years as Italy prepared to attack Ethiopia, Foreign Minister Heruy was unable to muster enough allies or arms to protect Ethiopia’s independence. After defeat and always Hayle Sellase’s trusted adviser, he went into exile with the emperor in 1936 and died in England in 1939.

Two Postscripts: A Marriage Proposal and Daba Birrou’s desperate search for arms

Two interesting diplomatic maneuvers grew out of Heruy’s trip to Japan. Both poisoned international relations for Tokyo and Addis Ababa, and became major justifications for Italy’s military preparations against Ethiopia in 1935. The first concerned the Araya Abeba. The second involved Daba Birrou, who had translated for Heruy.

Araya, a member of Hayle Sellase’s extended family, was a figure of underestimated importance in the Japanizer movement. A handsome young man, he played an important part in Ethiopia’s relations with Japan, and he gives every appearance of being groomed for greater things until the Italo-Ethiopian War intervened. Araya saw the Japanizers as “visionaries,” and he admired Japanese courtesy, development, and modernization. If remembered at all today, it is for his proposed marriage with a Japanese, Kuroda Masako. The quasi-betrothal produced great mirth and greater fear among many European observers. Even before his trip to Japan in 1931 with Heruy, his friend and patron, Araya had already expressed his wish to marry a Japanese woman. Partly this reflected the Japanizer in him as well as his wish for a traditionally submissive woman. Heruy was aware of Araya’s interest, but initially restrained him for fear that the marriage would adversely affect Ethiopia’s foreign relations and might interfere with his mission to Japan.⁴⁰

To statesmen in London, Paris, Moscow, and elsewhere, the threat of Japanese political, commercial, and military intrusions into Ethiopia seemed enough to justify Italy’s military preparations against Ethiopia from 1934 on. In 1933 and 1934, Araya’s proposed marriage vexingly personified these intrusions. One hyperventilated account argued that:

[P]lans have been made for effecting mixed marriages between the eligible Japanese settlers (estimated at about 2000 in number) and native Abyssinian women. This declared policy which is intended to produce a new race of leaders in the united revolt of the coloured peoples against the white races, was to have been inaugurated by the marriage of Princess Masako, a daughter of the Japanese prince Kurado [Kuroda], to the Ethiopian prince Lij Ayalé [Araya].⁴¹

³⁹Faërber-Ishihara, *Les premiers contacts*, 19; J. Calvitt Clarke III, “The Politics of Arms Not Given: Japan, Ethiopia, and Italy in the 1930s,” *Girding for Battle: The Arms Trade in a Global Perspective, 1815-1940*, Donald J. Stoker Jr. and Jonathan A. Grant, eds. (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003), 135-53.

⁴⁰Interview with Amde Araya.

⁴¹Roman Procházka, *Abyssinia: The Powder Barrel* (London: British International News Agency, 1936), 60. Translated from the German edition of 1935, this book was printed in Austria. Procházka had lived in Ethiopia—and had not much liked it there.

Mistakenly believing that this was to be a royal wedding, Europeans saw the origin of the proposed marriage as lying in Ethiopia's wish to model its modernization after Japan and in Japan's romantic vision of Ethiopia.

While this sufficiently explains the motives of Araya and Kuroda for joining in an arranged marriage, other individuals got involved as well. Most important were several Pan-Asian, nationalist Japanese who were promoting the marriage to leverage prominent roles for themselves in commercial exchanges between Japan and Ethiopia. One was Yamauchi. Interestingly, neither the government in Tokyo nor the one in Addis Ababa promoted the marriage idea; neither lamented when the proposal died sometime in 1934. Both suffered international complications because of it.⁴²

The proposed union continued to rankle the Italians long after the quasi-betrothal had wisped away.⁴³ Enemies of Ethiopia or Japan continued to write about it long after they had every cause to know that it had never carried the policy implications feared and had not come to pass anyway. One Communist book published in 1936, for example, echoed the thoughts and fears of many when it thundered against Japanese imperialism: "Through the marriage of an Abyssinian prince to the daughter of a Japanese noble, the Japanese were enabled to equip airdromes in Ethiopian and to receive a cotton concession there."⁴⁴ Clearly, for people in Moscow as for many others, the falsity of such statements was less important than was the need to draw on any potential anti-Japanese and anti-Ethiopian arguments. In fact, the USSR came remarkably late and reluctantly to Ethiopia's assistance.⁴⁵

The second diplomatic postscript involved Heruy's translator, Daba Birrou.

In the first half of the 1930s as Italy geared up for war in East Africa, Ethiopia sought outside political, military, and economic support to balance Italy's greater power. No one—to the consternation of the Italians and many in Japan's government—responded more favorably than did Japan's pan-Asian nationalists. In Summer, 1935 as war approached, Ethiopia's lack of supplies was becoming ever more obvious as outlying troops were daily pouring into Addis Ababa to get equipment only to find none available. Desperate for arms and munitions, Emperor Hayle Sellase decided to take advantage of popular Japanese sentiments to send Daba to Japan. Ostensibly, he was to be the first secretary to Ethiopia's honorary consul in Osaka. Shoji Yunosuke, a Pan-Asian nationalist and correspondent for the *Osaka Mainichi* accompanied him, and his newspaper sponsored the trip. Shoji had actively promoted Araya's proposed marriage to Kuroda.⁴⁶

Daba and Shoji arrived in Japan on 13 September. Italy attacked Ethiopia three weeks later. Despite the enthusiastic welcome for Daba from many nationalist Japanese, the government in Tokyo proved unwilling to oppose Italy either directly or indirectly. Its interests in Ethiopia were too few to risk a confrontation in a theater so far away. In

⁴²Clarke, "Marriage Alliance," 105-16.

⁴³Greene, 17 January, 1934: NARA 784.94/6.

⁴⁴O. Tanin and E. Yohan, *When Japan Goes to War* (NY: International Publishers, 1936), 14.

⁴⁵For the Soviet Union's policies *vis-à-vis* Italy, Japan, and Ethiopia before the Italo-Ethiopian War, see J. Calvitt Clarke III, "Periphery and Crossroads: Ethiopia and World Diplomacy, 1934-36," in *Ethiopia in Broader Perspective: Papers of the XIIIth International Conference of Ethiopian Studies*, 3 vols., K. E. Fukui and M. Shigeta, eds. (Kyoto: Shokado Book Sellers, 1997), 1: 699-712.

⁴⁶Clarke, "Dashed Hopes," 135-51.

short, Japan put international relations first and had few resources anyway to offer East Africa. Japan's foreign ministry and army agreed that public passions would not affect policy. The government announced that it would strictly observe neutrality, calmly watch the East African crisis, and completely ignore League of Nations policy.⁴⁷ The Japanese told the Italians but not Daba that they would not send loans, arms, munitions, volunteers, or a military mission to an Ethiopia unable to pay anyway. Tokyo rejected Daba's requests only through its instructions of 4 December preparing for appointing a minister *ad interim*, who would open Japan's new legation in Addis Ababa in January, 1936.⁴⁸ On 23 January, 1936, Heruy visited the newly-opened Japanese legation at Addis Ababa to order small quantities of light arms from Japan, but did no better than had Daba.⁴⁹

One of the Japanese nationalists actively involved in Heruy's visit in 1931, Araya's marriage proposal, and now Daba's visit, was Sumioka Tomoyoshi. At the end of March, in a letter to Ethiopia's emperor, he predicted that Ethiopia's brave army commanded by "its courageous King of Kings" would defeat his enemies. The letter went on to commend Daba's activities:

During his six months' sojourn in Japan ... Daba has at all times conducted himself with credit, and at no time has the prestige of Abyssinia suffered at his hands.... [The foreign minister] ... has received him twice in private conference and has seen him to the door in person when ... [he] took leave....

Despite the difficulties ... Daba has been able to push negotiations with the Japanese authorities to a point where agreement on principles has been reached, although on particulars there still seems room for further discussion.

The goodwill of the Japanese people toward Abyssinia has been evinced in the warm welcome which ... Daba received when he landed at Kobe and when he arrived at Tokyo station and in the intense activities of ... organizations and individuals in sending medical supplies, money and other articles for the aid of the Abyssinian people.⁵⁰

Sumioka's statement clearly—even if inadvertently—emphasized the semi-official nature of Daba's visit. His list of accomplishments was not much. Daba had seen Hirota twice and been escorted to the door. He had negotiated "agreement in principles" even if without particulars. Many Japanese had enthusiastically welcomed him. Some few groups had sent some few medical supplies, and Daba had not embarrassed himself. All this merely highlights how little his visit had achieved or even could have achieved.

⁴⁷Scalise, 14 October, 1935: Italy, Ministero degli Affari Esteri, Direzione Generale degli Affari Politici, Etiopia—Fondo di Guerra (1935-40) (Rome) [hereafter cited as AP Etiopia—Guerra] b(usta) 72 f(oglio) 3; Circular, 9 October, 1935: AP Etiopia—Guerra b117 f4; *Japan Advertiser*, 5 October, 1935.

⁴⁸Unno Yoshio, "Dainiji Itaria-Echiopia Senso To Nihon," *Hosei Riron* 16 (1983): 209. Taura Masanori has written on the issue of Japan establishing and maintaining a legation in Addis Ababa. See "Nihon-Echiopia Kankei," 141-70 and "Nichi-I Kankei (1935-36) to sono Yotai" Echiopia Senso wo meguru Nihon gawa Taio kara," in Ito Takashi, ed., *Nihon Kindai-shi no Saikochiku* (Tokyo: Yamakawa Shuppan-sha, 1993), 302-28.

⁴⁹Faërber-Ishihara, *Les premiers contacts*, 20.

⁵⁰*Japan Advertiser*, 28 March, 1936; Grew, 16 April, 1936: NARA 894.00/100.

Italy's ambassador in Tokyo agreed. He had only casually followed Daba's exploits. In his report to Rome describing Daba's departure from Tokyo at the end of March, he mentioned the couple of hundred members of "reactionary nationalistic associations," who had seen him off at the station. He received assurances from the war ministry that the supplies given Daba had been but a few samples of poor quality, and did not include "even one of the rifles that he had been insistently requesting."⁵¹

After seven months in Japan, Daba sailed for his homeland on 2 April. Although he had declined to attend a farewell party held by right-wing organizations, Daba did put on a brave face in interviews with the *Osaka Mainichi* just before his departure.⁵² At a press conference on 17 April, a Japanese foreign ministry spokesman stated that if Italy subjugated Ethiopia, Japan would act independently to protect its rights and interests in that region. He pointed out that Japan had a friendship and commercial agreement with Ethiopia and that commerce between the two countries had been increasing.⁵³

Meanwhile, Ethiopia's army was neither sufficiently armed, trained, nor led to effectively resist for long Italy's invasion. Italian troops entered Addis Ababa in May, 1936. By mid-October, Daba had settled himself in Cairo, and on 12 December, he subjected himself to Italian authority and received a passport.⁵⁴

Tokyo also adjusted itself to Italy's conquest of the Ethiopian Empire. The exchange of recognitions on 2 December, 1936—Japan's conquest of Manchukuo for Italy's conquest of Ethiopia—paved the way for the reconciliation between Tokyo and Rome and their eventual alliance during World War II.⁵⁵

Surely, Rome and Tokyo could not have this *volte-face* so quickly if the Italians had not come to believe Tokyo's many declarations of innocence about the arms transfers and training that Ethiopia had so desperately sought through Daba's mission. Perhaps they never had. But whether they had or not, throughout 1935 and much of 1936, they had effectively used rumors of significant Japanese inroads into Ethiopia to successfully disarm potential international opposition to Italy's coming adventure, especially in London, Paris, and Moscow. In truth, Daba's visit never had any real chance to succeed other than as a publicity stunt orchestrated by Shoji and the *Osaka Mainichi*. Japan was never in a position to give the kind of help Ethiopia so desperately had sought.

⁵¹Auriti, 31 March, 1936, 6 March, 1936: AP Ethiopia—Guerra b117 f7.

⁵²*OM&TNN*, 31 March, 1 April, 1936.

⁵³Grew, 13 April, 1936: NARA 894.00/unclear; Unno, "Dainiji Italia-Echiopia Senso," 208-09.

⁵⁴Rome, 13 June, 1936; Corti, 18 August, 1936; Minister of War, 29 September, 1936; Fabiani, 30 April, 1936, 8 September, 1936; Cairo, 3 October, 1936; 23 October, 1936; 18 December, 1936; Ghigi, 5 December, 1936: AP Ethiopia—Guerra b117 f7.

⁵⁵Bradshaw, "Japan," 320-22, 358-62; Sugimura, 29 October, 1936: Japan, Gaimusho Gaiko Shiryo Kan (Tokyo) [hereafter cited as GSK] A461 ET/II-8; Sugimura, 12-13 May, 1936, 25-26 March, 1936; Mushanokoji, 15-16 April, 1936: GSK A461 ET/II-7-7; Okakura and Kitagawa, *Nihon-Afurika Koryu-shi*, 40-45. US representatives followed these events closely. See the many documents in NARA 765.94.

Marie de' Medici: Muse or Strategist?

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Marie de' Medici was born in 1573 in Florence, at the core of a world dazed by the economic, religious and social revolution that changed sixteenth-century Europe. The existing, rich historiography regarding Marie has not been favorable to the Florentine granddaughter of Holy Roman Emperor Ferdinand I (r. 1558-1564) and of the princesses Anne of Bohemia and Hungary (1503-1547) and Eleanor Alvarez of Toledo (1522-1562). Daughter of Francesco de' Medici and, through her mother Johanna of Austria, niece to Holy Roman Emperor Maximilian II (r. 1564-1576), Marie was born a princess. Later, with her marriage to the Bourbon king Henry IV, she would become queen of France (r. 1600-1610) and then die as an exiled dowager queen in Cologne in 1642 among much criticism and negative propaganda, as the duc de Saint Simon, Cardinal de Richelieu and the historian de Michelet have chronicled.¹ Queen Marie de' Medici was accused of conspiracy, of not loving her children, and of excessive political influence on the Habsburg and Spanish crowns. Only recently, research conducted in France and Italy is throwing a more positive light on her persona. Fortunately for her reputation, for example, her name is bound to the creation of the first opera, "Euridice", written to celebrate her wedding in 1600, and to a cycle of twenty-four paintings created in the years 1622-1625 by Peter Paul Ruben now exhibited at the Louvre in Paris. These masterpieces constitute Marie de' Medici's artistic legacy.

Recent scholarly research on the cultural formation of Marie de' Medici and on her *Medicean* contribution to seventeenth-century French culture has demonstrated the high level of education that the princess received in Florence, and its relative magnitude with respect to that customarily received by the European queens of the period.² The goal of this paper is to understand whether art was used by the Tuscan and French governments exclusively to hide geopolitical agendas or if Marie de' Medici favored her personal predilections and inspired new forms of artistic expressions aside from propaganda. A reading of *The Artistic Education of Maria de Medici* (one painting from Rubens's Medici Cycle at the Louvre), of the manuscript by Michelangelo Buonarroti the Young (which chronicles Marie de' Medici's proxy wedding to King Henry IV who ruled from 1589 to 1610), and of the text of "Euridice", the opera written by Ottavio Rinuccini on the occasion of her wedding, is necessary in order to interpret Marie de' Medici's level of personal involvement in the arts and to understand whether she was an active

¹Louis de Rouvroy, duc de Saint-Simon, *Parallele des trois premiers Rois Bourbons*, M.P. Fougere, ed. (Paris: Hachette, 1746), 20; Armand Jean du Plessis de Richelieu, *Mémoires du cardinal de Richelieu*, Vol. I, Michaud and Poujoulat, eds. (Paris: Firmin Didot, 1837), 72; Jules de Michelet, *Histoire de France*, Vol. XIII (Paris: J. de Bonnot, 1867), 152.

²For Marie's contribution to French culture, see: Caterina Caneva, *Maria de Medici: una Principessa Fiorentina sul Trono di Francia* (Livorno: Sillabe, 1983), 74-84. For the education of Marie, see: Miles Chappell, "The Artistic Education of Maria de Medici," (*Le Siècle de Marie Actes du Séminaire de la Chaire Rhetorique et Société en Europe (XVI-XVII siècles)* du Collège de France, Paris, 2003), 13-31; Sara Mamone, *Paris et Florence: Deux Capitales du Spectacle pour une Reine, Marie de Medicis*, (Paris: Seuil, 1980), 208-228.

protagonist of the cultural life of her courts or if she played a submissive, although educated, role in the broader political scene.³

Francesco Solinas, Maître de Conférence at the Collège de France, Paris, has contributed to the most recent exhibitions on Marie de' Medici: *Marie de Médicis, un gouvernement par les arts* (held at the Chateau de Blois in 2003-2004) and *Marie de Medici: una Principessa Fiorentina sul Trono di Francia* (held in Florence in 2005). In the catalog edited for *Marie de Médicis, un gouvernement par les arts* he writes that Marie and her sister Eleonora (five years her senior) had been protected and educated from early childhood in the most refined of the European courts, the court of Tuscany, and had received an upbringing worthy of sovereigns-to-be.⁴ They had familiarity with the artists who were patronized by their father Francesco and by their uncle Ferdinand (second son of Cosimo I): Alessandro Allori, Santi di Tito, Scipione Pulzone da Gaeta, Jacopo Ligozzi and Ludovico Cigoli, who all contributed to their artistic education and painted the numerous portraits of the two privileged but lonely princesses.⁵ In fact, following their mother Johanna of Austria's early death and those of their siblings Philip and Anne, Marie and Eleonora were left alone at Palazzo Pitti in Florence by a father distracted by his passions.⁶ Solinas resorts to Miles Chappell's article "The Artistic Education of Marie de Medici" and writes in the catalog of *Marie de Médicis, un gouvernement par les arts* that Marie was educated in the study of history and classic and contemporary literature, and was trained to appreciate art and to master writing as few other women of the period.⁷ Eleonora and Marie were the first Medici princesses after Caterina to become ambassadors in Europe of the taste and civilization of the grand duchy of Tuscany. For this reason, they were trained to "exude" excellence.⁸

Solinas' and Chappell's depiction contradict the description that the historian Luis Batiffol provides of a young Marie educated by Madame Orsini, a Roman lady of severe and narrow ideas, who kept the princess in the most complete exclusion, allowing her to

³For Rubens's Medici Cycle, see: Rubens, *The Medici Cycle*, 1625. Oil on canvas, 12' 11 1/8" x 9' 8 1/8", Musée du Louvre, Paris. For Buonarroti's manuscript, see: Michelangelo Buonarroti, *Descrizione delle felicissime nozze della cristianissima maesta' di Madama Maria Medici regina di Francia e di Navarra*, ed. Marescotti Giorgio, Firenze, 1600. For "Euridice", see: Ottavio Rinuccini (1562-1621), poet at the Medici court and author of the first opera *Libretti*, has always held a special place in the literary criticism of opera.

⁴Paola Bassoni Pacht, ed., *Marie de Médicis, un gouvernement par les arts* (Paris: Somogy editions d'art, 2003), 44.

⁵Francesco Solinas, *Marie de Medici: una Principessa fiorentina sul Trono di Francia* (Livorno: Sillabe, 2005), 33-34.

⁶He had interests in the sciences, in the arts and in alchemy. He married his mistress Bianca Cappello two months after his wife Johanna of Austria died, and with her he moved to Villa Pratolino.

⁷For Solinas' reference, see: Chappell, "Artistic Education," 13-31. For educated women of Marie's time: Marguerite of Navarre, sister of Francis I king of France (r. 1515 - 1547) was one of the few exceptions. She authored the *Miroir de l'Ame Pecheresse* (in 1531) and the *Heptameron* (published in posthumous edition in 1559). Her court was renowned as one of the richest humanist courts in sixteenth-century Europe. Henry VIII's last wife, Catherine Parr, also devoted herself to the art of writing and influenced her stepdaughters Mary and Elisabeth. However, her books were of religious content and, as such, reflected more the religious upheaval of the period than her involvement with culture and education.

⁸Catherine de Medici (1519 - 1589). Queen of France as the wife of King Henry II of France, she was a daughter of Lorenzo II de Medici, Duke of Urbino, and of a French princess, Madeleine de la Tour d'Auvergne.




Figure 1: *The Education of the Princess*, by Peter Paul Rubens (Louvre, Paris, 1621-1625. Ronald Forsyth Millen and Robert Erich Wolf, *Heroic Deeds and Mystic Figures: a New Reading of Rubens' Life of Maria de' Medici* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989), 257.

see no one, and who took care that she should know nothing either of politics or the affairs of the state, "keeping constant watch over her."⁹ According to Batiffol, the little princess of Tuscany was kept in effectual ignorance of the world, learned docility and respect for her father, and, after his death, for her uncle and aunt.¹⁰

The argument of an intellectually modest Marie de' Medici, who reads very little, "because she is myopic and she does not like reading" and who "sometimes writes," was supported until a few years ago by Michel Carmona, geographer and historian at the Sorbonne, who built upon the existing biographies to write his re-examination of Marie de' Medici.¹¹ There is evidence of an intense correspondence between Marie and her family in Tuscany and other European courts, of letters of circumstance and of instructions sent to the dauphin's preceptor, of various recommendations and missives to the Paris *parlement*, and of letters to the governors and mayors of major villages.¹² Carmona argues that Marie left the task of her correspondence to her secretary because it was an exercise that annoyed her to the point of writing, "It is now time to sleep, and you know that I do not have time to write in another moment" on the few short letters that she started intentionally at night.¹³

The theory that Marie de' Medici did not favor writing and reading cannot be supported simply by the evidence that a secretary wrote her letters. This was common practice in the courts of the time. The first inventory of the books belonging to Marie and reported in 1886 by Ernest Bauchart would support this argument if not for the latest discoveries made during the current wave of rehabilitation of Marie de' Medici, which are unfolding unknown aspects of her life.¹⁴ The archivist-paleographer Isabelle de Conihout has contributed her expertise to the compilation of a (non-definitive) list of 180 books belonging to Marie de' Medici.¹⁵ The list includes texts in French and Italian and is certainly missing many titles, lost during Marie's tumultuous last years of exile that followed the conflicts with her son, King Louis XIII, and his minister Cardinal Richelieu.¹⁶ The new inventory also includes a complete collection of religious texts and books of hours beautifully edited and decorated. De Conihout proposes that the queen kept this collection in a separate place from her other books (probably in the oratory or a little studio in the Palace of Luxemburg where she lived after her regency), which would

⁹Louis Batiffol, *Marie de Medicis and the French Court in the XVII Century* (NY: Books for Libraries Press, 1970), 5.

¹⁰*Ibid.*, 5.

¹¹Michael Carmona, *Marie de Medicis* (Paris: Fayard, 1981), 55. The original citation in the text by Michael Carmona is "parce qu'elle est myope et que'elle n'aime guere la lecture." All translations by author.

¹²*Ibid.*

¹³"C'est maintenant l'heure de dormir et vous savez que je n'ai pas le temps d'ecrire a un autre moment que maintenant." *Ibid.*, 58.

¹⁴Quentin Bauchart, *Les femmes bibliophiles vol. I* (Paris: D. Morgand, 1886), 175-188, quoted in Isabelle de Conihout, "I Libri della Regina," Caneva, *Maria de Medici*, 257-259. According to this inventory, Marie de Medici only owned 29 books.

¹⁵Isabelle de Conihout, "I Libri della Regina," 257-259.

¹⁶The list of French and Italian books includes: Pierre Vallet, *Jardin du roi*; Andreini, *Adamo*; Honore' d'Urfé, *Astree*; Jean Puget de la Serre, *Histoire curieuse; Theagene et Chariclee*; Antoine Montchrestien, *Traité d'economie politique*; Pluvinel, *Maneige royal*; Giambattista Marino, *Adone*. Quoted in "I Libri della Regina," Caneva, *Maria de Medici*, 257-259. In 1631, with the excuse of an insurrection in Paris (probably engineered by Richelieu) King Louis XIII placed his mother under detention at the chateau of Compiègne. After escaping and making the mistake of setting foot just outside French territory, Marie was declared to be in exile and was forced to seek refuge in the Spanish Netherlands.

explain its remarkable preservation to this day. Even if only a small portion of Marie de' Medici's library has survived, it is nonetheless sufficient to prove the queen's cultural interests. One could argue that Marie's ownership of books does not necessarily prove that she read them; this may be so, but at the very least it is evidence enough of her cultural taste. This opposes the theory of the queen's plain education that is contended by what is now a surpassed historiographical trend.

Such obsolete renditions ignore the further "spin" that some of princess Marie's cultural formation was received at the marriage of the Prince of Mantua Vincenzo Gonzaga and Eleonora de' Medici in 1584. Marie was introduced to Torquato Tasso (1544-1595), Claudio Monteverdi (1562-1643) and the yet little-known Flemish painter Peter Paul Rubens (1577-1640) by her sister and the prince Gonzaga.¹⁷ Rubens, one of the favorite painters at the Gonzaga court, would later be present at Marie's proxy wedding with Henry IV in Florence (of which Rubens traced many sketches) and would, twenty-two years later (on 26 January, 1622), receive a commission—for the considerable sum of 60,000 *livres*—to paint forty-eight canvases of considerable dimensions for Marie de' Medici.¹⁸ By this time, Rubens had achieved fame and honors and was one of the most sought-after painters in the European courts, while Marie had concluded her regency and planned to spend her years as queen-mother at the new Palais Luxembourg built for her.¹⁹ The cycle of paintings was commissioned to decorate two galleries of the new palace and was meant to celebrate Marie de' Medici's life, from her birth to her triumph in France as queen.

Rubens completed the first part of his commission (twenty-four paintings for one of the two galleries) in Antwerp by May, 1625, when the proxy marriage of Marie's daughter Henrietta (1609-1669) with Charles I (1600-1649), King of England, of Ireland and of the Scots, took place. The gallery of the Palais Luxembourg was inaugurated for the occasion and was visited by Marie's son, King Louis XIII, and by her daughters, Elisabeth and Henrietta (1609-1669) the queens of Spain and England, respectively—and their courtiers. Marie de' Medici's double triumph was orchestrated by her innate ability to create propaganda from artistic mise-en-scene. As Alexis Merle du Bourg admits, Rubens masterfully transformed artworks strongly biased by Queen Marie's agenda into masterpieces.²⁰

Although the narcissistic celebration of Marie de' Medici in the Rubens cycle is evidently a metaphor for other political meanings, one of the paintings has the merit of providing modern scholars with information on her years in Florence. It is *The Education of the Princess* and is of particular importance to answer questions about Marie de' Medici's education. (See Figure 1.) As Ronald Millen and Robert Erich Wolf note, it was placed on the side of the gallery where the portrait of Marie's father Francesco I was located and where all the paintings have to do with her youth and early womanhood, a time of (relative) happiness and full of promise.²¹ The iconography takes into account the elements that Rubens was contractually bound to paint: "the highly illustrious life [of

¹⁷Torquato Tasso Italian poet, born at Sorrento near Naples in 1544; died at Rome, in 1595. Claudio Monteverdi (1567-1643), Italian composer, violinist and singer. Pacht, *Marie de Médicis*, 44.

¹⁸This document is quoted in *ibid.*, 96, as being published by J. Thuillier and J. Foucart, 1967 (1969), 98.

¹⁹Verónica Wedgwood, *The World of Rubens* (NY: Time, 1967), 13.

²⁰Pacht, et al., *Marie de Médicis*, 101.

²¹Ronald Millen and Robert Erich Wolf, *Heroic Deeds and Mystic Figures* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), 25.

Marie] and [her] heroic deeds," with a profusion of mystic figures, metaphors, myths and allegories. In contrast to the other paintings, which all depict a Marie adored, admired, celebrated, yet rendered as a still character, in *The Education of the Princess*, an adolescent Marie is an active individual with a personality.

As the conventional iconographic canons of interpretation indicate, and as Millen and Wolf also point out, she is receiving instruction from the helmeted and armored goddess Minerva under the approving look of three nude Graces.²² A wreathed musician (Apollo or Orpheus) plays a viola da gamba, earthly distracted by the voluptuous nudity of the Graces. A swirling Mercury observes Marie bent over Minerva's book, while all the characters in the painting seem not to notice the objects scattered across the foreground: a theorbo, a bust of Homer, a painter's palette and brushes, a sculptor's mallet and chisels, and engraving tools.²³ According to Macrobius, Mercury is associated with the light [of intelligence] and here he represents the swiftness of the intelligence that is descending as a heavenly gift on the princess.²⁴ Cartari (whose writings have also been used as source of interpretation) proposes to identify Minerva as goddess of Prudence and inventor of all the arts.²⁵ The familiarity of the adviser (the representational motives of the pictures are indicated in the contract signed by Rubens) of the iconographic program with the classics is validated by the depiction of the three Graces. In fact, they appear on numerous Roman coins as bearers of peace and harmony and their standing on a still life containing objects symbolizing culture and the arts emphasizes their importance for Marie and her intended message.

Millen and Wolf cite the sixteenth-century writer Georg Pictor. He repeated what the Classical and Late Latin sources said about Minerva's garments. These are of three colors—blue, golden yellow, and purple. The combination of these colors suggests the intricacies of wisdom, and this is the reason why Rubens uses them repeatedly for his Minervas in the cycle.²⁶ Musical instruments also have a symbolic political connotation. The lyre, the lute, the viola da gamba—as well as Minerva's shield—pictured in *The Education of the Princess* evoke harmony of the universe and of the soul, as their depictions in the New Testament, in seventeenth-century mythological texts, and in allegories and emblems confirm, but they can also be taken to refer to the more restricted sphere of relations within the state.²⁷ In *The Education of the Princess*, Marie studies her

²²*Ibid.*, 38.

²³A theorbo is Minerva's Medusa shield.

²⁴Macrobius was a fifth-century Neoplatonist much consulted as an iconographical source from the Middle Ages into Rubens' time, Millen, 38-48

²⁵Vincenzo Cartari, *Imagini de i dei degli antichi*, (Venetia: Ziletti, 1571), identifies Minerva as goddess of prudence and inventor of all the arts.

²⁶Millen and Wolf, *Heroic Deeds*, 46.

²⁷Callot, *The Prodigal Son Takes his Place at the Feast (Return)*. etching. Several musicians take part, including one with a lute. (H. Daniel. *Callot's Etchings*. NY, 1974. fig. 326; *La Revue des Arts* 1 [1951] 101 [useless reproduction]); [Book Inventory (BI) Paris 1600] Anon. *Apollo and the Muses*, title-page illustration from Antoine Francisque, *Le trésor d'Orphée* ... Paris, Veuve R. et P. Ballard, 1600. Etching. One of the Muses has a lute. (*Early Music* 6 [1978] contents insert; *Gitarre & Laute* 1981/1, 44 [minuscule reproduction]); [Vignon-J David Pr] Jérôme? David (ca.1605-ca.1670) after Claude Vignon (1593-1670). *Europe*. engraving. Includes an unplayed lute. (Mirimonde *Iconographie musicale* vol. I, no. 43); [BI Paris ca. 1614] Merian, Matthaeus I (1593-1650). "Contentement d'une dame noble," from *Emblemata amatoria*. Paris, Luc Lamieil editeur, ca. 1614. etching. A woman sits on a bed and plays a lute. There is an open music book on the table. (Wüthrich 1966. no. 55, Abb. 38); [BI London 1612] Caus, Salomon (ca.1576-1626). *Three Views of the Lute*,

lesson inscribed in the circular universe framed by Mercury (light of intelligence), Minerva (wisdom of the arts), laurel-wreathed Apollo or Orpheus and the peaceful Graces: a harmonious court of gods, bearers of gifts and virtues that Marie de' Medici dominates but to which she is also subject.

Sovereign and captive in a courtly universe ruled by a husband distracted by wars and loves, Marie de' Medici, queen consort in France, is well distant from the "the early happiness of Her reign" sung by Michelangelo Buonarroti the Young in his chronicle *Descrizione delle Felicissime Nozze della Cristianissima Maesta' di Madama Maria Medici Regina di Francia e di Navarra*. This journal is a detailed narrative of "The reason why, in the days that followed the wedding, before the departure of the bride and the accompanying courtiers, many celebrations were held, and not only at the court[...]."²⁸ On 6 October, 1600 "[...] Jacopo Corsi arranged the musical transposition of the beautiful epic arranged by Ottavio Rinuccini, "Euridice", which was executed with extreme expertise.[...]," the first opera was presented.²⁹ As Michelangelo wrote, it was based on the fairy tale (*affettuosa e gentilissima favola*) written by the poet at the Medici court Ottavio Rinuccini (1562-1621), who fantasized a different ending for the sad love story written by Ovid, Virgil and Poliziano.³⁰ In fact, he celebrated the vital reunion of Orpheus and Euridice, and therefore the triumph of love over death and adversities: "It may appear to someone that the changes I have made to the conclusion of Orpheus's tale is too bold, but this is what I wanted," he wrote.³¹

Kelley Harness proposes a political reading of "Euridice" and identifies Euridice with Florence and Orpheus with Ferdinand I de' Medici, thus allegorizing Florence's political health (as in Rinuccini's reformed myth) by means of a marital image (the Medici grand duke).³² Although Harness' argument is valid (also in consideration of the existence of an existing painting by Agnolo Bronzino of Cosimo de Medici as Orpheus,

from *La perspective avec la raison des ombres et miroers*. London 1612. engraving. (M. Rosci. *Baschenis, Bettera & Co.* Milan 1971. p. 35); [Dr no location] Anon. A Group of Musicians from the *Ballet des fées de la forest de Saint-Germain*, danced at the Louvre, Paris, in 1625. no location. drawing. Includes a figure playing a tenor or bass viol (played upside down as the player is walking), and at least twelve players of lutes and theorbo lutes. (Dufourcq *Musique*. vol. II, p. 238-29 [reproduction across page crease]); Muses: [BI Paris 1594] Anon. *Apollo and the Muses, from Chansonettes ...* Paris, A. Le Roy and C. Le Bé Ballard, 1594. woodcut. One of the Muses plays a lute. (Mortimer *French*. no. 135, p. 169)

²⁸Michelangelo, *Descrizione delle Felicissime Nozze*, p. 22 "Il perche' appresso de le nozze in tutti quei giorni che precedevano la partenza del legato e della regina vari trattenimenti si tennero e della corte non solamente" "[...] avendo il Signor Jacopo Corsi fatta mettere in musica con grande studio la "Euridice" affettuosa e gentilissima favola del Signor Ottavio Rinuccini, [...]; offertola a loro Altezza fu ricevuta [...]"

²⁹*Ibid.*, 22. "[...] and was offered, and accepted, by Their Highnessess [...]"

³⁰For Rinuccini, see: Francesca Chiarelli, "Before and After: Ottavio Rinuccini's Mascherate and their Relationship to the Operatic Libretto," *Journal of Seventeenth Century Music* 9 (2003), 3-13. Here, 8. For Chiarelli's reference, see Bojan Bujic, "Figura poetica molto vaga: Structure and Meaning in Rinuccini's *Euridice*," *Early Music History* 10 (1991): 29-64. In regards to the tale: the nymph Euridice was the wife of Orpheus. While escaping from Aristeus, she was bitten by a snake and died. Orpheus visited the underworld to rescue his wife but he broke the promise made to Hades of not looking back until he had reached the upper world, so Euridice was lost again.

³¹Quoted in Chiarelli, Hanning, *Of Poetry and Music's Power*, 270. "Potrà parere ad alcuno, che troppo ardire sia stato il mio in alterare il fine della favola d'Orfeo, ma così mi è parso convenevole in tempo di tanta allegrezza."

³²Kelley Harness, "Le Tre Euridici: Characterization and Allegory in the Euridici of Peri and Caccini," *Journal of Seventeenth Century Music* 9 (2003), 14.

painted in 1538-40), a reading of Buonarroti's description of the opera setting suggests an alternative evaluation: "the magnificent apparatus appeared behind the curtains arranged to form an arc, with two niches at its sides where the artist posed the statues of Poetry and Painting; it showed a misty landscape with relief, and the statues were beautifully drawn and enlightened by the daily light [...]"³³ It is the same choreography/iconography depicted by Rubens in *The Education of the Princess*, where the arch of curtains, the niches, and all the other elements of Buonarroti's description are conspicuously present. The same choreographer is behind the two works of art.

The scenographic apparatus for "Euridice" was realized by Ludovico Cardi detto il Cigoli, but the painted scenes were later re-employed for other representations and were repainted. Rubens, guest at the wedding celebrations, may have sketched the scenes, but the assertive control of Marie de' Medici over the iconographic program stated in the contract with Rubens in 1622 supports the hypothesis that she was also in control of the representational program of "Euridice." Both *The Education of the Princess* and "Euridice" celebrate a young, Florentine Marie devoted to the arts. (According to mythology, Orpheus was the son of the muse Calliope, who was pictured holding a writing tablet in her hand, sometimes a roll of paper or a book, and crowned in gold.) If in *The Education of the Princess* Marie portrays herself as Calliope, crowned in gold and mother of a laurel-wreathed Orpheus, the inference that she felt her status at this time as de-institutionalized queen mother to be inadequate and that the one of queen regent was more appropriate for her ambition is unequivocal. Moreover, the Three Graces resemble Marie. This suggests that in *The Education of the Princess* Marie de' Medici chose to have herself portrayed as granting the artistic spark to artists and poets. Like the Graces, she brought joy and goodwill to both gods and mortals through banquets, dances, and all other pleasurable social events; she sang with the Muses to the gods on Mount Olympus (her courts), and danced to the beautiful music that the god Apollo made upon his lyre. The traditional association of the Graces with arts and beauty, like the Muses and the Nymphs, must have intrigued the young but strong-willed princess and the more mature queen Marie and led her to personify the triple embodiment of grace and the bucolic beauty of the nymph. Marie is the pacifier, the artist and the patron of the cultural world of her epoch: Euridice and muse.

Harness affirms in her article about *Le Tre Euridici* that in seventeenth-century courts (particularly that of the Medici) comedies were understood to reflect contemporary urban life more closely than were pastorals, the latter being concerned as they were with the imitation of a higher truth. But in both genres, the Renaissance concept of decorum, by which a character's speech was congruent with his station in life, determined by age, class, moral status, and occupation, governed playwrights' choices.³⁴ At court, the experiences and values of the audience were based on a strict etiquette that determined the hierarchy and the nature of all social interactions.³⁵ According to these principles, dramatic male and female characters were treated differently by composers, who adhered

³³Buonarroti, *Descrizione delle felicissime nozze della cristianissima maesta' di Madama Marie Medici regina di Francia e di Navarra*, ed. Marescotti Giorgio (Firenze: 1600), 23-24. "Il magnifico apparato in degna sala dopo le cortine fra l'aspetto di un grand'arco, e di due nicchie da fianchi suoi, entro le quali la Poesia e la Pittura con bell'avviso dello inventore vi erano per istatue; mostrava selve vaghissime, e rilevate, e dipinte, accomodatevi con bel disegno: e per li lumi ben dispostivi piene di una luce di giorno."

³⁴Harness, "Le Tre Euridici," 3.

³⁵*Ibid.*

to the cliché of identification of the *giovane innamorata* (the young enamored woman) as a modest figure. Harness maintains that such a character had to be a model of chastity, manifested outwardly by modesty in dress and speech, while the typical scenery of a pastoral outdoor location, more proper for such a comedy, was a venue from which young Florentine women were discouraged.

Ottavio Rinuccini's rendition of Euridice revolutionized the application of these principles and, even though the poet's emphasis on Orpheus as a more forceful and persuasive orator seems to confer him a stronger role, his Euridice predominates.

And she, abandoned, released her face and her golden hair in their arms
[...] I live and breath again in this joyful space // Oh women, look, I am
the same // My auburn hair // My beautiful face // Recognize my voice //
the friendly sound of my words [...]//the ancient lineaments"³⁶

The strict courtly etiquette left no space to poets to make innovations. Rinuccini was encouraged to alter his comedy and to create a noble Euridice who is an active protagonist of the story.³⁷ It is the auburn Marie de' Medici, as she is described by Rinuccini when he writes about Euridice in the above passage. The poetic rhymes portray the same Marie de' Medici, as she is depicted in numerous paintings.

What Marie de' Medici has represented for art and history goes beyond paintings and music. She has conveyed strong feminist assertions that reconcile etiquette and gender limits with the whims of her intelligence. Marie de' Medici used her position to educate herself and to appreciate and participate in the arts and culture of the time—to learn how to survive as a protagonist the stormy courtly life of Florence. Marie, the young princess, gave voice to a young nymph-wife-muse and demanded that poetry and music acknowledge her dominant role while celebrating her femininity. Marie, the dowager queen, still celebrated the muse to whom she also conferred the responsibility of rebuilding a world devastated by religious war, of the invention of a new courtly style, and of a "renaissance" in French arts and letters.

³⁶Rinuccini, "Euridice," (Firenze: Palazzo Pitti, 1600).

³⁷"Although even Rinuccini's "Euridice" is markedly reticent, delivering only 27 of the opera's nearly 800 lines, in the versions of Ovid, Virgil, and Poliziano, she is nearly mute. She utters a solitary 'vale' in Ovid as Orpheus's backward glance precipitates her return to the underworld. The Euridice of Virgil's *Georgics* expands Ovid's matter-of-fact farewell into a full-blown lament." Harness, "Le Tre Euridici," 3.

Saving America during the Great Depression: Bishop Fulton J. Sheen Campaigns against Communism to Save the US

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Bishop Fulton J. Sheen (1895-1979), who became a prominent member of the US Catholic hierarchy during the Cold War, first began to gain national attention during the 1930s when he launched a crusade to keep the US away from what he viewed as the evils of communism. He was particularly concerned that communist influence was increasing in international affairs and in the US because of the economic hardships of the Depression. He devoted himself to an intensive study of communism and the USSR. He concluded that communism meant to replace Christianity with its own man-made ideology. He often proposed draconian measures to prevent the spread of communism in the US, including the suspension of free speech for communist sympathizers. Later, Sheen turned his attention to the war beginning in Europe. He repeatedly stated that he did not approve of Benito Mussolini, a Catholic and the Fascist dictator of Italy or Adolph Hitler, the dictator of Germany, but his major concern was with the communist state in the USSR. Sheen formulated arguments against communism and the USSR during the 1930s that he would later use during the Cold War to great effect on his national television show.¹

Sheen brought his crusade to the radio in 1930 when he became the speaker on *The Catholic Hour*, a national radio program. He was already gaining a reputation by speaking at Catholic churches and Church-sponsored institutions and organizations, but speaking each week on the radio brought him widespread media attention. During the 1930s, Sheen was not the only priest known for his radio broadcasts. Father Charles Coughlin broadcast from his church, the Shrine of the Little Flower, in Royal Oak, Michigan. Coughlin, in the beginning of his radio ministry, preached on subjects related to Catholic Doctrine but soon turned to politics. He denounced the Hoover administration after the Depression began and backed Franklin D. Roosevelt for president, but later called him a communist.² Coughlin's orations tended to take the form of demagoguery while Sheen's addresses were never aimed at gathering a personal following for political purposes. Sheen's speaking ability proved to be a great weapon in his crusade against

¹Sheen served as Auxiliary Bishop of the Diocese of New York while doing a very popular television show, "Life is Worth Living." I explored Sheen's role in the Cold War in a previous article: Michael J. Epple, "Fulton J. Sheen's Call for Religious Unity During the Cold War," *Selected Annual Proceedings of the Florida Conference of Historians* 12 (2005), 50-57. Until recently the main published works on Sheen were D.P. Noonan, *The Passion of Fulton J. Sheen* (NY: Dodd Mead, 1972) and Sheen's posthumous biography *Treasure in Clay* (SF: Ignatius Books, 1980). In 2001, Thomas Reeves published the first full-length biography of Sheen since Noonan's work, but he does not go into great detail on Sheen's anti-communism. Thomas C Reeves, *The Life and Times of Fulton J. Sheen* (SF: Encounter Books, 2001). Kathleen Field's dissertation *Bishop Fulton J. Sheen: An American Catholic Response to the Twentieth Century* (University of Notre Dame, 1988) attempted to locate Sheen's place in the history of US Catholicism but does not focus on his Anti-communism.

²For an in-depth study of Coughlin see Alan Brinkley, *Voices of Protest: Huey Long, Father Coughlin and the Great Depression* (NY: Alfred A. Knopf, 1982).

communism. A *Time* magazine article on Sheen and his broadcasts on *The Catholic Hour* radio program described him as articulate and blessed with an excellent broadcast voice.³

After beginning his denunciation of communism, Sheen worried about it gaining a foothold in the US because of the Great Depression, which began in 1929. By 1932 approximately one third of the US population had no income, while half of the labor force was either unemployed or under employed. In large industrial cities such as Chicago and Cleveland upwards of half the working force were laid off.⁴ Unable to meet mortgage payments, hundreds of thousands of families were evicted from their homes. People had little to eat and thousands faced outright starvation. Socialist and communist agitators led unionizing drives and appealed to intellectuals to consider the merits of Marxist theory.⁵ Sheen became alarmed that the working classes would be deceived by the rhetoric and join communist organizations. He especially worried about the Communist Party USA (CPUSA).

The CPUSA, while relatively small, was able to mobilize and reach a large number of non-Communists. The party used front organizations such as the American Youth Congress and the National Negro Congress that hid the communist connection.⁶ 1935 to 1939 the CPUSA attempted to form a Popular Front with socialists and other leftist organizations with the growing threat of fascism as the common enemy. Party membership reached and all-time high of 100,000.⁷ The leadership stopped criticizing President Franklin Roosevelt and the New Deal and even declared that "Communism is 20th Century Americanism"⁸ Sheen strongly condemned those who joined the party.

Sheen attacked Earl Browder, the American Communist Party candidate for president in the 1936 election, because he feared that the working class would cast their votes for him. He contended that Browder presented a false picture of what communism stood for and he claimed to have documents that refuted Browder's claims. Throughout his career, Sheen often referred to documentation, which he supposedly received from communist sources. In his autobiography, Sheen recalled that throughout his career, individuals who claimed to be communists would approach him. Although he became suspicious of some of them and enlisted the FBI to check them out, they did provide him with valuable information for his anti-communism.⁹ In his lectures he often cited communist publications both in the US and around the world but he only alluded to other non-published documents, which he received from unidentified sources concerning communism. Only a few documents remain in the Sheen Archives of the many that he claimed to have in his possession.¹⁰

³"Monsignor's Tenth," *Time*, 11 March 1940, 60-61.

⁴For a look at the hardships of the Depression see, John Garraty, *The Great Depression: an Inquiry into the Causes, Course and Consequences of the Worldwide Depression of the Nineteen Thirties as Seen by Contemporaries and in the Light of History* (SD: Harcourt Brace and Jovanovich, 1989).

⁵John Gerassi examines the relationship of unions and the CPUSA in his article, "Comintern, the Fronts, and the CPUSA in Michael Brown, et al, eds., *New Studies in the Politics and Culture of U.S. Communism* (NY: Monthly Review Press, 1993), 75-91.

⁶Guenter Lewy, *The Cause that Failed: Communism in American Political Life* (NY: Oxford University Press, 1990), 25-40.

⁷*Ibid.*, 56.

⁸*Ibid.*, 22.

⁹Sheen, *Treasure in Clay*, 86-7.

¹⁰The Sheen Archives are located in the offices of the Diocese of Rochester, NY where Sheen served as bishop

Sheen accused Browder of plotting revolution in the US and being under orders from Moscow. Browder denied those charges.¹¹ Sheen's insistence that Browder acted on orders from Moscow has been documented in recent works. In fact, Browder and other US communist leaders decided to downplay their differences with Franklin Roosevelt in 1936 and instead attacked Alf Landon, the Republican candidate whom they considered represented the greater threat to the worldwide communist movement. They reached this decision after consulting with members of the Comintern at a Moscow meeting.¹² Sheen ended his attack on Browder by emphasizing that he attacked communism not only because of its opposition to the Catholic Church but also "because civilization as we know it today will pass away if communism is allowed to become supreme."¹³

The bishop continued to attack Browder after the election. In Chicago, Sheen addressed 3,000 people at St. Philip Neri Church, where he asserted that Browder and communism offered nothing new, and he compared communist tactics to those used by Judas Iscariot who betrayed Jesus with a kiss. Sheen argued that communists persuaded people with a proverbial kiss of the good things of communism to incite a revolution and they betrayed the people into slavery as Judas betrayed Christ to his death.¹⁴ When Sheen gave a similar lecture in September, 1936, one newspaper wrote, "Rev. Dr. Sheen is performing a great and patriotic service when he strips the skin off the Communists and exposes them in the raw for the indecent, ugly, and menacing thing they represent."¹⁵ Throughout his career he would employ biblical illustrations in his condemnation of communism.

Sheen also objected to articles that were printed in the *Daily Worker*, the leading communist publication in the US. When the newspaper printed a series of questions dealing with communism, Sheen wrote a reply to the questions. The editor did not print his letter, so the Paulist Press published a pamphlet in February, 1937 entitled *Communism Answers the Questions of a Communist*. His answers reiterated his basic arguments against communism.

As part of his crusade against communism, Sheen condemned US secular universities for aiding the enemy. He emphasized that Catholic colleges were better suited for educating Americans than secular colleges because the faculty at Catholic institutions would not be promoting communism. According to a contemporary report, in one lecture he argued,

in the 1960s. Unfortunately for researchers looking at Sheen, the archives mainly contain articles written by and about Sheen. He did not keep the large number of letters he received and did not leave diaries or journals.

¹¹Sheen cites the official program of the Soviet International as commanding followers to begin revolutions by suppressing opposition. He also asserts that Stalin chastised Browder in July, 1935 for not recruiting more Americans to the Communist party. "Msgr. Sheen Replies to Communist Leader," *Toronto Catholic Register*, 15 October 1936, 1.

¹²In the *Soviet World of American Communism* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998), Harvey Klehr, John Earl Haynes and Kyrill M. Anderson offer documented proof that Browder received orders on how to run his 1936 campaign at a 1936 Comintern meeting in Moscow. See 31-48. Mark Naison and John Gerassi agree with this assessment in Naison, "Remaking: America: Communist and Liberals in the Popular Front," in Brown, et al, *New Studies*, 45-75 and Gerassi, "Comintern."

¹³*Toronto Catholic Register*; 15 October 1936, 1.

¹⁴"Over 3,000 Hear Monsignor Sheen Tell of Aims of Communism," *Chicago Daily Calumet*, 16 November, 1936.

¹⁵"Rats in our American House," *Scranton Times*, 21 September, 1936.

... many college professors seem to be the most gullible and the seed of Communism is best fostered in universities where the name of God is not mentioned. That is not according to the intent of our forefathers. They took it for granted that schools would teach of God and that the Constitution would remain grounded on high religious principles.... Communism is a real threat to America and American principles. In the final struggle, he intimated, the Church will be the only bulwark against its progress and the only defender of the nations against the pernicious inroads upon American customs and ideals.¹⁶

For Sheen the separation of church and state had little meaning if it allowed university faculty to promote communism because of their lack of understanding of the spiritual heritage of the US, which would protect it from communism. This touched on another theme that Sheen often used, namely that education in the evils of communism would convince people to abandon its teachings. He also suggested that Catholic colleges and schools could rescue the US from the dangers presented by communism. Sheen often attacked US intellectuals who he insisted favored communism during the Depression. He argued that the majority of the faculty in US secular universities either actively supported communism or did not warn their students of the dangers that it presented to US democracy.

Sheen later proposed that a school be created for industrial workers to teach them about the misconceptions of communism. The schools could be located in the factories or perhaps public schools could be used for educating the working class about the dangers of communism. This would counter secular schools throughout the US. People could learn about the "tactics of Communism."¹⁷ Sheen assumed that ordinary factory workers would be most likely to fall prey to communist propaganda with the Depression affecting their ability to earn a living wage. However, unlike some Catholic reformers such as Dorothy Day, Sheen never offered practical suggestions for how to help working families supply their basic needs; instead he concentrated on protecting their minds.¹⁸

To keep Americans from admiring communism, Sheen often vilified the communist leadership both in this country and the USSR. On more than one occasion he accused communist leaders, including Lenin who had died thirteen years earlier and Joseph Stalin who led the USSR at the time, of being common criminals. He stated that both men prior to the Russian Revolution of 1917 literally were bank robbers and murderers.¹⁹ Sheen thus argued that the leaders of the Soviet regime were unsavory characters who would stop at nothing to obtain their goals. He also pointed out that Stalin instructed communists in other countries to use violence, confiscation, and insurrection to bring about a successful revolution.²⁰

¹⁶"Attacks on Communism Wins Msgr. Sheen Applause in Opening Lecture of the Series," *Cleveland Universe Bulletin*, 6 November, 1936.

¹⁷"Bishop Proposes Worker's School," *Chicago Herald Examiner*, 16 November, 1936.

¹⁸For a discussion of Dorothy Day, see James Terence Fisher, *The Catholic Counterculture in America, 1932-1962* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1989), 1-101.

¹⁹"Msgr. Sheen Hits Tactics of Reds," *The Knickerbocker Press*, 23 January, 1937.

²⁰*Ibid.*

Sheen's 1937 Lenten sermons at St. Patrick's Cathedral attracted visiting foreign dignitaries, including Manuel Quezon, president of the Philippine Commonwealth, who had traveled to the US in February for talks with President Franklin Roosevelt. With Quezon present, Sheen attacked communism's claim that religion was the opium of the people. He argued that communists used that phrase because they maintained religion put workers to sleep. They would not protest working conditions and would only hope for a better life after this one. Sheen countered this argument by pointing out that Pope Leo XIII (1878-1903) and Pope Pius XI (1922-1939) had issued encyclicals that called for better conditions for the workers. Sheen also argued, "[r]esignation which religion preaches is not passive submission to economic injustice as Communism contends. Resignation means accepting our lot while working to better conditions by an intelligent understanding of the nature of things."²¹

Sheen concluded his remarks on communism by observing that religion tried to better humanity while accepting its nature. He was referring to Christian orthodoxy that humans are born with an evil nature that only God can change. He also argued that communism must ultimately fail because it tried to bring about revolution but could not change the nature of humanity. Once again, Sheen used religion in the form of the accepted beliefs of Christianity in general and the Catholic Church in particular. This was a comparison that not only his immediate audience could comprehend but also others with Jewish or Protestant backgrounds could most likely understand.

Sheen's skillful critique of communist rhetoric and current events in the USSR allowed him to take a belief long associated with communism in the popular mind and turn it around to demonstrate the hypocrisy within the communist system. Sheen was aware that communist publications often criticized the upper echelons of the Christian Church for living in greater luxury than the majority of Christians, so he wrote in a Catholic publication that communism practiced what it preached against.²² Again, Sheen's ability to simplify and Christianize his argument against communism appealed to Catholics and other Christians who believed communism was inherently evil and opposed to the forces of good.

In his crusading zeal, Sheen declared at one meeting that, "Communists in America should be denied the right to freedom of speech whenever they would use that right to destroy it."²³ Ironically, he made the statement that certain groups should have their right to free speech taken away at a banquet celebrating the 150th anniversary of the US Constitution. He declared that the "Godless Communists" went against the very intentions of the Christian framers of the Constitution. He also claimed that when Thomas Jefferson in the Declaration of Independence used the words "inalienable rights," he meant rights given people by the creator, namely God. Sheen gave his own definition of democracy: "Democracy to me means the right to disagree and still have my life. It means the right to dissent and still have my rights."²⁴ He justified his views by claiming that communists hid behind freedom of speech to bring a message that could eventually lead to the end of liberties if their views prevailed in the US. It would seem as though in

²¹"Shows Communist Attacks Upon Religion False," *The Catholic News*, 27 February, 1937.

²²Sheen was quoted as saying that only 2% of the Communist elite lived in comfort while other 98% lived in poverty. "Communism is Called Capitalism Gone Mad," *Brooklyn Daily Eagle*, 15 November, 1937.

²³"Flays Communists at A.O.H. Banquet," *Worcester Telegram*, 20 September, 1937.

²⁴*Ibid.*

this instance Sheen was condemned by his own words. Communists at this point were a small minority within this country and should have been allowed to speak their views as much as Sheen. According to Sheen, Americans should be happy to live in a country where they had basic liberties such as freedom of speech. They should zealously guard that freedom. Guarding that freedom might require silencing those who would bring about a drastic change in the US.

In September, 1937, Sheen called communists, "capitalists without any cash!"²⁵ According to Sheen, communists criticized capitalism because they would like to be capitalists but lacked the finances to do so. He argued that the world saw the beginnings of two revolutions in the late nineteenth century. The one revolution, which he termed the "revolution of hate," came from the writings of Karl Marx and Charles Darwin, and the other revolution he termed the "revolution of charity," originated in Christianity. Violence and selfishness marked the "revolution of hate." In the 1930s Joseph Stalin, the leader of the USSR, exemplified violence and selfishness. Sheen even asserted that Stalin had his own mother moved to a different town after she asked a local priest to pray for him, and she subsequently died of a broken heart. Sheen compared the extreme intolerance which existed in the USSR to areas where the "revolution of charity" was practiced. He did not overtly say so, but the US and other Western countries which embraced the free market system and allowed freedom of religion were obviously influenced by the "revolution of charity." He also claimed that the two revolutions were at work in the Spanish Civil War. Near the end of his lecture he asserted, "[i]t is much better to be poor and free than to live in Soviet Russia and be a slave..."²⁶ Sheen admitted that there were problems in capitalism, but even with some inequities it was much better to reside in a free capitalist country than under communist domination.

Sheen's solution to the inequalities in capitalist countries, especially his insistence that workers share in the profits of their labor, appears to have some socialist overtones. This idea has found its way into some parts of US industry with profit-sharing plans and employee ownership, but it must have appeared radical to the industrialists of the 1930s. He also suggested that workers be organized in something similar to the guilds of the Middle Ages. Pope Pius XI published the encyclical, *Quadragesimo Anno* in 1931, attempting to address the social situation of the 1930s. He declared wages paid should be sufficient for the income needs of the family without the necessity of the wife or children working. The pontiff also praised the growth of labor organizations but stated that Catholics should only join unions that allowed Catholic social teaching. Preferably, those who were of the same occupation could form guilds to work for the good of all.²⁷ The 1931 encyclical gave papal approval for the increased Catholic attention to social problems. Sheen referred to this encyclical in the 1930s to the 1950s when he argued that the Church did not condone unbridled capitalism that robbed the working man of a just living. Sheen also referred to the medieval guilds as a pattern that modern labor might adopt. Sheen, like many Catholics of the day, had a great admiration for that period of history when the Church had been united and society seemed less complicated, at least in

²⁵ "Links Hatred to Marxism: Msgr. Sheen Calls Reds Capitalists Without Any Cash," *Windsor Daily Star* 28 September, 1937.

²⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 20.

his imaginings. That image of a simpler time appealed to Catholics confronted with the complexities of the twentieth century.²⁸

During the late 1930s with the US economic situation slowly improving, Sheen increasingly turned his attention to the international scene. He became alarmed when the Roosevelt administration began to reassess its neutrality policy in regard to selling arms to the Spanish government in Madrid. That government, which was supported by the USSR, came to power after the overthrow of the monarchy in 1931. The new government instituted reforms in several areas, including removal of educational control from the Catholic Church as well as redistribution of land to the poor peasants. In 1936 General Francisco Franco, a Catholic, led a military revolt against the government which began a three-year civil war. Both Adolph Hitler and Benito Mussolini backed Franco while the USSR actively supported the new government.²⁹

Throughout the remainder of the decade Sheen would continue to argue that communism was the greatest threat facing the US during the Depression. He would continue to utilize many of the arguments that he used in the 1930s during World War II and the Cold War including his contention that Communism presented a counterfeit of Christian religion. Sheen's warnings about the dangers of Communism and the threat presented by the USSR received less attention during World War II when the US was allied with that state. However, once the Cold War began, Sheen and his arguments once again gained national attention when he would call for Jews and Protestants to join Catholics in presenting a united front against Communism.

²⁸For a discussion of how US Catholics in the twentieth century came to regard the medieval guild as an excellent form of labor organization see Philip Gleason, *Keeping the Faith: American Catholicism Past and Present* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1987), 22-23.

²⁹For more information on the origins of the Spanish Civil War, see Douglas Little, *Malevolent Neutrality: The United States, Great Britain, and the Origins of the Spanish Civil War* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1985).

The American Nation and the Eisenhower Doctrine, 1957-1958

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A consequence of the Suez crisis, the Eisenhower Doctrine of early January, 1957, approved by the US Congress a few weeks later, authorized the Chief Executive to use military forces if necessary to defend Middle Eastern nations (that had requested such aid) from overt communist-inspired aggression.¹ In addition, this measure authorized the president to provide up to \$200 million in economic aid to these countries. Also known as the "Middle East Resolution," the doctrine, formulated by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, who believed that Nasserism was "a Middle Eastern variety of international communism," received its main application during Summer, 1958 when President Eisenhower sent 14,000 US Marines to Lebanon to forestall a so-called communist coup similar to one that had recently been undertaken in Iraq.² The US troops returned home in November of the same year, a withdrawal which virtually marked the abandonment of the Eisenhower Doctrine "as a policy for the Arab Middle East."³

¹This crisis was certainly the most serious world problem Eisenhower faced during his presidency. It occurred in July, 1956 when Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser seized the British-owned Suez Canal, the strategic waterway in northeastern Egypt linking the Mediterranean and the Gulf of Suez. The fervent Arab nationalist Nasser hoped to finance his great project to build a dam at Aswan with tolls from the canal. Israel, fearful that a mighty Egypt would upset the balance of power in the region, and Britain as well as France, dependent on the canal for the flow of more than 50% of their oil supply, decided to force Nasser to give up the canal. On 29 October, 1956, Israeli troops attacked Egypt and, two days later, Britain and France invaded to seize the canal, to the US Chief Executive's dismay. "Eisenhower was furious. He had not been consulted by America's allies, and with Russia vowing to stand by Egypt, he feared that the West's gunboat imperialism might trigger a nuclear war. The president quickly repudiated the Suez expedition and initiated a U.N. resolution condemning the aggression and calling for a British, French, and Israeli withdrawal from Egypt." Paul S. Boyer, *et al.*, *The Enduring Vision: A History for the American People* (Lexington: DC Heath, 1990), 1015. This crisis, which swelled anti-West sentiment in the Third World, came to an end on 6 November when the invaders announced that their soldiers would leave Egypt.

²Chester J. Pach, Jr. and Elmo Richardson, *The Presidency of Dwight D. Eisenhower* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1991), 162. Robert D. Schulzinger, *American Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century* (NY: Oxford University Press, 1994), 252. Robert A. Divine, *Eisenhower and the Cold War* (NY: Oxford University Press, 1981), 99. Concerning the supposed 'communist threat' in Lebanon at the end of the 1950s, historian Robert Divine has claimed that it was grossly exaggerated: "There was no evidence of Russian activity in Lebanon; the problem was essentially internal, with understandable Moslem anxiety over [President Camille] Chamoun's political maneuvers intensified by Nasser's propaganda. Arab nationalism, not Soviet communism, was the source of danger to American hopes for a stable Middle East" (*ibid.*, 101). He has added: "The President apparently understood the essence of the problem, even though he did not share his insights with the American people. His greatest concern was not a coup in Lebanon but rather the security of the Persian Gulf oil fields.... The general who had won his reputation by waging mechanized warfare with planes and tanks to liberate Europe in World War II knew how vital petroleum was for both the military defense and the peacetime economy of America's closest allies." *Ibid.*, 101, 103. For William Stivers, Eisenhower's decision to intervene in Lebanon was much more difficult than the decision to overthrow Mohammed Mossadegh, prime minister of Iran, in 1953. William Stivers, "Eisenhower and the Middle East," in Richard A. Melanson and David Mayers, eds., *Reevaluating Eisenhower: American Foreign Policy in the 1950s* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1987), 206.

³John Findling, *Dictionary of American Diplomatic History* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1989), 174.

Not surprisingly, this doctrine, which historian H. W. Brands has characterized as “a sharpened version of the Truman Doctrine of a decade before,” generated a lot of reaction elsewhere in the world.⁴ Eisenhower later wrote,

Britain and France generally favored the plan. Communist China and the Soviet Union condemned it as a ‘substitution for British and French imperialism.’ The Moslem countries divided: Syria was hostile, Iraq and Saudi Arabia were cautiously critical, while Turkey, Pakistan, Lebanon, and Iran saw the doctrine as the best possible guarantee of peace.⁵

This paper, based on several primary sources (Gallup polls, the *New York Times*, *Newsweek*, the *Congressional Record*, etc.), aims to present and analyze the attitude of Americans towards the Eisenhower Doctrine during the years 1957-1958. Among other things, it intends to demonstrate—through sections dealing with public opinion, the media and Congress respectively—that this doctrine received considerable support in the US, a fact which clearly illustrates the strength of internationalist sentiment during the 1950s.

The historical literature relating to this topic is not extensive. Well-known monographs such as H. W. Brands’ *The Specter of Neutralism: The United States and the Emergence of the Third World, 1947-1960* (1989), Cecil Crabb’s *The Doctrines of American Foreign Policy* (1982) and Robert Divine’s *Eisenhower and the Cold War* (1981) devote some brief paragraphs concerning the debate generated by the Middle East Resolution on Capitol Hill.⁶ Salim Yaqub’s *Containing Arab Nationalism: The Eisenhower Doctrine and the Middle East* (2004) contains only a few lines regarding the attitude of the public opinion and the media towards the doctrine.⁷

Douglas Little, “Eisenhower Doctrine”, in Bruce W. Jentleson and Thomas G. Paterson, eds., *Encyclopedia of U.S. Foreign Relations* (NY: Oxford University Press, 1997), 77. Cecil Crabb, Jr., *The Doctrines of American Foreign Policy: Their Meaning, Role, and Future* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1982), 186. Only one of the 14,000 US Marines who served in Lebanon died from hostile fire. Pach and Richardson, *Presidency*, 193.

⁴H. William Brands, *The United States in the World: A History of American Foreign Policy* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1994), Vol. II, 252.

⁵Dwight D. Eisenhower, *The White House Years: Waging Peace, 1956-1961* (NY: Doubleday, 1965), 181.

⁶Among these authors, Crabb, who consulted the Gallup polls, has been the only one to address the issue of public opinion. (Crabb, *Doctrines*, 173-174). However, he tends to disregard the media’s reaction to the Eisenhower Doctrine. Scholar Richard Sobel has stated that the public, in foreign policy, is divided into three groups: “the ‘mass public’ is ‘neither interested nor informed’ and therefore seldom has any influence over foreign policy; the ‘attentive public’ is informed but has few means of exerting influence; and the ‘elite’ is both informed and influential.... Among the elite are opinion leaders, including media commentators and reporters, leaders of lobbying organizations, and members of Congress, who understand the issue and help move attitudes (and legislative action) toward specific policies.” Richard Sobel, *The Impact of Public Opinion on U.S. Foreign Policy, 1918-1978* (NY: Oxford University Press, 2001), 12; see also Ralph B. Levering, *The Public and American Foreign Policy, 1918-1978* (NY: William Morrow, 1978), 19-21.

⁷Salim Yaqub, *Containing Arab Nationalism: The Eisenhower Doctrine and the Middle East* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004), 94, 298.

Public Opinion

Several indications seem to confirm that US public opinion saw the Middle East Resolution favorably.⁸ In a Gallup poll of January, 1957, 70% of Americans responded positively to the question "Would you approve or disapprove if the United States gave economic ... aid to the countries in the Middle East area that are friendly to the United States?" In comparison, 19% disapproved and 11% had no opinion.⁹ The rate of approval reached 73% among Republicans, compared to 68% among Democrats.¹⁰ 50% of the sample also approved the sending of "our armed forces if Russian troops attack these countries"; 34% disapproved and 16% had no opinion.¹¹ A Gallup poll taken a few weeks later showed that no less than 72% of the American population approved "the way Dwight Eisenhower is handling his job as President," compared to a meager 18% of the interviewees who responded negatively.¹²

As for the 1958 US intervention in Lebanon, which had been approved by former US presidents Herbert Hoover and Harry Truman, a Gallup poll taken in New York, Chicago and San Francisco showed that 59% endorsed the sending of US troops there, compared to 27% who disapproved and 14% who remained undecided.¹³ Furthermore, *Newsweek* magazine, following hundreds of interviews conducted by its reporters in the 48 states in regards to the intervention, concluded that "an overwhelming majority" of Americans believed that Eisenhower was right in sending US troops.¹⁴ As the magazine went on to say:

In 22 states, approval was nearly unanimous. In twenty others, a heavy preponderance favored the President's action. Four states backed him by a narrow margin. One, Pennsylvania, was split. Only in Michigan did critics outnumber supporters.¹⁵

Although the Eisenhower Doctrine enjoyed a wide degree of support among the American people, an examination of the column "letters to the Editor" in some newspapers reveals that individuals occasionally expressed their outspoken opposition to the doctrine. In January, 1957 the *Chicago Tribune*, for instance, published a letter from a man exasperated by the Middle East Resolution who declared, "[i]nstead of trying to save what is left of the British empire, Eisenhower would be better advised to give serious consideration to the wave of wage increases now so general thruout the country, and the natural corollary of higher prices and rising inflation."¹⁶ A few weeks later, Representative Lawrence Smith, a Republican of Wisconsin, quoted an article which stated that mail to senators on the Foreign Relations Committee "is running 8 or 9 to 1

⁸The notion of 'public opinion', in pure general terms, refers "to the aggregate of individual opinions on issues of public interest." Ole Holsti, 'Public Opinion', in Jentleson and Paterson, eds., *Encyclopedia*, 440.

⁹George H. Gallup, *The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion, 1935-1971*. Vol. II: 1949-1958 (NY: Random House, 1972), 1467.

¹⁰*Ibid.*

¹¹*Ibid.*; see also *Newsweek*, 14 January, 1957, 26.

¹²Gallup, *Gallup Poll*, 1476.

¹³*New York Times*, 16 July, 1958, 5; Gallup, *Gallup Poll*, 1560-1561.

¹⁴*Newsweek*, 4 August, 1958, 16.

¹⁵*Ibid.*

¹⁶*Chicago Tribune*, 15 January, 1957, 20.

against the Eisenhower doctrine for the Middle East."¹⁷ Incidentally, personalities such as former Secretary of State Dean Acheson, theologian Reinhold Niebuhr and former Air Force Secretary Thomas Finletter stood against the Eisenhower Doctrine in early 1957.¹⁸ The US Marines' landing in Lebanon further irritated a number of readers of the *New York Times*. As one of them put it,

[t]he intervention of United States troops in Lebanon to safeguard so-called Western interests in the area at the request of a very unpopular Government and against the majority of the Lebanese people simulates the action of the British and the French in the Suez crisis and the Russian intervention in Hungary.¹⁹

Another reader referred to "the suicidal unilateral action of the Eisenhower Administration."²⁰

Newspapers and Magazines

Overall, the US press tended to react favorably to the Eisenhower Doctrine. The situation was no different for the most influential magazines of the nation. Newspapers such as the *Washington Post*, the *Hartford Courant* (Connecticut), the *Warren Tribune-Chronicle* (Ohio), the *Elkhart Truth* (Indiana), the *Peoria Journal Star* (Illinois) and the *Deseret News* (Utah) supported the doctrine in their editorial pages.²¹ The *New York Times* also voiced its approval of the Middle East Resolution of 1957, depicting it as a "consistent plan" that was entirely justified.²²

If we left the Middle East entirely alone we would not be leaving it free. The inhabitants of that area simply do not have enough power to maintain peace and security by their own unassisted efforts.... We will go as friends and on invitation, not as conquerers or masters, not as colonial exploiters or imperialists.²³

Not surprisingly, the prestigious daily—in a fashion similar to newspapers such as the *New York Herald Tribune*, the *Los Angeles Mirror-News*, the *St. Louis Globe Democrat*, the *Detroit News*, the *Buffalo Courier-Express*, the *Boston Traveler*, the *Philadelphia Inquirer*, the *Baltimore Sun*, and the *Atlanta Constitution*—endorsed the

¹⁷*Congressional Record*, 4 February, 1957, A727.

¹⁸*Newsweek*, 21 January, 1957, p. 26; *Congressional Record*, Appendix, 28 January, 1957, A730-731; 4 February, 1957, A713-714. Niebuhr, for instance, declared: "The economic program presented under the Eisenhower [D]octrine does not offer specific amounts to specific nations for the settlement of [Arab] refugees. We did nothing about this problem in the past, and are doing nothing now." *Congressional Record*, Appendix, 28 January, 1957, A731.

¹⁹*New York Times*, 18 July, 1958, 20.

²⁰*New York Times*, 19 July, 1958, 14.

²¹*Congressional Record*, Appendix, 14 February, 1957, A984-A985; 23 January, 1957, A420-A421; 10 January, 1957, A136; 14 January, 1957, A184; 6 February, 1957, A814-A815; 17 January, 1957, A285-A286.

²²*New York Times*, 6 January, 1957, 3E.

²³"The Eisenhower Plan," *New York Times*, editorial, 6 January, 1957, 10E; see also "The Aim is Peace," editorial, 8 January, 1957, 30.

military intervention in Lebanon.²⁴ It characterized the intervention as “a calculated risk, worth taking.”²⁵ According to the newspaper, the Eisenhower Administration had no alternative:

The United States cannot be one of the two great world powers and refuse to act like a great power. To ignore appeals for help from supporters like Lebanon,... to make no effort to reassure other friends in trouble like the Jordanians would be to abdicate the role that history and our wealth and energy have thrust upon us. In that respect the decision to defend Lebanon was like the decision to defend Korea.²⁶

Magazines such as *Time*, *U. S. News and World Report*, and *Newsweek* also responded positively to the Middle East Resolution. *Time*, for instance, reported the words of a correspondent which asserted that the doctrine “helps to preserve a western influence behind which the British and French may rebuild”²⁷ while in early March, 1957 columnist David Lawrence of the *U. S. News and World Report* called for Democratic senators to back “the Administration’s policies that seek to avoid war.”²⁸ For its part, *Newsweek* declared that “if American influence didn’t come into the Middle East, Communist influence would.”²⁹ According to columnist Ernest Lindley, the Middle East proposals advocated by President Eisenhower were entirely welcomed: “The need to make crystal clear our intention to defend the Middle East against Communist aggression has been urged in this space for more than eight years.”³⁰ Regarding the landing in Lebanon, the *Newsweek* columnist pointed out that “this expedition was unmistakably helpful to the free world.”³¹

All this having been said, it should not be forgotten that the Eisenhower Doctrine, a mixed success according to scholar Salim Yaqub, also had its vociferous detractors among the press.³² Describing it as a “blank check,” in January, 1957 the *New York Daily News*, for instance, found it ironic that the US President had seemed to resort to “the same sort of violent Mideast action” used by Britain and France during the Suez crisis.³³

The most vehement denunciations of the Middle East Resolution, however, came from the *Chicago Tribune* which presented itself as “the only newspaper in the country to have made an articulated case against the Eisenhower ‘doctrine.’”³⁴ Concerning what it

²⁴*Time*, 28 July, 1958, 18; *New York Times*, 17 July, 1958, 12.

²⁵“Marines in Lebanon,” *New York Times*, editorial, 16 July, 1958, 28.

²⁶“The Consequences of Lebanon”, *New York Times*, editorial, 17 July, 1958, 26.

²⁷*Time*, 18 March, 1957, 18.

²⁸David Lawrence, “Turning the Clock Back?” *U. S. News and World Report*, 8 March, 1957, 152.

²⁹*Newsweek*, 14 January, 1957, 22.

³⁰Ernest Lindley, “President’s Message,” *Newsweek*, 14 January, 1957, 36.

³¹Ernest Lindley, “Global Carping – Or Not?” *Newsweek*, 10 November, 1958, 60.

³²Yaqub has affirmed: “In evaluating the overall success of the Eisenhower Doctrine, one must distinguish between the policy’s ultimate objective and the strategy employed to achieve that objective. The ultimate objective was to prevent a Soviet takeover of the Middle East, and since such a takeover never occurred, it has to be said that the objective was achieved. But the strategy behind the policy—discrediting Arab figures deemed ‘soft on communism’ by promoting other Arab figures who were conspicuously anticommunist—failed miserably.” Yaqub, *Containing*, 4-5.

³³“Ike’s ‘Keep Out’ Sign,” *New York Daily News*, editorial, 8 January, 1957, 25.

³⁴“Reply to the President,” *Chicago Tribune*, editorial, 13 January, 1957, 20.

deemed Eisenhower's "latest folly," the conservative daily objected to the moment chosen by the Chief Executive to announce his Middle East proposals.³⁵ "[T]he timing of this venture is a mystery. There is no sudden communist crisis in the middle east. There is plenty of tension of various sorts, but it has been present for years."³⁶ On the other hand, the newspaper found the economic aid provisions included in the doctrine preposterous:

The foreign aid provisions of the Eisenhower program are ... illogical. If his concern in the middle east is preserving access to the supply and reserves of oil, there is no reason to start handing out hundreds of millions of dollars. The oil producing governments are already taking down tremendous royalties. They shouldn't need any help from this government.³⁷

In addition, the Illinois newspaper emphasized that Eisenhower's electoral campaign of 1956 had rested on a false representation:

His brief in support of the so-called Eisenhower 'doctrine' was ... at odds with everything he had told the American people in the Presidential campaign last year. Then his themes were peace and prosperity. He asked why some politicians were raising an anguished cry that 'we have no peace'.... Now it is Mr. Eisenhower himself who raises the cry that we have no peace and who demands of Congress contingent authority for war.³⁸

After the Senate's approval of the Middle East Resolution in early March, 1957, the *Chicago Tribune* did not miss the opportunity to deplore "the fact that Congress has abdicated its sole right to declare war."³⁹ Naturally, the *Chicago Tribune* stigmatized the intervention in Lebanon and reminded its readers that, in the past, it had been "opposed to military adventures abroad."⁴⁰ Incidentally, the *Wall Street Journal* and newspapers such as the *Los Angeles Times*, the *Denver Post*, the *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, and the *Detroit Free Press*, also spoke out against the landing in Lebanon.⁴¹

On Capitol Hill

Although the legislative branch did not share Eisenhower's sense of urgency over the Middle East Resolution, it must be noted, as one observer put forward, that the 85th

³⁵"Messing about in the Middle East," *Chicago Tribune*, editorial, 3 January, 1957, 14.

³⁶*Ibid.*

³⁷*Ibid.*

³⁸"Mr. Eisenhower's Mid-East 'Doctrine,'" *Chicago Tribune*, editorial, 6 January, 1957, 24.

³⁹"The Senate Abdicates," *Chicago Tribune*, editorial, 7 March, 1957, 14.

⁴⁰"Our Marines Have Landed," *Chicago Tribune*, editorial, 16 July, 1958, 20; see also "As Clear as Mud," *Chicago Tribune*, editorial, 17 July, 1958, 10; "A Large Order," *Chicago Tribune*, editorial, 19 July, 1958, 10. According to John J. McPhaul, the isolationism of the *Chicago Tribune* during these years was not really surprising considering its staunch anti-interventionist views during most of the Roosevelt-Truman era. In the months preceding the US entry into World War II, for instance, the colorful newspaper emerged as the press spokesman for the America First Committee and the "organ of the isolationists." John J. McPhaul, *Deadlines & Monkeyshines: The Fabled World of Chicago Journalism* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1962), 6.

⁴¹*Time*, 28 July, 1958, 18; *New York Times*, 17 July, 1958, 12.

Congress, under Democratic control, "clearly supports [the Chief Executive's] basic purposes."⁴² In fact, the House of Representatives acted rather promptly, voting, on 30 January, 355 to 61 for the authority which the President had requested.⁴³ Despite some difficulties which the Chief Executive's specific proposals encountered in the upper house, the approval of the doctrine was also unequivocal: on 5 March, 1957, the Senate passed a slightly modified version of the Middle East Resolution by a vote of 72 to 19. Among the 72 supporters, 42 were Republicans and 30 belonged to the Democratic Party; the opponents comprised 3 Republicans and 16 Democrats.⁴⁴

Initially, however, the reaction of the Senate was somewhat mixed: some of its members, in fact, objected to the Eisenhower Doctrine on different grounds. During the January hearings on the president's proposals, hearings at which Secretary of State Dulles testified, Democratic Senator J. William Fulbright of Arkansas was rather sceptical about the Soviet Union's intention to plan a direct aggression in the Middle East and contended that the Middle East Resolution appeared as "a blank check for the Administration to do as it pleases with our soldiers and with our money."⁴⁵ On Capitol Hill, Fulbright's contention was echoed by several of his Democratic colleagues. Mike Mansfield of Montana, for instance, feared that the Eisenhower Doctrine, which he qualified as an "ineptitude,"⁴⁶ "may now involve the commitment of American military strength of unforeseen dimensions to the Middle East"⁴⁷ while Allen Ellender, a Democrat of Louisiana, characterized it as "wholly unjustified" and "a Marshall plan with no specific objectives, no cutoff date, no limitation on expenditures, no set goals."⁴⁸ In the same vein, Democratic Senator Wayne Morse of Oregon made his stance regarding this "oil resolution"⁴⁹ crystal-clear:

The [Middle East][R]esolution is a unilateral instrument of the United States acting outside the United Nations.... I shall never vote for a resolution which puts my Government in a position where unilaterally the United States pledges American boys to save the oil lines for Western Europe without a pledge at the same time by the nations of Western Europe to use their boys.⁵⁰

In spite of all this, legislative critics, as mentioned, could not block passage of the Middle East Resolution since the latter rallied a significant majority of parliamentarians. Among them was Republican Senator Alexander Wiley of Wisconsin who said:

⁴²John C. Campbell, "From 'Doctrine' to Policy in the Middle East," *Foreign Affairs* 35:3 (April, 1957), 441.

⁴³Divine, *Eisenhower*, 92-93.

⁴⁴*Time*, 18 March, 1957, 19. More specifically, scholar Philip Briggs has added that the opposition in the upper house "was made up of a small number of liberal Democrats, a larger group of Southern Democrats, and three conservative Republicans." Philip J. Briggs, "Congress and the Middle East: The Eisenhower Doctrine, 1957," in Joann P. Krieg, ed., *Dwight D. Eisenhower: Soldier, President, Statesman* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1987), 265.

⁴⁵Quoted in *U. S. News & World Report*, 25 January, 1957, 56; 1 February, 1957, 56.

⁴⁶*Congressional Record*, 29 January, 1957, 1110.

⁴⁷*U. S. News & World Report*, 8 February, 1957, 118.

⁴⁸*Congressional Record*, 27 February, 1957, 2689, 2692.

⁴⁹*Congressional Record*, 25 January, 1957, 1004.

⁵⁰*Ibid.*, 1003.

The record of history proves that the danger of war intensifies not when we are strong and serve clear warning to an aggressor, but when we are weak and indecisive and fail to notify an aggressor of our determination to counter his plans.⁵¹

As for Democratic Congressman Charles Porter of Oregon, he proclaimed at the end of January, 1957 that his vote on behalf of the Middle East Resolution was easily vindicated: "We have long decided that Western Europe had to be sustained and defended. The oil from the Middle East is an essential if Western Europe is to survive. A breakdown in the economy in Western Europe would make those nations ripe for Communist subversion."⁵² A few weeks later, Democratic Senator Theodore Green of Rhode Island, the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, spoke in similar terms:

[The Middle East] [R]esolution is not a belligerent step.... The resolution does not threaten any nation in the Middle East. On the contrary, it is intended to extend a helping hand. The only warning contained in the resolution is directed toward international communism.... If the Communists controlled the oil of the Middle East they would be in a position to influence directly the course of events in Europe.⁵³

All in all, supporters of the resolution had several reasons to rejoice on 9 March when it was finally signed into law by Eisenhower.⁵⁴

Not surprisingly, the intervention in Lebanon—although criticized by well-known senators such as Mike Mansfield (Montana), Wayne Morse (Oregon), Hubert Humphrey (Minnesota) and Estes Kefauver (Tennessee)—was backed by several prominent members of Congress from both parties.⁵⁵ Senate Democratic leader Lyndon Johnson (Texas), Democratic Speaker of the House Sam Rayburn (Texas), House Democratic leader John McCormack (Massachusetts), as well as members of the upper house such as Jacob Javits (Republican of New York), William Knowland (Republican of California), John Sparkman (Democrat of Alabama) and Theodore Green, viewed the landing of 1958 favorably.⁵⁶

In the end, it should be noted that the strong support generated by the Eisenhower Doctrine in the US during 1957-1958 was not surprising considering the prevalence of the internationalist and anticommunist mood during the postwar era.⁵⁷ The positive

⁵¹*Ibid.*, 971.

⁵²*Congressional Record*, 30 January, 1957, 1320.

⁵³*Congressional Record*, 19 February, 1957, 2233.

⁵⁴Eisenhower, *White House*, 182.

⁵⁵*New York Times*, 16 July, 1958, 10.

⁵⁶*Ibid.*, 1, 10.

⁵⁷For instance, a Gallup poll taken in 1954 showed that 61% of the interviewees answered "internationalist" to the question "Would you say that you ... are more of an isolationist, or more of an internationalist?" compared to a meager 17% who responded "isolationist" (Gallup, *Gallup Poll*, 1262). In 1958, another poll revealed that 51% of the interviewees supported foreign aid, compared to 33% who declared themselves opposed (*ibid.*, 1546). Historian Justus Doenecke, regarding the concept of *internationalism*, has stated, "[u]nlike the word *isolationist*, the word *internationalist* usually bears a positive connotation. To be an internationalist is to adhere to a far-sighted 'large policy' designed to punish 'aggression' and to 'preserve' the 'world community.' If used

reaction towards the Middle East Resolution and its 1958 'application' appeared all the less surprising given the perceptible pro-Eisenhower sentiment that pervaded in the US at the end of the 1950s. Indeed, several Gallup polls showed the high degree of satisfaction expressed by the people regarding "the way [he] is handling his job as President."⁵⁸ A poll taken at the end of 1958 aiming to identify the man the American people admired the most "in any part of the world" revealed that Eisenhower stood at the top of the list.⁵⁹

Moreover, a myriad of Americans were keenly aware of the strategic importance of the Middle East where three-quarters of the world's proven oil reserves were located.⁶⁰ After all, many of them, during the second part of 1956, had identified "Suez" as "the most important problem facing the country today."⁶¹ In the Middle East, the US had several major interests to preserve, which some US observers reiterated in an article of 1958: "Our assets include: a 56-percent share in Middle Eastern oil production; ... use of the airfield at Dhahran [Saudi Arabia]; the military association with Iraq through the Baghdad Pact; and freedom to use the Suez Canal."⁶²

The fact that the Eisenhower Doctrine, as Cecil Crabb wrote, was "clearly harmonious with the overall trend of American foreign policy since World War II" and did not represent a "radical pronouncement" also inevitably contributed to the high level of approval it received from the public opinion, the media and members of Congress.⁶³ According to the *New York Times*, in fact, the Middle East Resolution hardly emerged as a new departure: "The Eisenhower Doctrine is not new in principle. It merely rounds out and expands the policies first enunciated as far back as 1947 in the Truman Doctrine, and later exemplified in the Marshall Plan, the intervention in Korea."⁶⁴ Some members of Congress even established parallels between the doctrine of 1957 and the sacrosanct

in the purest sense, a genuine internationalist seeks a global community of interest so great that all nations—including the United States—would sacrifice sovereignty in order to preserve it. Common usage of the term, however, denotes a belief that the United States and the rest of the world—and, in particular, Western Europe—are interdependent." Justus D. Doenecke, *Not to the Swift: The Old Isolationists in the Cold War Era* (Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press, 1979), 12. Although Joseph McCarthy was in decline after 1954, historian H. W. Brands, referring to the year 1957 and the introduction of the Middle East Resolution, has contended that "the spirit that made a generation of lawmakers tremble at his charges still stalked the halls of the Capitol." H. W. Brands, *The Specter of Neutralism: The United States and the Emergence of the Third World, 1947-1960* (NY: Columbia University Press, 1989), 286. Quite revealing of the extent of the anticommunist sentiment during those years was the fact that even rabbis in the US supported this Eisenhower Doctrine which aimed to protect Arab states. *New York Times*, 6 January, 1957, 41.

⁵⁸Gallup, *Gallup Poll*, 1492, 1522, 1566, 1570.

⁵⁹*Ibid.*, 1584. He came ahead of personalities such as Winston Churchill, Billy Graham, Harry Truman, Douglas MacArthur and Jonas Salk.

⁶⁰Richard H. Nolte and William R. Polk, "Toward a Policy for the Middle East," *Foreign Affairs* 36:4 (July, 1958), 645.

⁶¹Gallup, *Gallup Poll*, 1447.

⁶²Nolte and Polk, *Toward a Policy*, 648. Initially signed between Turkey and Iraq in February, 1955 as a mutual defense alliance, the Baghdad Pact expanded to include Pakistan, Iran and Britain a few months later. Declining an offer to join, "for fear that a formal ... alliance with Iraq would antagonize Egypt and Israel" the US, however, sent observers to the first meeting in November, 1955 and gave their support to the organization as a vehicle for its containment policy. Briggs, "Congress," 251. After Iraq withdrew from the pact in early 1959, this defense network was renamed the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO). Thomas L. Purvis, *A Dictionary of American History* (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1997), 64.

⁶³Crabb, *Doctrines*, 164.

⁶⁴"The Aim is Peace," *New York Times*, editorial, 8 January, 1957, 30.

Monroe Doctrine of 1823. Republican Senator Leverett Saltonstall of Massachusetts was among them.⁶⁵

The Eisenhower Doctrine, in short, which received its main application during Summer, 1958, enjoyed a wide degree of support in the US at the end of the 1950s. The overall favorable reaction of public opinion, the media and Congress can be explained by factors such as the strength of internationalist and anticommunist sentiment, as well as Eisenhower's huge personal popularity and a growing awareness of the strategic importance of the Middle East.⁶⁶

⁶⁵*Congressional Record*, 19 February, 1957, 2236. Saltonstall declared: "It is my opinion that the Congress is not relinquishing its responsibility to declare war by this declaration that we are ready to use our Armed Forces against aggression. The principles laid down in the ... resolution appear to me to be comparable to those of the Monroe Doctrine, in which this country expressed its intent to defend other nations in our hemisphere against aggressive acts, without specific mention of just how or when our Armed Forces would be employed." *Ibid.*

The Kennedy Space Center: Communicating NASA's History as a Tourist Product

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Since the first Mercury astronauts were introduced to the media and the nation in 1959, NASA has worked on the American psyche through presentation of spectacular images. The images of the first lunar landing and the *Challenger* explosion carry deep meaning for many people in the US; like the Kennedy assassination and the events of 11 September, 2001, millions of Americans can readily recall where they were at these historic moments. The combined effects of triumph and tragedy shape NASA's public image. Public perceptions of the space agency are routinely influenced by media representation and repetition of images, working outside of NASA's reach to control opinions of the space program. The image of the *Challenger* disaster is so vivid in cultural memory not merely because of its horror, but because television viewers were subjected to replaying of the same sequence of events, as if caught in a catastrophic loop. Unlike the spectacle of tragedy, images of triumph from the space program, when repeated, can swell national pride. A multimedia re-creation of the first moon walk can be experienced at the Kennedy Space Center Visitor Complex, where amid the enthusiasm of tour guides, astronauts, artifacts and media presentations, visitors may fall under the swoon of success and temporarily forget the tragic. While NASA's tragedies are monumental national media events, the visual rhetoric and touristic strategies of the Kennedy Space Center [KSC] largely fail to acknowledge its disasters and focus the visitor's experience through a triumphant lens.

Addressing KSC as spectacle is fitting, due to the spectacular presentation of the space program from its inception. Rhetorician Carole Blair, in her work with photographer Neil Michel, compares the Space Center to Walt Disney World in an effort to understand the seeming failures of the Astronaut Memorial Fund's Space Mirror.¹ Blair and Michel argue that the rhetoric of the theme park present at Disney World carries over to KSC, making it difficult for the Space Mirror to elicit the reverence it might invoke at another site. William van Wert refers to Disney World's dwarfing of both KSC and Orlando, and indeed central Florida has become a center for theme and amusement parks.² The Space Center advertises itself as being located a mere 45 minutes east of Orlando, inviting tourists to see a visit to the Space Center as something to tack on to a trip to the Magic Kingdom rather than as a primary destination. Van Wert argues further that we are "made forgetful of the Kennedy Space Center by Space Mountain," readily replacing the Space Coast with a hyperreal version of it.³ Extending the comparison of KSC and Disney World, Aadu Ott, Erik Ott, and Lars-Göran Vedin from the University of Göteborg in Sweden look at these two sites, as well as nearby

¹See Carole Blair and Neil Michel, "Commemorating in the Theme Park Zone: Reading the Astronauts Memorial," in Thomas Rosteck, ed., *At the Intersection: Cultural Studies and Rhetorical Studies* (NY: Guilford Press, 1999), 29-83.

²See William F. van Wert, "Disney World and Posthistory," *Cultural Critique* 32 (Winter, 1995), 187-214.

³*Ibid.*, 208.

SeaWorld, as locations for tourists to learn about science and technology.⁴ While the proximity of Disney World is difficult to ignore, KSC is a rich enough arena to warrant study of the contrasts it presents unto itself.

The Visitor Complex provides NASA with an opportunity to reshape and refine public perceptions of its work. With Federal funding always questionable, NASA undeniably strives to be popular. As cultural critic Constance Penley points out, NASA tries “to find ways to communicate their ideas and endeavors in such a way that people (in government, the media and everyday life) feel they are sufficiently part of those ideas and endeavors to want to lend their enthusiastic support.”⁵ KSC is, to quote NASA’s advertisements, a place where visitors can “see how Americans rise to the occasion” and witness “the marvels of America’s space program.”⁶ It is a site for NASA to present its history and engage visitors in sharing the space agency’s vision for the future. That history, however, is not solely one of triumph. Since the first manned space flight in 1959, three tragic incidents have tarnished NASA’s glory. In 1967, three astronauts died in a fire in the space capsule during a countdown rehearsal for the *Apollo 1* mission. Nineteen years later, seven astronauts aboard the space shuttle *Challenger* were killed shortly after takeoff. Most recently, the crew of *Columbia* died when the shuttle disintegrated during reentry in February, 2003. If these deaths are part of “the marvels of America’s space program,” how does the KSC Visitor Complex acknowledge, hide or honor those who have died?

These three incidents are the open secrets of the KSC Visitor Complex. There is little acknowledgement of the astronauts who died or their missions, but the addition of the Astronaut Memorial Fund’s Space Mirror in 1991 provides a place for visitors to pay their respects to the dead. An optimistic picture of the space program is, however, to be expected, since the Visitor Complex is organized to offer tourists a positive impression of NASA, to alight and sustain their enthusiastic support for the space program. This frontstage impression manufactured for visitors does not necessarily always align with the backstage demeanor of KSC workers. Drawing on Goffman’s notion of frontstage and backstage, Dean MacCannell identifies a tourist experience in which work itself becomes an attraction. Tourists are “permitted to view details of the inner operation” of a given institution, allowing “adults to recapture virginal sensations of discovery, or childlike feelings of being half-in and half-out of society, their faces pressed up against the glass.”⁷ Tour rhetoric at KSC leverages the perception visitors have of a privileged insider’s view. Bus tour guides reiterate the language of the Official Tourbook: “And because KSC is an operational space base where hazardous work is done, some areas of the center are restricted and tours may vary depending on mission operations.”⁸ This acknowledgement that typical tour visitors do not have access to the backstage is mediated by the “Up Close” tour, which “provides unprecedented access and insider

⁴Aadu Ott, Erik Ott and Lars-Göran Vedin, “Theme Parks in Orlando – Science, Technology, Design, Education and Entertainment in Interaction,” presented at the ETEN Conference on Teacher Education, Groningen, The Netherlands, 13-15 February, 2003. Available at: <http://www.ped.gu.se/utbildning/teknik/Orlando/ETEN/mars/3X.pdf>; accessed 14 November, 2006.

⁵Constance Penley, *NASA/TREK: Popular Science and Sex in America* (NY: Verso, 1997), 4.

⁶*American Automobile Association Tourbook: Florida 2003* (Heathrow, FL: AAA Publishing, 2003), 98.

⁷Dean MacCannell, *The Tourist: A New Theory of the Leisure Class* (NY: Schocken Books, 1989), 99.

⁸US NASA, *Kennedy Space Center Official Tourbook*. n.p., [c. 2000], 18.

detail for the viewing public."⁹ There is, of course, a backstage to the faux backstage offered in the "Up Close" tour.

The Spectacle of Space

The spectacular is the KSC Visitor Complex's primary communicative tool. NASA's relationship to the spectacular image draws on the risks involved in space exploration, particularly in the early years of the space race. Tom Wolfe's notion of the "right stuff" is the capacity to overcome death-defying odds without flinching, making it look easy. For Wolfe, courage in the face of death, on behalf of national honor, made the astronauts heroes.¹⁰ While he argues that the sense of awe Americans felt for their space program was lessened by the nuclear test ban and the resulting decreased intensity of the Cold War, reverence for the astronauts is stitched into the history of NASA. A sizable portion of the KSC Visitor Complex is devoted to this history, but the most persistent image at KSC is the shuttle ready for launch, strapped on to the external fuel tank and supported by two solid rocket boosters. The shuttle on the launch pad, on takeoff, in orbit and landing permeates the Visitor Center's exhibits, printed materials and videos.

In their work on "dark tourism," John Lennon and Malcolm Foley note that interpretation at tourist sites is often dominated by iconocentrism and montage, and KSC is no exception.¹¹ The persistent repetition of the shuttle image and its association with a successful launch works on the psyche of visitors. The shuttle becomes an icon of success as its failures are ignored in the Visitor Complex's rhetoric. Radical French intellectual Guy Debord, author of *The Society of the Spectacle*, argues that the domination of the spectacular is designed to "eradicate historical knowledge in general; beginning with just about all rational information and commentary on the most recent past."¹² He notes that "spectacular discourse obviously silences anything it finds inconvenient. It isolates all it shows from its context, its past, its intentions and its consequences. It is thus completely illogical. Since no one may contradict it, it has the right to contradict itself, to correct its own past."¹³

The spectacular can function as an interpretive tool to reconstruct cultural memory. Because of the ubiquitous presence of television and the broadcast networks' choices to focus on tragic spectacle, the images of catastrophic events like the shuttle disasters are more easily recalled than the twenty-four shuttle missions that preceded the *Challenger* disaster or those leading up to the last *Columbia* mission. Considering the media's effect of highlighting, replaying, and etching NASA's spectacular failures into the American psyche, the KSC Visitor Complex is an opportunity to counter the media's depictions.

The Visitor Complex employs the spectacular in the manner Debord describes to reinscribe the meaning of the shuttle icon. While working to undo the media's portrayal of NASA and its failures, the Visitor Complex also leverages the entertainment industry's positive depictions of the space agency. The gift shop at the Apollo/Saturn V Center is

⁹*Ibid.*, 28.

¹⁰See Tom Wolfe, *The Right Stuff*. 5th ed. (NY: Bantam, 1983).

¹¹John Lennon and Malcolm Foley, *Dark Tourism: The Attraction of Death and Disaster* (London: Continuum, 2000), 148.

¹²Guy Debord, *Comments on The Society of the Spectacle* (NY: Verso, 1990), 13-14.

¹³*Ibid.*, 28.

called The Right Stuff Shop, paying homage to Tom Wolfe's history of the Mercury program while simultaneously commodifying the space program by inviting visitors to buy the "right stuff" to remember their time at the Space Center. Prominently displayed for sale in KSC gift shops are bumper stickers and t-shirts citing the line made famous by director Ron Howard's 1995 film *Apollo 13*: "Failure is not an option." In the case of the *Apollo 13* mission, failure was avoided, but the three catastrophic missions demonstrate that failure can be, and has been, an outcome. Constance Penley notes that it is "astonishing that NASA can generate a positive spin at all, since one lingering effect of *Apollo 13* was to remind viewers that when NASA fails, it does so spectacularly. And there is not always a nice, heroic save as with the *Apollo 13* debacle."¹⁴ KSC works to put a "positive spin" on *Apollo 13*, using mission commander Jim Lovell as one of the handful of former astronauts tapped for voiceovers and on-screen performances in videos at the Visitor Complex. Lovell gives NASA an opportunity to focus visitors' attention on success rather than failure.

The spectacular is also communicated to KSC visitors in terms of superlatives and rarity. Throughout their tour experience, visitors are told that KSC is home to one of the largest buildings in the world, the Vehicle Assembly Building; one of the longest runways in the world, the Shuttle Landing Facility, which is visible from space; and two of the world's largest moving vehicles, the Crawler Transporters which carry the shuttle from the Vehicle Assembly Building to the launch pad. These facilities at KSC are among the most significant existing structures, but none set any records. Apart from being the only place in the world from which men have been launched to the moon, the only records KSC can claim are the world's only back-to-back IMAX theaters and the Space Shop, the world's largest store for space-related souvenirs and memorabilia. KSC is home to one of only three remaining Saturn V rockets. The others are located at tourist sites at the Johnson Space Center in Houston and the US Space & Rocket Center in Huntsville, Alabama. The Saturn V rocket is taller than a 36-story building, but it is difficult to get a sense of its immensity at KSC. When the rocket began to rust in the Atlantic coastal climate, it was restored and moved indoors. The Saturn V rocket is now suspended overhead in the Apollo/Saturn V Center, allowing visitors to walk around and under it. Getting a sense of its size is difficult, however, since the Center is built on the model of shopping mall: a long, rather narrow building with gift shops and the Moon Rock Café lining its corridors. The rocket becomes the centerpiece of the plaza, but visitors who are engaged or distracted by shopping, eating and the historical exhibits in the Center may only glance skyward to notice this rare artifact.

Despite its iconic dependence on the image of the space shuttle, KSC's most distinguished claim of self-identification is as the launch site for the Apollo program. According to the Official Tourbook, a "deep sense of history resonates at Kennedy Space Center. Within every building, around every corner, there is a story to tell about the days when astronauts were launched on epic journeys to the moon."¹⁵ This framing encourages visitors to adopt a particular and limited historical perspective of their experience at the Space Center. The Visitor Complex does tell other stories: those of the International Space Station, the Mercury astronauts and the shuttle program. The stories of *Apollo 1* and the final missions of *Challenger* and *Columbia* are part of the history "around every

¹⁴Penley, *NASA/TREK*, 14.

¹⁵*Official Tourbook*, 3.

corner," but scarcely resonate anywhere on the grounds except at the Space Mirror. The history of spectacular success is the one NASA seeks to sustain, and it is likely that visitors to KSC want to leave the Space Coast with affirmation of NASA's greatness. Even the presidentially-appointed Rogers Commission, organized to investigate the *Challenger* disaster, ends its report by referring to NASA as a "symbol of national pride and technological leadership." Although the report levels significant blows against NASA, it also applauds the space agency for its "spectacular achievements of the past" and anticipating "impressive achievements to come."¹⁶

Questions of Authenticity: "Being here's like being a part of it."

The discourse and visual rhetoric used at KSC routinely remind visitors of the spectacular achievements of NASA's past. Spectacle is always already mediated by NASA, which determines what stories will be told and how they will be communicated. Visitors' expectations are a determining concern for shaping tourist attractions like KSC, as market research is often used to learn what tourists expect from and want to experience at a destination. In his 1976 study of tourism, Dean MacCannell argues that "a quest for authentic experiences, perceptions and insights" increasingly frames tourist desires.¹⁷ MacCannell recounts an anecdote about tourists at Cape Kennedy during the Apollo 13 mission: One visitor transfixed by the beehive of activity in the News Bureau "summed up the feelings of the sightseers when he said, half aloud, 'Being here's like being part of it.'" To which MacCannell adds, "The young man in this account is expressing his belief that he is having an almost authentic experience."¹⁸

Visitors to KSC can expect no more than the nearly-authentic, knowing that their access is limited to the frontstage created for them, and access is even more restricted during launches and landings. As a result, much of the visitor experience is a ghost tour of sorts. As the tour bus driver tells his passengers, "If you were here just before a launch, you'd see the shuttle being moved along the crawlerway there, out to the launch pad," or "Just over there is the observation site where VIPs sit to watch a shuttle launch." Being there is like being almost there, seeing where spectacular events occurred, but not being able to truly witness them. Being there, to paraphrase MacCannell's tourist, can only be like being a part of it.

The Visitor Complex makes extensive use of multimedia to bridge the visitor's gap between the sites themselves and what those sites mean to the space program. Tour buses are equipped with a series of video monitors within easy visual range of all passengers, and an on-screen tour guide supplements the driver's informative spiel. The virtual tour guide has several advantages: in addition to enhancing safety for the bus driver so he or she can concentrate on the road rather than the script, visitors also experience an engaging use of technology, which may appeal to those technophiles aboard the bus. Perhaps the most salient benefit is to enable visitors to see the unseen. As the bus drives past the Shuttle Landing Facility, which is not visible from the road, the virtual tour guide appears on screen accompanied by footage of the space shuttle touching down, as we are told, on one of the world's longest runways. This spectacular image is among many

¹⁶Phillip K. Tompkins, *Organizational Communication Imperatives: Lessons of the Space Program* (Los Angeles: Roxbury Publishing, 1992), 139.

¹⁷MacCannell, *Tourist*, 105.

¹⁸*Ibid.*, 99.

images that are not left to the visitor's imagination but are presented on video to show the authentic workings of the Space Center.

At KSC's IMAX theaters, the five-story high IMAX screens and "wall of sound" provide an incomparable experience for viewers. *The Dream is Alive*,¹⁹ narrated by former *CBS Evening News* anchor Walter Cronkite, is comprised primarily of footage shot by the astronauts themselves. The audience is present with the larger-than-life astronauts floating cheerfully around the shuttle, alternately conducting scientific experiments and playing with their food as it floats in front of their mouths. This is one of the rare moments in which NASA cannot fail to recognize the *Challenger* disaster, since *Challenger* crew members Judy Resnick, Dick Scobee and Gregory Jarvis are all featured in the film. An opening voiceover dedicates the film to the seven *Challenger* astronauts. Recognition of their loss plays on the theme of legacy that often appears in NASA's rhetoric about the astronauts who have died. Although they are dead, the dream is alive: the space program continues, and no astronaut has ever died in vain. The film ends with Cronkite, once called "the most trusted man in America," inspiring the audience to recognize the space program as an ongoing endeavor: "Now that we know how to live and work in space, we stand at a new threshold of discovery."²⁰ With NASA's always precarious funding and uncertainty about the future of the shuttle program in light of the *Challenger* and *Columbia* disasters, *The Dream Is Alive* encourages visitors to stitch the past into a promising future for the space agency.

Like many tourist attractions, KSC relies on the virtual, replicas and simulations, as communicative tools.²¹ After a walk through the Rocket Park with its authentic artifacts of space flight history, or contemplation of the distant Shuttle Launch Pads from the Observation Gantry, visitors can experience a re-creation of the *Apollo 11* mission or examine a simulated version of the national wildlife preserve on which the Space Center is located. The Visitor Guide handed out with paid admission tickets is careful to distinguish the authentic from the replicas: "Touch a real Mars rock and experience the future of space travel," "See the actual Mercury Mission Control consoles," and "Walk through 'Explorer,' a full-scale orbiter replica."²² Yet visitors do not refer to their guides as a checklist of authenticity. Rather, they experience the Space Center and its artifacts as if it they are real. Reality as such permeates KSC because it is a historic site. The space is known and familiar, yet distant: we have seen it on TV, and thus we "know" where we are. Mary Ann Doane points out that television gives us a sense that we are *there* but only vicariously, watching someone else who *is* there trying to convey his/her sense of the catastrophe or the stunning success.²³

With this sense of place in mind, space enthusiasts may make a pilgrimage to KSC to stand where the spectacular has occurred. This desire to experience sense of place is the desire to experience the authentic. Commingling the authentic with replicas and simulations raises questions about the veracity of a history communicated through these artifacts. As Lennon and Foley ask, "Does re-creation of objects, [and] utilization of

¹⁹*The Dream Is Alive*. Directed by Graeme Ferguson. (NY: IMAX Films, 1985).

²⁰*Ibid.*

²¹Lennon and Foley, *Dark Tourism*, 145.

²²*Tourbook*, 3.

²³See Mary Ann Doane, "Information, Crisis, Catastrophe" in Patricia Mellencamp, ed., *Logics of Television: Essays in Cultural Criticism* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990), 222-239.

interpretive techniques ... displace the real history behind a façade of education and historical narrative?"²⁴ Historical exhibits like those found at KSC are necessarily interpretive, but any given interpretation eliminates the possibility of other ways to understand historic events. Visitors rely on KSC and its "official" interpretations to make sense of the space program. Dean McCannell notes that tourists often depend on the sites they visit to explain the unknown or unfamiliar: "If they were not marked, it would be impossible for a layman to distinguish, on the basis of appearance alone, between moon rocks brought back by astronauts and pebbles picked up at Craters of the Moon National Monument in Idaho."²⁵ A visitor unfamiliar with NASA's history, as many children who visit KSC may be, not only lacks the capacity to identify a moon rock but also lacks the ability to counter the interpretations offered with knowledge of one's own. In this instance, the visitor takes away, among the t-shirts, model rockets and mission patches, a story of success that scarcely acknowledges its losses and failures.

²⁴Lennon and Foley, *Dark Tourism*, 152.

²⁵MacCannell, *Tourist*, 41.

Maintaining the Colony: The Philippine Commonwealth and the Tydings-Kocalkowski Act of 1939

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Introduction

In 1939 the US Congress passed the Tydings-Kocalkowski Act. Named after its two sponsors, Senator Millard Tydings of Maryland and Congressman Leo Kocalkowski of Illinois, this act marked the end of a five-year effort by Philippine leaders to alter the economic provisions of the Philippine Independence Act of 1934. According to these provisions, major Philippine exports to the US were subject to absolute quotas, excise taxes and export taxes. No such restrictions, however, were placed on US exports to the Philippines. As a result, while Philippine exports declined by 25% over the period 1934-1940, US exports to the Philippines increased by 250%.¹ The result of this unequal arrangement was the rapid transformation of the Philippines from a nation with a consistent trade surplus to one with a chronic trade deficit. It was in this context that Philippine leaders lobbied for reform.

While the stated intent of the Tydings-Kocalkowski Act was to provide more protection for Philippine exports to the US, its key provisions only benefited US producers and did nothing to help the Philippines overcome its burgeoning trade deficits. Rather than help, the act maintained the unequal economic relationship established in 1934. Doing nothing to reverse the existing pattern of economic decline, the Tydings-Kocalkowski Act maintained the status quo, to the detriment of the Philippines. The only thing that saved the US from receiving the ultimate blame for Philippine economic decline during the Philippine Commonwealth (1935-1946) was the outbreak of World War II in Asia.

The Philippine Commonwealth in Historical Perspective

The Philippine Commonwealth has not received the scholarly attention it deserves. It is either eclipsed by the much longer period of formal colonial rule (1898-1934) that preceded it or by the more dramatic war with Japan (1941-1945) that brought it to a premature and unexpected end. In addition, only a few studies focus on economic policy *per se*. An early example of those that do is Charles Houston's descriptive work, published in 1954 and 1955, on the development of strategic commodities during the Commonwealth.² A decade later, Leo Stine followed with a more focused, yet still largely descriptive, study on Commonwealth economic policy.³ Daniel Doeppers referred

¹Technical Committee to the President of the Philippines, *American-Philippine Trade Relations* (Washington, DC: 1944), 32 and 243. Presidential Papers of Elpidio Quirino, Ayala Library, Makati, Philippines.

²Charles O. Houston, Jr., "The Philippine Coconut Industry 1934-1950," *Journal of East Asian Studies* 3:2 (1954), 153-181; "The Philippine Sugar Industry: 1934-1950," *Ibid.*, 3:3 (1954), 370-406; "The Philippine Abaca Industry: 1934-1950," *Ibid.*, 3:4 (1954), 408-415; "Other Philippine Crops and Industries: 1934-1950," *Ibid.*, 4:1 (1955), 15-39.

³Leo C. Stine, "The Economic Policies of the Philippine Commonwealth," *Journal of East Asiatic Studies* 10 (1966), 1-136.

to the economic problems the Commonwealth faced in his larger study of social and economic development in colonial Manila while Aruna Gopinath included a chapter on Commonwealth economic policy in her biographical study of Manuel Quezon's tenure as President of the Commonwealth.⁴ Only recently has economic policy become the primary focus of study as analysts such as Nakano and MacIsaac see in Commonwealth policies the roots of future policy.⁵ It is in keeping with this latter tradition that this paper focuses on a unique part of Commonwealth economic history, the negotiations between Philippine and American leaders over the terms of the Tydings-Kocialkowski Act.

The Road to Reform

Granting independence to a colony was an unprecedented act for which the US has drawn praise.⁶ The Philippine Independence Act, commonly known as the Tydings-McDuffie Act, required the Philippines to write a constitution acceptable to the President of the US and elect a commonwealth government under the terms of the new constitution. Once the new government took power, the Philippines were to be given ten years to prepare for complete independence, which would be granted on the first Fourth of July following the ten-year preparatory period. With the formal establishment of the Commonwealth of the Philippines on 15 November, 1935, final independence was scheduled for 4 July, 1946.

One of many problems in the Tydings-McDuffie Act, however, was the short time period given the Philippines to wean itself from the US economy. It was understood that when the Philippines became independent its products would no longer enter the US free of duty, as had been the case for most of the colonial period (1898-1934). They would be subject to the full US tariff. Since all major Philippine exports had been developed to take advantage of duty-free entry to the US, most producers were unprepared to pay the full tariff and remain competitive. Estimates of the decline in exports that would accompany independence ran as high as 80%.⁷

⁴Daniel F. Doepfers, *Manila, 1900-1941: Social Change in a Late Colonial Metropolis*, Southeast Asian Studies Monograph Series 27 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1984); Aruna Gopinath, *Manuel Quezon: The Tutelary Democrat* (Quezon City, Philippines: New Day Publishers, 1987).

⁵Satoshi Nakano, "The 'Windfall' Revenue Controversy 1937-1941: A Perspective on Philippine Commonwealth History," *Pilipinas* 28 (1997), 31-60; Steve MacIsaac, "The Struggle for Economic Development in the Philippine Commonwealth, 1935-1940," *Philippine Studies* 50 (2002), 141-167.

⁶Stanley Karnow, *In Our Image: Americas Empire in the Philippines* (NY: Ballantine Press, 1989), 244-245.

⁷Joint Preparatory Committee on Philippine Affairs [Hereafter, JPCPA], *Report of May 20, 1938* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1938), Part 3: 565.

A second problem was the highly unequal economic provisions imposed on the nation as the *quid pro quo* for the offer of independence. Quotas were imposed on Philippine exports to the US while US goods were to continue to enter the Philippines without restriction. Furthermore, in separate legislation that followed the Tydings-McDuffie Act, special excise taxes were established for the two largest Philippine exports, sugar and coconut oil. While the proceeds of these taxes were to be returned to the Philippine government, the money earned from the coconut oil tax was not to be used to help the coconut industry restructure and prepare for independence.⁸

Finally, an export tax, a simulated tariff, was to be imposed on all Philippine exports beginning in the sixth year of the Commonwealth. The tax was to be the equivalent of 5% of the full US tariff, but was to be increased incrementally in each succeeding year, so that by the tenth year the Philippines would be paying an effective tariff of 25% of the full tariff. The proceeds of this tax were to be used to pay off the bonded indebtedness of the Philippines. In essence, the money was to be used to pay off the debt incurred by the US while it ruled the Philippines. In another demonstration of the unequal nature of the relationship, no such tax was to be imposed on US goods exported to the Philippines. The Philippines alone were going to have to pay for the costs of colonial rule.

In preparation for independence the Philippines had to undertake two economic tasks. First, Filipino producers had to restructure their industries. They either had to cut costs of production dramatically to remain competitive in the US market, find new markets for their products, develop new products for export or produce new items to meet domestic demand that was sure to increase if exports earnings declined considerably. Second, they had to find some way to survive the ten-year transition to independence; 80% of Philippine exports were to be subject to some combination of quotas, taxes and effective tariffs during the Commonwealth period. Not only did this make necessary adjustments in preparation for independence more difficult, it meant that it would be difficult to remain competitive in the US market during the Commonwealth as well.

Pessimistic about their chances to adjust during the Commonwealth period, Philippine leaders decided to push for amendments in the economic provisions of the Tydings-McDuffie Act. This effort began, in essence, even before the act went into effect. An earlier version of the independence act, The Hare-Hawes-Cutting Act, contained the same economic provisions as the final Tydings-McDuffie Act. Passed in 1933 and signed into law in 1934 by US president Franklin Roosevelt, the Hare-Hawes-Cutting Act was rejected by the Philippines. Only when Philippine Senate President and *de facto* leader of the Philippines Manuel Quezon proved unable to prod the US Congress

⁸*United States Statutes at Large* 48 (1934), 456-465. "An Act to provide for the complete independence of the Philippine Islands, to provide for the adoption of a constitution and a form of government for the Philippine Islands, and for other purposes." 73rd Congress. 2nd Session. PL 127 48, Part 1: 1933-1934. Chapter 84, Section 6. (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1934), 459-460; *Ibid.*, 670-678: "An Act to include sugar beets and sugarcane as basic agricultural commodities under the Agricultural Adjustment Act and for other purposes." *Ibid.*, 680-764: "An Act to provide revenue, equalize taxation, and for other purposes."

to reconsider these provisions were they accepted. Even then, it was with the clear understanding that they were subject to further examination during the Commonwealth.⁹

That examination began in 1935 with a US Tariff Commission study of the effects the export taxes and full tariffs would have on Philippine products.¹⁰ This was followed by the creation of a Joint Preparatory Committee on Philippine Affairs (JPCPA) in 1937. Composed of Philippine and US representatives, and chaired by Assistant Secretary of State Francis B. Sayre, the JPCPA held public hearings in Washington DC, San Francisco, and Manila before issuing a final report in 1938 recommending measures to protect Philippine industries for the duration as a Commonwealth and provide a more gradual application of the full US tariff after independence was granted in 1946.¹¹ Using these recommendations, the State Department drafted a bill for the reform of the Tydings-McDuffie Act in late 1938 and passed it on to the US Congress in 1939. The Tydings-Kocialkowski Act was the cumulative result of these efforts.

"The Autumn of Our Discontent"

Up until the time the JPCPA began to write its report, Philippine leaders and the US State Department seemed to be working in tandem. In fact, the State Department followed Manuel Quezon's lead, letting him choose the US and Filipino members of the committee, allowing Francis Sayre to chair it at Quezon's request, and setting an agenda for the committee that was Quezon's own.¹²

Quezon wanted reforms that would protect Philippine exports. At the top of his agenda was protection of the coconut industry. The Tariff Commission predicted the export tax would ruin the coconut oil industry, even before independence was granted. The excise tax alone had already caused the selling price of Philippine copra, the raw meat of the coconut, to fall 43%.¹³ If the taxes could not be removed Quezon insisted he be able to use the funds at his discretion to restructure the industry.

In addition to immediate protection for all Philippine industries, Quezon wanted duty-free trade, or some form of permanent preferential trade between the Philippines and the US, to continue indefinitely after independence. He also wanted as much economic autonomy during the Commonwealth as he could get. Ideally, he wanted to be able to negotiate trade agreements with other countries and protect the Philippine market from US goods. More fundamentally, he wanted complete control over the domestic economy. He wanted to be able to resolve disputes between American and Filipino producers without interference from the US. The most important of these existed between sugar planters, almost entirely Filipino, and sugar refiners, one-third American, over the distribution of the sugar quota to the US market. He also wanted the automatic refund of the proceeds from the sugar excise tax and the removal of the prohibitions on the use of the proceeds of the coconut excise tax.

⁹JPCPA, *Op. cit.*, Part I: 8.

¹⁰United States Tariff Commission, *United States-Philippine Trade*. Second Series, 18 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1937).

¹¹JPCPA, *Op. cit.*, Pt.1.

¹²*New York Times*, 29 November, 1937, "Roosevelt Favors Easing Break from Philippines," 3; Manuel L. Quezon to Jorge B. Vargas, (Personal Secretary of Pres. Quezon) 8 April, 1937. All correspondence, unless otherwise indicated, was taken from Reel 19 of the microfilm collection of the Manuel L. Quezon Papers at the University of Michigan.

¹³MacIsaac, "Struggle," 151.

But with independence and economic autonomy coming in a few years, Quezon's first goal was to remove the unequal provisions in the independence legislation because they had the most immediate effect on the Philippine economy. Only if that could not be accomplished, would he seek full autonomy. As a result, in 1937, he demanded either reform in the Tydings-McDuffie Act or immediate independence. With independence he could at least begin the adjustment process that the limitations in the independence legislation prevented. While Americans doubted the sincerity of Quezon's demand for early independence, Quezon had the support at home. As a result, the JPCPA was instructed to make recommendations for reform of the independence legislation as well as consider the possibility of early independence.¹⁴

The final report of the JPCPA was the product of some controversy. Filipino members of the committee were unhappy with initial drafts. Only when Quezon threatened to recall the Filipino members of the committee did the Americans come up with some rather tame compromises.¹⁵ On the export tax the committee recommended changing the tax to a declining duty-free quota for coconut oil, cigars and pearl buttons, the industries most sensitive to even a small increase in cost. Under this recommendation the duty free quota for these products would decline by 5% per year—thus substituting gradual strangulation for sudden death. On the coconut oil tax the committee recommended the use of the proceeds be unrestricted, allowing them to be used to restructure the coconut industry if necessary.

On trade matters the committee was more accommodating. Instead of a permanent tariff preference in the US market for Philippine goods, the committee recommended an additional fifteen years of gradually escalating tariffs or, in the case of coconut oil, cigars and pearl buttons, gradually declining quotas. This was important because it granted the Philippines 15 years of autonomy coupled with protection for major exports—a more reasonable set of circumstances for making adjustments in the economy. This measure to a large extent compensated for the committee's final rejection of the immediate independence option. But after the dust had settled and the report was issued, it was still clear that the Philippines had received only minor concessions for the duration of the Commonwealth. The changes in the export tax provisions affected only three industries, all of which were controlled by US investors. Meanwhile, sugar, the number one Philippine export, an export that was under greater Filipino control than any other, received no concessions. The nation did receive an extension of tariff preferences after independence, however, a major concession.¹⁶ Still, Quezon only grudgingly accepted the committee's recommendations after he was told it was the most that Congress was likely to accept.¹⁷

¹⁴Quezon to Roy Howard, 23 July, 1937. Reel 19; JPCPA, *Op. cit.*, 11-13; Joseph Ralston Hayden, *The Philippines: A Study in National Development* (NY: MacMillan, 1942), 565.

¹⁵Quezon to the US High Commissioner to the Philippines (unsigned, n.d). This letter is included at the end of the correspondence for 1937.

¹⁶JPCPA, *Op. cit.*, Pt. 1.

¹⁷Quezon to Quinton Paredes, telegram, 4 March, 1938; Manuel L. Quezon to Paredes, telegram, 25 March, 1938; Franklin D. Roosevelt to the US High Commissioner to the Philippines, telegram, signed Burnett, 22 March, 1938.

The Struggle in Congress

Even though the JPCPA had completed its work, the battle for economic reform was still in its infancy. The US State Department drafted a bill based on the final report in December, 1938, for presentation to the Congress in 1939. But several of the original provisions recommended by the JPCPA had been removed or changed to the detriment of the Philippines. Philippine leaders objected. Philippine Vice President Sergio Osmena, head of the economic mission sent to help promote the bill in the US Congress, presented US Assistant Secretary of State Sayre with a list of 21 amendments.¹⁸ Though most of the issues of conflict were resolved in favor of the Philippines after a month of negotiation, the Philippine delegation wanted all resolved before formally submitting the bill. Sayre, on the other hand, wanted to get the bill out as quickly as possible.¹⁹ Though Sayre emphasized the importance of a united front to overcome the opposition he expected, Quezon and Osmena only agreed to send the bill to Congress after Sayre in turn agreed to let them approach individual legislators for additional concessions.²⁰

The US State Department saw the provision for gradually declining preferences after independence to be the key provision of the bill. Sayre, the point man for the State Department's efforts on behalf of the Philippines, made an eloquent argument for this provision before the Senate Committee on Territories and Insular Affairs, to which the bill had been assigned, and for the other provisions of the act; he insisted that the US had a moral obligation to insure the Philippines the opportunity for successful economic adjustment.²¹ While gradually declining preferences fell short of a permanent preference, which Quezon and Osmena initially wanted, Joaquin M. Elizalde, the Philippine Resident Commissioner to the US, testified to the Philippine intent to accept the State Department's proposal.²² Elizalde's testimony is important because it probably reflected Quezon's willingness to accept the provision. Elizalde was closely tied to Quezon and is unlikely to have agreed to anything without approval from his superior.

Osmena, on the other hand, a long-time political adversary of Quezon, remained unwilling to concede the earlier Philippine demand for permanent preferences. He kept trying to strike a better deal on his own. He pushed for an amendment that would have granted the Philippines a permanent tariff preference of 75% after independence and he worked closely with key members of the Committee on Territories and Insular Affairs throughout their deliberations to get this amendment passed.²³

He also refused to communicate Quezon's views on issues at key junctures in the deliberations. At one point during the hearings, the US High Commissioner to the

¹⁸Sergio Osmena to Quezon, telegram, 4 January, 1939; Quezon to Osmena, telegram, 10 January, 1939.

¹⁹Quezon to Osmena, telegram, 10 January, 1939; Osmena to Quezon, telegram, 24 January, 1939.

²⁰*Ibid.*

²¹US Senate Committee on Territories and Insular Affairs [Hereafter, CTIA], *Complete Independence of the Philippine Islands: Hearing before the Committee on Territories and Insular Affairs*, 76th Congress, 1st Session, 16 February to 15 March, 1939, 22-46.

²²*Ibid.*, 203-204.

²³Osmena to Quezon, telegram, 19 March, 1939.

²⁴Quezon to Osmena, telegram, 30 March, 1939; Quezon to Osmena, telegram, 7 April, 1939; Quezon to US Senator David Worth Clark of Idaho, telegram, 13 April, 1939; Satoshi Nakano, "The 'Windfall' Revenue Controversy 1937-1941: A Perspective on Philippine Commonwealth History," *Pilipinas* 28 (1997), 44-46.

²⁵Osmena to Quezon, telegram, 22 March, 1939.

Philippines, Paul McNutt, called for a re-examination of the independence option. He implied that Quezon supported his request. McNutt's intervention made several key US senators leery of extending preferences after 1946, fearing an extension might be used to justify continued US rule. Quezon tried on several occasions to get Osmena to inform the members of the committee that he was committed to independence, and that he was willing to accept it immediately if the tariff preferences came with it. Osmena refused to follow up and Quezon finally sent a separate wire to the committee stating his position.²⁴

This is where Quezon's and Osmena's strategy of seeking additional concessions beyond the US State Department's bill backfired. Osmena's efforts to get a "better" deal reinforced a commonly held perception in the Senate that the Philippines were not committed to independence. Osmena confessed as much when he reported in March, three months into his mission, that some members of the committee wondered if the Philippines really wanted a bill at all.²⁵ Osmena's activities also strained his working relationship with Sayre. Osmena was not comfortable with Sayre or the State Department. Instead, he seemed more at home with US "old-timers" from the Philippines. In reports back to Manila he barely noted Sayre's testimony on the US obligation to Philippine independence, but he lavished praise on the testimony of John Hausserman. A lawyer by profession, Hausserman went to the Philippines in the early colonial period to practice law. Not long after he arrived he purchased the Benguet Mining Company and amassed a fortune in gold before retiring and returning home to the US. Though he was no longer a resident of the Philippines, Haussermann opposed independence and testified that any trade preferences extended to the Philippines had to be accompanied by US sovereignty.²⁶

After six months of deliberation, the US Congress ultimately passed the Tydings-Kocalkowski Act. The act amended the economic provisions of the Tydings-McDuffie Act by removing the export tax from coconut oil, cigars and pearl buttons for the duration of the Commonwealth and making these products subject to declining duty free quotas as called for in the report of the JPCPA. It also modified the application of the export tax on embroideries. It gave the Philippine government the power to allocate sugar quotas, and it sanctioned the use of the proceeds of the coconut excise tax for loans to coconut planters, but left the tax in place. It did not remove any of the export quotas, however. Most significantly, the act did not include the provision for declining tariff preferences after independence. No provision at all was made for the period after independence, though another economic conference was scheduled for two years prior to independence.

US Opposition

Whatever problems may have existed between the US State Department and the Philippines, the failure of the act to provide for the period after 1946 was due to opposition in the US Congress, primarily from Americans with economic interests in the Philippines and isolationists who felt an extension of tariff preferences after 1946 might lead the US to postpone Philippine independence. US economic interests may have even played upon isolationist fears to prevent the passage of an act that would extend preferential trade without maintaining US control. Things were also complicated by the

²⁶Osmena to Quezon, telegram, 9 March, 1939.

fact that Roosevelt had lost control of the southern wing of the Democratic Party with his heavy-handed attempts to intervene in the 1938 primaries. One of his targets at the time was Millard Tydings, the co-sponsor of the bill. As a result, Roosevelt was in no position to push any legislation through the Congress.²⁷

As the bill was discussed in committee in the Senate, opposition to the provisions that granted more economic authority to the Philippine government during the remainder of the Commonwealth came from Americans involved in the Philippine trade. US fats and oils producers opposed the elimination of all restrictions on the use of the proceeds of the coconut oil excise tax.²⁸ There were even efforts to restrict powers already granted the Commonwealth government. The Philippine Sugar Association, the association of mill owners in the Philippines, submitted an amendment that would have prevented the Philippine government from controlling sugar quota allocations as planned. Likewise, an amendment altering the existing allocation of the cordage quota in favor of a US firm was proposed.²⁹

In the end only the cordage industry got its way. The amendment submitted by the Philippine Sugar Association was rejected and the use of the proceeds of the coconut oil excise tax for crop loans to coconut planters was allowed. However, these final decisions were made only after Quezon threatened to reject the bill if he did not control sugar quota allocations and if restrictions on the use of the coconut excise tax remained in place.³⁰

Even Quezon, however, was unable to dictate the rules of the game after independence. When John Hausserman, the gold magnate, stated that the US should maintain sovereignty over the Philippines after 1946 if preferential trade was granted, Millard Tydings and Arthur Vandenberg, key members of the Committee on Territories and Insular Affairs and isolationists, agreed wholeheartedly.³¹ Tydings, who was the bill's sponsor in the Senate, was in fact opposed to the legislation due to the provisions for the period after independence. When he introduced it to the committee he characterized it as a State Department bill with which he had nothing to do. He and Vandenberg then grilled representatives of the Philippine government who appeared before the committee, revealing their displeasure that the independence legislation was being reviewed. There were simply no strong supporters of the bill in the Senate. Sayre's and Osmena's hope for the bill waned as senators haggled over the preference/independence issue.³²

Opposition to reduced preferences after independence remained strong. This was a result of both the fear of isolationists, and the hope of US investors and traders, that the Philippines would remain under US rule. Senate isolationists wanted a formal statement forbidding the reconsideration of the independence issue inserted into the bill. Investors

²⁷Osmena to Quezon, telegram, 28 March, 1939; Nakano, "Windfall," 42-46.

²⁸CTIA, *Op. cit.*, 169-174; Osmena to Quezon, telegram, 21 June, 1939.

²⁹Osmena to Quezon, telegram, 20 June, 1939; Osmena to Quezon, telegram, 16 June, 1939. Cordage, or rope and twine, was a strategic commodity in which the Philippines had a potential natural monopoly. Manila hemp, the highest quality source of rope and twine, was found only in the Philippines. American rope producers had quotas placed on cordage to guarantee their access to the vital raw material and to insure that the Philippines did not come to monopolize global production of high quality rope and twine.

³⁰Quezon to Osmena, telegram, 17 June, 1939; Quezon to Osmena, telegram, 5 July, 1939.

³¹CTIA, *op. cit.*, 232-241.

³²Philippine lobbyist and ex-US Senator Harry B. Hawes to Vargas, 13 March, 1939; Osmena to Quezon, telegram, 19 March, 1939; Osmena to Quezon, telegram, 14 April, 1939; CTIA, *Op. cit.*, 68-77.

and traders, on the other hand, made the case that the international situation in Asia made a firm commitment inadvisable.³³

The final straw for the bill as originally proposed came in May when President Roosevelt proved unable or unwilling to press for the extension of tariff preferences after 1946. Osmena had observed early on that the administration might not be in a position to see the bill through as written.³⁴ Frank Hodsoll, British military analyst and confidante of Quezon's, felt the opposition to the bill came from Roosevelt's political enemies who opposed him on everything.³⁵ In any event, Roosevelt made the key concession in May, offering a modified version of the bill in which the provision for the period of declining preferences after independence would be eliminated in return for support for what was considered to be the remedial portions of the bill governing coconut oil, cigars, pearl buttons and embroideries.³⁶

With Roosevelt dropping the provision for declining tariff preferences after 1946 the rift over the bill was miraculously healed. Why? Because the independence issue was tied to the issue of preferences! US isolationists and economic nationalists could not accept a preferential economic relationship with the Philippines unless the US government maintained control. Tydings, for instance, became an active supporter of the bill once the fifteen-year period of declining preferences was dropped. With the major problem gone, the remedial portions of the bill were soon passed by the Senate and sent to the House.³⁷ In the end, the final act conformed closely to the recommendations of the JPCPA for the period up to 1946.

Further demonstration of the divisiveness of the independence plus preferences portion of the bill came in the House on 29 June. More than six months after Osmena and Sayre had begun their work and over a month after Roosevelt had ostensibly resolved the question, there were still members of the House Committee on Insular Affairs, to which the final version of the Senate bill had been assigned, who believed McNutt's claim that Philippine leaders did not want independence. They continued to oppose the bill for that reason.³⁸

Notably missing in the final version of the bill was any evidence of the influence of US agriculture. The original Tydings-McDuffie Act was a product of US agricultural interests, which used the independence issue as a device to exclude Philippine commodities from the US market.³⁹ While these interests weighed in on the Tydings-Kocialkowski Act it is not clear what effect, if any, they had on the major provisions of the bill. Agriculture already had its quotas and export taxes courtesy of the Tydings-

³³Sergio Osmena, *Report of the Special Mission to the United States 1938-1939* (Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1939), 26-28.

³⁴Sergio Osmena, "Memorandum of My Conversation with His Excellency President Quezon," 18 January 1939.

³⁵Frank Hodsoll to Quezon, 17 June, 1939.

³⁶Osmena to Quezon, telegram, 9 May, 1939.

³⁷Sergio Osmena, "Outline of Matters to be Taken Up by Vice President Osmena with President Quezon by Long Distance Telephone Tonight," 12 May, 1939.

³⁸Sergio Osmena, "Outline of Matters to be Taken up by Vice President Osmena with President in Quezon in Long Distance Conversation Tonight," 12 April, 1939.

³⁹Grayson Kirk, *Philippine Independence* (NY: Farrar & Rinehart, 1936); Shirley Jenkins, *American Economic Policy Toward the Philippines* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1954).

McDuffie Act. These remained the same, and with a few minor exceptions Philippine leaders did little to try to increase or remove quotas.

US and Cuban sugar producers had hoped to use some of the concessions in the bill to negotiate a decrease in the Philippine sugar quota. That they were unable to do so possibly reflected a decision by supporters of the bill to not press for the fifteen years of declining tariff preferences after independence. US sugar refiners also intervened to prevent the Philippines from increasing shipments of refined sugar but did nothing to change existing practice.

Sugar refiners, for instance, made no effort to reduce overall sugar quotas. As H. Beach Carpenter, representative of US sugar refiners made clear, he did not care under what conditions raw sugar entered the US.⁴⁰ American fats and oils producers also had no objections to the declining duty free quotas for coconut oil, though their representative A.M. Loomis suggested, unsuccessfully, a declining quota for copra as well. And J.S. McDaniels of the Cordage Institute favored the continuation of preferences after independence because of the mutual benefit to be derived.⁴¹ Though US agricultural interests may have forced the Philippines and the US State Department to stand pat on absolute quotas, the export tax, and excise taxes, there is little evidence that it was responsible for the decision to not provide fifteen years of declining tariff preferences.

Conclusion

The evidence presented here suggests that the Tydings-Kocialkowski Act maintained the existing status quo in favor of US producers. Ironically, however, the coalition that crafted the final version of the act did so for contradictory reasons. US isolationists wanted to cut all political ties to the Philippines and US traders and investors wanted to maintain their preferred access to the Philippine economy. The only common ground between the two was the belief that any continuation of tariff preferences for the Philippines required continued US control over Philippine policy. The result was a remedial measure that provided no substantial improvement in the prospects for Philippine economic adjustment prior to the termination of all tariff preferences.

The coalition of interests that favored change was unable to present a unified front. The US State Department bickered with Quezon, Quezon bickered with Osmena, Osmena bickered with Elizalde, and President Roosevelt bickered with Millard Tydings. Realistically, it was unlikely that significant changes would be made for the duration of the Commonwealth; the status quo established by US agricultural interests, exporters, and investors in the Tydings-McDuffie Act would have been difficult to overturn, and, as the evidence points out, it was not. However, greater unity from Filipino representatives might have persuaded the US Congress at this time to grant the fifteen-year extension of declining preferences after independence despite the opposition of key legislators and Americans with interests in the Philippine trade. The result will never be known: the Filipino side could not agree on a coherent strategy and the US opposition was strong enough to prevent significant changes in the existing arrangements.

In the end, The Tydings-Kocialkowski Act proved simply to be another in a long line of US initiatives that took advantage of the Philippines. The intensive effort on the

⁴⁰Osmena to Quezon, telegram, 22 March, 1939; Osmena to Quezon, telegram, 31 May, 1939; Osmena to Quezon, telegram, 29 June, 1939.

⁴¹CTIA, *Op. cit.*, 169-171, 213.

part of Philippine leaders and the US State Department for economic reform for had come to naught. The Philippines were left with chronic trade deficits as the US trade surplus grew, unrestricted as it was by any formal barriers. The process of underdevelopment begun at the outset of the Commonwealth continued.

Gators, Mosquitoes, Sand Fleas and Tallahassee: Life at Camp Gordon Johnston, 1942-1946

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Palm trees, warm breezes and scantily-clad beauties: that is Florida, or at least what troops thought Florida was when they learned they were being sent to Carrabelle, Florida. From 10 September, 1942 to 21 February, 1946, Carrabelle was home to Camp Gordon Johnston, which, according to one resident brigade history, did have "palm trees and cool breezes, but it also had rain, mud, swamps, lizards, chiggers, snakes, wild hogs, deer, flies, mosquitoes, sand fleas and wilderness."¹ The camp, located sixty miles south of Tallahassee, became famous, not only because it was one of the few US amphibious training centers, but also because of its living conditions. Journalist Walter Winchell called the camp, the "Alcatraz of the Army."² The camp trained three full divisions during its lifetime and had a significant impact not only on Tallahassee and the local area, but on winning World War II. While life for the soldiers training in the camp was not ideal, it slowly evolved from the "Hell-By-The Sea" into one of Florida's largest military installations.³

When the US entered World War II its army was small and unprepared. The only way to get to Germany and Japan was by an amphibious landing, and the US Army, unlike the Marine Corps, had little experience and few units for such an operation. Before the outbreak of the war, The US Army had two amphibious corps, one in the Atlantic, one in the Pacific.⁴ With the US at war, the military had to quickly transform.

General John P. Lucas, commander of the Third Infantry Division, who would later rise to fame or notoriety after the Anzio landings on 22 January, 1944, wrote the first report about the condition of the US amphibious corps. He wrote that the training was "unwieldy, ineffective, and dangerous" and that "a real operation against a competent enemy could end only in disaster for American forces."⁵ Lucas' report would be backed by Chief-of-Staff General George C. Marshall in April, 1942, when the US Army was given the task to "plan, prepare, and train the necessary ground and air forces for joint amphibious operations of the scale envisaged."⁶

With the Army given the assignment, General Brehon Somervell, commander of Army Service Forces, established the first amphibious training center at Camp Edwards.⁷ Camp Edwards was located in Cape Cod, Massachusetts. The earliest troops there

¹Put 'Em Across: A History of the 2d Engineer Special Brigade, 1942-1945 (Harrisburg, PA, 1946; reprint ed., Fort Belvoir, VA 1988), 19.

²David J. Coles, "Hell-by-the-Sea: Florida's Camp Gordon Johnston in World War II," *The Florida Historical Quarterly* 73 (1994), 2

³*Ibid.*, 3.

⁴Franklin Chronicle, 3 March, 2000.

⁵Marshall O. Becker, *The Amphibious Training Center: Study Number 22, Army Ground Forces* (Washington, DC: US Army, 1946), 1.

⁶*Ibid.*, 1.

⁷Robert Amory, *Surf and Sand: The Saga of the 533d Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment and 1461st Engineer Maintenance Company, 1942-1945* (Andover, MA: Andover Press, 1947), 10.

complained of poor transportation and were plagued by a lack of hot water. Three divisions, the 36th, 45th and 46th, trained at Camp Edwards.⁸ However, the Army quickly discovered that another camp was needed and an Army Ground Forces board trekked across the US to find a suitable location. The board looked for an:

island approximately ten miles offshore, a large sheltered body of water near a convenient bivouac area, a coastal area about twenty miles long with a number of one mile landing beaches, and eight to ten miles of land suitable for training purposes inland from the coast.⁹

The board examined various locations in Florida including the Everglades and Venice before settling on Carrabelle. Carrabelle was a controversial selection. The Surgeon General believed the area to be unhealthy for troops and other military leaders believed the beaches were not suited for amphibious training.¹⁰ Regardless, Carrabelle would prove to be a perfect spot for the new Amphibious Training Center (ATC) as Carrabelle "had all the elements necessary to approximate conditions in the South Pacific."¹¹

According to the history of one of the units involved written soon after the war, when news of the move to Carrabelle reached Camp Edwards, the troops were jubilant and believed they were being "unusually well taken care of, Cape Cod in the summer and Florida in the winter."¹² Yet, for the few troops who knew northwest Florida, the move may have been a blessing, just very well disguised.

On 8 September, 1942, the first troops from the 38th Infantry Division arrived at Camp Carrabelle. The camp was officially activated under the command of Colonel Walter E. Smith on 10 September.¹³ For many of the first arrivals, Carrabelle, Florida was not the Florida they had envisioned. They found no resort and no beautiful women, only a lot of work and terrible living conditions.

The troops back at Camp Edwards prepared for the long train ride to Carrabelle. Private Paul G. Earhart, on learning he was being sent to Carrabelle remembers thinking, "[o]h, boy, we're going to Florida." Yet, Earhart's joy and the joy of other soldiers would prove to be short lived. Passing through numerous small towns and "some place called Tallahassee" the troops arrived and many wondered if they had taken a wrong turn and ended up in the South Pacific.¹⁴ Troops that arrived later in the year boarded the train in winter uniforms. For many, who believed Florida was always warm and sunny during the winter, this was an ominous start to their trip.¹⁵

On arrival at Carrabelle, the camp was nothing more than a speck upon the beach. In order to save money, the construction material for the troop housing quarters was

⁸*Ibid.*, 13.

⁹Becker, *Amphibious Training Center*, 9.

¹⁰*Ibid.*, 9.

¹¹Henry C. Allan, "H-Hour Plus Three: The Saga of the U.S. Army Amphibious Engineers in the Pacific During World War II," Institute on World War II and the Human Experience, Florida State University, Tallahassee, Florida. [Hereafter, IWWIHE.]

¹²*Put 'Em Across*, 19.

¹³*Official History Camp Gordon Johnston*, 4.

¹⁴Paul G. Earhart, interview by Eric Tenbus, 31 May, 2000, IWWIHE.

¹⁵Henry C. Allan, Unknown Interviewer, Unknown Date, IWWIHE.

made out of light, prefabricated wood, with no flooring. For most of its existence the simple US soldier at Camp Gordon Johnston had to endure sand fleas and sinking floors. A veteran of the camp reminiscing sixty years later recalled that as for the barracks themselves, the men joked they lived in "eight-by-eight tents," meaning eight men lived in each tent.¹⁶ To make matters worse, few of the latrines were indoors and the camp as a whole lacked heating, which made the surprisingly cool Florida winter that much more unbearable.¹⁷ Calling life and training in Carrabelle, "primitive" was a cruel understatement.¹⁸

The initial reaction of the troops to life in Carrabelle was generally negative, and would remain so throughout their training. Future Army Group Command and General of the Army Omar N. Bradley,¹⁹ who commanded the 28th Infantry Division at Camp Gordon Johnston, wrote in his memoirs:

Camp Gordon Johnston was the most miserable Army installation I had seen since my days in Yuma, Arizona, ages past. It had been hacked out of palmetto scrub along a bleak stretch of beach. We were forced to scatter our three infantry regiments miles apart and thus could never train a complete division. Moreover, it was bitterly cold in that northern leg of Florida. Every training exercise was a numbing experience. The man who selected that site should have been court martialled for stupidity.²⁰

While the camp may not have suited a general, it did appeal to some young men who had left their hometowns for the first time. As Korbin Laiminger said in 2003, "I loved it; I loved it. I loved it. There was something about it ... it was refreshing."²¹ To this day, the Camp Gordon Johnston Museum holds annual reunions that are attended by many of the remaining survivors. Many soldiers may not have blissful memories of Camp Gordon Johnston, but many return to the area yearly to pay homage to the camp and recall their younger days.

Living conditions improved over the years. The camp finally built a mess hall so the soldiers could eat indoors, and by the end of the war it established a library, five theaters, service clubs for enlisted men, noncommissioned and commissioned officers, baseball fields, basketball courts, boxing rings and six chapels for the soldier's spiritual needs.²² While these activities were months away, the first troops at Camp Gordon Johnston were incredibly bored and had to invent ways to amuse themselves. Their amusement needs would be met by a local amphibian.

The main source of information and amusement on post was the camp newspaper, *The Amphibian*. First published 16 October, 1942, the first issue had no name and the editors of the paper, offered a "you name it contest."²³ The winner was Sergeant Jephtha

¹⁶Paul G. Earhart, interview by Eric Tenbus, 31 May 2000, IWWIIHE.

¹⁷Coles, "Hell-by-the-Sea," 8.

¹⁸Frank Facente, phone interview by Robin Sellers, 24 February, 2000, IWWIIHE.

¹⁹Bradley and his wife had temporary quarters in Wakulla Springs, about fifteen miles south of Tallahassee, but he was only able to visit her on Sundays.

²⁰Omar N. Bradley and Clay Blair, *A General's Life: An Autobiography* (NY: Simon and Schuster, 1983), 112.

²¹Korbin Laiminger, interview by Steve Brewer, 17 June, 2003, IWWIIHE.

²²Coles, "Hell-by-the-Sea," 17.

²³*Amphibian*, 16 October, 1942.

W. Pope, who received two packs of his favorite cigarettes for naming the paper. Other names considered were the "Green Gator" and the "Second Frontiersman."²⁴ The paper, which was published weekly, was surprisingly well written and humorous. The humor ranged from poems written about Spam, to jokes about Japanese soldiers weighing less than the average US female.²⁵ The best-known poem to emerge from the camp was entitled, "Hell in Camp Carrabelle, Florida" written by Sergeant Bill Roth.²⁶ The poem took aim at the conditions of the camp and the local weather,

The heat in the summer is one hundred and ten,
Too hot for the Devil, too hot for the men,
Come see for yourself and you can tell
It's a helluva place, this Carrabelle²⁷

The paper evolved from a simple newspaper with hand-drawn cartoons, to a more formal paper consisting of cartoons and stories from other papers. *The Amphibian* contained jokes, unit reports, brief notes on the war, and, most important of all, pictures of women and articles on upcoming dances with college women in Tallahassee and other areas. The most remarkable aspect of the paper is how little it dealt with the actual war. From its first publication to early 1945, the paper included updates and major events in the war, but a majority of the space was dedicated to local stories and troop banter. This is understandable, as the war was constantly in the thoughts of the men training at Camp Gordon Johnston, and very rarely did they need a reminder that a war was raging across the sea and that they soon would be engulfed in it.

The first division to complete training was the 38th. Like any camp during the early stages of the war, the soldiers were plagued by equipment shortages, but the troops trained and prepared for their first large maneuver. During the middle of December, 1942, Camp Gordon Johnston held its first large-scale exercise. 10,000 troops and over 300 landing craft would be used.²⁸ A typical day for the troops at Camp Gordon Johnston consisted of departing the camp at 0600 hours for their designated landing area. The troops were then "instructed in the types of boats, their general characteristic, and the number of troops each could carry. Finally, the troops would return at 2000 hours to camp."²⁹

The first maneuvers in mid-December started off well. The troops left at the right time, in fairly good order. Awaiting them that morning was Army Ground Forces commander General Leslie McNair. He was visiting to referee the first maneuvers. McNair and other commanders watched and waited for the first troops to arrive. Finally, the umpires noticed troops landing ashore, for a moment events seemed to have worked out. Unfortunately, the first troops to arrive were not shock troops, but medical troops, who were quickly killed. Obviously disappointed, McNair and the umpires waited for the correct units to arrive. This time, instead of medical troops, ordinance troops trampled

²⁴ *Amphibian*, 23 October, 1942.

²⁵ *Amphibian*, 10 February, 1945.

²⁶ See Appendix I.

²⁷ *Amphibian*, 16 October, 1942.

²⁸ Amory, *Surf and Sand*, 28.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 26.

ashore and met the same fate as their medical counterparts.³⁰ The exercise was a disaster. During the night, the boat battalions, led by inexperienced officers and hampered by poor communications, wandered off course. Most of the attacking force landed on the wrong beaches and left the support units alone to defend themselves. A few weeks later, the exercise was repeated and the 38th succeeded in taking the correct beach at the right time. The next division, the 28th under Omar Bradley, had a much easier time at Camp Gordon Johnston, but the camp would suffer tragic accidents from time to time.

The worst accident at Camp Gordon Johnston took place on 8-9 March, 1943. A small unit was training in rough weather at night.³¹ Nineteen men from this unit, believing they had hit land and their proper designated landing site, disembarked from the craft. Sadly, fourteen of the nineteen men, heavily weighed down with equipment, would drown. The landing craft had hit a sand bar out in the middle of the ocean, and the troops disembarked into deep, stormy water. This incident was the worst in terms of numbers lost, but perhaps, the saddest accident took place in Dale Mabry Airfield, an airfield near Camp Gordon Johnston. On 8 June, 1942, Second Lieutenant Russell D. Love was killed in a plane crash just nine hours before his wedding. Throughout its history, numerous troops drowned and automobile accidents were common, but the camp had a good safety record considering its location and all the snakes and alligators that lived where the troops trained. Training at Camp Gordon Johnston was dangerous, and while the post theaters were often filled, the troops looked forward to their weekends off in Tallahassee. This was because, according to veteran Korbin Laiminger in 2003, the state capital had something that Camp Gordon Johnston lacked: young women.³²

Tallahassee will never be confused with Miami or even Jacksonville. Due to the migration to the Sunbelt, Tallahassee has grown tremendously since the war. With a booming population, and the passage of years, many of the memories of Camp Gordon Johnston have disappeared from Tallahassee. For the troops stationed at Camp Gordon Johnston during the war, Tallahassee had to suffice to meet their needs for entertainment, drinking and women. Initially, Tallahassee was ill prepared for the arrival of troops into its borders. Small and understaffed, many stores and restaurants refused to admit troops, as they could not keep up with demand. According to Laiminger, Tallahassee offered the troops a "good reception," but events later in the war would leave a cloud over the city's history.³³ In spite of its size and inability to meet many of the soldier's needs, Tallahassee prospered during the war and soldiers had their fun with students from Florida A&M University and Florida State Women's College, both located in the city.

The war brought many changes to the South. These included more money, more industry, more military installations, and troops from Northern and Midwestern states, who quickly learned that "Southern girls are nice but not all of them are the peaches and cream type" as remembered by camp veteran H.C. Allen.³⁴ Newly-arriving troops had reasons to be optimistic as they were regaled with stories of women in Florida and Alan continued "reports of Hookers in Florida were glowing."³⁵ Tallahassee was the capital of

³⁰*Ibid.*, 29.

³¹*Amphibian*, 13 March, 1943.

³²Laiminger interview.

³³*Ibid.*

³⁴Henry C. Allan, Unknown Interviewer, Unknown date, IWIIHE.

³⁵*Ibid.*

Florida, but Tampa was the capital of prostitution. The Tampa *Tribune* ran the headline, "Tampa Called The Worst Spot for Prostitution."³⁶ While Tallahassee saw an increase in crime, prostitution and certainly venereal disease, the two colleges and the numerous women around the city offered the men of Camp Gordon Johnston dance functions, dates and numerous extracurricular activities.

The two colleges were extremely strict when it came to dating. Troops from Camp Gordon Johnston were not allowed in dorms and could meet the women only during certain hours. At times, the campus administration of both campuses would have to remind troops of this fact. As for the city itself, the city usually "rolled up the sidewalks" by 6 p.m., but, according to Laiminger, Tallahassee did have Tallahassee did have a few popular restaurants, a movie theatre and a USO (United Serviceman's Organization) canteen located on Adams Street.³⁷

Most troops would visit Tallahassee on the weekends, and would "double date" with another buddy from camp. While options were limited, the troops would usually pick up their dates on campus or their home and take them out to eat at the Dutch Kitchen or Pat and Mike's, which was known for its "veal cutlets and tomato gravy."³⁸ After eating, the couples would play ping-pong or other games at the USO or attend an evening movie. Most dates ended at 10 p.m. sharp because the two colleges had curfews for their students.

The usual places for troops from the camp and women to mingle were USO dances or dance functions run by the colleges. The ratio, usually two women for every man, meant most troops would go home happy. For the more adventurous soldiers and their dates, alcohol could be found. During the war, Tallahassee was dry, which made getting alcohol hard to find, but for most troops, not hard enough. For desperate troops looking for a drink, all they had to do was travel south of the city limits to a small, hidden concrete building. Defending this building from marauding Camp Gordon Johnston soldiers was a "big black man" who, if troops handed him a ten Dollar bill, would give them a pint of gut-rot whiskey. Unbeknownst to most people living in Tallahassee, according to Laiminger, the primitive "brew-thru" was run by Tallahassee's sheriff!³⁹

Aside from Tallahassee, troops enjoyed cooling off in Wakulla Springs, but never explored much of Carrabelle and its outlying areas. Many people who lived in Tallahassee during the war remember the soldiers as polite and kind. Troops were often arrested for antics common to many people their age. Ann Bannerman Camp, then a teenager, recalls sex-starved soldiers and their "wolf calls" to women passing by, but overall, the troops handled themselves well.⁴⁰ Often the troops were relieved to get out of camp and just make it to Tallahassee, as transportation, like many of the men's pick-up lines, were frequently lacking.

Troops at Camp Gordon Johnston complained of transportation problems to outlying areas. The main source of transportation for the troops to Tallahassee was Lee Coach Line. However, as troops would often find out, the bus service was anything but

³⁶Dawn Traux, "Victory Girls and Social Protection in WWII Tampa," in Lewis N. Wynne, ed., *Florida At War* (Dade City, FL: Saint Leo College Press, 1993), 29-48. Here, 29.

³⁷Laiminger, interview.

³⁸*Ibid.*

³⁹*Ibid.*

⁴⁰Ann Bannerman Camp, interview by Robin Sellers, 11 November, 1998, IWWIIHE.

reliable. Plagued by mechanical issues and general incompetence, troops were often left stranded in Tallahassee. The bus service was so awful that a few troops were forced to walk from Tallahassee back to Camp Gordon Johnston in order to avoid being AWOL. According to the camp newspaper, by Summer, 1944, the troops and the administration had their day in court, when the Florida Railroad Commission and Tallahassee's city manager investigated the problems of Lee. The head of the company acknowledged the problem and vowed to remain in Tallahassee and solve it.⁴¹ Lee Coach Line would run more smoothly, but the troops and local farmers came up with more ingenious ways to travel to Tallahassee and back.

Some farmers, fishermen and other locals around Carrabelle, knowing of the soldiers' plight, began to buy old station wagons and remove all the doors. According to Laiminger, these improvised buses helped countless Camp Gordon Johnston soldiers get back and forth from Tallahassee.⁴² As for the troops themselves, DUKW convoys became the most popular mode of transportation, especially when the war was nearing its end. The DUKW's were one of the amphibian soldier's most useful tools, in and out of battle. The 2½-ton amphibious craft could carry troops in water and on the road. According to Laiminger, every weekend a convoy of DUKW's carrying excited troops arrived in Tallahassee and parked near the Greyhound station on the corner of McComb and Tennessee streets.⁴³

Up to 1944, relations between Camp Gordon Johnston and Tallahassee had remained peaceful and beneficial to both parties. With the war winding down and Germany and Japan on the verge of collapse, the peaceful relationship between the troops and Tallahassee would be broken by two riots. The first and smaller riot occurred in 1944, when the rivalry between soldiers from Dale Mabry Camp and Gordon Johnston exploded onto the streets of Tallahassee. The two installations had always had an uneasy rivalry, and fights between soldiers from the camps were not uncommon. The riot was eventually put down with the aid of local policemen and military police, who pointed guns at the troops and threatened to "blow them to hell."⁴⁴ The second riot, however, was much more devastating.

African-American troops played a pivotal role in the winning of the war. Though in segregated units, African-American troops fought, bled, and died with their white brethren. A few black units were stationed at Camp Gordon Johnston during its existence. *The Amphibian* had a section for them. Florida had "Jim Crow" laws, and African-American soldiers were not allowed in certain cities. Tallahassee accommodated the black troops, and they traveled in the numerous DUKW convoys on the weekends. African-American troops serving in Camp Gordon Johnston were still treated as second-class citizens. They did not receive a "Colored Service Club" until 1944.⁴⁵ A feeling of discontent boiled over into the streets in April, 1945.

Angry with their role in the war, their treatment in Florida, and their imminent departure overseas, African-American troops from Dale Mabry and Camp Gordon

⁴¹*Amphibian*, 11 August, 1945.

⁴²Laiminger interview.

⁴³*Ibid.*

⁴⁴James A. Schnur, "Persevering on the Home Front: Blacks in FL During WWII," Wynne, *Florida At War*, 58.

⁴⁵*Amphibian*, 13 May, 1944.

Johnston stormed the streets of Frenchtown, the black enclave in Tallahassee.⁴⁶ The troops threw bottles, destroyed black businesses and fought with local police and military police, as the troops tried to "take Frenchtown apart and paint it red."⁴⁷ The riot was eventually put down, but it had such an impact on Camp Gordon Johnston that the arrival of new black soldiers to the camp was postponed.⁴⁸ Aside from the riots in 1944 and 1945, the relationship between the camp and Tallahassee was relatively peaceful. The riots only occurred later in the war, as troop discipline eased, and many resented the fact that they were being sent overseas so late.

"Victory hit Camp Gordon Johnston like a delayed action bomb" read the headline in the *Amphibian*.⁴⁹ World War II was finally over, and the lives of all the troops stationed in the camp would be saved. With the war over, the camp and the *Amphibian* turned toward demobilization and trying to convince a few soldiers to re-enlist for another tour of duty. Over the next months the troops would decide their future and figure out what to do after they left the Army. With the war over, the camp would continue, but its days were numbered.

Camp Gordon Johnston had a tremendous impact on Tallahassee and the war. Three full divisions were trained at Camp Gordon Johnston, the 4th, 28th, and 38th Infantry.⁵⁰ All three would serve with distinction in the Pacific and European theatres. The camp was officially disbanded in March, 1946. By the next year, all the land was resold or given back to the original owners, and little remains of the camp or its impact on the local area.

Today, most of the area remains as it was during the war. Franklin County and Carrabelle are still thinly-populated areas. Many families are now retiring to Carrabelle or buying second homes near the Gulf of Mexico. Aside from the chirping of the insects, the area in which Camp Gordon Johnston troops lived is quiet. The camp and its history have received little attention from the Army and historians. This is surprising as it was famous for its living conditions and was one of the few amphibious training centers in the US. Aside from a struggling museum, there is little evidence of the camp and its importance during World War II. Without Camp Gordon Johnston, the war, perhaps, could have gone on longer and more blood would have been spilt.

⁴⁶Coles, "Hell-by-the-Sea," 19.

⁴⁷*Tallahassee Daily Democrat*, 2, 4 April, 1945.

⁴⁸Schnur, "Persevering," 59.

⁴⁹*Amphibian*, 18 August, 1945.

⁵⁰Robert Dunbar, "The Situation in Early 1942: A Short Saga of the Engineer Amphibian Command," IWWIHE.

Figure 1: *Amphibian*, 16 October, 1942

HELL IN CAMP CARRABELLE, FLORIDA FIXED UP BY SGT. BILL RATH

The Devil in Hell we're told was chained
And a thousand years he there remained.
He neither complained nor did he groan
But determined to start a Hell of his own.



Where he could torment the souls of men
Without being chained in an underground pen.
So he asked the Lord if He had on hand
Anything left when he made this land.




The Lord said, "Yes, I've plenty of land
But its way down yonder in the Florida sand.
The fact is, old boy, the stuff's real poor
But you're welcome to it and plenty more."



So the Devil went down to look at the truck
And all he could see was Florida muck.
Now after examining it careful and well
He concluded the place was too dry for Hell.



So in order to get it off his hands,
The Lord he promised to water the lands.
For he had some water, or rather some swamp,
Rather cathartic, that smelled like "Mein Kampf".




Hence the trade was closed and the deed was given
And the Lord went back to His home in Heaven.
The Devil said, "Now I have all that is needed
To make a good Hell." And hence he succeeded.


He scattered some chiggers along the road;
Lizards in the grass, an occasional toad.
The Gulf has sharks, barracuda, stingaroes;
And in the sand he mixed millions of fleas.



To the tail of the jelly fish he added a sting,
Then the dragon fly he put on the wing,
Then added some typhoid to all of the drink,
With a pinch of sulphur to make it stink.




The rattlesnake bites you, the horse fly stings,
The mosquito delights you with his buzzing wings.
Sand burrs cause you to jig and dance
And those who sit down get ants in their pants.



The Devil then said that throughout the land
He'd arrange to tattoo the Devil's own brand:
All should be tortured unless they bore
Scars and scratches and bites by the score.

The heat in the summer is one hundred and ten,
Too hot for the Devil, too hot for the men.
Come see for yourself and you can tell
Its a holla place, this Carrabelle.



4

A Fallen Favorite in the Court of Philip III of Spain (1598-1621): The Role of *Fortuna* in the Textual Representation of Rodrigo Calderón's *Privanza* and Death

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In seventeenth-century Spain, *Fortuna*, the ancient goddess revived in the Renaissance, became a "rhetorical image of the idea of the world's mutability,"¹ and as such was closely associated with Spanish favorites [*privados*].² In fact, the transitory nature of *Fortuna* offered an ideal literary metaphor to represent the volatile character of *privanza* during the Spanish Golden Age. During the reign of Philip III of Spain (1598-1621), when the system reached its peak,³ biographical narratives of important political figures often revolved around the topic. This was the case with one of the most famous *privados* in the court of Philip III, Rodrigo Calderón (1576-1621).⁴

Rodrigo Calderón, also known by his title, the Marqués de Siete Iglesias, played a prominent role in the Spanish court as a result of his intimate connection with the most powerful political figure of the time, the Duke of Lerma.⁵ During his twenty-year career, Calderón accumulated a tremendous amount of wealth, honors and power, which he was not timid to flaunt, and which made him a host of enemies, inspiring a flurry of satirical poetry

This paper is part of the author's MA Thesis (Florida International University, 2006). The author gratefully acknowledges Dr. Noble David Cook, Dr. Joseph Patrouch, and Dr. Aurora Morcillo for their support and guidance.

¹José Antonio Maravall, *Culture of the Baroque: Analysis of a Historical Structure*, Terry Cochran, trans. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986), 200.

²The favorite in Spain is referred to as a *privado* or *valido*, while his tenure in office is called his *privanza* or *valimiento* (both interchangeable terms). For a seminal study of favoritism as a political development observed in the great monarchies of Europe during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries see John H. Elliott and L. W. B. Brockliss, eds., *The World of the Favorite* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1999).

³According to Antonio Feros, the phenomenon of *valimiento* began "during the reign of Philip II, crystalized under Philip III, and continued without major changes during the reign of Philip IV, at least until the fall of Olivares in 1643." See *Kingship and Favoritism in the Spain of Philip III of Spain, 1598-1621* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 44.

⁴For studies on Calderón see: Julián Juderías, "Un proceso político en tiempo de Felipe III: don Rodrigo Calderón, Marqués de Siete Iglesias, su vida, su proceso y su muerte," *Revista de archivos, bibliotecas y museos* 13 (1905), 334-365; 14 (1906), 1-31; José Martí y Monso "Los Calderones y el Monasterio de Nuestra Señora de Portaceli," *Boletín de la sociedad castellana de excursiones*, Vol. IV (1909-1910), 1-13, 71-76, 86-97, 101-105, 164-168, 179-184, 207-210, 271-283, 293-299, 322-333, 352-359, 379-388, 400-405, 431-434, 454-459, 486-488, 491-496, 528-536, 554-560; Ángel Ossorio y Gallardo, *Los hombres de toga en el Proceso de Rodrigo Calderón*, 2nd ed. (Madrid: Javier Morata, 1934); Ruth Pike, "The *Converso* Lineage of Rodrigo Calderón," in Malcolm R. Thorp and Arthur J. Slavin, eds., *Politics, Religion and Diplomacy in Early Modern Europe: Essays in Honor of De Lamar Jensen* (Kirksville, MO: Sixteenth Century Essays and Studies, 1994), 219-229; and James M. Boyden, "Fortune Has Stripped You of Your Splendour: Favourites and Their Fates in Fifteenth- and Sixteenth- Century Spain," 26-38 in John H. Elliott and L. W. B. Brockliss eds., *The World of the Favourite* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1999).

⁵For a revisionist study on the Duke of Lerma's political role during the reign of Philip III see Antonio Feros, *Kingship and Favoritism in the Spain of Philip III of Spain, 1598-1621* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). Even though the Duke had several favorites, Calderón was his principal *privado*.

and writings.⁶ In 1618, after the fall of the regime lead by Lerma and under the pressure of public opinion and the nobility, King Philip III ordered an investigation into Calderón's activities. In the course of a trial that lasted over two years, and during which he remained in prison, the *privado* was tortured and his considerable fortune confiscated. After the death of Philip III on 21 March, 1621, Calderón's trial was expedited as a result of the political maneuvers of the faction associated with the new king, Philip IV.⁷ On 21 October, 1621, the courtier was paraded in a mule, publicly humiliated and executed by a slit in the throat in the main square of Madrid.

In spite of the widespread discontent about Calderón's *privanza*, his torture and execution had an unexpected effect on public opinion, causing uproar and engendering criticism. Ultimately, Calderón went from being the embodiment of everything that was wrong with the government of Philip III to being the victim of the new administration. The eulogies about Calderón's demeanor during his imprisonment and execution were as intense as the criticisms during his *privanza*. This dramatic transformation in the way Calderón was perceived by the public can be clearly seen in various texts that circulated at the time. These portray him as a martyr.

One of the most recurrent themes in the literature centering on Rodrigo Calderón is the idea that his fall was inevitable because it followed the laws of fortune—what comes up must come down. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the role of *Fortuna* in the textual representation of Calderón's death. The texts considered include: Gerónimo Gascón de Torquemada's *Nacimiento, vida, prisión y muerte de Rodrigo Calderón, Marqués de Siete Iglesias*;⁸ Matías de Novoa's *Historia de Felipe III*;⁹ Francisco de Quevedo's *Grandes anales de quince días*,¹⁰ and Sebastián Flores's *Dos romances a don Rodrigo Calderón por un vecino de Ciudad Real*.¹¹

Before beginning the analysis of the texts, it is important to set forth the concept of *Fortuna* as it was understood in the period. According to James Hall's definition, *Fortuna* was the inconstant ancient goddess revived in the Renaissance, who bestows her favors at random, or the medieval Dame Fortune turning her wheel.¹² *Fortuna's* attributes in visual representations emphasized her tendency to reward "the unworthy or the positively wicked;" thus, often she appeared blindfolded. One of her more common

⁶Numerous examples of this can be found in Antonio Pérez Gómez, ed., *Romancero de don Rodrigo Calderón (1621-1800)* (Valencia: La Fuente que Mana y Corre, 1955).

⁷Gaspar de Guzmán, who became the Count-Duke of Olivares, the *privado* of Philip IV, led the opposing faction; see John H. Elliott, *The Count-Duke of Olivares: The Statesman in an Age of Decline* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1986).

⁸Gerónimo Gascón de Torquemada, *Nacimiento, vida, prisión y muerte de don Rodrigo Calderón, Marqués de Siete Iglesias*, Spain Collection, Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University Library. (Microfilm copy by Gale Group, Reel 2, Box 3, Folder 33).

⁹Matías de Novoa, *Memorias de Matías de Novoa, ayuda de cámara de Felipe IV, primera parte hasta ahora conocida bajo el título de historia de Felipe III por Bernabé Vivanco* (Madrid: Impr. De M. Ginesta, 1875). Hereafter *Historia de Felipe III*.

¹⁰Francisco de Quevedo Villegas, "Grandes anales de quince días, Historia de muchos siglos que pasaron en un mes. Memorias que guarda a los que vendrán," in Felicidad Buendía, ed., *Obras completas* (Madrid: Aguilar, 1964, 5th ed.), 1:730-765.

¹¹Sebastián Flores, *Dos romances a don Rodrigo Calderón por un vecino de Ciudad Real [Barcelona 1621]*, Isidoro Villalobos Racionero, ed. (Madrid: Fondo de Publicaciones Municipal, Comisión de Cultura, Ayuntamiento de Ciudad Real, 1987).

¹²James Hall, *Dictionary of Objects and Symbols in Art* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1979), 127.

features, the globe, represents her inconstancy, although during the Renaissance it also represented the world over which she ruled.¹³ Frequently, she was represented as the opposite of Virtue (who usually rested on a solid block or cube), a contrast that highlights *Fortuna's* fickleness. *Fortuna* was closely associated with the sea. In fact, the globe upon which she stands was also an attribute of Opportunity, or Chance, herself the mistress of the sea, feared by those in ships. Therefore, the goddess was usually represented with a billowing sail, what Hall calls "a reminder of the wind's inconstancy."¹⁴ Less common attributes include a cornucopia, a die and a bridle. In classical antiquity, *Fortuna* was associated with a wheel, which denoted her ability, as Hall states, to "raise the fallen and abase the proud."¹⁵ Although pictorial conventions, all of these visual attributes can be found also as literary metaphors describing the fates of *privados* during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and constantly appear in the narratives and poetry about Rodrigo Calderón.

Furthermore, the association between Calderón, as a prototype of the fallen favorite, and *Fortuna* had a well-established literary tradition in Spain. Scholars of *privanza* or favoritism such as James Boyden and Antonio Feros have noted that the goddess *Fortuna* has been closely associated with Spanish *privados*. Boyden, for example, argues, "[r]eversals of fortune were favoured topics of early modern literature and philosophy."¹⁶ "Writers of the period," says Boyden, "often seem to utilize biographical narrative merely as a perfunctory set-up for the predictable punchline of the subject's fall from power, prosperity or grace."¹⁷ For example, when describing the ordeal of Spanish intellectual Bartolomé de Carranza, with the Inquisition, Juan de Mariana wrote: "it seems that he rose so high [simply] in order that his fall might be the more severe."¹⁸ Another example, which Boyden argues was probably one of the most precipitous downfalls of the fifteenth century, was the famous Alvaro de Luna. The favorite, who, like Rodrigo Calderón, lost his head on the scaffold, inspired considerable literature portraying his dramatic rise and even more dramatic fall. "It is difficult to imagine," Boyden writes, "a more striking illustration of the transitory nature of earthly fortune than the spectacle of the constable's [Alvaro de Luna] execution in a public square of Valladolid on 2 June 1453."¹⁹

The *privados* themselves recognized the insecurity, even danger, of their positions. Alvaro de Luna, for instance, wrote a compelling commentary on the nature of *privanza*:

I chose ... to serve as I was in duty bound and as I felt the situation demanded; I deceived myself, for this service has been the cause of my misfortune. How bitter that I should find myself deprived of liberty who more than once have risked life and fortune to preserve your highness's

¹³*Ibid.*

¹⁴*Ibid.*

¹⁵*Ibid.*

¹⁶James Boyden "Fortune Has Stripped You of Your Splendour": Favourites and their Fates in Fifteenth- and Sixteenth-Century Spain," in Elliott and Brockliss, *World of the Favorite*, 26-37. Here, 26.

¹⁷*Ibid.*, 26-27.

¹⁸Juan de Mariana. Quoted in *ibid.*, 27.

¹⁹*Ibid.*

freedom! I am well aware that for my great sins I have angered God, and I will consider it a boon if I can placate his rage through these travails.²⁰

Fickleness, danger, inconstancy were all recurrent themes in the literature of *privanza*. Boyden points out that maritime metaphors were quite common in the political writings of the time. Seventeenth-century historian Luis Cabrera de Córdoba, for instance, described royal favor “as treacherous as the sandbanks of Flanders.”²¹ Antonio Feros, in his study of the Duke of Lerma, points out that contemporaries were well aware that there was a fundamental law regarding kings and their favorites. The fall of the favorite was completely up to the whims of the monarch: “Nothing could stop his fall—neither his offices, nor riches, creatures or allies.”²² Although the favorite reinforced the monarch’s power, and by doing so accumulated titles and wealth for himself, his dependence on the king was such that a loss of favor could forever compromise his house and servants.²³ Given the nature of *privanza*, it is easy to understand why its association with *Fortuna* was so frequent.

The eulogy that the Dominican friar, Fernando de Araque,²⁴ gave upon the death of the Duke of Lerma, the patron of Rodrigo Calderón, clearly reveals seventeenth-century beliefs regarding the nature of *privanza* and its relationship with *Fortuna*:

... You were not a king, but you equaled the greatest monarchs in the world. I also know that everyone says that you obtained Philip III’s *privanza* using common human means, but I must defend you by saying that your ascent was founded on your virtues, your religiosity and your love of God. These are the qualities that made you dominant over Fortune during so many years. And even if the entire world celebrated your downfall, they were wrong because nothing can cast you down from the throne of your magnificence.²⁵

The iconography of *Fortuna* can be clearly observed in this text. Virtue is represented as the opposite of *Fortuna*; that is why the author made the point to affirm that Lerma’s ascent and *privanza* was not merely based on chance (*Fortuna*) but on his talents (Virtue). Thus, Araque implied that Lerma’s image for posterity should be kept intact and free from criticism.

In his seminal study of Baroque culture, José Antonio Maravall points out that in seventeenth-century Spain, *Fortuna* “was conceived as the mover of the changes and the cause of the movement that disturbed the sphere of humans.”²⁶ Nevertheless, Araque’s sermon illustrates another aspect of the idea of fortune in the seventeenth century: personal agency. This personal agency can be seen in the writings of the time, many of which counseled, according to Maravall, how “to rely on the occasion” in order “to attain

²⁰Alvaro de Luna to King Juan II. Quoted in *ibid.*, 29.

²¹Luis Cabrera de Córdoba. Quoted in *ibid.*, 30.

²²Antonio Feros, *Kingship and Favoritism*, 126.

²³*Ibid.*

²⁴Lerma was an important patron of the Dominican order.

²⁵Fray Fernando de Araque. Quoted in Feros, *Kingship and Favoritism*, 261.

²⁶Maravall, *Culture of the Baroque*, 189.

our intended result."²⁷ "Whoever knows their time will easily overcome them" was a favorite maxim of the time.²⁸ "The idea of fortune," writes Maravall, "did not signify that an inexorable factum- favorable or adverse- had descended upon them; nor had pure chance had to be passively tolerated by the human being."²⁹ For this reason, there were numerous treatises which counseled courtiers how to act in order to avoid being a victim of the changes of fortune.

This was the case with Antonio de Guevara (1481-1545), an influential courtly writer in sixteenth-century Spain, who wrote an important treatise in 1539: *Aviso de privado ó despertador the cortesano*. In that text, which became very popular in Spain and underwent several editions during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Guevara exhorted his readers to be suspicious of the whims of *Fortuna*. In fact, the first advice to would-be *privados* was related to this idea:

The man that has [the honor or *privanza* or grandeur in this life] because of merit has more value than the one that has it but does not deserve it. Fortune has given you the fame and favor of *privanza*; for this reason, sir, you should not trust her because proud buildings are easily demolished by earthquakes, and on top of the highest mounts lightning strikes, and the most generous of peoples are hit by the plague, and in the greenest branches the birds will be hunted, and the quietest calm is the sign of the greatest tempest, and prolonged health foreshadows grave illness; what I want to say is that the ones that reach the highest recognition are the ones that will fall to the greatest subjection.³⁰

In this passage, Guevara elaborates on the idea that the meteoric rise of a favorite will unfaithfully be followed by a corresponding fall. The danger, wrote Guevara, was that the ones who soar could not gradually descend, but would forcibly crash down. Therefore, Guevara counseled the *privado* to be careful and be wary of their "friends" who would pledge fidelity, because those would be the first to condemn as the winds of *Fortuna* veer off: "because many of those who offer to take up arms on our behalf will be the first ones to throw the first stone."³¹ Guevara identified *Fortuna* with hypocritical men, who lavishly grant complements (flatter), only to later hand out criticisms with equally intense cruelty. For this reason, wrote Guevara, "I counsel prudent and cautious men to trust *Fortuna* less, the more favor she shows."³²

²⁷*Ibid.*, 191.

²⁸*Ibid.*

²⁹*Ibid.*

³⁰"La honra ó la privanza ó la grandeza d'esta vida, más vale el hombre que la merece y no la tiene que el que la tiene y no la merece. Muy grande y muy encumbrada es la privanza do os ha encumbrado fortuna, por eso debéis, señor, menos que otro cortesano, fiaros d'ella porque á los superbos edificios derruecan los terremotos, y sobre los más altos montes caen los rayos, y por los pueblos más generosos entra la pestilencia, y en las ramas más verdes arman á los pájaros la liga, y la calma más quieta es señal de mayor tempestad, y la salud muy prolongada es vigilia de grave enfermedad; quiero por lo dicho decir que los que están mas altos estados están á caer más sujetos." Antonio de Guevara, *Aviso de privado ó despertador de cortesanos [1539]*, A. Alvarez de la Villa, ed. (Paris: Louis-Michaud, 1912), 30-31. This and the following translations are the author's own.

³¹"Porque muchos de los que se ofrecen á tomar por nosotros armas son después los primeros que nos arrojan las piedras." *Ibid.*, 34.

³²"Ni mas ni menos hace fortuna con aquellos que algún tiempo están en su gracia; la cual, cuanto más tiempo

Guevara's admonitions and reflections, although written in 1539, encapsulate the essence of the narratives and poetry describing Rodrigo Calderón's fall from grace. This can be observed in the writings of one of the greatest Spanish Golden Age authors, Francisco de Quevedo. In his *Grandes anales de quince días*, Quevedo celebrates Calderón's demeanor during the procession towards the scaffold, while lamenting the reversal of fortune experienced by the *privado*:

Everyone admired his valor and fortitude, and each movement that he made was considered a heroic deed. Because he died, not only with spirit, but also with grace, and (if it can be said) with disdain. And he was able to mock many who were there to enjoy his humiliation. His Christianity was not separated from his dashing behavior, and his humility from his fortitude. Oh, secrets of God! Even the Main Square had its revenge from Calderón's haughtiness. The one that cleared it for the death of the bulls, now filled it with people to see his.³³

Quevedo's passage immediately brings to mind Guevara's images, which so eloquently described the laws of *Fortuna*- what comes up must inevitably come down.

Reversal of fortune can be seen also as the foundation of Gerónimo Gascón de Torquemada's biography of Calderón, *Nacimiento, vida, prisión y muerte de don Rodrigo Calderón, Marqués de Siete Iglesias*. References to *Fortuna* appear in crucial places in the text. One of these references can be seen in a passage that describes a conversation between Calderón and his confessor, Father Gregorio de Pedrosa. Calderón explained how during the height of his *privanza* he had a premonition that as he found himself in such fortune and grace, he felt he was going to be equally disgraced and humiliated:

During a festival in which I was looked upon by the most famous courtiers, princes, ministers, ladies, gentleman and the king, as I was in a beautiful horse, with my baton, respected and revered by all, I knew that even though I had enemies, nobody was capable of confronting me. And seeing myself like this, I thought to myself, for God's sake that I found myself in such high place without deserving it; I am afraid that those that see me triumphant this day, should see me in this same main square lose my life in a dishonorable way.³⁴

á uno regala y halaga, tanto más después se encrudece contra su persona, y por esto aconsejaría yo al hombre prudente y cuerdo que cuanto menos le fuese contraria fortuna tanto menos fiase d'ella." *Ibid.*, 35.

³³"Admiraron todos el valor y entereza suya, y cada movimiento que hizo le contaron por hazaña, porque murió no sólo con brío sino con gala, y (si se puede decir) con desprecio. Y pudo tener vanidad de la burla que hizo a muchos prevenidos para vengarse tanto en su flaqueza como en su afrenta. No apartó la cristiandad de la bizarria, ni la humildad de la entereza. ¡Oh secretos de Dios! Que hasta la plaza se desquitó de su soberbia; pues quien siempre la despejaba para la muerte de un toro, aquel día la llenó de gente para que viese la suya." Quevedo, "Grandes anales de quince días," 753.

³⁴"Dijole luego ay P(adre) mio que vio como pudiera yo muchos dias antes de mi prission a ver anunciado y prevenido este dia y muerte inominiosa y afrentossa que he de tener en essa placa publica de Madrid- Como seria le dijo su confessor por q(ue) en dia de toros y cañas respondio D(on) Rodrigo de los mas celebres que en la corte sean visto en el qual se hallaron los reyes me vi tan desvancido de verme a los ojos de mi Rey, y de las damas y de tantos principes y señores y consejeros, y a los ojos de mas de cien mil almas que con atencion me miravan en un hermosso cavallo en cuerpo con mi baston tan respetado y

It is doubtful that Calderón actually said these words, which nevertheless, are very revealing of the underlying beliefs regarding the fate of the fallen favorite. The passage reflects Guevara's warning to men who obtained honor and grandeur not by virtue, but by chance. As noted in Guevara's passage, these undeserving men should be suspicious of fortune because "the ones that reach the highest recognition are the ones that will fall to the greatest subjection."³⁵

The same concept is expressed in a poetic narrative of the *privanza* and fall of Rodrigo Calderón, published in Barcelona in 1621, the year of Calderón's execution: *Dos romances a don Rodrigo Calderón por un vecino de la Ciudad Real*. In the following stanza, Sebastián Flores who calls himself an important citizen of Royal City, wrote:

Fortune elevated you
to gentleman, from being a servant
but like the stone in the core,
she put you back in your place³⁶

A few stanzas later, Flores continued to elaborate on this idea, by making contrasts between Calderón's former glory and his inevitable fall. The images in the following three stanzas correspond to Guevara's prediction that those who received excessive adulation would unequivocally be humbled:

Who used to see you night and day
going and coming to the palace,
with a thousand servants and pages,
by the grandees respected!

Who used to see you Captain
of the guard,³⁷ so unsullied,
that only your shadow
made the strong soldier tremble!

Who used to see you such a hearthrob,
rustling silks and brocades!
... and now you are seen, Marquis,
like a solitary bird.³⁸

reverenciado de todos y que aunque a mi parecer tenia enemigos ninguno se atrevia a declararseme- y viendome assi dije entre mi valgame Dios que me bea yo en tan alta fortuna sin mereerlo que seria silos que ahora me ven triunfando y otros tantos mass me viessen algun dia en esta misma placa privar de la vida afrentosamente q(ue) lo temo arto." Gascón de Torquemada, *Nacimiento, vida, prisión y muerte de Rodrigo Calderón*, folio 11.

³⁵Guevara, *Aviso de privado*, 31.

³⁶"La fortuna os levantó/ a señor, siendo criado,/ mas como la piedra al centro,/ os vuelve al primer estado." Flores, *Dos romances*, 19.

³⁷Calderón was the Captain of the German Guard, a position that allowed him to go through the streets of Madrid with a cortege and lavishly clothed.

³⁸"¡Quién os vido noche y día/ salir, y entrar en Palacio,/ con mil lacayos y pajes,/ de los Grandes respetado!! ¡Quién os vido Capitán/ de la guarda, tan lozano,/ que sólo de vuestra sombra/ temblaba el

Flores also pointed out the dangers of *privanza*, utilizing the popular maritime metaphors associated with reversals of fortune:

I was for a time, although no more,
because, with fortune rolling
from miserable page
I came to be the king's *privado*.

To my voices and desires
he always showed a pleasant face
he like a good king
I like a bad subject

He still wants to go aboard
my rudderless small ship
but in the sea of *privanza*
there are too many opposing winds.³⁹

In the second romance, a description of Calderón's prison and sentence, Flores continued with the theme of *Fortuna*. In the following stanzas, he utilizes another image associated with it: the wheel that determines the fate of its victims. In the second one, he suggests that the wheels of fortune might blow on Calderón's favor yet once more:⁴⁰

There are blows and critical moments
from *Fortuna* and her wheel,
because wealth and *privanza*
with few have constancy.

But there is no general rule,
Marquis, that might not have an exception,
and, if now it is against you,
it might be that favor returns.⁴¹

In his *Historia de Felipe III*, Matías de Novoa, a chronicler and long-time member of the royal court, lamented the changing winds of *Fortuna*, as he described how

fuerte soldado!! ;Quién os vido tan galán/ cruzir sedas y brocados!! ...Y ahora os miro, marqués,/ cual pájaro solitario.//” Flores, *Dos romances*, 19.

³⁹“Fui algún tiempo; ya no soy,/ que, la fortuna rodando,/ de misero pajejico/ vine a ser del rey privado.// A mis voces y deseos/ Mostró siempre el rostro grato./ El hizo como buen rey,/ y yo como mal vasallo.// Ya quiere dar al través/ mi barquillo desmandado,/ que en el mar de la *privanza*/ hay muchos vientos contrarios.//” *Ibid.*, 20

⁴⁰Boethius (c. 480- c. 524) in the *Consolation of Philosophy* described Fortune's wheel as that which “raises the fallen and abases the proud.” Hall, *Dictionary*, 127.

⁴¹“Son golpes y trances varios/ de la fortuna y su rueda,/ que la riqueza y *privanza*/ con pocos tienen firmeza.// Mas no hay regla general,/ marqués, que excepción no tenga,/ y, si ahora os es contraria, podrá ser que a favor vuelva.//” Flores, *Dos romances*, 22.

Calderón's house and goods were seized in Madrid, leaving his wife and children homeless and without recourse: "So inconstant are the goods given by *Fortuna*, so ephemeral the honors and human recognition!"⁴² Gascón de Torquemada also emphasized in his narrative the feelings of despair caused by the whims of *Fortuna*. The author wrote that when Calderón said his good byes to his jailers, they "began to shed tears and scream ... and the public was so shocked to see such a spectacle that they were shrieking with pain."⁴³ When the executioner slit Rodrigo Calderón's throat, Gascón de Torquemada described the onlookers as "disconsolate, screaming a thousand wails, as they witnessed such a lamentable case."⁴⁴

Matías de Novoa made another moralizing comment on the whims of *Fortuna* and the fate of those who find themselves elevated by it: "[t]he necessity in which Calderón's wife and children found themselves in after having enjoyed so much wealth was such that this was sufficient to disillusion those who seek wealth and fortune with so much eagerness and thirst of self-aggrandizement."⁴⁵ In another passage, as he described Calderón's brush with torture at the hands of the Inquisitors, Matías de Novoa continued to protest the whims of *Fortuna*: "[w]hat disparate voices have put together the inconsistency of the times and the variability and lies of *Fortuna*!"⁴⁶

The perception of danger and inconstancy that characterized the system of *privanza*, to which all *privados* were subjected, was encapsulated in two phrases. The first, by Matías de Novoa, says: "The more that one goes higher, everything comes down, in an instant!"⁴⁷ The second can be found in the last page of Gascón de Torquemada's narrative: "Humiliate me Lord, because with humility I will find salvation and with arrogance my fall."⁴⁸ Both expressions can be seen as the ultimate moral lesson. In the seventeenth century, when success was based on chance (*Fortuna*), the results could be disastrous for the individual. For the seventeenth-century writers discussed in this paper, the goddess *Fortuna* offered an ideal metaphor to describe and rationalize Rodrigo Calderón's fall and execution. This manner of representation eloquently emphasized the tragedy of the story by contrasting the *privado*'s former political and social triumphs to his subsequent failures.

⁴² "¡Tan inconstantes son los bienes que da la fortuna, tan caducas las honras y grandezas humanas!" Matías de Novoa, *Historia de Felipe III*, 166.

⁴³ "Aquí comenzaron todos a derramar lagrimas y a dar gritos viendo su grande esfuerzo y una perss(ona) tan venerable q(ue) parecia y hacia respecto en los q(ue) le miravan ...la gente toda estava tan lastimada q(ue) davan mil alaridos dever semejante espectáculo." Gascón de Torquemada, *Nacimiento, vida, prisión y muerte de Rodrigo Calderón*, f 19.

⁴⁴ "Hecho el berdugo el cuchillo ala garganta...dejando al pueblo vien desconsolado dando mil gritos apiadados de tan lamentable casso." *Ibid.*, f 25.

⁴⁵ "La necesidad en que se vieron (Calderón's wife and children), habiéndose visto en tanta riqueza, fue la que bastó para desengañar á los que con tanto afan y sed de acrecentarse la buscan." Matías de Novoa, *Historia de Felipe III*, 167.

⁴⁶ "¡Que voces tan dispares han juntado aquí la inconstancia de los tiempos y la condicion variable y mentirosa de la fortuna!" *Ibid.*, 256.

⁴⁷ "Que tanto y más que le subió, le baja, y todo en un instante." *Ibid.*, 256.

⁴⁸ "Humilladme señor q(ue) humilde me salvare y sobervio me perdere." Gascón de Torquemada, *Nacimiento, vida, prisión y muerte de Rodrigo Calderón*, f 27.

Diverse Affiliations in the City of Angels: Promoting Urban Identity in Eighteenth-century Puebla, Mexico

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Puebla de los Ángeles, eighteenth-century Mexico's "second city" in prestige and importance, housed one of the colony's most devout and ceremonially-inclined populations. The people of Puebla (commonly referred to as *poblanos*) participated in a variety of religious spectacles commemorating patron saint days and Corpus Christi, as well as other more somber occasions marking death and natural disaster. Less overtly religious events, such as celebrations in honor of the royal family and the entrances of new viceroys, also marked the passage of time. Puebla's streets and plazas functioned as rotating sets for a diverse array of public performances.

Puebla "of the Angels" stands eighty miles southeast of the capital of New Spain, at the crossroads of the port of Veracruz and Mexico City.¹ In the seventeenth century, it served as the colony's major center of manufacturing and as an important hub for the distribution of goods arriving from Europe and the Philippines, but at the beginning of the eighteenth century Puebla began a period of economic decline which hastened a drop in population. From a high of approximately 90,000, by the mid-eighteenth century the city's population hovered at around 55,000.² Puebla, nevertheless, retained its reputation as New Spain's "second city," partially because of its textile industry, and partly because it served as the home of many artisans who specialized in the making of hats, soap, candles, confectionery goods, glass, porcelain, paper, leather goods, and ironware. At its foundation, moreover, Puebla had been intended as a city primarily for Spaniards and, despite its ethnically heterogeneous population, the location continued to attract Spanish immigration. According to Puebla's 1777 census, 31.8% of the population identified themselves as Spanish.³

While many *poblanos* experienced a decline in living standards in the eighteenth century, the city continued to enjoy a rich ceremonial life, promoted largely by the municipal council, or *cabildo*, but also by parishes and religious sodalities dispersed throughout the city. In Puebla, as elsewhere in the early modern world, people shaped and affirmed their identities through local associations. During most of the colonial period, the central part of the city, originally intended for Spaniards, contained

¹The colony of New Spain corresponds to the territory of present-day Mexico, and its jurisdiction extended over the Philippines and parts of Western North America, Central America, and the Caribbean.

²Puebla experienced sharp economic and population decline at the beginning of the eighteenth century partially due to the arrival of a reform-minded *alcalde mayor* (or president of the municipal council), who began overseeing the collection of the *alcabala*, the royal tax on purchases and sales. The *alcalde mayor*'s strict policies drove merchants out of Puebla. See Gustavo Rafael Alfaro Ramírez, "La crisis política de la Puebla de los Ángeles. Autoritarismo y oligarquía en el gobierno de don Juan José de Veytia y Linaje," *Relaciones* 99:25 (Summer, 2004), 215-256.

³According to the census, 21.4% classified themselves as Indian, 16.1% as *mestizo*, and the rest of the population fell within one of the *casta*, or racially mixed, designations. See Miguel Marín Bosch, *Puebla neocolonial, 1777-1831: Casta, ocupación y matrimonio en la segunda ciudad de Nueva España* (Guadalajara: El Colegio de Jalisco, 1999), 67.

approximately one-half of Puebla's population. This nucleus encompassed the ethnically and socially diverse parish of Saint Joseph and the primarily Spanish or Spanish-Creole *Sagrario Metropolitano*, while indigenous people generally congregated in three parishes on the outskirts of the central city. Nine neighborhoods, or *barrios*, overlapped the parish boundaries. Members of the same profession commonly lived in the same *barrio*, and expressed their faith through confraternities located in one of their neighborhood churches.⁴

This article focuses on how Puebla's eighteenth-century councilmen staged public rituals that helped superimpose a civic identity over more local affiliations to *barrio*, parish, and guild. By sponsoring events that transcended neighborhood divisions, municipal councilmen helped to promote a civic consciousness. At the same time, Puebla's ceremonies generally conformed to a model of society prevalent throughout the Catholic world; that of the spiritual body of Christ, or by extension, the early modern body politic. The social and political composition of the colony mirrored the spiritual body of Christ in that, paraphrasing the famous passage from *Romans*, Christians (or, in this case, subjects) made up one body with many members, but not all members had the same or equal function.⁵ Many elaborate commemorations not only provided space for incorporating different groups, but actually *required* the participation of subjects from the full spectrum of Puebla's ethnically and socially heterogeneous population.

Historians have long recognized the importance of ceremony for forging national or civic consciousness. Leaders often have played on historic myths and have "invented traditions" to encourage political unity.⁶ Historians have examined how in the early modern period, French, Italian, and Spanish rulers traced their lines of descent back to the mythical figure Hercules, and incorporated the hero's image into works of festive art.⁷ Other scholars have focused their attention more on local contexts and the promotion of ceremony by urban leaders. Richard Trexler, for example, has illustrated how the civic culture of Renaissance Florence bound people together under the fiction of communitarian brotherhood, and Edward Muir has shown how the sovereign of early modern Venice created a mystical aura of legitimacy by linking his rule to the cult of the apostle Saint Mark, who supposedly blessed the city while evangelizing in Italy.⁸

Scholars of colonial Spanish America have also examined the political utility of public ritual, but instead of focusing on the local reasons councilmen had for sponsoring ceremony, scholars like Linda Curcio-Nagy and Ángel Lopez Cantos have placed more emphasis on how ceremony worked to legitimize the Crown. Recently, however, scholars have begun to reassess this emphasis. Writing about seventeenth-century Lima, Peru,

⁴For a description of the urban landscape, see Juan Villa Sánchez and Francisco Javier de la Peña, *Puebla sagrada y profana: Informe dado a su muy ilustre ayuntamiento el año de 1746 (facsimil)*, rev. ed. (Puebla: Benemérita Universidad Autónoma de Puebla, 1997; first published 1835).

⁵See *Romans* 12:4-5.

⁶See Eric J. Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, eds., *The Invention of Tradition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), esp. 1-14.

⁷Diego Angulo Iñiguez, *La mitología y el arte español del renacimiento* (Madrid: Imprenta y Editorial Maestre, 1952), 70-73; Gothard Karl Galinsky, *The Heracles Theme: The Adaptations of the Hero in Literature from Homer to the Twentieth Century* (Totowa, NJ: Rowan and Littlefield, 1972), 191; Peter Burke, *The Fabrication of Louis XIV* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1992), 26; Jonathan Brown and J. H. Elliot, *A Palace for a King: The Buen Retiro and the Court of Philip IV* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1980), 157-160.

⁸Richard C. Trexler, *Public Life in Renaissance Florence* (NY: Academic Press, 1980), esp. 213-278; Edward Muir, *Civic Ritual in Renaissance Venice* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), 186.

Alejandra Osorio has argued that while colonial ceremonies had a "civilizing mission" to indoctrinate subjects into European culture, they also recognized diversity.⁹ Similarly, I emphasize public ritual's capacity for strengthening the legitimacy of municipal leaders, while allowing for the expression of diverse affiliations, unified under an overarching political identity. This focus complements historian Solange Alberro's assessment of baroque ceremonies as serving an integrative, as well as a "federalist" or corporative function in Mexico City.¹⁰ Yet, as I emphasize, ceremonies did not challenge social hierarchies. While serving the basic objectives of political domination, colonial ceremonies recognized the validity and inevitability of inequality.

The public rituals sponsored by Puebla's councilmen served to, above all else, exalt their positions within the city and strengthen the *cabildo's* corporate identity. Councilmen, or *regidores*, did this by primarily tying their authority to the king of Spain, by presenting themselves as the patriarchs of the city, and by mimicking the customs of the European elite. Puebla's aldermen enjoyed a variety of ceremonial prerogatives which they jealously guarded as distinguishing markers vis-à-vis other members of the elite. Individuals paid great sums for their positions on the council and expected to project their social and political standing to the populace. Councilmen throughout the Spanish Empire benefited from a host of special privileges, which trickled down from corporations farther up the scale of colonial power; that is, *cabildo* members enjoyed modified versions of the same privileges enjoyed by the king, viceroys, and members of the *audiencia*.¹¹ These, in turn, helped define councilmen as representatives of the royal person.

Spanish American ceremonies reflected hierarchical divisions based on race and class, codified into written law, but reaffirmed and validated during public performances.¹² In Puebla, as elsewhere in the empire, councilmen made a concerted effort to integrate people, however unequally, into public rituals. These reflected the veritable "pecking order" of colonial society.¹³

⁹Alejandra Osorio, "Inventing Lima: The Making of an Early Modern Colonial Capital, ca. 1540-ca. 1640" (Dissertation, SUNY Stony Brook, 2001).

¹⁰Solange Alberro, "Barroquismo y criollismo en los recibimientos hechos a don Diego López Pacheco Cabrera y Bobadilla, virrey de Nueva España, 1640: un estudio preliminar," *Colonial Latin American Historical Review* 8: 4 (Fall, 1999), 444.

¹¹By the late eighteenth century, in addition to Spain, the empire extended over western North America, Mesoamerica, Central America, and with the exception of Portuguese Brazil, the rest of South America. Administrative units known as viceroalties divided the regions; these included New Spain, Peru, La Plata, and New Granada. Imperial control also extended over Chile, Florida, Puerto Rico, Cuba, Santo Domingo, Louisiana, the Philippines, and the Nootka colony (Vancouver), as well as the Kingdom of Naples and Duchy of Parma in Europe. In Spanish America, *audiencias* were judicial districts and courts of appeal. *Viceroy*s served as the governing heads of colonies, and as the presidents of *audiencias*.

¹²Ángel López Cantos, *Juegos, fiestas y diversiones en la América Española* (Madrid: Editorial MAPFRE, 1992), 20.

¹³Mark A. Burkholder, "Honor and Honors in Colonial Spanish America," in Lyman Johnson and Sonya Lipsett-Rivera, eds., *The Faces of Honor: Sex, Shame, and Violence in Colonial Spanish America*, (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1998), 18-44. Here, 29. During Corpus Christi in Mexico City, for example, cathedral chapter members walked closest to the Eucharist and select members of the secular *cabildo* carried the staffs of the pallium. See Linda A. Curcio-Nagy, "Giants and Gypsies: Corpus Christi in Colonial Mexico City," in William H. Beezley, William E. French and Cheryl English Martin, eds., *Rituals of Rule, Rituals of Resistance: Public Celebrations and Popular Culture in Mexico*, (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 1994), 1-26.

Corpus Christi, for example, spotlighted the unity of Puebla's Catholics, but also the subordination of particular groups. As art historian Carolyn Dean has argued for seventeenth-century Cuzco, the procession, which celebrated Christ's triumph over sin, by extension, also celebrated the Spanish Crown's triumph over non-Christian people. In order to underscore this implicit function, Corpus Christi showcased cultural difference by incorporating different groups wearing their traditional dress into the procession.¹⁴ Regardless of enjoying the reputation as the "city of Spaniards," Puebla had a sizeable indigenous population which councilmen sought actively to include in the festivities.¹⁵

While the ceremony incorporated all social groups, it did so on unequal terms. Indeed, more than provide a reflection of Puebla's plebeian population, the ceremony sought to *represent*—in exaggerated form—colonization and imperialism. Indigenous people performed in the ceremonies, but not as themselves, or as the residents of the *barrios* of Analco or Saint Sebastian, but as "conquered Indians" in the abstract. In Puebla, as in other Spanish cities, the procession incorporated *cabezudos*, papier-mâché dolls with oversized heads. Squadrons of Indians danced around wearing these heads, grossly painted and elaborately dressed to represent indigenous women as a conquered group. Others donned heads representing Spanish, African, and Moorish women. Councilmen, therefore, used gender, as well as ethnicity, to underscore subordination to Church and State. Aldermen took great care with these dolls, periodically paying artisans to retouch them and wig makers to repair and style their hair.¹⁶

There are few recorded instances of Puebla's indigenous population expressing its own cultural autonomy during *cabildo*-sponsored ceremonies. Instead, ceremonies glorified conquest and subjugation. For the most part, public spectacle worked to create a sense of solidarity, but, as with the example of Corpus Christi, organizers also acknowledged the inequality inherent in colonialism. For big events, like viceregal entrances or oath ceremonies, aldermen expected indigenous people to contribute in some way, but exactly how fell outside the jurisdiction of Puebla's municipal council. Art historian Nancy Fee has pointed to lack of references of indigenous participation in Puebla's viceregal entrances as evidence for the *poblano* council's Eurocentric sensibility.¹⁷ This interpretation does not fall outside the realm of possibility; Puebla's aldermen were either Spanish or Spanish-creoles, considered their city New Spain's "European" city *par excellence*, and tried to remain true to the dictates of European court ceremonial. Yet, a lack of indigenous participation was not specific to the ceremonies of Puebla. Anecdotal examples notwithstanding, Spanish American ceremonies did not generally celebrate indigenous culture, but sought to approximate European models.¹⁸ The *cabildo* minutes do not reflect that Puebla's Indians participated widely in public

¹⁴Carolyn Dean, *Inka Bodies and the Body of Christ: Corpus Christi in Colonial Cuzco* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1999), 1.

¹⁵As in Mexico City, Native Americans built elaborate *sombras*, or flowered arches, for the processional route. Every year, the *cabildo* paid indigenous governors 60 pesos for the Indians' labor and gathered squadrons of native dancers to perform during the procession. See, for example, Cuenta de Corpus, 1708, Archivo Municipal de Puebla (hereafter AMP), Libro de Cuentas (hereafter LC) 1, f62v.

¹⁶Por los gastos de Corpus Christi, 1741, AMP, LC 5, ff116-116v.

¹⁷Nancy Fee, "La Entrada Angelopolitana: Ritual and Myth in the Viceregal Entry in Puebla de los Angeles," *The Americas* 52:3 (January, 1996), 283-320.

¹⁸Víctor Mínguez, *Los reyes distantes: imágenes del poder en el México virreinal* (Castelló de la Plana: Publicacions de la Universitat Jaume I, 1995), 24.

ceremonies. Rather, they mainly describe indigenous people serving auxiliary functions, such as cleaning the streets, building flowered arches, or acting as street musicians.

This contrasts with Mexico City, where some accounts of viceregal entrances emphasize native participation and the incorporation of indigenous iconography into works of ephemeral art. Solange Alberro has referred to the "historical self-awareness" of Mexico City's Jesuits who, in 1640, incorporated native dance and costumes into a ceremony celebrating the arrival of Viceroy Diego López Pacheco Cabrera y Bobadilla. By loosely referencing a native past, they expressed what can be regarded as a nascent creole identity.¹⁹ Eventually, Mexico City's creoles would become more comfortable with New Spain's indigenous past, and for the 1681 entrance of the Count of Paredes into the capital, famed intellectual Carlos Sigüenza y Góngora designed a triumphal arch that visually equated Roman and Aztec Gods, thereby arguing that, for creoles, the prehispanic past represented their legitimate "classical" heritage.²⁰ Yet, because, as many scholars have noted, creole identity flourished mainly in eighteenth-century Mexico City, these examples of "native" iconography may have represented more of an exception than a rule.

In Puebla, published accounts of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century ceremonies made no comparable references to indigenous participation or history, and *cabildo* minutes focused exclusively on creole participation within a European framework. Yet, the failure of published accounts and *cabildo* minutes to acknowledge indigenous participation may be more a consequence of the *poblano* elite's vision of "Spanishness," than a true reflection of indigenous participation; when pondering the absence of references to the indigenous population's role in public ceremony, one must keep in mind that in Puebla, as in many New World cities, native people had their own parallel *cabildo*. Unfortunately, contemporary scholars have yet to locate documentation related to Puebla's indigenous government.

Enigmatic references in the "Spanish" *cabildo* minutes suggest that Puebla's indigenous people did in fact participate in royal ceremonies, but on their own terms. For the royal oath ceremony for Luis I in 1724 (ruled January-August, 1724), for example, councilmen did not describe any plans for the city's indigenous community to hold their own particular celebrations. A petition by a master carpenter, however, does make mention of an independent indigenous ceremony. The carpenter had purchased the right to hold bullfights in the city's main plaza for three days with the understanding that he would keep the profits. On 13 October, he asked the council to extend the period for another three days, stating that he would begin holding bullfights on Tuesday the seventeenth and not the day before because he had heard that this was the day that the indigenous governor wanted to make his ceremonial entrance into the city.²¹ This suggests that despite the possible Eurocentrism of the *poblano* elite, Puebla's indigenous

¹⁹See Solange Alberro, "Barroquismo y criollismo," 443-460.

²⁰Anthony Pagden, "Identity Formation in Spanish America," in Nicholas Canny and Anthony Pagden, eds., *Colonial Identity in the Atlantic World, 1500-1800* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 72-73.

²¹In the 1970s, the Biblioteca Nacional de Antropología e Historia microfilmed Puebla's *cabildo* minutes. Since then, the library has renumbered the folio pages. Because the numbering no longer coincides, I cite the minutes according to where I consulted them. Petición de Antonio de Arteaga sobre que se concedan tres días más de toros, *Actas*, 13 October, 1724, AMP-Biblioteca Nacional de Antropología e Historia (hereafter AMP-BNAH), AC 40, f310v.

leaders organized their own, independent public functions through their parallel governing body.

For royal oath ceremonies and funerary rites, however, councilmen made sure to include the region's natives in city-wide commemorations. Indians, like all royal subjects, needed to mourn the deceased king and praise the successor. Since the sixteenth century councilmen had included Indians in oath ceremonies. In 1557, following the *cabildo's* oath ceremony, or *jura*, in honor of the new king, Philip II (1556-1598), the *caciques* from the surrounding villages of Tepeaca, Tecamachalco, Guatinchan, Tecali, Ocopetlayuca, Quechula, and Totomehuacan took turns rising upon a stage set up in the center of Puebla to give their community's oath of loyalty to him. Over two centuries later, Puebla's councilmen codified into law indigenous participation in royal oath ceremonies; the 1789 ordinances of the city mandated that upon receiving news of an impending *jura* celebration, the *Tribunal de Fiel Ejecutoria* (the tribunal that enforced the quality and price of local goods), had to alert the indigenous governor of Puebla and the leaders of the outlying villages so that they could come to the city and participate in the *jura del rey*.²²

Later, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, surrounding indigenous communities held their own oaths of loyalty, while the indigenous leaders of Puebla participated in the city's *jura del rey*. Puebla's two *cabildos* processed from the municipal palace to the home of the royal standard bearer, and then back to the main plaza for the declaration of the oath. Indigenous leaders walked at the head of the line, followed by the secular *cabildo*. The ordering of the procession visually communicated the subordination of the indigenous population, who needed to be "watched over" by Spanish imperial officials.

While articulating the paternalism of the colonial system, the ceremonies also celebrated the indigenous republic as a semi-autonomous corporation. There are signs that Puebla's ethnically heterogeneous indigenous community expressed its cultural independence during royal ceremonies. In 1760, for example, the native governor led the first wing of the procession, surrounded by numerous Indians all wearing their "ancient" costumes and feathered headdresses.²³ Public ceremonies reaffirmed indigenous identity, either as subordinates of the Crown or as culturally independent and free-willed subjects. The *cabildo's* ceremonies, in effect, absorbed groups, while recognizing their distinct place within the colonial system.

Afro-Mexicans also participated in many of the *cabildo's* events, which provided an opportunity for reaffirming both their social autonomy and their loyalty to the colonial system. In Puebla, militias became organized according to racial categories established by the Crown; that is, *moreno*, *pardo*, or white in composition.²⁴ On the eve and day of oath ceremonies, Afro-Mexican militiamen stood guard over the main plaza, and while a cross-section of individuals may have interpreted their presence as a warning against disloyalty to the Crown, the city's free-colored population may have taken pride in the

²²Libro que contiene los patronatos, 1769, AMP, Libros Varios 20, f514v.

²³Jura de Carlos III, 1760, AMP, Expedientes 205, Legajo 2417, f191r.

²⁴Ben Vinson, *Bearing Arms for His Majesty: The Free-Colored Militia in Colonial Mexico* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001), 17. Colonial authorities regarded all Afro-Mexicans as *castas*, a legal category for mixed-race people, including those of African descent. The term *pardo* referred to dark-skinned blacks and *moreno* to light-skinned blacks.

inclusion of the *pardo* regiment. Descriptions of oath ceremonies discuss the participation of soldiers from varying social groups. In 1724, for the oath ceremony in honor of Luis I, cavalymen from Puebla's white elite rode atop their horses in the company of richly-dressed lackeys, while members of the battalion of "merchants" (Spanish or Creole as well) also stood guard in the plaza dressed in costumes appropriate for "galas." Finally, within the same space, but off to the southeast side of the plaza, richly-attired members of the *pardo* regiment stood poised to guard the plaza and honor the king.²⁵ By 1701, Afro-Mexicans claimed membership in various confraternities within the city, and guarded their right to participate in public processions. Some of the leading members of these confraternities were tailors, and colored militiamen came largely from this occupational category.²⁶

In colonial New Spain, ethnicity, occupation, neighborhood residency, and confraternity membership often coalesced, and public ceremonies organized participants along these distinct lines. For example, Spaniards belonged to specific religious sodalities, such as the confraternities of Jesus the Nazarene, the Holy Cross, and Our Lady of the Rosary, while other confraternities welcomed Indians and *castas*.²⁷ Councilmen, like all colonial subjects, could claim membership in several confraternities, but all were required to join the confraternity of the Holy Burial. When joining the *cabildo*, *alcaldes mayores* and *regidores* vowed to participate in the organization's Good Friday procession and "pass the plate," or collect alms, for the confraternity.²⁸ Some sodalities, such as that of Jesus the Nazarene, included residents of the parish of Saint Joseph who also worked in the same occupation.²⁹ Ceremonies, like Corpus Christi, the procession in honor of the Holy Burial of Christ on Good Friday, and royal funerary honors, required the participation of the city's confraternities which were divided by occupation, ethnicity, and social standing.

Ceremonies reaffirmed corporate distinctiveness because all members of the metaphorical body of Christ and body politic played an important role in society. Aldermen, therefore, had to maintain a delicate balance between the city's various parts and the whole, and some public ceremonies proved particularly adaptable to maintaining equilibrium. During the procession for the Holy Burial of Christ on Good Friday, councilmen ordered guilds to carry an angel during the procession.³⁰ While guilds throughout the colony carried effigies of angels during Good Friday processions, in Puebla the practice resonated with the city's distinct identity as a "city of angels."

By simply participating in the event alongside members of other guilds, artisans professed their membership in the urban polity. Puebla, however, has a unique origin

²⁵ *Actas*, AMP, AC 40, ff 313r-318v.

²⁶ El Señor Inquisidor Fiscal de este Santo Oficio contra Don Juan de Jauregui y Barcena, canónigo doctoral de la Santa Iglesia de la Puebla y provisor ... por haber impedido que las cofradías de aquella ciudad asistiesen a la fiesta de San Pedro Mártir, 1699, AGN, Inquisición 711, Expediente 2, ff 108r-225v; Vinson, *Bearing Arms for His Majesty*, 110.

²⁷ El Señor Inquisidor Fiscal de este Santo Oficio contra Don Juan de Jauregui y Barcena, canónigo doctoral de la Santa Iglesia de la Puebla y provisor ... por haber impedido que las cofradías de aquella ciudad asistiesen a la fiesta de San Pedro Mártir, 1699, AGN, Inquisición 711, Expediente 2, ff 108r-225v.

²⁸ *Actas*, 1 January, 1764, AMP-BNAH, AC 51, f 256v.

²⁹ Miguel Ángel Cuenya Mateos, *Puebla de los Angeles en tiempos de una peste colonial: una mirada al torno Matlazahuat de 1737* (Zamora, Michoacán: Colegio de Michoacán, 1999), 64-65.

³⁰ Mandamiento sobre los boticarios, AMP, Reales Cédulas 18, f 126v.

myth which participants may have recalled during the procession.³¹ Two angels supposedly appeared to the first Bishop of Tlaxcala, Julián Garcés, in a dream and pinpointed for him the site of the city of Puebla, compelling the bishop to search for and find its would-be location. On 29 September, 1531, the feast day of Saint Michael the Archangel, a Mass officially marked the foundation of the city.³² *Poblanos*, therefore, could claim to live in a city blessed by angels. Playing on the city's auspicious beginnings, Puebla's coat-of-arms represented two angels flanking, or essentially guarding, the city.

Since Puebla's establishment, the *cabildo* had committed itself to celebrating Saint Michael's feast day, acknowledging the central role of angels in Puebla's collective history. Public rituals, chronicles, and local hagiographies constantly reminded *poblanos* of the miraculous discovery of their city, and sermons sometimes referred to the "angelic" character of the city and its residents. As many *poblanos* would have likely recalled, not only had angels blessed Puebla at the time of its foundation, but the Archangel, Saint Michael, continued to bless the region by appearing to an Indian in 1631 in the nearby town of San Bernardo; with the approval of the diocesan hierarchy, a shrine flourished at the site and the Archangel's cult grew in popularity. According to hagiographer Francisco de Florencia, while Saint Michael had devotees throughout the diocese, the people of "the city of Angels" proved most devout for obvious reasons. As the prince of the *seraphim*, the first of the nine angelic orders, the Archangel stood at the head of the celestial hierarchy. According to Florencia, he demonstrated special favor to Puebla by sending two of his angels to help found the city.³³ In 1681, a sermon given in the Church of Saint Joseph referred to Puebla as an "Angelic City," and in 1708, a sermon given in the Franciscan convent in honor of the birth of Crown Prince Luis of Spain referred to Puebla as "the illustrious *patria* of the angels."³⁴

In this early modern "city of angels," councilmen and religious leaders managed to celebrate corporate distinctiveness while promoting a civic identity. Corporations acted semi-autonomously but interdependently, much like the parts of the human body; Puebla's confraternities and guilds acted as members and, while the Spanish king

³¹According to Mircea Eliade, "every religious festival, any liturgical time, represents the reactualization of a sacred event that took place in a mythical past." See Mircea Eliade, *The Sacred and the Profane: The Nature of Religious Man*, Willard R. Trask, trans. (San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1959; first printed 1957), 68-69.

³²Villa Sánchez and de la Peña, *Puebla sagrada y profana*, 12-13; Pedro López de Villaseñor, *Cartilla Vieja de la Nobilísima Ciudad de Puebla deducida de los papeles auténticos y libros antiguos, 1781* (Puebla: Secretaría de Cultura, 2001), 260-265; José de Mendizábal, "Efemérides del estado de Puebla (1519-1699)," in Carlos Contreras Cruz and Miguel Ángel Cuenya, eds., *Ángeles y constructores: mitos y realidades en la historia colonial de Puebla (Siglos XVI-XVII)* (Puebla: Benemérita Universidad Autónoma de Puebla, 2000), 319-335. Here, 321.

³³Francisco de Florencia, *Narración de la Maravillosa Aparición, Que Hizo el Arcángel San Miguel a Diego Lázarro de San Francisco, Indio feligrés del Pueblo de S. Bernardo, de la Jurisdicción de Santa Maria Nativitas* (Sevilla: Imprenta de las Siete Revueltas, n.d.), 1-64, 163.

³⁴Nicolás Carrasco Moscoso, *Sermón de el patrocinio, que contra los rayos y tempestades, goza dichosa la ciudad de la Puebla a el esclarecido Patriarca San Joseph* (Puebla: Imprenta de Diego Fernandez de Leon, 1688), 9. Jacinto Bernardez de Ribera, *Sermon que en Accion de Gracias Ofrecio â Dios, y à su Purissima Madre el Convento de las Llagas de Nuestro Seraphico Padre S. Francisco de la Ciudad de la Puebla de los Angeles: Por el dichosissimo nacimiento de N. Principe, y Señor Don Luiz Phelipe el Primero de España* (Mexico City: Viuda de Miguel de Ribera Calderón, 1708), f A1r.

functioned as the head of the body politic at the imperial level, the *cabildo* acted in his stead within the city. The government's ceremonies, therefore, celebrated the unity of the body, while also acknowledging the difference of its parts. In this loose conglomeration of parts, the government actively searched out forces of unity. While religion served as the most obvious social adhesive, the *cabildo* also encouraged civic pride to bind residents. By requiring the inclusion of various corporations, city-wide ceremonies encouraged simultaneously a sense of exclusion and inclusion; all groups participated, but as separate entities with their own particular affiliations. At the same time, they shared and celebrated an identity rooted firmly in their city.

American Intervention in Central Africa: How Minerals and Raw Materials Dictated US Policy towards Zaire and Angola, 1945-1988

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Introduction: The Cold War in Central Africa

The actions of the US in Central Africa were predicated upon securing important mineral commodities through the manipulation of the political situations in that region. However, those actions were, on the whole, at odds with the US ideology of liberty, freedom, and democracy. US support for the coup against the government of Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba in the Congo and subsequent US support for Mobutu Sese Seko's tyrannical regime in Zaire were geared toward consolidating access to the area's mineral wealth. The US was concerned with controlling Zaire's raw materials at all costs while keeping the Soviets out of Angola, Zaire's neighbor. The goal was to maintain a communist-free Central Africa with easy US access to its mineral wealth.

The US adjusted its ideology to secure economic and military advantages in Central Africa. It has been argued that the military and economic needs of the US were secondary to US political objectives in Central Africa. Yet, the unmistakable need for particular minerals and raw materials by certain parts of the US defense apparatus demonstrates that US power was projected into Central Africa in order to stabilize the region for US economic interests, not simply to prevent the penetration of the Soviets' communist ideology.¹ The US desired to maintain the status quo after colonialism had ended. This translated into maintaining economic dominance over the region in order to facilitate the extraction of the rare mineral commodities needed by the US defense apparatus. Friendly African regimes were needed to make this goal a reality.

To this end, the US was involved in coups, assassinations, and covert operations in the region and funneled military assistance through Central Africa. The threat of the Soviets serving as obstacles to US access to Central Africa's mineral resources influenced US policy in the region throughout the Cold War.² It is debatable as to whether the USSR was indeed fully committed to exerting its power and influence in the region.³ The supposed friendly relationship between the USSR and Zaire's first Prime Minister,

¹Michael G Schatzberg, *Mobutu or Chaos? The United States and Zaire, 1960-1990* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1991), 73-74. Most historiography of this period argues that US interests were political. Michael Schatzberg, along with Sean Kelly, argues that the US looked to prop up Mobutu as a means of preventing the Congo from falling into political "chaos," and then keep it from going communist. It becomes obvious after examining the literature and sources on the Congo that the US was geared towards having a strong man in the Congo in order to keep the region open to US economic and military needs, while simultaneously preventing the Soviets from dominating the region and blocking US access to the Congo's mineral wealth. This is the exact opposite of what Schatzberg describes.

²Sean Kelly, *America's Tyrant: The CIA and Mobutu of Zaire* (Lanham, MD: American University Press, 1993), 245.

³Schatzberg, *Mobutu*, 17. Schatzberg argues that the Soviets could only "wish" to bring Zaire into their sphere of influence, but global realities, such as nonexistent logistical capabilities, proved to be far too great a challenge to overcome for the USSR.

Patrice Lumumba, immediately concerned the Americans and led to his assassination and the establishment of a regime friendly to US interests.⁴ A similar situation played out in Angola where the ties of the MPLA (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola) to the USSR led the US to back both the FNLA (National Front for the Liberation of Angola) and UNITA (National Union for the Total Liberation of Angola) as opposition forces. The US sought to prevent the Soviet-backed MPLA from establishing control over the region, as this would be a threat to US economic and military interests.⁵ Though this venture failed and the MPLA captured the majority of territory in Angola, the US viewed events in both of these newly-independent African nations as critically important to the national security of the US.

The US had immense economic and defense interests in Central Africa throughout the Cold War. The US defense system was critically dependent upon particular types of mineral commodities, such as cobalt, chromium, platinum, and copper.⁶ These minerals were used for a variety of defense and military related purposes. The USSR, while economically flawed in many aspects and incapable of battling the US in technology and industrial capacity, had at least one major advantage over the US. The USSR was rich in rare minerals, precisely the ones the US needed to maintain its defense apparatus.⁷ The Soviets were willing to exploit this advantage and the Americans were well aware of the precarious situation in which they could potentially be placed if the Soviets were successful in establishing themselves in a position of power and influence within Central Africa.⁸ The basis of the battle in Central Africa between the two superpowers rested upon which state would succeed in establishing influence over the governments of Zaire and Angola.

The Influence of Central African Mineral Wealth on US Policy

The threat of a Soviet advance into Central Africa had been a foreign policy concern of the Americans since the beginning of the Cold War. As early as 1945, the Americans believed that the Soviets had intentions to bring Africa into their sphere of influence. The concern of the Americans during this early period was due to the belief that the Soviets were searching for nuclear materials in order to build an atomic bomb. US Secretary of State James Byrnes mentioned in 1945 the possibility of the Soviets desiring "uranium deposits in the Belgian Congo" in order to create an atomic bomb.⁹ The fears of the Americans were hardly alleviated by the fact that the Soviets had not pursued an entry into Central Africa. The Soviets in turn recognized US dependence on outside mineral sources. One Soviet official, Major General Lagovskiy, urged the USSR to exploit the US weakness. As Ronald Prain has argued, Lagovskiy was well aware of modern military dependence upon minerals such as "chrome, platinum, nickel, cobalt and titanium. In so far as the West was vulnerable to the supply of these commodities

⁴Kelly, *America's Tyrant*, 41.

⁵George Wright, *The Destruction of a Nation: United States' Policy Towards Angola since 1945* (Chicago: Pluto Press, 1997), 58.

⁶*Ibid.*, 246.

⁷Ronald Prain, "Metals and Africa: Economic Power in an International Setting," *African Affairs* 77:307 (April, 1978), 241.

⁸*Ibid.*

⁹John Lewis Gaddis, *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947* (NY: Columbia University Press, 2000), 267.

Lagovskiy believed the USSR should exploit this weakness."¹⁰ US foreign policymakers' suspicions of the Soviets' goals in the early years of the Cold War laid a foundation for future disputes and confrontations in Central Africa.

A major cause for concern for the US in the early years of the Cold War was the growing awareness of US dependence upon mineral commodities needed in the US defense system. The Korean War had made military advisors aware of the short supply of such materials and some military advisors reported that the US needed to stockpile mineral commodities such as "nickel, cobalt and columbium."¹¹ The reports suggest to upper-level military intelligence officers the need to stockpile such minerals, but also emphasize concentration in those mineral resources where the US would face "serious deficits ... with respect to each of the metals under consideration."¹² If engaged in long-term military conflict, insufficient stockpiling of necessary minerals needed for weaponry could deliver a serious blow to the US defense apparatus. The early 1950s awakened US foreign policymakers to these dangers. The strategy devised by the Eisenhower administration to prevent this possibility made Central Africa a focal point of US foreign policy during the Cold War.

In the 1950s, most of Africa was under European colonial rule. The Eisenhower Administration had no choice but to deal with Central Africa through its colonizers. Angola's example demonstrates how the US played politics to ensure itself of what it deemed critical defense and economic necessities. The discovery of oil in Angola led the Eisenhower Administration to deal directly with the Portuguese government to make sure access to it would be open to US oil firms. The US bought Portugal's assistance through military aid in the form of \$287.4 million to gain access to the newly-discovered Angolan off shore oil reserves.¹³ The Eisenhower Administration denounced European colonialism throughout the world, but in the case of Angola, where US interests were paramount, the issue of colonialism was brushed aside.

Across the border, the US had played an active role in the colonization of what later became the Belgian Congo by supporting its annexation by King Leopold II in 1884.¹⁴ The US and other Western nations were taken aback in 1960 by the independence address given by Patrice Lumumba during his inauguration as the first prime minister of the Congo. His speech was in clear defiance of Western neo-colonialism, and it demonstrated his willingness to fight against turning his nation into an "economic colony" of the West.¹⁵ Lumumba did not last long. He was taken prisoner, tortured, and assassinated just two months after his inaugural speech. The US has been implicated in his assassination, which demonstrates the unpreparedness of the US to put up with a radical, democratic, independent-minded leadership in Central Africa.¹⁶ The US was

¹⁰Prain, "Metals and Africa," 241.

¹¹Papers of Harry S. Truman; Psychological Strategy Board. Memorandum by Edward T. Dickenson, Vice Chairman of National Security Resources Board to James Lay, Jr., Executive Secretary of National Security Council (24 June, 1952), 1.

¹²*Ibid.*, 2.

¹³*Ibid.*, 29.

¹⁴Adam Hochschild, *King Leopold's Ghost: A Story of Greed, Terror, and Heroism in Colonial Africa* (NY: Houghton Mifflin, 1998), 81.

¹⁵*Ibid.*, 301.

¹⁶*Ibid.*, 302.

determined that the end of colonialism would not hinder US access to the riches of Central Africa.

The concern over mineral commodities in Central Africa played an important role in the formation of US foreign policy. US support for Portuguese colonial rule in Angola, the assassination of Lumumba, and promotion of the Mobutu regime in Zaire made it clear that the US was serious about ensuring its ability to gain access to these nations' raw materials. The fear of losing such a valuable region to the Soviets led US foreign policymakers to support regimes that would be anti-Soviet, pro-US, and usually ruled by fierce dictators. According to David Schmitz, "[t]he United States gained friendly if brutal and corrupt allies who provided stability, support for American policies, and a favorable atmosphere for American business."¹⁷ These interests would guide US policy in Central Africa for more than thirty years.

US Interests in Central Africa

US policymakers used the concept of containment to justify their economic needs in Central Africa. Cobalt was the most critical mineral to the US military due to its function in a variety of military, industrial, and scientific applications. The applications of cobalt will be discussed, but the US dependence on foreign sources for cobalt should be understood before advancing to its applications.

The US was almost completely dependent on Zaire for cobalt during the Cold War. As of 1978, the US was 97% import reliant for cobalt. Nearly 80% of its cobalt imports came from Zaire.¹⁸ The US demand for cobalt had an upward trend from the early 1960s through the 1980s. The growth in cobalt use reflected "the metal's high-temperature properties, which became increasingly important during the 1960's and the 1970's," where the trend had been to have hotter operating temperatures.¹⁹ Throughout the latter half of the Cold War, Zaire, the USSR and China were the world's main suppliers of cobalt. Zaire produced roughly 57% of the non-Communist world's output. US strategic interests were influenced by this almost total reliance on cobalt from Zaire.²⁰ For the US, cobalt had been a strategic mineral as early as 1946. The threat of Zaire's domination by a foreign rival of the US was a major concern.

Cobalt was an essential product in the US defense system without comparable substitute. Its most common uses were in "alloys in which it imparts qualities such as heat resistance, high strength, wear resistance, and superior magnetism. Major end-products include jet engine parts, permanent magnets, cutting tools, and pigments."²¹ All of these functions were of major importance to the US military. According to a 1984 Marine Corps University analysis, the loss of such a commodity "would have a drastic

¹⁷David. F. Schmitz, *Thank God They're On Our Side: The United States and Right-Wing Dictatorships, 1921-1965* (University of North Carolina Press, 1999), 5.

¹⁸"Cobalt: U.S. Dependence on Outside Supplies," *Economic Intelligence Weekly Review* (15 December, 1978).

¹⁹"Cobalt: Policy Options for a Strategic Mineral," Special Study by the Congressional Budget Office (September, 1982), 5.

²⁰"Zaire's Mineral Importance to the West," Memorandum to Secretary of State for African Affairs Lannon Walker (June, 1980).

²¹*Ibid.*, 1.

impact on the United States."²² Cobalt's availability in only a few friendly states made it imperative to secure Zaire against others hostile to the US.

Besides major interests in Zaire, US interests in Angola were also substantial. The Portuguese had kept Western investors out of Angola until the indigenous liberation movements began their quest for freedom from Portuguese colonization. The Portuguese then invited US and European states to invest in Angola. Angola attracted large amounts of investment because of its great and diverse supply of rare minerals. As a result, the country underwent a boom in development during the last decade before gaining its independence (1965-1975).²³ The discovery of oil in the Angolan region of Cabinda in the mid-1960s intensified interest by Western investors. US oil companies were the most prominent of these investors. When the Portuguese gave independence to Angola in 1975, the US watched as the various factions within Angola fought for control of the country. The Americans hoped that their economic interests in Angola would be secured as they had been under Portuguese rule so that they could continue their exploitation of Angola's raw materials. The eventual triumph of the MPLA through Soviet and Cuban military aid enhanced the fears of US foreign policymakers and US businesses.²⁴

US intervention strategies in Angola and Zaire were based on the possibility of the Soviets undermining US influence and then blocking US access to the mineral commodities it needed for its defense system to operate. These suspicions were confirmed by the little information the Americans had heard from the Soviet side. Major General Lagovskiy's suggestion to cripple the Americans by taking control of Central Africa's mineral commodities was already known, but higher Soviet officials, such as Soviet Party leader Leonid Brezhnev, had also declared the Soviet intention to gain control of "the two great treasure houses on which the West depends: the energy treasure house of the Persian Gulf and the mineral treasure house of Southern and Central Africa."²⁵ US foreign policy, whether based on a legitimate threat or not, deemed it necessary to control both of these key African nations and prevent them from falling into the hands of the Soviets. There was no doubt that the Soviets intended to proceed with such a policy, but it was a question of whether the USSR had the capacity to penetrate the region and proceed to eradicate US influence in Central Africa.²⁶

Zaire: From Belgian Colony to US Proxy

The Congo became independent in 1960. It had been under the control of Belgium for nearly 100 years. The US regarded the newly-independent African nation as a priority in its Cold War agenda. The US was concerned with the inauguration of newly-independent nations due to the possibility that they would be swayed towards communism. The emergence of Patrice Lumumba as prime minister of the Congo and his

²²"U.S. Reliance on Africa for Strategic Minerals" Maj. R.A. Hagerman, USMC, Marine Corps University Command and Staff College (6 April, 1984).

²³David and Marina Ottaway, *Afrocommunism* (NY: Africana Publishing, 1981), 109.

²⁴Wright, *Destruction of a Nation*, 72. Gulf Oil, the most notable of US businesses involved with Angola, was forced to end its operations there due to the demand of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. Kissinger wanted to ensure that the Angolans could not benefit from US business, much to the vexation of Gulf Oil.

²⁵Quoted from "Strategic Material-U.S. Vulnerability" by Major Gilda A. Jackson, USMC, Marine Corps University Command and Staff College (1988).

²⁶Henry Bienen, "U.S. Foreign Policy in a Changing Africa," *Political Science Quarterly* 93:3 (Autumn, 1978), 452.

anti-colonial agenda eventually led the Americans to believe he was a Soviet puppet. According to historian Michael Schatzberg, Lumumba was a nationalist seeking the aid of the world's powers in order to rectify his country's abysmal economic and political situation.²⁷

Lumumba, in hindsight, landed himself in an unfortunate position due to the fact that he looked first to the Americans for aid in removing Belgian troops and settling the Katanga secession, one of the Congo's provinces that had declared itself independent of the Congo. This act, in addition to his anti-imperialist inauguration speech, may have caused Belgium to target him as a menace to the designs of Western powers seeking to keep their monopoly over the rich minerals of the Congo.²⁸ The Katanga region was known to be rich in minerals, the very ones the US defense apparatus deemed of utmost significance. The US embassy in Kinshasa, the capital of the Congo, initially backed the secession of the Katangans.²⁹ The obvious ramifications were that the US, like Belgium, was interested in allowing Katanga to become independent. An independent Katanga would likely serve the interests of Western governments and businesses.

Despite his anti-imperialist stance, Lumumba visited the US and met with Secretary of State Christian Herter who he requested negotiate a settlement which would remove Belgian troops from the Congo. The Americans never responded to his requests and eventually Lumumba resorted to seeking Soviet aid in settling international disputes within his nation.³⁰ This was the beginning of the end for Lumumba. After his requests to the Soviets were only partially answered, the US deemed Lumumba to be a communist, or at the very least, a communist sympathizer. According to Schatzberg, "[w]hen a few Soviet aircraft and trucks appeared in Kinshasa, U.S. diplomats, acting on both the evidence before their eyes and the rigorously Manichean cold war-inspired logic of the times, became convinced that Lumumba had opted for a Soviet alliance."³¹ The simple truth was that Lumumba was facing a severe crisis in his nation and, after repeated refusals by the US to help him, Lumumba was left with only one realistic choice: to secure aid from the USSR. This became the beginning of Lumumba's end. The Eisenhower Administration allowed the CIA to stage a coup: Lumumba was assassinated by men tied to one of his political rivals in January, 1961.³² The Americans already had a plan in place to install General Mobutu Sese Seko as the new leader of the Congo. He was hailed as a bulwark against Soviet aggression in the region and, more importantly for US interests, Mobutu would make sure that Congo's valuable mineral commodities would be safe and available to the US.

Mobutu's reign in the Congo lasted nearly three decades. He changed the name of his country to Zaire, and during that span of time he was everything the Americans hoped he would be. Zaire became staunchly anticommunist under Mobutu's rule. It became apparent that the Americans were not interested in allowing Zaire to become a democracy. The CIA's interventions in favor of Mobutu's coups, its assassination of Lumumba, and the efforts of the US government, Schatzburg wrote, "to solidify the

²⁷Schatzberg, *Mobutu*, 16.

²⁸*Ibid.* 15. CIA Director Allen Dulles deemed Lumumba to be "a person who was a Castro or worse."

²⁹*Ibid.*, 12.

³⁰*Ibid.*, 16.

³¹*Ibid.*, 17.

³²*Ibid.*, 21.

coercive arms of Mobutu's Zairian state subverted rather than supported the implantation and evolution of truly democratic processes.³³ The prevention of democracy through support for an anticommunist dictator in Zaire made the Americans feel secure that their investments in Zaire would be safe and easily accessible. The US had great private investments in Zaire since the creation of the Congo by King Leopold II and its representatives wanted to ensure that Zaire remained stable in order to keep close watch over its mineral commodities.³⁴

US Intervention in Angola's Civil War

Angola was one of the last African countries to be freed from colonial rule. Portugal was finally forced out in 1975 after nearly 250 years of rule. Civil war broke out immediately between the FNLA and the MPLA. Eventually, UNITA would also enter the fray. The civil war would continue throughout 1975 until Soviet military aid and Cuban troops made the MPLA the victor and the dominant force in Angola. The initial US desire was to bring all three factions to the negotiating table and settle their differences, thereby keeping the Soviets out of the political equation. US officials observing the situation in Angola reported that the Angolans would eventually pull away from the Soviets in favor of nationalist goals and objectives. This expectation was somewhat complicated by the fact that no such precedence for Soviet influence in Central Africa had existed prior to the outbreak of civil war in Angola.³⁵

The situation in Angola at the outset of the civil war was a battle for control of Luanda, the capital of Angola. Control of the entire country by just one of the factions was impossible due to each faction having their headquarters and political support from differing regions. The MPLA was initially the weakest of the factions, but their Marxist ideological background served as a means to allow them to court favor with the Angolan people, and eventually with the USSR.³⁶ Cuban logistical and military help had been with the MPLA for years, dating as far back as 1965.³⁷ The combination of heavy Soviet aid and Cuban troops built the MPLA into a small military power and led to its victory in the civil war.

The MPLA was the dominant party by 1977 and, through the help it received from the USSR and Cuba, it reorganized itself into a Marxist-Leninist party.³⁸ The fears of the Americans were great at this point. The potential of a Soviet threat loomed over the

³³*Ibid.*, 102.

³⁴Hochschild, *King Leopold's Ghost*, 243-244. The US was the first nation to recognize Leopold's new colony. US businesses and government officials would be implicated in Leopold's many tyrannical business ventures as well. Leopold's plan was to bring US businesses into league with himself in the Congo in order to "create an American vested interest in the Congo." He needed US support to turn the tide of European anti-colonialism and anti-slavery against his precious colony. Stephen R. Weissman, "CIA Covert Action in Zaire and Angola: Patterns and Consequences," *Political Science Quarterly*, 94: 2 (Summer, 1979), 274.

³⁵Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, William E. Schaufele, Jr. reporting to the House Committee on International Relations (26 January, 1976).

³⁶Wright, *Destruction of a Nation*, 7.

³⁷Piero Gleijeses, *Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2002), 83. Che Guevara was sent to assess the capabilities of the MPLA as a revolutionary organization and the MPLA proved themselves worthy in his eyes. Cuban support was less Marxist oriented and had much more to do with supporting a revolutionary independence movement.

³⁸Donald F Busky, *Communism in History and Theory: Asia, Africa, and the Americas* (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2002), 125.

mineral commodities of Central Africa, as had been feared for over thirty years. This threat was now more apparent than ever. Fortunately for the Americans, the USSR did not translate its Cold War victory in Angola into a political and economic opportunity. Throughout the rule of the MPLA in the late 1970s, the Americans funded UNITA hoping to bring the MPLA to the bargaining table so that the US could save face and limit Soviet influence in Angola. The Soviets only helped the US cause by reducing their influence over Angola which led to the MPLA seeking Western investments in its oil industry.

The economic strategy for the MPLA, following their victory in the civil war, was to nationalize Angola's industries. The Soviets influenced this decision, but MPLA leader Agostinho Neto realized that following Soviet economic policies could not relieve Angola's severe economic problems. According to Oye Ogunbadejo,

In the end, harsh realities forced Neto to open up to the West. By early 1979, the President openly admitted that strict pro-Soviet policies could no longer be maintained in economic relations and policies Neto announced the taking of several steps backwards from the ultimate goal of socialism in order to get the beleaguered economy back on its feet.³⁹

US fears of a Soviet takeover in Angola began to decline, but now the ball was in the Americans' court and Neto and his regime were banking on the US to bolster the Angolan economy. US industries responded with agreements by the Gulf Oil Company and Texaco. These companies became lucrative partners in developing Angola's offshore oil deposits.⁴⁰

The Angolans were not aligned with the West ideologically, but were willing to deal with their foes due to economic constraints. Although hawkish US policymakers in the late 1970s such as Henry Kissinger demanded that the MPLA completely break ties with the Soviets as a condition of negotiations, other US officials viewed the situation in Angola as a matter which was not nearly as serious as some in the White House described it to be. Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Richard M. Moose stated that the Americans only wished for Angola to acknowledge the UNITA forces which would bring about a coalition government in Angola and would cease fighting between the two factions. In addition, Moose stated that previous economic relationships between the Americans and Angolans were positive signs that there could be more trade between the two countries if the MPLA would remove Cuban troops. The Soviets had little to invest in Angola in regards to their offshore oil deposits and the Angolans became aware of this. The Soviets proved to be incapable of improving the Angolan economy. The Americans, still supporting UNITA, became the only option for Neto and his party if they hoped to stabilize Angola's economy. The US may have been left on the outside looking in politically in regards to Angola, but economically its representatives had pushed the USSR out of the picture. Angola's oil was safely in the hands of US oil firms and, though future US presidential administrations would continue the Cold War rhetoric of

³⁹Oye Ogunbadejo, "Angola: Ideology and Pragmatism in Foreign Policy," *International Affairs* 57:2 (Spring, 1981), 259.

⁴⁰Ottaway, *Afrocommunism*, 118.

demanding a friendly regime in Angola, economically the Americans could not ask for much more.

Conclusions

Political scientists have argued that the US never had anything to fear from the Soviets in Central Africa. Zaire's cobalt mines and its other mineral commodities were presumably safe from outside interference and the Soviets were nothing more than opportunistic in their dealings with the MPLA. The possibility of the Soviets seeking to corner the market on strategic and valuable mineral commodities was also off the mark in their opinions.⁴¹ Historical circumstances need to be carefully evaluated before making such assertions. The US was not only suspicious of the Soviets' activities in Central Africa, but received all indications from Moscow that the USSR had made it a priority to inject its influence into the region in order to destabilize the flow of mineral commodities to the West.

The US was ideologically motivated during the Cold War. However, as far as Central Africa was concerned, it was the region's mineral commodities that dictated the directions of its foreign policy. US political interests were molded in Central Africa to ensure the availability of prized mineral commodities so that the US defense system could continue to function at maximum capacity. US economic and political interests were rarely exclusive of one another, and the Congo was no different. Yet, support for Mobutu, and permission to US multinationals to engage in direct relationships with the MPLA, a regime politically influenced by its Cold War rival, demonstrate that the US was more desirous of securing economic advantages than following through on its Cold War ideological objectives—the spread of democracy. The Cold War in Central Africa was dictated by the need of the US defense system to gain access to the region's mineral commodities and the desire of US industrial corporations to do business there. Cobalt and other strategic minerals defined the terms of the Cold War in Central Africa, not ideology.

⁴¹R. Craig Nation, "Soviet Engagement in Africa: Motives, Means, and Prospects," in R. Craig Nation and Mark V. Kauppi, eds., *The Soviet Impact in Africa* (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1984), 43.

Crusade in the Sunshine: Political Immorality in Florida, 1956-1960

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Florida has long remained a paradox harboring various contradictory lifestyles. South Florida is the home to numerous retirees, snowbirds, and Latin American immigrants and refugees, while the northern region of the state, often referred to as the "Other Florida" by South Floridians or the "Real Florida" by its inhabitants, shares more in common with neighboring Georgia and Alabama. The Interstate 4 corridor running from Daytona Beach to Tampa Bay divides the state into these two distinctly different regions. Throughout the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries it became apparent that the diverging politics in these two areas had set the state on a collision course which finally came to a head in the middle of the twentieth century. As South Florida grew, much of North Florida remained stagnant, lagging behind the south in its modernization and more modern ways of thinking. As early as the 1870s the alluring image of a winter playground, promoted around the world in the new age of leisure and travel, would establish one of the state's leading industries, tourism. This was countered, however, by the stoicism and traditionalism of North Florida where defenders of the "Old South" were often suspicious of outsiders and resistant to change.

Florida also differed from its sister states in the South in this past century in that it experienced a population boom like no other state in the nation except possibly California, transforming the peninsula from a backwater, poor, insignificant state which ranked twenty-seventh in population in 1940 (2 million) into the ninth largest state (5.8 million) by 1965.¹ Many of the new Floridians brought with them political beliefs alien to the Deep South and these threatened to undermine the deeply-entrenched system that had been in place since the end of Reconstruction. As the population centers moved southward, North Floridians saw their cherished way of life, in tune with the values of the "Old South", come under attack by a "New Florida." In response to this attack, politicians in North Florida, who had dominated state politics dating back to the antebellum period, rallied behind the "stars and bars" in an attempt to maintain their hammerlock on the state. These politicians would ultimately fill the ranks of the "Pork Chop Gang," a group of conservative state legislators who controlled Florida's government.

One of the first major assaults on the "Old South" values of the "Pork Chop Gang" was the Supreme Court's landmark decision in *Brown v. Board of Education* which in 1954 directly challenged segregated educational systems throughout the country. Florida, like its Southern neighbors, largely resisted this perceived affront to white supremacy. The "Pork Choppers" soon saw the court's decision as a means to rally support to their cause and hopefully maintain their authority over the state. In spite of the fact that the majority of Floridians did not fully accept all aspects of the "Pork

¹Edmund E. Kallina, *Claude Kirk and the Politics of Confrontation* (Gainesville FL: University Presses of Florida, 1993), 7.

Choppers” agenda, many were still not champions of integration. Following the lead of Alabama and other Southern states who had managed to virtually ban the NAACP from legally functioning within their borders, Charley Johns, president of the state senate and leader of the “Pork Chop Gang,” helped to create the Florida Legislative Investigation Committee (FLIC) in 1956. This ushered in a dark era in Florida history which coincides with US Senator Joseph McCarthy’s (R-Wisconsin) anti-communist crusade in Washington. “McCarthyism” in Florida commenced at the end of McCarthy’s national reign of terror and proved to be a methodical and orderly assault on all opponents of the region, whether they be Communists, African-Americans, homosexuals or liberals. The campaign waged against homosexuals differentiated Florida from many of its neighbors in the South as this twist added a so-called “defense of morality” into the equation.

The study of Florida politics is not a new field but most works have focused on specific people (governors, senators, and congressmen) rather than looking at the overarching themes which bound these men together. Biographies of Governors LeRoy Collins by Thomas Wagy, Claude Kirk by Edmund Kallina, as well as Senators Claude Pepper by Ric Kabat and George Smathers by Brian Crispell tend to focus on a narrow scope of topics centering on the lives of these individuals.² Kevin Klein’s study of the “Pork Chop Gang” did not look at the FLIC and how it was used by the “Pork Chop Gang” to halt integration and defend the “Old South” from perceived enemies both within the state and in Washington.³ Notwithstanding, his work is valuable in studying the prevailing attitudes of the “Pork Choppers.” It also looks into the newspaper battles that occurred within the state.

The Florida Legislative Investigation Committee is a relatively new research topic in Florida history. The majority of the files have only recently been released to the public after being kept in legal custody by the Florida State Legislature from the disbanding of the Johns Committee in 1965 to the 1990s. Bonnie Stark’s 1985 work on the Johns Committee was completed without access to these files and relied heavily on newspaper accounts as well as interviews with some of the major players in the ordeal. (Johns declined Stark’s numerous requests for an interview.)⁴ Her study also centered largely on the University of South Florida and the systematic attack on liberalism perceived as infesting the university’s Tampa campus. Stacey Lorraine Braukman’s unpublished dissertation was one of the first to utilize the newly-opened Johns Committee files.⁵ Her study is an invaluable examination into how Johns and his allies used the FLIC and police-state tactics in an attempt to purge Florida’s higher education system of homosexuals, liberals and any others perceived to be exhibiting and practicing “un-American” behavior. Dan Bertwell’s work, “A Veritable Refuge for Practicing Homosexuals,” focuses on the Johns Committee’s investigation into the University of

²Thomas Wagy, *LeRoy Collins: Spokesman of the New South* (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1985); Kallina, *Claude Kirk*; Ric Kabat, “From New Deal to Red Scare: The Political Odyssey of Senator Claude D. Pepper,” (Dissertation, Florida State University, 1995); Brian Crispell. *Testing the Limits: George Armistead Smathers and Cold War America* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1999)

³Kevin N. Klein, “Guarding the Baggage: Florida’s Pork Chop Gang and its defense of the Old South,” (Dissertation, Florida State University, 1995).

⁴Bonnie Stark, “McCarthyism in Florida: Charley Johns and the Florida Legislative Investigative Committee, July 1956 to July 1965” (MA Thesis, University of South Florida, 1985).

⁵Stacy Lorraine Braukman, “Anticommunism and the Politics of Sex and Race in Florida, 1954-1965” (Dissertation, University of North Carolina, 1999).

South Florida and, like the other efforts, fails to connect McCarthyism to the larger century-long attempt by conservatives maintain their power while halting unwanted advances from "outsiders."⁶ This brand of conservatism was created in Florida in order to protect what was believed to be properly "American" and, more importantly, "Old South," values

According to former US Congressman Sam Gibbons, after failing to link the NAACP to a vast communist conspiracy in Florida, "Pork Chop Gang" ringleader and state senator Charley Johns "discovered homosexuals." The Starke, Florida native and rabid segregationist, whom Gibbons also referred to as "the Christopher Columbus of homosexuality," used this supposed un-American behavior to breathe new life into his floundering Florida Legislative Investigation Committee.⁷ The FLIC, aptly called the Johns Committee, outlasted McCarthy on the national level, wreaking havoc until 1965. Operating under the guise of McCarthyism, the FLIC was the attack dog of the conservative and segregationist "Pork Chop Gang" which at the time dominated the Florida State Legislature.

While their ultimate goal was to protect the "Old South" and combat integration, the committee soon focused their attention on easier targets such as the state's university system which they perceived to be too liberal. It was in the attacks on the University of Florida where the FLIC employed ignominious tactics in assaulting homosexuals and others labeled immoral within the student body as well as the faculty. The FLIC demonized homosexuality in order to convince Floridians that an overhaul of the state universities was needed. The offensive against the state's flagship university was billed as a moral crucible aimed at protecting the state against unwanted intrusion by liberal academics and homosexuals. As was the case with all aspects of the Johns Committee, anti-Communism was used to justify the witch hunt.

Johns and the FLIC were more of a threat to liberty than Senator McCarthy because of the tactics employed and the mere fact that they cast their net over a larger segment of the population.⁸ In 1953 Charley Johns aimed to create a special investigating committee within the Florida Legislature to curb gambling, crime and other vices. He proclaimed, "I plan now to introduce and fight for legislation to create a state FBI ... a state investigative force is an absolute must."⁹ Johns was defeated on the floor of the legislature by a 19-17 margin but he viewed the result as a minor setback and continued to pursue the issue.¹⁰ Johns was subsequently trounced by moderate Democrat Leroy Collins in the 1954 Democratic Primary. In spite of Collins' margin of victory of 66,127 votes, Johns was still immensely popular in the more rural northern part of the state. Florida had not succumbed to the "Dixiecrat Revolt" of 1948 when four Southern states (Mississippi, Alabama, South Carolina and Louisiana) with 1,175,930 voters cast their lot for rabid segregationist Strom Thurmond. Florida awarded its eight electoral votes to President Harry Truman, and while Thurmond received a meager 15.5% of the vote, he

⁶Dan Bertwell, "A Veritable Refuge for Practicing Homosexuals: The Johns Committee Persecution of Homosexuals at the University of South Florida," *Selected Annual Proceedings of the Florida Conference of Historians* 13 (2006), 27-36.

⁷Sam Gibbons, interview by Nancy Hewitt, USF Silver Anniversary Oral History Project, 1985, Box 522, University of South Florida Archives, Tampa.

⁸Tallahassee *Democrat*, 11 May, 2003, E1.

⁹*Ibid.*

¹⁰*Ibid.*, 24 May, 1953.

dominated Northern and rural Florida.¹¹ Because of archaic districting dating back to the 1885 constitution, 12% of Florida's population elected a majority of the state's legislators. This gave Johns and his allies in the "Pork Chop Gang" enormous political clout in Tallahassee.¹²

Johns knew that in order to obtain support to continue his endeavors, he would have to play on the fear of the unknown and convince the populace that the committee would "investigate all organizations whose principles include a course of conduct ... which would constitute violence or a violation of the laws of the state."¹³ By framing his labor as a moral fight to save the state from any threat and linking it directly to the greater struggle of the Cold War, Johns made it difficult for anyone to oppose him. The fruitless efforts of the Johns Committee to expose the NAACP as a communist front, and therefore a threat to the stability of Florida convinced Charley Johns to aim his assaults elsewhere. Since the FLIC was forced to biannually justify its existence before the legislature, Johns shifted the focus of the committee to an investigation into the state's higher education system. Initially Johns claimed the FLIC would hunt communists in the system but it quickly became apparent that this was a daunting task likely to produce results similar to the war waged on the NAACP. Johns and the committee focused their full attention on a more pliable, unsuspecting and vulnerable target, the sexual preferences of the students and faculty of Florida's universities. Johns employed former Tallahassee vice squad chief R.J. Strickland to aid in this undertaking. Strickland would become the backbone of the FLIC and pressure and coerce numerous faculty members and students into admissions of guilt and help to purge the universities of what he perceived to be threats to morality.¹⁴

⁴ To complete the transition from investigating the NAACP and their futile attempt to halt the integration of Florida's schools to protecting the morality of the state's institutions of higher learning, the FLIC required additions to its platform. One of these was a list of definitions of the new "enemy," homosexuals. The Johns Committee utilized their newly-created advisory board to produce provisions and definitions of what they perceived to be deviant behavior that was detrimental to their valued way of life. In spite of the fact that the FLIC was an extremist association, they were overly cautious as to the wording of the provisions and solicited an outside group of psychologists and psychiatrists to amend the language of the report. The preliminary phrasing was harsh; the board of doctors felt it went too far and would alienate moderates and hurt the validity of the FLIC. Almost all of their suggestions were taken to heart and a new report was issued with numerous alterations known as "fundamental changes." The group urged the dropping of the term "crime against nature" to be replaced with the phrase "deviant sex conduct" which they adopted from a similar Illinois Code.¹⁵ The second approved proposal was to strike from public record, any mention of "animal-human sex relations" to soften the tone of the report.¹⁶

¹¹<http://uselectionatlas.org/RESULTS/>. Accessed 8 November, 2006.

¹²Tallahassee Democrat, 19 December, 1954.

¹³Journal of the Proceedings of the House of Representatives of the State of Florida, 1956, 937-938.

¹⁴Stark, "McCarthyism in Florida," 89.

¹⁵Proposals of the Group of Psychologists and Psychiatrists to the Florida Legislative Investigation Committee, Florida Legislative Investigation Committee Files, Record Group 000940, Series 1486. Box 3, Florida State Archives, Tallahassee, Florida. (Hereafter, FLIC Files.)

¹⁶*Ibid.*

One of the most important proposals adopted by the FLIC and put to use in later attacks on the University of Florida, the University of South Florida, and Florida State University, was a stipulation that called for mandatory psychiatric examinations of all condemned as so-called sexual deviants. One of the final proposals offered to and accepted by the FLIC called for the utmost secrecy when charges of immoral sexual behavior were brought against members of the academic community.¹⁷ This last qualification confirmed Johns' obsession to continue his campaign without outside interference by anyone who might bring into question the legality of the committee's actions. In this regard, the work of the Johns Committee differed from the battle waged by Senator McCarthy and his allies on the national level in the preceding years. McCarthy brought his struggle into the national spotlight in an attempt to discredit his opponents while Johns kept his actions under a veil of secrecy in order to combat resistance and questions concerning the legality of his labor.

With the particulars matted out, R. J. Strickland set out to conduct an in-depth investigation of sexual behavior at the University of Florida (UF) at the behest of Charley Johns. His son Jerome, a student there, had alerted his father in 1958 to the presence of homosexual teachers at the university.¹⁸ Strickland had spent Summer, 1958 creating a secretive ring of informers among students at the university, many of which were friends or acquaintances of Jerome Johns.¹⁹ According to an article in the UF newspaper in 2000, Strickland also elicited aid from local and state law enforcement agencies who felt an allegiance to the former vice squad chief. Some of the campus police and highway patrol even posed as students to help swell Strickland's ranks of informers.²⁰ Strickland set up a headquarters in the Thomas Hotel in Gainesville and his interrogation suite, room 202, quickly became a symbol of the movement.

Strickland's effort reaped immediate benefits. His paid informants quickly ascertained that the men's restroom at the Alachua County Courthouse was a common meeting place for the city's homosexual population. Strickland acted swiftly by installing secret cameras inside the bathroom. He also planted his informers as part of elaborate stake-outs in an attempt to sully the reputation of the faculty.²¹ Strickland was alerted to what he referred to as the "situation at the courthouse" by several homosexuals he questioned who were delivered to him in room 202 by local law enforcement. One such informer, Bill Tilletson, a member of the UF Police Department, brought an unidentified man to room 202 and proceeded to attempt to entrap the unsuspecting man into soliciting, what Strickland referred to as "homosexual relations." After a couple of minutes, Strickland entered the room and confronted the anonymous man with accusations of homosexuality and indecency. Caught completely off guard, the man relented and admitted to being a homosexual and went further by claiming to have engaged in homosexual activities for the past two years while being a student at UF. He refused to indict any of his former lovers but did state that he was aware of numerous homosexuals among the student body and faculty. The break for Strickland came when the man identified the restroom at the courthouse as being a meeting place for homosexuals and

¹⁷*Ibid.*

¹⁸Stark, "McCarthyism in Florida," 92.

¹⁹*Ibid.*, 91.

²⁰Gainesville, *Independent Alligator*, 2 October, 2000.

²¹Stark, "McCarthyism in Florida," 94.

also identified the late afternoon and early evening as the time when many of these incidents occurred.²²

With this information in hand, Strickland initiated his operations targeted at university faculty. His endeavors were met with immediate successes. A report from Strickland to the FLIC in December, 1958 conveyed the story of an English professor at UF who solicited sex from an undercover officer at the county courthouse. The officer asked the professor to accompany him to the county jail where he proceeded to interrogate him. The professor admitted to being a homosexual and, when threatened with the loss of his job, exclaimed that he had been in the process of "trying to correct his trouble for the past three years" by seeing a psychiatrist in Jacksonville. This was the break for which Strickland and Johns had been waiting. In fear of losing his position, the professor cooperated fully with the investigators and named a colleague in his department, the assistant dean of the College of Arts and Sciences, an instructor of Music, and two professors in the Humanities Department of being homosexuals. The English professor went further, naming a student he knew to be homosexual. The professor promised to aid the investigation in the future in any way possible.²³

Three days after the interrogation, the English professor called the university police department and submitted another list of homosexuals. This new list included a lecturer in the English Department, another professor in the same department, the head professor of Geography, and a Management and Business Law professor. In return for the list of known homosexual faculty members, the professor requested immunity and asked if his admission of homosexuality would jeopardize his standing with the university. The interrogating officer notified him that the case was no longer under his jurisdiction and all future recommendations and decisions would be made by the Gainesville Police Department and ultimately any higher authorities. One can surmise this was an allusion to the FLIC.²⁴ Concluding his report on the incident, Strickland noted that this informer seemed to be a potentially valuable asset to the FLIC and should be kept in his position, at least until his information was no longer deemed as being beneficial to the committee.²⁵

The progress report of the FLIC filed by R.J. Strickland pertaining to Autumn, 1958 commented on the development of a successful informer structure in Gainesville. Strickland remarked that the "questioning of several subjects, mainly students at the University of Florida, has revealed a considerable homosexual operation being in existence."²⁶ The work of the committee was still largely unknown to the community and the state as a whole but, as word began to leak out, several people came forward with their own stories to tell. These charged former colleagues and classmates with being homosexuals. A judge who worked in the Alachua County Courthouse took matters into his own hands. He returned to the building after hours in an attempt to trap a colleague engaging in homosexual relations there. The judge, according to his declaration, entered the courthouse with a flashlight and crept up the stairs until he cornered two men in a

²²Statement of facts gathered by R.J. Strickland in Room 202, Thomas Hotel, August 19, 1958. FLIC Files, Box 16.

²³Ibid., 5 December, 1958.

²⁴Ibid.

²⁵Ibid.

²⁶Progress Report of R.J. Strickland, University of Florida Investigation, September-October 1958. FLIC Files, Box 16.

hallway and was able to identify one of them before they separated and fled the building. The judge immediately contacted Strickland and divulged this information to the investigator.²⁷

This cooperation exceeded Strickland and Johns' expectations and helped them cast a net over the homosexual community in Gainesville and at UF. Since the reasons for Johns' probe into the university were still largely secret, people began to conjecture about the strange occurrences around campus. Reports of students and faculty members being whisked away from their classes by uniformed law enforcement officials reached the press who came to their own conclusions. The *Florida Alligator*, the university's newspaper, surmised that Strickland was in Gainesville to investigate and possibly attempt to halt the entrance of George Stark to UF's law school. Stark, from Orlando, was an African-American and had been admitted despite protests and outcry from many at the university as well as across the state.²⁸ The Gainesville *Sun* determined that Strickland was in the city to examine charges brought against faculty members who were purportedly inciting racial agitation by advocating full integration.²⁹

The Johns Committee's victims remained silent on the issue because, if they agreed to resign and keep quiet, no revelations concerning their private life would be made public. Such revelations would hinder any future job searches made by the individuals. Florida law provided for a public hearing for those in the teaching profession who were charged with being "guilty of immorality," but publicity would besmirch the reputation of the accused, even if their innocence was proven at a later date.³⁰ This placed the professors in a precarious predicament and only a solitary professor stepped forward to challenge Strickland, Johns or the committee. In the late 1950's homosexuality was frowned upon by the majority of the public and many viewed it as a disease or psychological disorder. It was under these conditions that the victims of the Johns Committee had to face their futures and it explains why most remained silent on the issue and accepted their fate.

At the conclusion of Fall Semester, 1958 Strickland furnished President Reitz with a list of professors, students and employees of UF who were deemed to be sexual deviants by the FLIC. The committee reported the termination of the contracts of fifteen professors when they delivered their report to the state legislature in 1959. This number has been disputed by former UF faculty members who place the number between twenty and twenty-five. The professors on Strickland's list were called to meet with President Reitz in alphabetical order after which they quietly resigned.³¹

Whenever the committee was challenged, Johns threatened to take the proceedings public. UF President J. Wayne Reitz (1955-1967) was quick to quiet disconcerted faculty members. He did not want damage done to the university's reputation. Johns held the upper hand and knew that by publicizing inquiries into the morality of the state's most prestigious institution of higher learning, he would tarnish the school's status within the state. Reitz also worried that if they did not act on the findings

²⁷ *Statement of Facts of Conversation between R.J. Strickland and an anonymous Circuit Court Judge, August 12, 1958.* FLIC Files, Box 15.

²⁸ Gainesville, *Florida Alligator*, 31 October, 1958.

²⁹ Gainesville *Sun*, 28 October, 1958.

³⁰ Florida Statutes (1959), chapter 231.28.

³¹ Stark, "McCarthyism in Florida," 99.

and recommendations of the FLIC, the school would be accused of harboring homosexuals. The FLIC was more productive and successful in attacking the university system and, according to the UF newspaper in 2000, "by 1963, the committee's investigations had resulted in more than 39 professors and deans being dismissed from their positions at UF, Florida State University and the University of South Florida ... even more students were expelled or forced to leave."³²

While the Johns Committee would wreak havoc on Florida for almost another decade, UF had weathered the worst of the storm by the end of the decade. The Johns Committee's crusade against the NAACP, homosexuals, and liberals was a mammoth undertaking that affected every aspect of Florida society. Charley Johns and his allies in the "Pork Chop Gang" painted their mission as a moral crusade framed within the larger picture of the Cold War and, therefore, opposition to their operation was viewed as unpatriotic. The tenacity with which they investigated organizations deemed morally corrupt or a societal threat proved that "McCarthyist" conservatives sought to maintain their world view in the face of an ever-changing nation.

³²Gainesville, *The Independent Florida Alligator*, 2 October, 2000.

The People Who Met Ponce de Leon: The Tequesta and their Place in Florida History

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In a 1992 episode of *Seinfeld* Jerry and George discuss their favorite explorers. Jerry says, "That's easy, Ferdinand Magellan, around the world." George replies that he likes Hernando de Soto. Jerry retorts, "de Soto, what did he do?" and George responds that he discovered the Mississippi River. Jerry dismissively says, "Like they wouldn't have found that anyway." Perhaps like de Soto, Juan Ponce de Leon is a lesser-known Spanish explorer, and despite the Fountain of Youth, descriptions of Florida as "Ponce de Leon Land," and a rather quixotic engraving in every fourth-grade Florida history book, we know very little about his 1513 and 1521 exploits in Florida. Ponce de Leon is a Florida icon. In fact, the 2005 Florida legislature created a Discovery of Florida Quincentennial Commemoration Commission. After all, 2013 is just around the corner.

But what about Ponce de Leon's time in Florida? Unfortunately no primary records are known—no ship's log, no personal journal—but there is an account by Spanish historian Antonio de Herrera.¹ A fascinating map, romantically named for Italian Count Ottomano Freducci, shows the outline of the Florida coast and many of the places mentioned in the Herrera history.² But most historians agree that Ponce de Leon was not the first European in Florida. The hostility of the Florida natives suggests that illicit slave raiders from the Caribbean had probably found the peninsula and that there was likely a steady stream of interaction between Florida and her Caribbean neighbors as natives fled their home islands.

So what (and who) did Ponce de Leon discover in Florida? The Herrera account mentions a few natural features and some native villages. This includes the people of southwestern Florida, ultimately known as the Calusa, who mortally wounded Ponce de Leon in 1521. One of the only tribal names mentioned is that of "Chequescha," an Indian town on Biscayne Bay. This makes the Tequesta one of the earliest tribes to appear in the chronicles of North America. Perhaps like de Soto's Mississippi River, they would have been found anyway. While Ponce de Leon does not tell us much about the Tequesta, archaeologists and historians have been cooperating since the 1940s to understand this interesting, unique and enigmatic people.

Origins of the Tequesta

Fossil hunters climbing into a sinkhole cave in southern Miami in 1985 may have found evidence of the earliest ancestors of the Tequesta.³ Many of the deposits in the cave, dubbed the Cutler Fossil Site, were quite old, including bones of animals from the

¹T. Frederick Davis, "Juan Ponce de León's Voyages to Florida," *Florida Historical Quarterly* 14:1 (1935), 15-16.

²David O. True, "The Freducci Map of 1514-1515," *Tequesta* 4 (1944), 50-52.

³Robert S. Carr, "Early Man in South Florida," *Archaeology* 40:6 (1987), 62-63; Steven D. Emslie and Gary S. Morgan, "Taphonomy of a Late Pleistocene Carnivore Den, Dade County, Florida," in David W. Steadman and Jim I. Mead, eds., *Late Quaternary Environments and Deep History: A Tribute to Paul S. Martin* (Hot Springs, SD: The Mammoth Site of Hot Springs, South Dakota, Inc., 1995), 65.

late Pleistocene Rancholabrean fauna, including a possible dire wolf den; a possible hearth; limestone and chert tools; bone artifacts; and human remains. Archaeologists classified the stone points as Paleoindian and Early Archaic, types not previously known from southern Florida.⁴ During the Early Archaic the site locale would have been well above sea level, and the fauna recovered suggest a forested environment surrounded by open, savannah-like grasslands and open marshes and wetlands.⁵ Archaeologists working in the rivers of north Florida have for many years pointed to the early occupation of the state, dating to at least 12,000 years ago as evidenced by Clovis and Folsom stone tools. The Cutler find remains the earliest evidence of humans in southern Florida at a time when now extinct animals may have still roamed open grasslands and sought out karstic sinkholes for water.

Archaeological sites dating from the Middle to Late Archaic (from 5,000 to 2,500 years ago) are better known. Archaeological surveys in Miami-Dade and Broward counties have identified at least 11 radiocarbon dated sites from this era, located within the Everglades and on the Atlantic Coastal Ridge.⁶ This time period in Florida and neighboring states is usually associated with very early pottery, thick, bag-shaped, and tempered with Spanish moss, as well as massive coastal shell mounds. Both are largely absent from the Everglades area. To explain this archaeological propose that there are two, distinct Archaic traditions in southeastern Florida.⁷ In this model the fiber-tempered pottery tradition is largely a coastal phenomenon associated with shell mound building, while the aceramic Archaic or Glades Archaic is a more widespread tradition, perhaps giving rise to the distinctive regional culture of the Tequesta and their ancestors.⁸ One implication is that the Glades Archaic may have evolved in place.

The Tequesta and the Everglades

Perhaps one of the most distinctive characteristics of the Tequesta is their association with the Everglades. Marjory Stoneman Douglas, long-time champion of the Everglades, acknowledges their unique culture, but perhaps did not recognize the close association between the Tequesta and the river of grass.⁹ Considerable attention has recently been focused on restoration of the Everglades ecosystem, a unique hydrological system found in large portions of Palm Beach, Broward and Miami-Dade counties.

⁴Carr, "Early Man," 63.

⁵Emslie and Morgan, "Taphonomy," 81.

⁶Robert S. Carr, *Dade County Historic Survey, Final Report: The Archaeological Survey* (Miami: Metropolitan Dade County Office of Community and Economic Development, 1981), 20; Robert S. Carr, "The Archaeology of Everglades Tree Islands," in Fred H. Sklar and Arnold Van der Valk, eds., *Tree Islands of the Everglades* (Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002), 201; Robert S. Carr, Amy Felmsley, Richard Ferrer, Willard S. Steele, and Jorge Zamanillo, *An Archaeological Survey of Broward County: Phase I* (Miami: Archaeological and Historical Conservancy, 1991), 11-12; Marilyn A. Masson, Robert S. Carr, and Debra S. Goldman, "The Taylor's Head Site (8BD74): Sampling a Prehistoric Midden on an Everglades Tree Island," *The Florida Anthropologist* 41:3 (1988), 339; Bert Mowers and Wilma B. Williams, "The Peace Camp Site, Broward County, Florida," *The Florida Anthropologist* 25:1 (1972), 18-19; and Christine L. Newman, "The Cheetum Site: An Archaic Burial Site in Dade County, Florida," *The Florida Anthropologist* 46:1 (1993), 40-41.

⁷James P. Pepe and Linda Jester, *An Archaeological Survey and Assessment of the Mt. Elizabeth Site 9MT30, Martin County, Florida* (Miami: Archaeological and Historical Conservancy, 1995), 19.

⁸Michael Russo and Gregory Heide, "The Joseph Reed Shell Ring," *The Florida Anthropologist* 55:2 (2002); Wheeler, Kennedy, and Pepe, "Archaeology of Coastal Palm Beach," 143-144.

⁹Marjory Stoneman Douglas, *The Everglades, River of Grass*, rev. ed. (Miami: Banyan Books, 1978), 68.

Today, the coastal portions of these counties are dominated by the urban and suburban development of West Palm Beach, Fort Lauderdale and Miami—making it difficult to visualize the estuarine lagoons; narrow, sandy beaches; and streams draining the Everglades marsh that were home to the Tequesta. Development has pushed westward from the coast, and now the remnants of the Everglades are preserved in water conservation areas, the Loxahatchee National Wildlife Refuge and Everglades National Park. Unfortunately, recent historical and environmental perspectives on the Everglades have ignored the role of the Tequesta in shaping this ecosystem.¹⁰ Some 5,000 years ago, when the Everglades and Lake Okeechobee were in their infancy, the ancestors of the Tequesta were there. In fact, archaeological investigation of Everglades tree islands indicates that the Tequesta may have contributed to the formation of these islands.¹¹ Unfortunately, the massive effort designed to restore the Everglades may threaten these tree island sites with flooding or destruction during creation of water control structures.

The sites of the Everglades are significant since they constitute, as described by archaeologist John Griffin, “a largely intact settlement pattern over a large land area.”¹² They are understood in terms of a hierarchical model of habitation sites that translates into larger villages, smaller hamlets and family camps, and special use sites or resource procurement stations.¹³ But Everglades National Park includes only a small part of the area inhabited by the Tequesta and their ancestors. Several large middens occur on the coast of Broward and Miami-Dade counties, and in some cases there are groups of these sites along with sand mounds and other site types. These site complexes are usually found around the mouths of small creeks and streams that drain the Everglades interior or on the barrier island. Sites also are clustered around creeks where they breach the Atlantic Coastal Ridge and within the interior Everglades, especially on tree islands of the southern Everglades. Interior sites typically are associated with natural drainages and also, perhaps, canoe trails. All of these sites can be used to model and test ideas about trends in plant and animal use, contact between the interior and the coast, mortuary patterns, and trends in technology.

Tequesta Art and Aesthetics

But what of the intellectual and aesthetic lives of these people? Evidence for Tequesta decorative arts has been limited, especially when compared with neighboring areas. The Key Marco site on Florida’s southwestern Gulf Coast produced carved and painted wooden masks, figureheads, and other utilitarian and ceremonial objects.¹⁴ The Fort Center site, located on the western side of Lake Okeechobee had carved wooden bird and animal effigies in a mortuary context.¹⁵ Other neighboring tribal groups participated

¹⁰David, McCally, *The Everglades: An Environmental History* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1999).

¹¹Carr, “Archaeology of Everglades Tree Islands,” 200.

¹²John W. Griffin, *The Archeology of Everglades National Park: A Synthesis* (Tallahassee: National Park Service, Southeast Archeology Center, 1988), 327.

¹³John W. Griffin, *Archeology of the Everglades*, Jerald T. Milanich and James J. Miller, eds. (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2002), 278.

¹⁴Frank H. Cushing, Preliminary Report of the Explorations of Ancient Key Dwellers’ Remains on the Gulf Coast of Florida, *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society* 35:153 (1897); Marion S. Gilliland, *The Material Culture of Key Marco, Florida* (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1975).

¹⁵Alice Gates Schwelm, “The Carved Wood Effigies of Fort Center: A Glimpse of South Florida’s Prehistoric Art” (MA Thesis, University of Florida, Gainesville, 1983); William H. Sears, *Fort Center: An Archaeological*

in traditions of decorated ceramics, like Safety Harbor and Weeden Island, which are more typically associated with decorative arts in the southeastern US. Glades pottery, however, remained relatively simple in form, with a series of simple geometric incised designs. An art history approach to Florida archaeology discovered several well-developed traditions of decorated bone work, several of which appear to have origins with the Tequesta and their ancestors.¹⁶

Around 2,500 years ago a distinctive carving style emerges that is a departure from the earlier geometric traditions. This is when small, in-the-round and bas-relief carvings of animals are made, usually ornamenting bone pins and pendants. This tradition of carving is well-developed by A.D. 1000, and the list of animals represented includes deer, opossum, duck, hawk or eagle, eel-like fish, rattlesnake, turtle, and shark. The shark, for example, is typically only depicted by very realistic, miniature versions of spinal column segments surmounting a bone pin. The carvings are very sensitive, naturalistic miniature portrayals. The tradition broadens to include neighboring areas, where bone animal carvings appear in later periods. The small, personal nature of the carvings is quite unlike the larger wooden carvings from Key Marco and Fort Center, but this pervasive animal imagery may be linked to clan totems or broader beliefs regarding "animal owner" spirits, shamanistic beliefs and ancestor worship.¹⁷

At least two other decorated bone traditions seem to have their origins with the Tequesta and their ancestors.¹⁸ All of these are later traditions, primarily associated with the post A.D. 1000 era. The first of these is widespread throughout much of Florida and involves rectilinear and curvilinear forms that have origins in mat, textile, and featherwork patterns. The earliest examples of these forms are found in southeastern Florida around A.D. 1100, other occurrences are all associated with the European Contact Period. This suggests the Tequesta innovation of these designs had considerable influence on bone carvers in neighboring areas. Elsewhere in the Americas mat and featherwork designs are often associated with elite status individuals.¹⁹

One final group of decorated antler artifacts from the Margate-Blount site is difficult to classify. Interviews with the excavators indicate that these objects were recovered from a "ceremonial precinct" associated with a village midden, burial mound and cemetery.²⁰ This ceremonial precinct included intentional burials of an alligator, decapitated and coiled rattlesnakes, turtles, raccoons and other animals. The carved and engraved antlers depict a very stylized vulture and a rattlesnake that may be related to

Site in the Lake Okeechobee Basin (Gainesville: University Presses of Florida, 1982).

¹⁶Ryan J. Wheeler, "Time, Space and Aesthetics: Decorated Bone Artifacts from Florida" (MA Thesis, University of Florida, Gainesville, 1992); Ryan J. Wheeler, "Early Florida Decorated Bone Artifacts: Style and Aesthetics from Paleo-Indian through Archaic," *The Florida Anthropologist* 47:1 (1994), 49, 57; Ryan J. Wheeler and Wesley F. Coleman, "Ornamental Bone Carving of Southern Florida: Some Late Styles and their Associations," *The Florida Anthropologist* 49:2 (1996), 50-58.

¹⁷Ryan J. Wheeler, *Ancient Art of the Florida Peninsula: 500 B.C. to A.D. 1763* (Dissertation, University of Florida, Gainesville, 1996), 371-372.

¹⁸Wheeler and Coleman, "Ornamental Bone Carving."

¹⁹James H. Howard, *Shawnee!: The Ceremonialism of a Native Indian Tribe and Its Cultural Background* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1981); James H. Howard, *Oklahoma Seminoles: Medicines, Magic and Religion* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1984); Francis Robicsek, *A Study in Maya Art and History: The Mat Symbol* (NY: Museum of the American Indian, 1975).

²⁰Amy Felmley, "Prehistoric Mortuary Practices in the Everglades Cultural Area, Florida" (MA Thesis, Florida Atlantic University, Boca Raton, 1991), 101-102; Wheeler, "Time, Space and Aesthetics," 89-90.

stylized imagery found on shell disks from very late contexts elsewhere in the southeastern US.²¹ Besides the fascinating animal burials of Margate-Blount, the antler carvings suggest the Tequesta had gained some knowledge of artistic systems working in other parts of the Southeast, and had reinterpreted interesting designs in a local media and manner.

Earthworks and Canoe Canals

The aesthetic lives of the Tequesta were not confined to carving small, personal items of bone. But, unlike their Maya neighbors to the south, the Tequesta had no suitable stone for construction of monuments. Despite this, the Tequesta and their ancestors built an array of earthen architecture, including circular ditches; long-distance canoe canals; mounds and mound complexes; and linear earthworks.²²

Archaeologists have noted a general trend, with dirt and sand mound construction increasing considerably after A.D. 1000, though these features are much less frequent than in neighboring areas, like the Florida Keys and Ten Thousand Islands.²³ Mounds are typically interpreted as burial monuments, in some cases housing the final remains of hundreds of people. Flat-topped temple mounds are extremely rare in the area, represented at only two sites.

Early twentieth-century anthropologist Mark Harrington described a site at the forks of the New River in present-day Fort Lauderdale's Sailboat Bend neighborhood that included a shell mound and at least 6 sand mounds, the largest of which was 8 ft high and 50 ft in diameter.²⁴ Extending from this large mound were "low embankments." Sites with similar earthworks are more common in the area around Lake Okeechobee, but continue to puzzle archaeologists. Are the earthworks formal pathways, reflections of cosmological organization, or water control structures? We just do not know.

Long-distance canoe canals also are known within the territory of the Tequesta and their ancestors.²⁵ Two of these canals are located at Cape Sable in Everglades National Park. The 3.9 mile-long Mud Lake Canal passes near the Bear Lake mound group, and connects Mud Lake and the waters of Whitewater Bay with Florida Bay. Botanist John Kunkel Small remarked that the canal essentially made Cape Sable an island, allowing an Indian canoeist to avoid a long trip around the treacherous waters of the cape.²⁶ The channel is 29 feet in width and 1 to 2 feet in depth, bounded on either side by sandy spoil banks. The Snake Bight Canal nearby may be an earlier construction that was destroyed by a hurricane, subsequently replaced by the Mud Lake Canal. Both

²¹Jeffrey P. Brain and Philip Phillips, *Shell Gorgets: Styles of the Late Prehistoric and Protohistoric Southeast* (Cambridge, MA: Peabody Museum Press, 1996); Jon D. Muller, *An Experimental Theory of Stylistic Analysis* (Dissertation, Harvard University, 1966).

²²William G. Johnson, "A Belle Glade Earthwork Typology and Chronology," *The Florida Anthropologist* 49:4 (1996), 253.

²³Felmley, "Prehistoric Mortuary Practices."

²⁴M. R. Harrington, "Archeology of the Everglades Region, Florida," *American Anthropologist* n.s. 11:1 (1909); see also A.P. Knowlton map in Robert S. Carr, Jorge Zamanillo, and Willard S. Steele, *An Archaeological Survey of Southeast Broward County, Florida: Phase 3* (Miami: Archaeological and Historical Conservancy, 1995), 24-25, 38-39.

²⁵Ryan J. Wheeler, "Aboriginal Canoe Canals of Cape Sable," *The Florida Anthropologist* 51:1 (1998), 15-16.

²⁶John K. Small, "The Land Where Spring Meets Autumn," *Journal of the New York Botanical Garden* 25 (1924), 82-83.

features served to control canoe traffic at a critical point, where travelers from the Florida Keys, Gulf Coast and Everglades regions would have ventured. These canal features, known at a few other Florida locales, are extremely significant, since they represent the only examples in North America of a long-distance canoe canal as well as the culmination of 5,000 to 6,000 years of adaptation to Florida's aquatic landscape.

The presence of the circle-ditch, linear embankment, and canoe canal sites in the region of the Tequesta and their ancestors is significant. Some researchers suggest all these earthworks are ceremonial, but recognize the considerable leadership effort involved in planning and organizing the labor to build the features. They further see the earthworks and canals as evidence for the development of cultural complexity.²⁷ Archaeologist George Luer points out that the canoe canals represent a significant investment of labor, and likely were important for regional and interregional exchange.²⁸ The canals were placed at strategic locations where other travel routes, like overland trails, natural water bodies, or canoe trails, came together, giving some communities control of certain travel corridors. Luer suggests that regional centers developed after A.D. 1000 (at least along the Gulf Coast), replacing earlier, and more numerous independent polities; he hypothesizes that the development of canals is related to increasing reliance on interregional exchange that occurred as the regional centers emerged.²⁹

The Miami Circle

For many years archaeologists and historians pointed to extensive archaeological deposits at the mouth of the Miami River as the site of the principal village of the Tequesta in the sixteenth century and perhaps for millennia before then. State archaeologists investigated the so-called Granada site on the north bank of the river in 1978 and confirmed the hypothesis when they found Spanish pottery and glass beads among thousands of potsherds, bones and shells.³⁰ Modern high-rises grew up quickly and gave us the familiar skyline of *Miami Vice*. Twenty years later another discovery was made during archaeological salvage excavations on the south side of the river. Excavators discovered a circular pattern of holes and basins carved into the shallow Miami Oolite limestone formation—the 38 ft diameter feature was dubbed “the Miami Circle” and quickly made its way into the press.³¹ A heated public debate about the fate of the Miami Circle, slated for destruction by a downtown redevelopment project, led to an eminent domain lawsuit, as well as additional research.³²

²⁷John M. Goggin and William C. Sturtevant, “The Calusa, A Stratified, Non-Agricultural Society (with Notes on Sibling Marriage)” in Ward H. Godenough, ed., *Explorations in Cultural Anthropology: Essays in Honor of George Peter Murdock* (NY: McGraw-Hill, 1964), 194-197, 207-208.

²⁸George M. Luer, “Calusa Canals in Southwestern Florida: Routes of Tribute and Exchange,” *The Florida Anthropologist* 42:3 (1989), 113.

²⁹*Ibid.*, 124-125.

³⁰John W. Griffin, ed., *Excavations at the Granada Site: Archaeology and History of the Granada Site*, Vol. 1, (Tallahassee: Division of Archives, History and Records Management, 1982).

³¹Robert S. Carr and John Ricasak, “Preliminary Report on Salvage Archaeological Investigations of the Brickell Point Site (8DA12), Including the Miami Circle,” *The Florida Anthropologist* 53:4 (2000), 260-261.

³²Pamela Levinson, “Will the Circle be Unbroken? The Miami Circle Discovery and Its Significance for Urban Evolution and Protection of Indigenous Culture,” *St. Thomas Law Review* 13:1 (2000), 286-287.

Countering “New Age” and pseudoscience claims about connections with druids, Maya and Olmec Indians of Central America, as well as criticism from legitimate researchers, scientists from the county, state and non-profit arenas documented archaeological deposits and geological formations that demonstrated the antiquity of the site. Artifacts found during excavations are typical of the Miami area, including sand-tempered ceramics and some early decorated Glades series sherds, as well as bone and shell implements.³³ Exotic items, like basaltic stone celts, galena, pumice, and chipped stone artifacts point to regional and long-distance exchange. Radiocarbon dates suggest the Miami Circle was carved sometime around 2,000 years ago. The later burial of a complete shark, as well as features that included a dolphin cranium and a sea turtle shell, hint that the area may have continued to have some significance.

Research suggests that the Miami Circle represents the “footprint” of a prehistoric structure, and further analysis of the site and associated cultural materials should help broaden our understanding of Tequesta architecture, long-distance exchange networks, and patterns of animal interment. For example, studies of chipped stone and pumice artifacts from the Miami Circle and other sites in southern Florida indicate that the Tequesta and their ancestors participated in a form of redistribution exchange where residents of different sites controlled particular resources.³⁴ Exchange through redistribution points to a more complex economic system, beyond a simple down-the-line network. A cooperative effort between the State of Florida, Miami-Dade County, and many other public and private organizations and individuals led to the state’s acquisition of the Miami Circle in 1999.

Life and Death in the Village Tequesta

Perhaps one of the most amazing recent archaeological discoveries in southeastern Florida is an extensive cemetery in downtown Miami, likely that of the Tequesta and their ancestors. Excavations, recently completed, were undertaken to make way for one of the many current Miami high-rise projects—sure to at least change the skyline featured during the opening credits of *CSI Miami*. Archaeologists working at the future site of the 80-story Met 3 tower found the remains of hundreds of individuals buried in several distinct ways.³⁵ They speculate that the oldest burials, probably made shortly after death, were clustered in a deep sinkhole. Over 100 secondary burials may represent a cemetery of 1,000 years ago. Secondary burials reflect a mortuary tradition in which bodies are stored temporarily, perhaps for months or years, before being interred in mounds or cemeteries. At least eight extensive ossuaries, essentially massive piles of bone, were found in karstic channels in the soft limestone bedrock. Excavators speculated that the ossuaries may reflect the final stages of burials made in the Tequesta cemetery, perhaps just before or after the arrival of Europeans. Interestingly, previous research

³³For additional information on excavation and analysis of the Miami Circle see special issues of *The Florida Anthropologist* 53:4 (2000) and 57:1-2 (2004).

³⁴Robert J. Austin, “Chipped Stone Artifacts from the Miami Circle Excavations at Brickell Point,” *The Florida Anthropologist* 57:1-2 (2004); Stephen A. Kish, “Geochemical and Petrologic Characterization of Pumice Artifacts from the Miami Circle at Brickell Point (8DA12)—Relationship to other Pumice Artifacts in Florida and Potential,” (Unpublished Report, Department of Geosciences, Florida State University, Tallahassee, 2004).

³⁵This account is based on personal communication with Matt Matternes, field director of this excavation, New South Associates, Inc., Atlanta.

suggested that such formal cemeteries were a reflection of structured lineages with ties to land and resources, and that increasing variation in mode of burial is likely related to increasing sociopolitical complexity.³⁶ Physical anthropologists will make detailed inventories of the remains recovered, documenting clues about health, disease, injuries, as well as general trends of age and sex represented; at the same time archaeologists will analyze artifacts and compile the results of their work. In the end, the human remains and associated grave goods will be reburied nearby.

The best description of one of these cemeteries comes from Jesuit Father Joseph Javier Alaña's account of the 1743 mission attempt made near the mouth of the Miami River.³⁷ The mission, called Santa Maria de Loreto, was made at an Indian village that included remnants of Keys, Calusa, and Boca Raton tribal groups. Alaña describes two "idols" held by the Indians, the principal one, "a board sheathed in deerskin with its poorly formed image of a fish that looks like the barracuda, and the other a figure like tongues." The other idol is described as the god of the cemetery, "a head of a bird, sculpted in pine," which the missionaries destroyed along with a temple building.³⁸ Alaña noted child sacrifice was practiced upon the death of the cacique or other leading men, and that the names of the dead were taboo. The guarded cemetery was situated somewhat distant from the village and visited at frequent pilgrimages—offerings of food, tobacco, reed mats and other gifts were placed daily on graves to appease the dead.³⁹

Persistence and Decline after Ponce de Leon

Notwithstanding Ponce de Leon's early encounters with the Tequesta and Calusa, intensive contact did not begin until 1567 when Pedro Menéndez de Avilés founded a mission at Tequesta. The 1567 mission there was part of a broader plan formulated by Menéndez de Avilés to establish a permanent Spanish presence in Florida.⁴⁰ Missionary and military outposts were established at four villages in southern Florida. The Tequesta mission was short-lived and abandoned after hostility broke out between the Indians and the Spanish soldiers garrisoned there. The documents generated during these extended periods of contact between Spaniard and Indian provides insights into the daily lives, beliefs, economy, and sociopolitical organization of these southern Florida natives. While the Calusa are perhaps best represented in these accounts, the Tequesta figured prominently in the Spanish plans for Florida.

Accounts of the Tequesta become infrequent after the flurry of contact with the Spanish in 1566-1570. Historical records include a number of cases where the Tequesta killed shipwreck victims, and others where the Spanish authorities in St. Augustine were

³⁶Felmley, "Prehistoric Mortuary Practices," 74-75, 85.

³⁷The Alaña account is presented in translation in John H. Hann, *Missions to the Calusa*. (Gainesville: University Presses of Florida, 1991), 418-431.

³⁸*Ibid.*, 422.

³⁹*Ibid.*, 149; R. Wayne Childers, "Historical Notes and Documents: Life in Miami and the Keys: Two Reports and a Map from the Monaco-Alaña Mission, 1743," *The Florida Historical Quarterly* 82:1 (2003), 77.

⁴⁰Historians John Hann and Arva Moore Parks have used ethnohistoric accounts to provide good ethnographic reconstructions of the Tequesta and their neighbors. See John H. Hann, *Indians of Central and South Florida, 1513-1763* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2003); and Arva Moore Parks, *Where the River Found the Bay: Historical Study of the Granada Site, Miami, Florida: Archaeology and History of the Granada Site II* (Tallahassee: Florida Division of Archives, History and Records Management, 1982).

able to ransom these unfortunate captives.⁴¹ Interestingly, the name "Tequesta" seems to fall into disuse in Spanish documents after 1600. Around this time there are a number of documents and at least one map that refer to the natives of the "Bocas of Miguel Mora," which apparently was a reference to the group occupying the Biscayne Bay region.⁴² These documents are related to Spanish Governor Ybarra's attempts to curry favor with the natives of southern Florida in order to assure the safety of shipwreck victims.

Bishop Díaz Vara Calderón describes the area in 1675 and indicates that the people of southern Florida are "13 tribes of savage heathen Carib Indians, in camps, having no fixed abodes, living only on fish and roots of trees."⁴³ Following the collapse of the Spanish missions in north Florida, increasing attacks and slave raids by Uchise and Yamasee Indians led a large group of native Floridians to petition for evacuation to Cuba.⁴⁴ 270 Indians, including the leaders of Carlos, Jove, Maimi, Concha, Muspa, and Rioseco, moved to Cuba in 1711, though many died there of disease and the remainder returned to Florida. When the Spanish reestablish a mission in 1743 the site appears to be within the territory of the Tequesta.⁴⁵ The accounts of this late mission attempt are fascinating, since they demonstrate considerable historical continuity with the archaeological record and earlier accounts of the sixteenth century.

Review of the European and Indian interaction in southern Florida reveal several important trends and patterns. Unlike northern Florida, where most natives became incorporated into the mission system, missions likely had little long-term impact on the Tequesta and their neighbors. Also, the decline in use of the term "Tequesta" following the close of the sixteenth century is mirrored in the area immediately to the north, and may reflect actual changes in local tribal and village organization.⁴⁶ Perhaps the influx of materials recovered from shipwrecks, which were prevalent in the area, may have been responsible for altering traditional relationships between villages, allowing some to assume more prominent roles in the local exchange systems. Despite some apparent changes in sociopolitical organization, the ethnohistoric record indicates patterns of considerable conservatism among the Tequesta and their neighbors.⁴⁷ Similar patterns were detected in studies of artistic traditions in southern Florida, where native artists quickly incorporated and reinterpreted new mediums and designs in traditional ways.⁴⁸

Despite the strong adherence to traditional ways and the ability to incorporate new ideas, materials, and motifs, the Tequesta and their neighbors were doomed by the collapse of the Spanish mission system in northern Florida early in the eighteenth century. Several writers mention the impact of slave raiding by the English and their

⁴¹Hann, *Indians*, 162-163.

⁴²Eugene Lyon, "More Light on the Indians of the Ays Coast," (Typescript, P.K. Yonge Library of Florida History, University of Florida, Gainesville, 1967), 2b; Ron L. Seckinger, "Observations on the Origin and Date of a Seventeenth Century Florida Map," *Florida Historical Quarterly* 43:4 (1965), 386-387; William C. Swanton, *Early History of the Creek Indians and Their Neighbors* (Washington, DC: Bureau of American Ethnology, 1922), 342-343.

⁴³Lucy L. Wenhold, "A 17th Century Letter of Gabriel Diaz Vara Calderón, Bishop of Cuba, Describing the Indians and Missions of Florida," *Smithsonian Miscellaneous Collections* 95:16 (1932), 11-12.

⁴⁴Parks, *Where the River found the Bay*, 52-53.

⁴⁵Hann, *Missions*, 420.

⁴⁶Compare Hann, *Indians*, 162-163 and Ryan J. Wheeler and James Pepe, "The Jobé and Jeaga of the Palm Beach County Area," *The Florida Anthropologist* 55:3-4 (2002), 237-238.

⁴⁷Hann, *Indians*, 175-177.

⁴⁸Wheeler, *Ancient Art*, 364-366.

Indian allies on the populations of the Florida peninsula.⁴⁹ Many of the Florida natives taken as slaves were kept in the Carolinas, while others may have been exported to British colonies in Barbados or New England.⁵⁰ Writers like Bernard Romans document the departure of the last remnants of the southern Florida natives, noting that 80 families of the "Caloosa nation" left for Cuba with their Spanish allies.⁵¹

Despite the accounts that indicate an end to the native traditions of southern Florida, it seems likely that some descendants of the Tequesta and their neighbors persisted in southern Florida after 1763. For example, anthropologist John Swanton felt that mentions of "Spanish Indians" during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries were likely remnants of the Calusa who remained in Florida.⁵² Despite the apparent resolution of the identity of the "Spanish Indians," several sources indicate that the eighteenth-century Seminole were aware of the Florida natives who preceded them.⁵³ In the 1770s William Bartram interviewed an older Seminole leader who recalled the "Calos ulges" of the Caloosahatchee River area, noting that they were a remnant of the original denizens of the area.⁵⁴ Musicologist Frances Densmore's study of Seminole music identifies several songs that the former group attributes to the Calusa.⁵⁵

So, are there modern-day descendants of the Tequesta? Archaeologists and historians are not sure, but in 2000 a group emerged called the Tekesta Taino Tribal Band of Bimini, Florida. This is a modern group who believes they can trace their ancestry to the Tequesta of southern Florida and the Taino of the Caribbean. The Tekesta Taino have contacted archaeologists and historians and expressed an interest in visiting archives in Cuba to research baptismal and other records that might support their claim. While the modern persistence of Tequesta cultural patterns is dubious, it is clear that the people who met Ponce de Leon in 1513 were a complex, powerful and enigmatic tribe. Perhaps the greatest irony is that modern development is providing an opportunity for scientific study of the Tequesta while at the same time seeing the destruction of their sites and monuments.

⁴⁹For example, see Thomas Nairne's account in Alexander Moore, *Nairne's Muskogean Journals: The 1708 Expedition to the Mississippi River* (Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 1988), 75; and the Herman Moll map of 1720, which includes a narrative of such a raid, in Wheeler and Pepe, "The Jobé and Jeaga," 223.

⁵⁰John H. Hann, *Apalachee: The Land between the Rivers* (Gainesville: University Presses of Florida, 1988), 301-304.

⁵¹Romans, *Concise Natural History*, 194.

⁵²Swanton, *Early History of the Creeks*, 344.

⁵³See Wilfred T. Neill, "The Identity of Florida's "Spanish Indians," *The Florida Anthropologist* 8:2 (1955); William C. Sturtevant, "Chakaika and the "Spanish Indians:" Documentary Sources compared with Seminole Tradition," *Tequesta* 13 (1953) for more on the resolution of this issue.

⁵⁴Gregory A. Waselkov and Kathryn E. Holland Braund, eds., *William Bartram on the Southeastern Indians* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1995), 255-256.

⁵⁵Frances Densmore, *Seminole Music* (Bulletin 161, Bureau of American Ethnology, Smithsonian Institution, Washington, D.C., 1956), 59-60, 90-91, 211.